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
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
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
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
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1. The first part of the paper is devoted to a general discussion of the problem of the existence of a solution of the system of equations

$$\frac{dx}{dt} = A(x)u, \quad \frac{dy}{dt} = B(y)v, \quad (1)$$

where  $A(x)$  and  $B(y)$  are matrices depending on  $x$  and  $y$  respectively, and  $u$  and  $v$  are vectors depending on  $x$  and  $y$  respectively.

2. In the second part of the paper we consider the case when the matrices  $A(x)$  and  $B(y)$  are constant matrices.

3. In the third part of the paper we consider the case when the matrices  $A(x)$  and  $B(y)$  are functions of  $x$  and  $y$  respectively.

4. In the fourth part of the paper we consider the case when the matrices  $A(x)$  and  $B(y)$  are functions of  $x$  and  $y$  respectively.

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13. In the thirteenth part of the paper we consider the case when the matrices  $A(x)$  and  $B(y)$  are functions of  $x$  and  $y$  respectively.



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THE  
DIVINE LEGATION  
OF  
MOSES  
DEMONSTRATED.  
IN NINE BOOKS.

The FIFTH EDITION, Corrected and Enlarged.

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BY  
WILLIAM, Lord Bishop of GLOUCESTER.

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VOL. II.

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# C O N T E N T S

O F T H E

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Continuation of Book II.

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THE  
DIVINE LEGATION  
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DEMONSTRATED.

BOOK II.

SECT. V.

**H**ITHERTO we have shewn the Magistrate's care in PROPAGATING the belief of a God,—of his Providence over human affairs,—and of the way in which that Providence is chiefly dispensed; namely, by rewards and punishments in a *future state*. These things make the essence of Religion, and compose the body of it.

His next care was for the SUPPORT of Religion, so propagated. And this was done by UNITING it to the State, taking it under the civil protection, and giving it the rights and privileges of an ESTABLISHMENT. Accordingly we find that all states and people, in the ancient world, had an ESTABLISHED RELIGION; which was under the more *immediate*



protection of the civil Magistrate, in contradistinction to those which were only TOLERATED.

How close these two Interests were united in the egyptian Policy, is well known to all acquainted with Antiquity. Nor were the politest Republics less solicitous for the common interests of the two Societies, than that sage and powerful Monarchy, (the nurse of arts and virtue) as we shall see hereafter, in the conduct both of Rome and Athens, for the support and preservation of the *established* worship.

But an *established religion* is the voice of Nature; and not confined to certain ages, people, or religions. That great voyager and sensible observer of men and manners, J. Baptiste Tavernier, speaking of the kingdom of Tunquin, thus delivers himself concerning this universal policy, as he saw it practised, in his time, both in the East and West: "I come now to the political description of this kingdom, under which I comprehend the religion, which is, *almost every where, in concert with the civil government, for the mutual support of one another*."

That the Magistrate *established* Religion, united it to the State, and took it into his immediate protection for the sake of civil Society, cannot be questioned; the advantages to Government being so apparent.

But the necessity of this union for procuring those advantages, as likewise the number and extent of them, are not so easily understood. Nor indeed can they be understood without a perfect knowledge of the nature of an ESTABLISHED RE-

"Je viens à la description politique de ce royaume, dans laquelle je comprends la religion, qui est presque en tous lieux de concert avec le gouvernement civil pour l'appuy reciproque de l'un et de l'autre. Relation nouvelle du Royaume de Tunquin, c. x. à la fin.

LIGION,

LIGION, and of those principles of equity, on which it ariseth. But as this master-piece of human policy hath been of late, though but of late, called in question, after having from the first institution of Society, even to the present age, been universally practised by the Magistrate, and as universally approved by philosophers and divines; and as our question is the conduct of Lawgivers, and legitimate Magistrates, whose institutions are to be defended on the rules of reason and equity; not of Tyrants, who set themselves above both; it will not be improper to examine this matter to the bottom; especially as the enquiry is so necessary to a perfect knowledge of the civil advantages, resulting from an *established religion*.

We must at present then lay aside our ideas of the ancient modes of civil and religious societies; and search what they are, in themselves, by nature; and thence deduce the institution in question.

I shall do this in as few words as possible; and refer those, who desire a fuller account of this matter, to a separate discourse, intituled *THE ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE*.

In the beginning of the first book, where we speak of the origin of civil Society, the reader may remember we have shewn the natural deficiency of its plan; and how the influence and sanction of *Religion* only can supply that defect.

*Religion* then being proved necessary to Society; that it should be so used and applied, and in the best way, and to most advantage, needs no proof. For it is as instinctive in our nature to improve, as to investigate and pursue Good: and with regard to the improvement of this in question, there is special reason why it should be studied. For the experience of every place and age informs us, that the coactivity of *civil Laws* and *Religion*, is little enough



to keep men from running into disorder and mutual violence.

But this improvement is the effect of art and contrivance. For all natural Good, every thing constitutionally beneficial to man, needs man's industry to make it better. We receive it at the provident hand of Heaven, rather with a capacity of being applied to our use, than immediately fitted for our service. We receive it indeed, in full measure, but rude and unprepared.

Now, concerning this technical improvement of moral good, it is in *artificial* bodies as in *natural*; *two* may be so essentially constituted, as to be greatly able to adorn and strengthen one another: But then, as in this case, a mere juxtaposition of the parts is not sufficient; so neither is it in that: some union, some coalition, some artful insertion into each other will be necessary.

But then again, as in natural bodies the artist is unable to set about the proper operation, till he hath acquired a competent knowledge of the nature of those bodies, which are the subject of his skill; so neither can we know in what manner Religion may be best applied to the service of the State, till we have learned the real and essential natures both of a *State* and a *Religion*. The *obvious* qualities of both sufficiently shew, that they must needs have a good effect on each other, when properly applied; as our artist, by the knowledge of the obvious qualities of two several bodies, we suppose, may make the like observation, though we have not yet got sufficient acquaintance with them to make the proper application.

It follows as therefore to gain a right knowledge of the nature both of a *State* and of a *Religion*.

I. To begin with *civil Society*: It was instituted either with the purpose of attaining all the good of every kind, it was even accidentally capable of producing; or only of some certain good, which the Institutors had in view, unconcerned with, and unattentive to, any other. To suppose its end to be the vague purpose of acquiring all possible accidental good, is, in politics, a mere solecism; as hath been sufficiently shewn by the writers on this question<sup>b</sup>. And how untrue it is in fact, may be gathered from what hath been said in the beginning, of the origin of Society. Civil society then, I suppose, will be allowed to have been instituted for the attainment of some certain end or ends, exclusive of others: and this implies the necessity of distinguishing this end from others. Which distinction arises from the different properties of the things pretending. But again, amongst all those things, which are apt to obtrude, or have, in fact, obtruded upon men, as the ends of civil government, there is only this difference in their properties, as ends; *That, one of them is attainable by civil Society only, and all the rest are easily obtained without it.* The thing then with that property or quality must needs be the genuine end of *civil Society*. And this end is no other than SECURITY TO THE TEMPORAL LIBERTY AND PROPERTY OF MAN. For this end (as we have shewn) civil Society was invented; and *this*, civil Society alone is able to procure. The great, but spurious rival of this end, the SALVATION OF SOULS, or the security of man's *future* happiness, belongs therefore to the other division. For

<sup>b</sup> See *Locke's Defences of his Letters on Toleration*. This appears too to have been Aristotle's opinion — φέρεται μὲν δὲ διωριγαι τὸ θῆλον, καὶ τὸ δέλον· ὅθεν γὰρ ἡ φύσις ποιεῖ ταῦτα, οἷον χαλὰ κούρποι τὴν Δελφικὴν μάχαιραν πενιχρῶς, ἀλλ' ἂν πρὸς ἑ, etc. *Polit.* l. i. c. i.

it is not depending on outward accidents, or on the will or power of another, as the body and goods do, may be as well attained in a state of nature, as in civil society; and therefore, on the principles here delivered, cannot be one of the causes of the institution of civil government; nor, consequently, one of the ends thereof. But if so, the promotion of it comes not within the proper province of the Magistrate:

II. *Secondly*, as to religious Society, or a Church. This being instituted to preserve purity of faith and worship, its ultimate end is the SALVATION OF SOULS: from whence it follows,

I. That *the religious Society must needs be SOVEREIGN, and INDEPENDENT ON THE CIVIL*. Natural dependency of one Society on another, arises either from the *law of nature*, or of *nations*. Dependency by the *law of nature*, is from *essence* or *generation*. Dependency from *essence* there can be none. For this kind of dependency being a mode of natural union and coalition; and coalition being only where there is an agreement in *eodem tertio*; and there being no such agreement between two Societies essentially different, as these are, there can possibly be no dependency. Dependency from *generation* is where one Society springs up from another; as corporations, colleges, companies, and chambers, in a city. These, as well by the conformity of their ends and means, as by their charters of incorporation, betray their original and dependency. But *religious Society*, by ends and means quite different, gives internal proof of its not arising from the State; and we have shewn by external evidence<sup>c</sup>, that it existed before the state had any being. Again, no dependency can arise from the *law of na-*

<sup>c</sup> See Book iii. sect. 6.

tions, or the *civil law*. Dependency by this law is, where one and the same people composing two different Societies, the *imperium* of the one clashes with the *imperium* of the other. And, in such case, the lesser Society becomes, by that law, dependent on the greater; because the not being so, would make that absurdity in politics, called *imperium in imperio*. But now *civil* and *religious* Society, having ends and means entirely different; and the means of *civil* Society being *coercive* power, which power therefore the *religious* hath not; it follows, that the administration of each Society is exercised in so remote spheres, that they can never meet to clash: And those Societies which never clash, necessity of state cannot bring into dependency on one another.

2. It follows, *That this independent religious Society hath not, in and of itself, any coercive power of the civil kind*: Its inherent jurisdiction being, in its nature and use, entirely different from that of the State. For if, as hath been proved, *civil Society* was instituted for the attainment of one species of good (all other good, requisite to human happiness, being to be attained without it) and that *civil Society* attains the good, for which it was ordained, by the *sole* mean of coercive power; then it follows, that the good, which any other kind of Society seeks, may be attained without that power; consequently, *coercive* power is unnecessary to a *religious Society*. But that mean, which is unnecessary for the attainment of any end, is likewise *unfit*; in all cases, but in that, where such mean is rendered unnecessary by the use of other means of the same kind or species. But *religious society* attains its end by means of a different kind; therefore *coercive* power is not only unnecessary, but unfit. Again, Ends, in their nature different, can never be attained by

one and the same mean. Thus in the case before us: *coercive* power can only influence us to outward practice; by outward practice only, is the good which *civil Society* aims at, immediately effected; therefore is *coercive* power peculiarly fit for *civil Society*. But the good, which *religious Society* aims at, cannot be effected by outward practice; therefore *coercive* power is altogether unfit for *this Society*.

Having thus by a diligent enquiry found,

I. First, *That the care of the civil Society extends only to the body, and its concerns; and the care of the religious Society only to the soul:* it necessarily follows, that the civil Magistrate, if he will improve this natural influence of Religion by human art and contrivance, must seek some UNION OR ALLIANCE with the Church. For his office not extending to the care of souls, he hath not, in himself, power to enforce the influence of religion: and the Church's province not extending to the body, and consequently being without coercive power, she has not, in herself alone, a power of applying that influence to *civil* purposes. The conclusion is, that their joint powers must co operate thus to apply and enforce the influence of religion. But they can never act conjointly but in union and alliance.

II. *Secondly*, having found *that each society is sovereign, and independent on the other*, it as necessarily follows, that such union can be produced only by FREE CONVENTION AND MUTUAL COMPACT: because, whatever is sovereign and independent, can be brought to no act without its own consent: but nothing can give birth to a *free convention*, but a sense of mutual wants, which may be supplied; or a view of mutual benefits, which may be gained by it.

Such



Such then is the nature of that *Union* which produceth a RELIGION BY LAW ESTABLISHED: and which is, indeed, no other than *a public league and alliance for mutual support and defence*. For the *State*, not having the *care of souls*, cannot enforce the influence of *religion*; and therefore seeks the concurring aid of the *Church*: and the *Church* having no *coercive power* (the consequence of its care's not extending to *bodies*) as naturally flies for protection to the *State*: this being of that kind of *Alliance* which Grotius calls FOEDUS INÆQUALE — “Inæquale  
“ *foedus* (says he) *hic intelligo quod ex ipsa vi pac-*  
“ *tionis manentem praelationem quandam alteri do-*  
“ *nat: hoc est, ubi quis tenetur alterius impe-*  
“ *rium ac majestatem conservare UT POTENTIORI*  
“ *PLUS HONORIS, INFIRMIORI PLUS AUXILII DE-*  
“ *FERATUR* <sup>a</sup>.”

An *Alliance*, then, *by free convention*, being in its nature such that each party must have its motives for contracting; our next enquiry will be,

I. What those motives were, which the *State* had for *seeking*, and the *Church* for *accepting* the offers of an union: And,

II. The *mutual benefits* and advantages thereby arising.

The motives the *Magistrate* had to seek this *alliance*, were these:

I. To preserve the essence and purity of religion.

II. To improve its usefulness, and apply its influence in the best manner.

III. To prevent the mischief which, in its natural independent state, it might occasion to civil society.

I. The *Magistrate* was induced to seek it, 1. *As the necessary means of preserving the being of religion*. For though (as hath been shewn in the treatise of

<sup>a</sup> De Jure Belli et Pac. l. i. c. 3. § 21.

*the Alliance* \*) religion constitutes a Society; and tho' this Society will indeed, for some time, support the existence of religion, which, without it, would soon vanish from amongst men; yet, if we consider that religious Society is made up of the same individuals which compose the civil; and destitute likewise of all coercive power; we must needs see, that a Society, abandoned to its own fortune, without support or protection, would, in no long time, be swallowed up and lost. Of this opinion was a very able writer, whose knowledge of human nature will not be disputed: "Were it not, says he, for that  
 "sense of virtue, which is principally preserved, so  
 "far as it is preserved, BY NATIONAL FORMS AND  
 "HABITS OF RELIGION, men would soon lose it  
 "all, run wild, prey upon one another, and do  
 "what else the worst of savages do'."

2. But of whatever use an *Alliance* may be thought, for preserving the *being* of religion, the necessity of it, for preserving its *purity*, is most evident: for if *truth*, and *public utility* coincide, the nearer any religion approacheth to the truth of things, the fitter that religion is for the service of the State. That they do coincide, that is, that truth is productive of utility, and utility indicative of truth, may be proved on any principles, but the atheistic; and therefore we think it needless, in this place, to draw out the argument in form<sup>s</sup>: Let us then consider the danger religion runs of deviating from truth, when left, in its natural state, to itself. In those circumstances, the men of highest credit, are such as are famed for greatest sanctity. This *sanctity* hath been generally understood to be then most per-

\* Book i. § 5.

† Wollaston's *Religion of Nature delineated*, p. 124. Quarto Edit. 1725.

‡ See Book iii. § 6.



Sect. 5. of MOSES demonstrated. II

fect, when most estranged from the world, and all its habits and relations. But this being only to be acquired by secession and retirement from affairs; and that secession rendering man ignorant of civil Society, and of its rights and interests; in place of which will succeed, according to his natural temper, the destructive follies either of superstition or fanaticism, we must needs conclude, that religion, under such directors and reformers, (and God knows these are generally its lot) will deviate from truth; and consequently from a capacity, in proportion, of serving civil Society. I wish I could not say, we have too many examples to support this observation. The truth is, we have seen, and yet do see religious Societies, some grown up, and continuing unsupported by, and *united* with the State; others, that, when supported and *united*, have by strange arts brought the state into subjection, and become its tyrants and usurpers; and thereby defeated all the good which can arise from this *alliance*; such Societies, I say, we have seen, whose religious doctrines are so little serviceable to civil Government, that they can prosper only on the ruin and destruction of it. Such are those which teach *the holiness of celibacy and asceticism, the sinfulness of defensive war, of capital punishments, and even of civil magistracy itself.*

On the other hand, when religion is in *Alliance* with the State, as it then comes under the Magistrate's direction, those holy leaders having now neither credit nor power to do mischief, its purity must needs be reasonably well supported and preserved: for truth and public utility coinciding, the civil Magistrate, as such, will see it for his interest to seek after, and promote truth in religion: and, by means of public utility, which his office enables him so well to understand, he will never be at a loss,

Iofs, where such truth is to be found: so that it is impossible, under this civil influence, for religion ever to deviate far from truth; always supposing (for on such supposition this whole theory proceeds) a LEGITIMATE government, or civil policy, established on the principles of the natural rights and liberties of man: for an unequal and unjust Government, which seeks its own, not public utility, will always have occasion for error; and so, must corrupt religion both in principle and practice, to promote its own wrong interests.

II. Secondly, the Magistrate was induced to seek this Alliance, *as the necessary means to improve the usefulness, and to apply in the best manner the influence of religion for his service.* And this an Alliance does by several ways.

I. By bestowing additional reverence and veneration on the person of the civil MAGISTRATE, and on the LAWS of the state. For, in this alliance; where the religious Society is taken into the protection of the State, the supreme Magistrate, as will be shewn hereafter, is acknowledged HEAD of the religion. Now nothing can be imagined of more efficacy for securing the obedience of the people. Those two great masters in politics, Aristotle and Machiavel, as we have seen, thought it of force enough to gain reverence and security to a tyrant. What then must we suppose its efficacy in a legitimate Magistrature? The same veneration will extend itself over the Laws likewise: For while some of them are employed by the State for the support of the Church, and others lent to the Church to be employed in the service of the State, and all of them enacted by a legislature, in which churchmen have a considerable share (all these things being amongst the conditions of Alliance<sup>b</sup>) laws, under such di-

<sup>b</sup> See the Alliance between Ch. and St. B, ii. c. 3.

rection,



rection, must needs be regarded with the greatest reverence.

2. *By lending to the CHURCH a coactive power*—It may be remembered, that, in speaking of the innate defects of civil Society, we observed, that there were several sorts of duties which civil laws could not enforce; such as the duties of IMPERFECT OBLIGATION; which a religious Society, when endowed with *coercive power*, to invigorate the influence of religion, is capable of exacting; and SUCH likewise of the duties of PERFECT OBLIGATION; whose breach is owing to the intemperance of the sensual appetites; the severe prohibition of which threatens greater and more enormous evils: for while these unruly passions overflow, the stopping them in one place is causing them to break out with greater violence in another: as the rigorous punishment of fornication hath been generally seen to give birth to unnatural lusts. The effectual correction therefore of such evils must be begun by moderating and subduing the passions themselves. But *this*, civil laws are not understood to prescribe<sup>1</sup>; as punishing those passions only when they proceed to *act*; and not rewarding the attempts to *subdue* them: it must be a tribunal regarding irregular intentions as criminal, and good desires as meritorious, which can work this effect; and this can be no other than the tribunal of religion. When that is once done, a coactive power of the civil kind may be applied to good purpose; but not till then: And who so fit to apply it as that Society, which prepared the subject for its due

<sup>1</sup> These were the considerations, doubtless, which induced the excellent author *De l'esprit des loix* to say, "Il est aisé de régler par des loix, ce qu'on doit aux autres; il est difficile d'y comprendre tout ce qu'on se doit à soi-même." Vol. i. p. 167: 4<sup>to</sup>.

application and reception? \* Again, it hath been observed<sup>1</sup>, that the State punishes deviations from the rule of right as *crimes* only; and not as *such deviations*, or as *sins*; and, on the idea of crimes, proportions its punishments: by which means some very enormous deviations from the rule of right, which do not immediately affect society, and so are not considered as *crimes*, are overlooked by the civil tribunal: yet these, being, tho' *mediately*, very pernicious to the state, it is for its interests they should be brought before some capable tribunal. But, besides the civil, there is no other than the ecclesiastical, endowed with coactive power. Hence may be deduced the true, and only, end and use of SPIRITUAL COURTS. A church tribunal then, with coactive power, being necessary in all these cases; and a religious Society having, in itself, no such power, it must be borrowed from the State: but a State cannot lend it, without great danger to itself, *but* on the terms of an *Alliance*; a State therefore will be induced to seek this Alliance, in order to improve the natural efficacy of religion.

3. By conferring on the State the application of the efficacy of religion, and by putting it under the Magistrate's direction. — There are certain junctures when the influence of religion is more than ordinarily serviceable to the State: and these, the civil Magistrate only knows. Now while a Church is in its

\* A jurisdiction somewhat resembling this we find in the famous court of AREOPAGUS at Athens: which city was once the model of civil prudence as well as of religion, to the improved part of mankind. Ilocrates speaking of this branch of jurisdiction in the Areopagus, says, "It was not exerted to PUNISH crimes, but to PREVENT them — εἰ τὸ πρῶτον ἐκόντων, δι' ὧν κολλᾶσθαι τὴν ἀκοσμησίαν, ἀλλ' ἐξ ὧν αἱ καίλασκειν αὐτοὺς ἀξίον ζημίαις βεβλήσθαι αἰμαλάντων. ἡγεῖτο γὰρ τὸ μὴ αὐτῶν ἔργον εἶναι. ΑΡΕΙΟΠ. ΔΟΓ.

<sup>1</sup> See the Alliance, Book i. § 4.



natural state of independency, it is not in his power to improve those conjunctures to the advantage of the State, by a proper application of religion: but when the *Alliance* is made, and consequently the Church under his direction, he hath then authority to prescribe such public exercises of religion, and at such times, and in such manner, as he finds the exigencies of State require.

4. *By engaging the Church to apply its utmost endeavours in the service of the State.* For an *Alliance* laying an obligation on the State to protect and defend the Church, and to provide a settled maintenance for its ministers, such benefits must needs produce the highest love and esteem for the benefactor: which will be returned, out of motives both of gratitude and interest, in the most zealous labours for the service of civil government.

III. Lastly, *the State was induced to seek this Alliance, as the only means of preventing the mischiefs, which the Church, in its natural independent condition, might occasion to civil Society.* For, in this state the Church having, of itself, a power of assembling for religious worship, factious men may commodiously, under that cover, hatch and carry on designs against the peace of civil government: and the influence which popular and leading men gain over the consciences of such assemblies, by the frequency of occasional harangues, may easily ripen these contrivances into act, when strengthened with the specious pretext of religion: all which evils are effectually remedied by this *Alliance*. For then, the civil Magistrate being become protector of the Church, and, consequently, supreme HEAD and director of it, the ministry is mostly in his power; that mutual dependency, between the clergy and people, being, by means of a settled revenue, quite broken and destroyed. He admits and excludes to  
the

the exercise of their function, as he sees fit; and grants it to none, but such as give a previous security for their allegiance to him: by which means, all that influence, which the ministers and leaders in a Church had over it before the Alliance, as the *protectors of religion*, is now drawn off from them, and placed solely in the civil Magistrate.

Another mischief there is in this *unallied* condition of the Church, still as certain and fatal, whenever more than one religion is found in a State. For in these latter ages, every sect thinking itself the only *true church*, or, at least, the *most perfect*, is naturally pushed on to advance its own scheme upon the ruins of the rest: and where argument fails, civil power is brought in, as soon as ever a party can be formed in the *public administration*: and we find, they have been but too successful in persuading the Magistrate that his interests are concerned in their religious differences. Now the most effectual remedy to the dangerous and strong convulsions, into which States are so frequently thrown by these struggles, is an *Alliance*, which establishes *one church*, and gives a *full toleration to the rest*; only keeping sectaries out of the *public administration*: From a heedless admission into which, these disorders have arisen.

Having now shewn the principal motives which engaged the State to *seek an alliance* with the Church,

I come, in the next place, to consider the motives which the Church had to *accept* of it. For this being, as is observed, a *FREE CONVENTION*, unless the Church, as well as State, had its proper views, no *Alliance* could have been formed. To discover these motives, we must recollect what hath been said of the nature and end of a *religious Society*: for the benefits adapted to that nature and end, must



must be her legitimate motive: but if so, this benefit can be no other than SECURITY FROM ALL EXTERNAL VIOLENCE. The State indeed could not justly offer it, had no Alliance been made: but this is no reason why the Church should not think it for its interest to secure its natural right by *compact*; any more than that one State should not stipulate with another not to do it violence, though *that other* was under prior obligations, by the law of nature and nations, to forbear.

But by this *Alliance* between the two Societies, the State does more: it not only promises not to injure the *Church* confederated, but to serve it; that is, to protect it from the injuries of other religious Societies, which then exist, or may afterwards arise in the State. How one religious Society may be injuriously affected by another, hath been shewn just before; how great those injuries may prove, will be shewn hereafter. It must needs then be the first care of a Church, and a reasonable care, to preserve itself, by all lawful ways, from outward violence. A State then, as hath been said, in order to induce the Church's acceptance of this offer, must propose some benefit by it: and because this is the only *legitimate* benefit the Church can receive, it must propose *this*: which, therefore, being considerable, will be the Church's *motive for Alliance*.

There are only two other considerations that can be esteemed *motives*: the one, *to engage the State to propagate the established religion by force*: and the other, *to bestow honours, riches, and powers upon it*. Now, on recurring to the nature and end of the two Societies, the *first* motive will be found *unjust*; and the *second*, *impertinent*. It is *unjust* in the Church to require the engagement; because the performing it would be violating the natural right every man

hath of worshipping God according to his own conscience. It is *unjust* in the State to engage in it; because, as we have shewn, its jurisdiction extendeth not to opinions.

It is *impertinent* in a Church to aim at riches, honours, and powers, because these are things which, as a Church, she can neither use nor profit by; for they have no natural tendency to promote the *ultimate* end of this Society, *salvation of souls*; nor the *immediate* end, *purity of worship*. "*Nihil ecclesia sibi nisi fidem possidet*"<sup>m</sup>, says St. Ambrose. We conclude, therefore, that the only legitimate motive she could have, was *security and protection from outward violence*.

On these mutual motives was formed this FREE ALLIANCE; which gave birth to a CHURCH BY LAW ESTABLISHED.

Now as from the nature of the two Societies is discovered what kind of union only they could enter into; so from that consideration, together with the motives they had in uniting, may be deduced, by necessary inference, the reciprocal TERMS and conditions of that union.

From the mutual motives inducing thereunto, it appears, that the great *preliminary and fundamental article* of *Alliance* is this, THAT THE CHURCH SHALL APPLY ITS UTMOST INFLUENCE IN THE SERVICE OF THE STATE; AND THAT THE STATE SHALL SUPPORT AND PROTECT THE CHURCH.

But in order to the performance of this agreement, there must be a *mutual communication of their respective powers*: for the province of each Society being naturally distinct and different, each can have to do in the other's, but by mutual concession.

<sup>m</sup> *Epist. contra Symmachum.*

But



But again, these Societies being likewise as naturally independent one on the other, a mutual concession cannot be safely made, without one of them, at the same time, giving up its INDEPENDENCY: from whence arises what Grotius, we see, called *MANENS PRÆLATIO*: which, in his *Fœdus inæquale*, the more powerful Society hath over the less.

Now from these two conclusions, which spring necessarily from *the great fundamental article of union*, we deduce all the terms, conditions, mutual grants, and concessions, which complete this *Alliance*.

For, from this obligation on the Church *to apply its influence in the service of the State*, arise a SETTLED MAINTENANCE FOR THE MINISTERS OF RELIGION; and an ECCLESIASTICAL JURISDICTION with *coactive* power: which things introduce again, on the other side, the DEPENDENCY OF THE CLERGY ON THE STATE. And from the State's obligation *to support and protect the Church*, ariseth the ECCLESIASTICAL SUPREMACY OF THE CIVIL MAGISTRATE; which again introduceth, on the other hand, the right of CHURCHMEN TO PARTAKE OF THE LEGISLATURE.

Thus are all these Rights and Privileges closely interwoven and mutually connected by a necessary dependence on each other.

But to be more particular in the grounds and reasons of each grant and privilege, we will now, in a different and more commodious order for this purpose, examine,

I. What the CHURCH RECEIVES from the State.

II. What the Church GIVES to it.

Which will present us with a *new view of the two Societies, as they appear under an Establishment*; and leave nothing wanting to enable us to form a perfect judgment of their natures.

I. What the Church *receives* from the state by this *Alliance*, is,

I. First, *A public and settled endowment for its ministers.* The reasons of it are, 1. To render the religious Society, whose assistance the State so much wants, more firm and durable. 2. To invite and encourage the clergy's best service to the State, in rendering those committed to their care, virtuous. But 3, and principally, in order to destroy that mutual dependency between the clergy and people, which arises from the former's being maintained by the voluntary contributions of the latter; the only maintenance the clergy could have, before the two Societies were allied; and which dependence, we have shewn to be productive of great mischiefs to the State. Add to all this, that as the clergy are now under the Magistrate's direction, and consequently become a public Order in the state, it is but fit and decent, that the State should provide them with a public maintenance.

2. The second privilege the Church receives from this Alliance is, *a place for her representatives in the Legislature.* For, as it necessarily follows, from that *fundamental article of Alliance* of the State's *supporting and protecting the Church*, that the Church must, in return, *give up its independency to the State*, whereby the State becomes empowered to determine in all church-matters, so far as the Church is considered under the idea of a Society; as this, I say, necessarily follows, the Church must needs have its representatives in the Legislature, to prevent that power, which the State receives in return for the protection it affords, from being perverted to the Church's hurt: for the giving up its independency, without reserving a right of representation in the legislature, would be making itself, instead of a *subject*, a *slave* to the State. Besides, without these  
Repre-



facing p. 20. V. II.

from the Bemtine Table?

PLATE X.



J. Mank. sc.



Representatives no laws could be reasonably made concerning the Church: because no free man, or body, can be bound by laws, to which they have not given their consent, either in person, or by representative. So that, as the Church when she entered into alliance, cannot *justly*, we may presume she did not *willingly*, give up her independency without the reservation of some such prerogative.

3. The third and last privilege is, *a jurisdiction, enforced by civil coercive power*, FOR REFORMATION OF MANNERS. It is one of the *preliminary* articles of this *Alliance*, that *the Church should apply its best influence in the service of the State*. But there is no way in which it can be so effectually enforced as by a jurisdiction of this kind. It hath been shewn above, that there are a numerous set of duties, both of *imperfect obligation*, which civil laws could not reach; and several of *perfect obligation*, which, by reason of the intemperance of the sensual passions, from whence the breach of those duties proceeds, civil laws could not effectually enforce; as their violence yielded only to the influence of Religion; both which, however, the good of the Community requires should be enforced; and which an ecclesiastical tribunal, intrusted with coercive power, is only able to enforce. And, indeed, the sense of those wants and defects, which these courts do supply, was the principal motive of the State's seeking this *Alliance*. On the other hand, the Church having now given up her supremacy, she would without the accession of this authority, be left naked and defenceless, and reduced to a condition unbecoming her dignity, and dangerous to her safety.

II. Let us now see, what the Church gives to the State. It is, in a word, this: *The resigning up her independency; and making the civil Magistrate her SUPREME HEAD, without whose approbation and allow-*



*ance she can administer, transact, or decree nothing in quality of a politicd Society.* For as the State, by this *Alliance*, hath undertaken the protection of the *Church*; and as no Society can safely afford protection to another over which it hath no power, it necessarily follows that the *civil Magistrate must be supreme.* Besides, when the State, by this convention, covenanted to afford protection to the Church, that contract was made to a particular Church of one denomination, and of such determined doctrine and discipline. But now, that protection, which might be advantageous to the State in union with such a Church, might be disadvantageous to it, in union with one of a different doctrine and discipline: therefore, when protection is given to a Church, it must be at the same time provided, that no alteration be made in it, without the State's approbation and allowance. Farther, the State having *endowed its clergy*, and bestowed upon them a *jurisdiction with coæssive power*, these privileges might create an *imperium in imperio*, had not the civil Magistrate, in return, the *supremacy of the Church.* The necessity of the thing, therefore, invests him with this right and title.

Thus have we shewn the mutual privileges *given and received* by Church and State, in entering into this famous *convention*: the aim of the State being, agreeably to its nature, *UTILITY*; and the aim of the Church, agreeably to its nature, *TRUTH.* From whence we may observe, that as these privileges all took their rise, by necessary inference, from the fundamental article of the convention, which was, *that the Church should serve the State; and the State protect the Church*; so they receive all possible addition of strength from their mutual connection with, and dependency on, one another. This we have cause to desire may be received as a certain mark that our  
plan

*plan of Alliance* is no precarious arbitrary hypothesis, but a *theory*, founded in reason, and the invariable nature of things. For having, from the real essence of the two Societies, collected the *necessity* of allying, and the *freedom* of the compact; we have, from the *necessity*, fairly introduced it; and from its *freedom*, consequentially established every mutual term and condition of it. So that now if the reader should ask, *where this charter or treaty of convention for the union of the two Societies, on the terms here delivered, is to be met with*; we are enabled to answer him. We say, it may be found in the same archive with the famous ORIGINAL COMPACT between magistrate and people, so much insisted on in the vindication of the *common rights of subjects*. Now, when a sight of this *compact* is required of the defenders of civil liberty, they hold it sufficient to say, that it is enough for all the purposes of fact and right, that such *original compact* is the only legitimate foundation of civil Society: that if there were no such thing *formally* executed, there was *virtually*: that all differences between magistrate and people, ought to be regulated on the supposition of such a *compact*; and all Government reduced to the principles therein laid down: for, that the happiness, of which civil Society is productive, can only be attained, when formed on those principles. Now something like this we say of our ALLIANCE BETWEEN CHURCH AND STATE.

Hitherto we have considered this *Alliance* as it produceth an *establishment*, under its most simple form; *i. e.* where there is but *one* Religion in the State: but it may so happen, that, either at the time of convention, or afterwards, there may be *more than one*.

1. If there be *more than one* at the time of convention, the State allies itself with the *largest* of the reli-

gious Societies. It is *fit* the State should do so, because the larger the religious Society is (where there is an equality in other points) the better enabled it will be to answer the ends of an *Alliance*; as having the greatest number under its influence. It is *scarce possible* it should do otherwise; because the two Societies being composed of the same individuals, the greatly prevailing religion must have a majority of its members in the assemblies of State; who will naturally prefer their own religion to any other. With *this* Religion is the *alliance* made; and a full TOLERATION given to all the rest; yet under the restriction of a TEST LAW, to keep them from hurting that which is *established*.

2. If these different religions spring up *after* the Alliance hath been formed; then, whenever they become considerable, a *test law* is necessary, for the security of the *established church*. For amongst diversities of sects where every one thinks itself the *only true*, or at least the *most pure*, every one aims at rising on the ruins of the rest; which it calls, *bringing into conformity* with itself. The means of doing this, when reason fails, which is rarely at hand, and more rarely heard when it is, will be by getting into the public administration, and applying the civil power to the work. But when one of these Religions is the *established*, and the rest under a *toleration*; then envy, at the advantages of an *establishment*, will join the *tolerated churches* in confederacy against it, and unite them in one common attack to disturb its quiet. In this imminent danger, the *allied church* calls upon the State, for the performance of its contract; which thereupon gives her a TEST LAW for her security: whereby, the entrance into the Administration of public affairs (the only way, the threatened mischief is effected) is shut to all but members of the *established church*.

Thus



Thus a TEST LAW took its birth, whether *at* or *after* the time of *Alliance*. That the State is under the highest obligations to provide the Church with this security, we shall shew,

1. By the *Alliance*, the State promised to protect the Church, and to secure it from the injuries and insults of its enemies. An attempt in the members of any other church to get into the administration, in order to deprive the *established church* of the covenanted rights which it enjoys, either by sharing those advantages with it, or by drawing them from it to itself, is highly injurious. And we have shewn, that where there are diversities of religions, this attempt will be always making. The State then must defeat the attempt: but there is no other way of defeating it, than by hindering its enemies from entering into the Administration: and they can be hindered only by a *test law*.

2. Again, this promise of protection is of such a nature as may, on no pretence, be dispensed with. For protection was not simply a condition of *Alliance*, but, on the Church's part, the only condition of it. We have shewn, that all other benefits and advantages are foreign to a Church, as such, and improper for it. Now, not performing the *only condition* of a contract, virtually breaks and dissolves it: especially if we consider that this only condition is both *necessary* and *just*. *Necessary*, as a free convention must have *mutual* conditions; and, but for this condition, one side would be without any: *Just*, as the convention itself is founded on the laws of nature and nations; and *this* the only condition which suits the nature of a Church to claim. If it be pretended that debarring good subjects from *places of honour and profit*, in the disposal of the Magistrate, is *unjust*; I reply, that the assertion, tho' every where taken for granted, is false; it being founded on the principle,

principle, that *reward is one of the sanctions of civil laws*, which I have shewn to be a mistake<sup>n</sup>; and that all, a member of Society can *claim*, for the discharge of his duty, is *protection*. So that, farther reward than this, no subject having a *right* to, all *places of honour and profit* are free donations, and in the absolute disposal of the Magistrate.

3. But again, the Church, in order to enable the State to perform this *sole condition* of protection, consented to the giving up its supremacy and independency, to the civil Sovereign: whence it follows, that, whenever the enemies of the *established Church* get into the magistrature, to which, as we have said, the supremacy of the Church is transferred by the *Alliance*, she becomes a prey, and lies entirely at their mercy; being now, by the loss of her supremacy, in no condition of defence, as she was in her natural state, unprotected and independent: so that the not securing her by a *test law*, is betraying, and giving her up bound to her enemies.

4. But lastly, had no promise of protection been made, yet the State would have lain under an indispensable necessity of providing a *test law*, for its own peace and security. It hath been observed, that wherever there are diversities of religion, each sect, believing its own the true, strives to advance itself on the ruins of the rest. If this doth not succeed by dint of argument, these partisans are apt to have recourse to the coercive power of the State: which is done by introducing a party into the public administration. And they have always had art enough to make the State believe that its interests were much concerned in the success of their religious quarrels. What persecutions, rebellions, revolutions, loss of civil and religious liberty, these intestine struggles

<sup>n</sup> See Book i. sect. 2.



between sects have occasioned, is well known to such as are acquainted with the history of mankind. To prevent these mischiefs was, as hath been shewn, one great motive for the State's seeking *Alliance* with the Church: for the obvious remedy was the *establishing one church*, and giving a *free toleration to the rest*. But if, in administering this cure, the State should stop short, and not proceed to exclude the *tolerated* religions from entering into the public administration, such imperfect application of the remedy would infinitely heighten the distemper: for, before the *Alliance*, it was only a mistaken aim in propagating truth, which occasioned these disorders; but now, the zeal for opinions would be out of measure inflamed by envy and emulation; which the temporal advantages, enjoyed by the established church, exclusive of the rest, will always occasion: And what mischiefs this would produce, had every sect a free entry into the administration, the reader may easily conceive. If it be said, that, would men content themselves, as in reason they ought, with enjoying their own opinions, without obtruding them upon others, these evils, which require the remedy of a *test law*, would never happen. This is very true: and so, would men but observe the rule of justice in general, there would be no need to have recourse to civil Society, to rectify the violations of it.

In a word, an ESTABLISHED RELIGION WITH A TEST LAW is the universal voice of Nature. The most savage nations have employed it to civilize their manners; and the politest knew no other way to prevent their return to barbarity and violence.

Thus the city of ATHENS, so humane and free, exacted an oath of all their youth for the security of the established religion: for, Athens being a democracy, every citizen had a constant share in the

administration. A copy of this oath, the strongest of all *tests*, is preserved by Stobæus, who transcribed it from the writings of the Pythagoreans, the great school of ancient politics. It is conceived in these words: "I will not dishonour the *sacred arms*<sup>o</sup>, nor desert my comrade in battle: I will DEFEND AND PROTECT MY COUNTRY AND MY RELIGION, whether alone or in conjunction with others: I will not leave the public in a worse condition than I found it, but in a better: I will be always ready to obey the supreme magistrate, with prudence; and to submit to the established laws, and to all such as shall be hereafter established by full consent of the people: and I will never connive at any other who shall presume to despise or disobey them; but will revenge all such attempts on the sanctity of the republic, either alone or in conjunction with the people: and lastly, I WILL CONFORM TO THE NATIONAL RELIGION. So help me those gods who are the avengers of perjury<sup>p</sup>."

Here we see, that after each man had sworn, *to defend and protect the religion of his country*, in consequence of the obligation the State lies under

<sup>o</sup> Όπλα τὰ ἱερά, the *sacred arms*, by what follows, seems to mean those which the lovers presented to their favourite youths. Concerning this institution, see what is said in the explanation of Virgil's episode of Nisus and Euryalus, in sect. iv. of this book.

<sup>p</sup> Οὐ καίαισχυρῶ ὅπλα τὰ ἱερά, ἃδ' ἐγκαταλείψω τὸν παρὰ γάττιν ὅπῃ αἰ τοιχόσω· ΑΜΥΝΩ ΔΕ ΚΑΙ ΥΠΕΡ ΙΕΡΩΝ, καὶ ὑπὲρ ὁσίων καὶ μόνῳ, καὶ μέλα πολλῶν· τὴν πατρίδα δὲ ἐκ ἐλάσσων παραδύσω, πλείω δὲ καὶ ἀριῶ, ὅσων αἰ παραδίδωμαι· καὶ εὐηκοῦσω τῶν αἰεὶ κρινόντων ἱμφερόνως, καὶ τοῖς θισμοῖς τοῖς ἰδρυμένοις πείσωμαι, καὶ ἕς τινος αἰ ἄλλως τὸ πλῆθος ἰδρύσθεται ἡμ' ἐξέως· καὶ αἰ τις ἀναιρῇ τὸς θεομῆς ἢ μὴ πειθῆναι, ἢ καὶ ὑπὲρ ἱδῶ, ἀμυνῶ δὲ καὶ μόνῳ, καὶ μέλα πάντων· καὶ ΙΕΡΑ ΤΑ ΠΑΤΡΙΑ ΤΙΜΙΣΩ· ἴσθεις ὅσοι τέττοι. Joan. Stobæi de Rep. Serr. xij. p. 243. Ludg. Ed. 1638.

to protect the *established worship*, he concludes, *I will conform to it*: the directest and strongest of all tests.

But a test of conformity to the established worship, was not only required of those who bore a share in the civil administration, but of those too who were chosen to preside in their religious rites. Demosthenes hath recorded the oath which the priestesses of Bacchus, called *Γεραῖραι*, took on entering into their Office. “ I observe a religious  
“ chastity, and am clean and pure from all other  
“ defilements, and from conversation with man:  
“ AND I CELEBRATE THE THEOINEIA AND IO-  
“ BACCHIA TO BACCHUS, ACCORDING TO THE  
“ ESTABLISHED RITES, AND AT THE PROPER  
“ SEASONS<sup>9</sup>. ”

Nor were the ROMANS less watchful for the support of the *established religion*, as may be seen by a speech of the consul Posthumius in Livy, occasioned by some horrid abuses committed, through the clandestine exercise of foreign worship. “ How  
“ often, says he, in the times of our fathers and  
“ forefathers, hath this affair been recommended  
“ to the Magistrates; to prohibit all foreign wor-  
“ ship; to drive the priests and sacrifices from the  
“ cirque, the forum, and the city; to search up,  
“ and burn books of prophecies; and to abolish  
“ all modes of sacrificing, differing from the Ro-  
“ man discipline? For those sage and prudent men,  
“ instructed in all kind of divine and human laws,  
“ rightly judged that nothing tended so much to  
“ overthrow religion, as when men celebrated the

<sup>9</sup> Ἀγνείας, καὶ ἱερὰ καθαρόν, καὶ ἀγνὴ ἀπὸ τῶν ἄλλων ἢ καθαρύ-  
σθαι, καὶ ἀπ’ ἀνδρῶν συνουσίας, καὶ τὰ Θεοῖνα, καὶ Ἰοβάκχια γεραίω  
τῇ Διονύσω ΚΑΤΑ ΤΑ ΠΑΤΡΙΑ, καὶ ἐν τοῖς καθήκουσιν χρόνοις. Orat.  
cont. Næwram.

“ sacred rites, not after their own, but foreign,  
“ customs’.”

But when I say all regular policied states had an *established religion*, I mean no more than *he* would do, who, deducing Society from its true original, should, in order to persuade men of the benefits it produceth, affirm that all nations had a civil policy. For, as this writer could not be supposed to mean that every one constituted a free State, on the principles of public liberty (which yet was the only Society he proposed to prove was founded on truth, and productive of public good) because it is notorious, that the far greater part of civil policies are founded on different principles, and abused to different ends; so neither would I be understood to mean, when I say all nations concurred in making this UNION, that they all exactly *discriminated the natures*, and fairly *adjusted the rights* of BOTH SOCIETIES, on the principles here laid down; tho’ an ESTABLISHMENT resulting from this discrimination and adjustment, be the only one I would be supposed to recommend. On the contrary, I know this *union* hath been generally made on mistaken principles; or, if not so, hath degenerated by length of time. And, as it was sufficient for that writer’s purpose, that those Societies, good or bad, proved the sense, all men had of the benefits resulting from civil policy in general, though they were oft mistaken in the application; so it is sufficient

‘ Quoties hoc patrum avorumque ætate negotium est magistratibus datum, ut sacra externa fieri vetarent; sacrificulos, vatesque foro, circo, urbe prohiberent; vaticinos libros conquirerent, comburerentque; omnem disciplinam sacrificandi, præterquam more Romano, abolerent? Judicabant enim prudentissimi viri omnis divini humanique juris, nihil æque dissolvendæ religionis esse, quam ubi non patrio, sed externo ritu sacrificaretur. *Hist. lib. xxxix.*

for



for ours, that this universal concurrence in the two SOCIETIES TO UNITE, shews the sense of mankind concerning the utility of such union. And lastly, as that writer's principles are not the less true on account of the general deviation from them in forming civil Societies; so may not ours, though so few states have suffered themselves to be directed by them in practice, nor any man, before, delivered them in speculation.

Such then is the *Theory* here offered to the world; of which, whoever would see a full account, and the several parts cleared from objections, may consult the treatise mentioned before, intituled, *The Alliance between Church and State*; in which we pretend to have discovered a plain and simple truth, of the highest concernment to civil Society, long lost and hid under the learned obscurity arising from the collision of contrary false principles.

BUT it is now time to proceed with our main subject. We have here given a short account of the true nature of the *Alliance between Church and State*; both to justify the conduct of the ancient Lawgivers in establishing religion; and to shew the infinite service of this institution to civil Society. Another use of it may be the gaining an exacter knowledge of the nature of the established religions in the *pagan world*: for, having the true *theory* of an Establishment, it serves as a straight line to discover all the obliquities to which it is applied.

I shall therefore consider the *causes*, which facilitated the *establishment of religion* in the ancient world: and likewise *those causes* which prevented the *establishment* from receiving its due form.

1. Ancient pagan religion consisted in the worship of local tutelary Deities; which, generally speaking, were supposed to be the authors of their civil Institutions.



tutes. The consequence of this was, that the *State*, as well as *particulars*, was the *SUBJECT* of religion. So that this religion could not but be *national and established*; that is, protected and encouraged by the civil Power. For how could that religion, which had the *national God* for its *object*; and the *State*, as an artificial man, for its *subject*, be other than *national and established*?

II. But then these very things, which so much promoted an *established religion*, prevented the union's being made upon a just and equitable footing. 1. By giving a wrong *idea of civil Society*. 2. By not giving a right *form to the religious*.

1. It is nothing strange, that the ancients should have a wrong *idea of civil Society*; and should suppose it ordained for the cognizance of *religious*, as well as of *civil* matters, while they believed in a local tutelary Deity, by whose direction they were formed into Community; and while they held that Society, as such, was the *subject* of religion, contrary to what has been shewn above, that the *civil Society's* offer of a voluntary alliance with the *religious*, proceeded from its having no power in itself to enforce the influence of religion to the service of the State.

2. If their *religion* constituted a proper Society, it was yet a Society dependent on the State, and therefore not *sovereign*. Now it appears that no voluntary alliance can be made, but between two independent sovereign Societies. But, in reality, Pagan religion did not constitute any Society at all. For it is to be observed, that the unity of the object of faith, and conformity to a formula of dogmatic theology, as the terms of communion, are the great foundation and bond of a religious Society\*. Now these things were wanting in the several national reli-

\* See *The alliance between church and state*, Book i. § 5.

gions of Paganism: in which there was only a conformity in public Ceremonies. The *national Pagan* religion therefore did not properly compose a *Society*; nor do we find by Antiquity, that it was ever considered under that idea; but only as *part of the State*; and in that view, indeed, had its particular Societies and Companies, such as the colleges of Priests and Prophets.

These were such errors and defects as destroyed much of the utility, which results from *religious Establishments*, placed upon a right bottom. But yet *religious Establishments* they were; and, notwithstanding all their imperfections, served for many good purposes: such as *preserving the being of Religion*: — *bestowing additional veneration on the person of the Magistrate, and on the laws of the State*: — *giving the Magistrate the right of applying the civil efficacy of religion*: — *and giving Religion a coercive power for the reformation of manners*. And thus much FOR ESTABLISHMENTS.

## SECT. VI.

THE last instance to be assigned of the Magistrate's care of religion, shall be that universal practice, in the ancient world, of religious TOLERATION; or the permitting the free exercise of all religions, how different soever from the *National* and *Established*. For tho' the very nature and terms of an *Established* religion implied the Magistrate's peculiar favour and protection; and tho' in fact, they had their *Test-laws* for its support, wherever there was diversity of worship; yet it was ancient policy to allow a large and full TOLERATION. And even in the *extent* of this allowance they seem generally to have had juster notions than certain of our modern Advocates for religious Liberty. They had no



conception that any one should be indulged in his presumption of extending it to *Religious Rites and practices hurtful to Society, or dishonourable to Humanity*. There are many examples in Antiquity of this sage restriction. I shall only mention the universal concurrence in punishing *Magical Rites*, by which the health and safety of particulars were supposed to be injuriously affected. And Suetonius's burning the sacred grove in Anglesea<sup>1</sup>, in which human sacrifices were offered up by the Druids, was but the beginning of what those modern Advocates, above mentioned, would call a *Persecution* against the Order itself, whose obstinate perseverance in this infernal practice could not be overcome but by their total extirpation.

Two principal causes induced the *ancient Lawgivers* to the sage and reasonable conduct of a large and full toleration.

I. They considered that Religion seldom or never makes a *real impression* on the minds of those who are *forced* into a profession of it: and yet, that all the service Religion can do to the State, is by working that *real impression*<sup>2</sup>. They concluded, therefore, that the profession of Religion should be FREE.

— “Præsidium posthac impositum victis, excisque Luci, SÆVIS superstitionibus sacri. Nam cruore captivo adolere aras, et hominum fibris consulere deos fas habebant.” *Tac. Ann.* l. xiv. c. 30. — *Superstition* amongst the Greeks and Romans had its free course. But the *sævæ superstitiones*, the *savage and cruel Rites*, injurious and dishonourable to human nature and civil Society, were rigorously forbidden.

“In specie autem fictæ simulationis, sicut reliquæ virtutes, ita PIETAS inesse non potest; cum qua simul et sanctitatem et religionem tolli necesse esse: quibus sublati, perturbatio vitæ sequitur et magna confusio. Atque haud scio, an PIETATE adversus deos sublata fides etiam, et societas humani generis, et una excellentissima virtus, iustitia tollatur. Cic. *De nat. deor.* l. i. c. 21.

Hence

Hence may be understood the strange blindness of those *modern Politicians*, who expect to benefit the State by forcing men to outward conformity; which only making hypocrites and atheists, destroys the sole means religion hath of serving the State. But here, by a common fate of Politicians, they fell from one blunder into another. For having first, in a tyrannical adherence to their own scheme of Policy, or superstitious fondness for the established System of Worship, infringed upon religious Liberty; and then beginning to find, that diversity of Sects was hurtful to the State, as it always will be, while the rights of Religion are violated; instead of repairing the mistake, and restoring religious Liberty, which would have stifled this pullulating evil in the seed, by affording it no further nourishment, they took the other course; and endeavoured, by a thorough discipline of *Conformity*, violently to rend it away: and with it they rooted up and destroyed all that good to Society, which so naturally springs from Religion, when it hath once taken fast hold of the human mind.

II. This was the most legitimate principle they went upon, and had the most lasting effect. They had another, which, though less ingenuous, was of more immediate influence; and this was the keeping up the warmth and vigour of religious impressions, by the introduction and toleration of new Religions and foreign Worship. For they supposed that “piety and virtue then chiefly influence the mind, while men are busied in the performance of religious Rites and Ceremonies”; as Tully observes, in the words of Pythagoras, the most celebrated of

\* — Siquidem et illud bene dictum est a Pythagora, doctissimo viro, tum maxime et pietatem et religionem versari in animis, cum rebus divinis operam daremus. *De Leg.* l. ii. c. 11.



the pagan Lawgivers. Nor does this at all contradict the Roman maxim, as delivered by Posthumius in Livy. [see p. 29, 30.] For *that* maxim relates to *public Religion*, or the Religion of the State; *this* concerns *private Religion*, or the religion of Particulars. Now vulgar Paganism being not only false, but highly absurd, as having its foundation solely in the fancy and the passions; variety of Worships was necessary to suit every one's taste and humour. The genius of it disposing its followers to be inconstant, capricious, and fond of novelties; weary of long-worn Ceremonies, and immoderately fond of new. And in effect we see amongst the same people, notwithstanding the universal notion of tutelary Deities, that, in *this* age, one God or mode of worship, in *that*, another mode had the vogue. And every new God, or new ceremony, rekindled the languid fire of Superstition: just as in modern Rome, every last Saint draws the Multitude to his shrine.

For, here it is to be observed, that in the Pagan world, a *tolerated Religion* did not imply *dissent* from the *established*, according to our modern ideas of *toleration*. Nor indeed could it, according to the general nature and genius of ancient Idolatry. *Tolerated Religions* there are rather subservient to the *established*, or supernumeraries of it, than in opposition to it. But then they were far from being on a footing with the *established*, or partakers of its privileges.

But men going into Antiquity under the impression of modern ideas, must needs form very inaccurate judgments of what they find. So, in this case, because few *tolerated Religions* are to be met with in Paganism, according to our sense of *toleration*, which is the allowance of a Religion *OPPOSED* to the *national*; and consequently, because no one is watched with that vigilance which ours demand, but  
all



all used with more indulgence than a Religion, reprobating the *established*, can pretend to; on this account, I say, a false opinion hath prevailed, that, *in the Pagan world, all kinds of Religion were upon an equal footing, with regard to the State.* Hence, we hear a noble writer perpetually applauding <sup>†</sup> *wise* Antiquity, for the full and free liberty it granted in matters of Religion, so agreeable to the principles of truth and public utility; and, perpetually arraigning the UNSOCIABLE HUMOUR OF CHRISTIANITY for the contrary practice; which, therefore, he would insinuate, was built on contrary principles.

On this account, it will not be improper to consider, a little, the genius of Paganism, as it is opposed to, what we call, *true Religion*: Which will shew us how easily the civil Magistrate brought about that Toleration, which he had such great *reasons of State* to promote; and at the same time, teach these objectors to know, that the good effect of this general tolerance, as far as the genius of Religion was concerned in its promotion, was owing to the egregious falshood and absurdity of Paganism: and that, on the other hand, the evil effects of intolerance under the Christian religion, proceeded from its truth and perfection; not the natural consequence, as these men would insinuate, of a *false Principle*, but the abuse of a *true one*.

Ancient Paganism was an aggregate of several distinct Religions, derived from so many pretended revelations. Why it abounded in these, proceeded, in part, from the great number of Gods of human invention. As these Religions were not laid on the foundation, so neither were they raised on the destruction of one another. *They were not laid on the*

<sup>†</sup> See the *Characteristics*, passim.

foundation of one another ; because, having given to their Gods, as local tutelary Deities<sup>2</sup>, contrary natures

<sup>2</sup> See Book iv.—Nay, so fond were they of this notion of local tutelary Deities, that they degraded even JUPITER himself, their *Father of gods and men*, into one of them, as appears by his several appellations of *Jupiter Ammon, Olympicus, Capitolinus*, etc. This deceived Dr. Bentley, who finding *Jupiter*, in the popular theology, to be a local Deity, concluded him not to be *one but many*. So that in the last edition of his excellent *Remarks* on that foolish book, called *A discourse of free-thinking*, he reproves the translator of Lucan for calling Jupiter Ammon, *th's greatest of the gods, this mighty chief*: — “ A Roman would never have,” said that *Juppiter Ammon* was as great as *Juppiter Capitolinus*; “ though the translator took it for granted that all *Jupiters must needs be the same*. But a known passage in Suetonius may correct his notion of the heathen theology.—Augustus had built “ a temple to *Juppiter Tonans*, within the area of the capitol; “ whereupon he had a dream, that *Capitolinus Juppiter* complained his worshipers were drawn away: Augustus, in his dream, answered, that he had dedicated *Tonans* there, only “ as the other's porter; and accordingly, when he waked, he “ hung (as a porter's badge) that temple round with bells,— “ Now if *Capitolinus* would not bear the very *Thunderer* by him, but in quality of his porter; much leis would he have “ suffered poor beggarly *Ammon* (for all he was his name-fake) “ to be stiled the *mighty chief*.” p. 281. Here he had one poet to contradict; who “ thought (he says) all Jupiters the “ same.” When he wrote his notes on Milton he had *another* on his hands, who, it seems, did not think them to be the same, and he chuses to contradict him, likewise.

“ Ammonian Jove, or Capitoline, was seen

“ He with Olympias, this with her who bore

“ Scipio——— Par. L<sup>st</sup>. Book ix. v. 508.

On which, the Critic observes with some contempt — “ Then “ he brings more stories—and (something strange) two *Jupiters*.” However in his former humour he will have it, that according to the popular theology, “ all Jupiters were not the “ same.” This will deserve to be considered. The PEOPLE of Antiquity, in excess of folly and flattery, were sometimes wont to worship their good kings and benefactors under the name of *Jupiter, the Father of gods and men*, who, by thus lending his titles, received, in a little time, from posterity, all that worship which was first paid to the borrowers of his name; all their particular benefactors being swallowed up in him. And this was one principal reason of Jupiter's being a tutelary deity.

But

tures and dispositions, and distinct and separate interests, each God set up, on his own bottom, and held

But their PHILOSOPHERS, searching into the original of the Pagan theology, found out this lost secret, That their kings had given occasion to the worship of this local tutelary Jupiter; whom, therefore, they regarded, as different Jupiters; that is, as so many kings who had assumed his name. Hence Varro in Tertullian reckons up no less than three hundred. The result of all this was, that in the popular theology there was but ONE Jupiter; in the philosophic theology there were MANY. Just, as on the contrary, in the popular mythology there were many Gods; in the philosophic physiology, but one.

What shall we say then to the story from Suetonius, which is brought to prove that, according to the popular theology, all Jupiters were not the same? For surely the Romans regarded the Capitoline Jupiter, and the Thunderer as the same person: If it be asked, Why then, had they different name? Suetonius will inform us: who relates that Augustus consecrated this temple to Jupiter Tonans, on his being preserved from a dreadful flash of lightning, in his Cantabrian expedition. And so Minucius Felix understood the matter, where he thus addresses the Pagan idolators — *Quid ipse JUPITER vester! modo imberbis statuitur, modo barbatus locatur: et cum HAMMON dicitur, habet cornua; et cum CAPITOLINUS, tunc gerit fulmina.* Cap. 21. And Eusebius, who was perfectly well acquainted with the Pagan theology, says expressly, that Ammon was one of the *Surnames* of Jupiter — *ἑνὶ δὲ διὰ τὸν ὑπὸ τῶν ΑΜΜΩΝΑ προσωνομαζόμενον.* *Præp. Evang.* l. iii. c. 3. And Cicero in his book of the *nature of the Gods* makes Cotta take it for granted, that the Capitoline and the Ammonian Jupiter were one and the same, for speaking of the form and figure of the Gods against Velleius, he says, *Et quidem alia [species] nobis Capitolini, alia Atrix, Ammonis Jovis.* Where all the weight of the observation consists in the supposition, that the Capitoline and Ammonian Jupiter were one and the same God. However, this must be confessed, that Capitolinus and Tonans appear to Augustus in a dream, as two different persons, and are so considered by him when awake. The true solution of the difficulty is this: The Pagans worshiped their Gods under a material visible image. And their Statues, when consecrated, were supposed to be informed by an Intelligence, which the God, to whose worship they were erected, sent into them, as his Vicegerent. This general notion furnished Lucian with a very pleasant incident in his *Jupiter Tragicus*, who calling a grand synod of the Gods, is made to summon all those

held little in common with the rest". *They were not raised on the destruction of one another*; because, as hath been observed, the several Religions of Paganism did not consist in matters of belief, and a dogmatic theology, in which, where there is a contrariety, Religions destroy one another; but in matters of practice, in Rites and Ceremonies; and in these, a contrariety did no harm: For having given their Gods different natures and interests, where was the wonder if they clashed in their commanded Rites; or if their worshipers should think this no mark of their false pretensions?

These were horrible defects in the very essence of Pagan theology: and yet from these would necessarily arise *an universal toleration*: for each Religion admitting the other's pretensions, there must needs be of gold, silver, ivory, stone, and copper. Now, in Augustus's dream, it was the *Intelligence*, or Vicegerent, in the statue of Jupiter Capitolinus, who complained of his new brother, in that of Tonans, as getting all the custom from him. This being the whole of the mystery, Jupiter's popular unity remains unshaken.

But what shall we say to the Critic? He censures Row, for not saying what Milton had said; and afterwards censures Milton for not saying what Row had said; and is yet so unlucky as to be doubly mistaken. The case is this, Where Milton speaks of two Jupiters, he is delivering the sense of the *Philosophers*; where Row says there was but one, he is delivering the sense of the *people*; and both were right. But the Critic being in a contradicting humour will have both to be in the wrong.

\* Denique et antequam commercii orbis pateret, & antequam gente: ritus suos morisque miscerent, unaquaque natio conditorum suum, aut ducem inclytum, aut reginam pudicam sexu suo fortiozem, aut alicujus muneris vel artis repertorem venerabatur, ut civem bonæ memoriæ. Sic et defunctis præmium, et futuris dabatur exemplum. *Mineæ. Fæ.* c. xx. Hence may be seen the falshood, both in *fact* and *right*, of the foundation-principle of the book called—*The grounds and reasons of the Christian Religion*; that "it was a *common* and *necessary* method for new Revelations to be built and grounded on precedent Revelations." Chap. iv. p. 20—26. See this position confuted more at large in the second vol. of the *Div. Leg.* Book vi. sect. vi.

a per-



a perfect harmony and INTERCOMMUNITY amongst them. Julian makes this the distinguishing character of the pagan Religion. For the imperial Sophist writing to the people of Alexandria, and upbraiding them for having forsaken the religion of their country, in order to aggravate the charge, insinuates them to be guilty of ingratitude, as having forgotten those happy times when *all Egypt worshiped the Gods IN COMMON*, — καὶ οὐκ εἰσερχέσθαι μνήμη τῆς παλαιᾶς ὑμᾶς ἐκείνης εὐδαιμονίας, ἥνικα ἦν ΚΟΙΝΩΝΙΑ μὲν πρὸς Θεὸς Αἰγύπτῳ τῇ πᾶσιν, πολλῶν δὲ ἀπελευόμεν ἀγαθῶν. And, in his book against the Christian Religion, he says, there were but two commands in the Decalogue, that were peculiar to the Jews, and which the Pagans would not own to be reasonable, namely, the observation of the Sabbath, and the *having no other Gods but the Creator of all things*. Ποῖον ἐστὶ ἐπὶ (says he) πρὸς τῶν Θεῶν ἔξω τῶ, Οὐ προσκυνήσεις Θεοῖς ἑτέροις, καὶ τῶ, Μνησθήσῃ τῶν σαββάτων, ὃ μὴ τὰς ἄλλας οἰεῖται χρῆναι φυλάττειν ἐν ὁλῶς \*. The First Cause of all things, we see, was acknowledged by the gentile Sages: what stuck with them was the not worshipping other Gods IN COMMON. — For according to the genius of Paganism, as here explained, no room was left for any other disputes, but whose God was most powerful; except where, by accident, it became a question, between two nations inhabiting the same country, who was truly the TUTELAR Deity of the place. As once we are told happened in Egypt, and broke out into a religious war:

Inde furor vulgo, quod numina vicinorum  
Odit uterque locus, cum SOLOS CREDIT HABENDOS  
Esse deos, quos ipse colit <sup>b</sup>.

Here the question was not, which of the two worshipped a Phantom, and which a God, but whose

\* Ap. S. Cyril. cont. Julian, l. v.

<sup>b</sup> Juvenal, Sat. xv.

God was the *tutelar* God of the place. Yet to insult the *tutelar* Gods of the place was a thing so rare, and deemed so prodigious, that Herodotus thinks it a clear proof of Cambyfes's incurable madness that he outraged the Religion of Egypt, by stabbing their God Apis and turning their monkey Deities into ridicule<sup>c</sup>. Notwithstanding a late noble writer, from this account of Juvenal, would persuade us<sup>d</sup>, that *intolerance* was of the very nature and genius of the Egyptian theology, from whence all Paganism arose. "The common heathen religion" (says he) was supported chiefly from that sort of "enthusiasm, which is raised from the external objects of grandeur, majesty, and what we call august. On the other hand, the Egyptian or SYRIAN religions, which lay most in mystery and concealed rights, *having less dependance on the Magistracy*, and less of that decorum of art, politeness, and magnificence, ran into a more pusillanimous, frivolous, and mean kind of superstition; the observance of days, the forbearance of meats, and the contention about traditions, seniority of laws, and priority of godships.

"Summus utrimque

"Inde furor vulgo, etc."

Well might he say, he suspected "that it would be urged against him, that he talked at random and *without book*<sup>e</sup>." For the very contrary of every thing he here says, is the truth. And his supposing the Egyptian and Syrian religions had less dependence on the Magistracy than the Roman; and that the Egyptian, and Syrian (as he is pleased to call the *Jewish*) were the same, or of a like genius,

<sup>c</sup> Καμβύσης δε, ως λέγουσι Αιγύπτιοι, διὰ τὸ τοῦ ἀδικήματος αὐτοῦ ἐμάνη, ἰὼν εἰς πρῶτον Φρονήρας. *Thalia*. c. 30.

<sup>d</sup> *Glazartist* c. vol. iii. Miscel. 2.

<sup>e</sup> Vol. iii. p. 41.

<sup>f</sup> P. 82.

is such an instance of his knowledge or ingenuity, as is not easily to be equalled. However, since the noble writer hath made such use of the Satirist's relation, as to insinuate that the Ombites and Tentyrites acted in the common spirit and genius of the Egyptian theology, and became the model of *intolerance* to the Jewish and Christian world, it may not be amiss to explain the true original of these religious squabbles, as Antiquity itself hath told the story: whereby it will appear, they had their birth from a very particular and occasional fetch of civil policy, which had no dependence on the general Superstition of the Pagan world.

The instance stands almost single in Antiquity. This would incline one to think that it arose from no common principle: and if we enquire into the *nature* of the Egyptian theology, it will appear impossible to come from *that*. For the common notion of local and tutelary deities, which prevents all *intolerance*, was originally, and peculiarly, Egyptian, as will be seen hereafter. It may then be asked how this mischief came about? I believe a passage in Diodorus Siculus, as quoted by Eusebius, will inform us. A certain king of Egypt, finding some cities in his dominions apt to plot and cabal against him, contrived to introduce the distinct worship of a different animal into each city; as knowing that a reverence for their own, and a neglect of all others, would soon proceed to an *exclusion*; and so bring on such a mutual aversion, as would never suffer them to unite in one common design. Thus, was there at first as little of a *religious war on the principles of intolerance* in this affair of the Ombites and Tentyrites, as in a drunken squabble between two trading Companies in the church of Rome about their patron saints. But Diodorus deserves to be heard in his own words: who, when he had

had delivered the fabulous accounts of the original of brute-worship, subjoins that which he supposed to be the true. "But some give another original of the worship of brute animals: for the several cities being formerly prone to rebellion, and to enter into conspiracies against Monarchical government, one of their Kings contrived to introduce into each city the worship of a different animal: so that while every one revered the Deity which itself held sacred, and despised what another had consecrated; they could hardly be brought to join cordially together in one common design, to the disturbance of the Government &c."

But to return: such then was the root and foundation of this SOCIABILITY of Religion in the ancient world, so much envied by modern Pagans. The

ἡ Αἰτίας δι' ἣν ἄλλαι φασὶ τινεὶ τῆς τῶν ἀνθρώπων ζωῆς τιμῆς· τῷ γὰρ πολέθῃς τὸ παλαιὸν ἀφιστάμενοι τῶν βασιλείων, καὶ συμφρονήσαντες εἰς τὸ μηκέτι βασιλεύειν, ἐπειροῦσαι τινὰ διαφορὰ σιδοῦσθαι αὐτοῖς τῶν ζώων παρασχῆναι, ὅπως ἰκάνων τὸ μὴ παρὰ αὐτοῖς τιμωμένοι σφοδρῶν τὸ διὰ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀφιερῶμεν καὶ ἀφαιρεῖν, μηδέποτε ὁμοιοῦσαι δύνῃται πάντες οἱ κατ' Αἰγυπτίους. *Euseb. Præp. Evang.* p. 32. Rob. Steph. ed. Plutarch gives us an account of another of these squabbles (if indeed it was not the same with Juvenal's) which happened much about the same time, between the Oxyrynchiæ and the Cynopolitæ; and confirms what is here said of the original of this mutual hatred. — Ἄλλῃ δὲ τῶνδε τῶν δεινῶν τινὰ καὶ πατέρων βασιλείων ἱερῶσι, τὰς Αἰγυπτίους καταμαβύλα τῇ μὴ φύσει καὶ πρὸς μίαν πολλὴν καὶ πλείωσμον ὀχυρῶν οἴκας, ἀμαχῶν δὲ καὶ δυσκαδεῖναι ὑπὸ πολλῆς δυνάμει ἐν τῷ σφρόνῳ καὶ κοινοπραγίᾳ ἔχοντες, αἰδῶν αὐτοῖς ἐν καλῶσπον δόξαντα διδοῦναι διαφορὰς ἀπαυγνὰ πύρρῃσι τῶν γὰρ θηρίων ἃ περιέταξιν ἄλλαι ἄλλα τιμὰ καὶ σιδοῦσαι δυσμῶς καὶ πειλημῶς ἀλλήλους προσφερομένης, καὶ τροφῇ ἰτέραν ἰτέρας προσίσθαι σφιγκτάς, ἀμυνόσας, αἱ τοῖς οἰκείοις ἰσχυροὶ καὶ χαλεπῶς ἀδικήμονες φέρουσιν, ἐλπίθοντες τὴν τῶν θηρίων ἔχθρῃς συνδικόμενοι καὶ συνεκπολεμῶναι πρὸς ἀλλήλους· μῆτοι γὰρ ἐπὶ τῶν Αἰγυπτίων Λυκοπολίται προέβαιον ἐσθίειν, ἐπὶ καὶ λυκοῖς, ὃν διὰ νομίζουσιν· οἱ δὲ Ὀξυρύνχῃται καὶ πρὸς τῶν Κυνωπολιτῶν τὸν ὀχυρῆσιν ἔχοντες ἰσχυροὶ, πικρὰς συλλαγῶν καὶ θοσῆς, εἰς ἱερῶν καὶ σφραγῶν· ἐκ δὲ τῶν καλῶσας εἰς πόλιν, ἀλλήλους τῶν διδοῦναι κακῶς, καὶ ὅτερον ἐπὶ Ρωμαίων καταβύρῃσι διδοῦσας. *Περὶ 12. καὶ ΟΥΣ. 676, 677. Steph. ed.*

effect



effect of their absurdities, as *Religions*; and of their imperfections, as *Societies*. Yet had universal custom made this principle of INTERCOMMUNITY, so essential to Paganism, that when their Philosophers and men of learning, on the spreading of Christianity, were become ashamed of the grossness of Polytheism, and had so refined it by allegorical interpretations of their Mythology, as to make the several Pagan deities but the various attributes of the one only God; they still adhered to their darling principle (for Paganism still continued to be without a dogmatic theology; or formulary of faith) and contended, that this diversity was harmony, a musical discord, well pleasing to the God of heaven and earth. “It is but reasonable for us (says Symmachus<sup>b</sup>) to suppose, that it is one and the same BEING whom all mankind adores. We behold the same stars; we live under the influence of one common heaven; we are encompassed by the same universe. What matters it, what device each man uses in his search after truth? ONE road is plainly too narrow to lead us into the initiation of so GRAND A MYSTERY.” Elegantly alluding to the *secret* of the greater *Mysteries*, where, after the History of the Popular theogony had been delivered to the Initiated, the orphic Hymn, revealing the doctrine of the *Unity*, concluded the entertainment. “The great lord and governor of the earth (says Themistius) seems to be delighted with these diversities of Religions. It is his Will that the Syrians worship him one way, the Greeks another,

<sup>b</sup> *Æquum est, quicquid omnes colunt unum putari; eadem spectamus astra; commune cælum est; idem nos mundus involvit: Quid interest quâ quisque prudentiâ verum requirat? UNO itinere non potest perveniri ad tam GRANDE SECRETUM.* Lib. x. Ep. 61. ad Valent. Theod. et Arcad. Augg.

“ and the Egyptians yet another<sup>1</sup>. The reader sees that the foundation of this way of thinking, was the old principle of *intercommunity* in the worship of local tutelary Deities. But, what is remarkable, it appears even to this day, to be essential to Paganism. Bernier tells us, that the Gentiles of Hindoustan defended their religion against him in this manner: “ They gave me (says he) this pleasant  
 “ answer; that they did not at all pretend that their  
 “ Law was universal—that they did not in the least  
 “ suspect that *ours* was false: it might, for what  
 “ they knew, be a good Law for us, and that God  
 “ MAY HAVE MADE MANY DIFFERENT ROADS TO  
 “ LEAD TO HEAVEN; but they would by no means  
 “ hear that *ours* was general for the whole world,  
 “ and *theirs* a mere fable and invention<sup>2</sup>.” Bernier

<sup>1</sup> Ταύτη νόμιζε γίνεσθαι τῇ ποιικιλίᾳ τῶν τῷ παντὶς Ἀρχηγέτην· ἄλλως Σούρις ἐβίβλει θεοσκευεῖν, ἄλλως Ἕλληνας, ἄλλως Αἰγυπτίους. *Orat.* XII.

<sup>2</sup> Ils me donnoient cette réponse assez plaisante; qu'ils ne pretendoient pas que leur Loi fût universelle — qu'ils ne pretendoient point que la nôtre fût fautive; qu'il se pouvoit faire qu'elle fût bonne pour nous, et que DIEU POUVOIT AVOIR FAIT PLUSIEURS CHEMINS DIFFERENS POUR ALLER AU CIEL; mais ils ne veulent pas entendre que la nôtre tant generale pour toute la terre, la leur ne peut être que fable et que pure invention. *Voyages de Fr. Bernier*, tom. ii. p. 138. Friar William de Rubruquis, a French Minorite, who travelled into Tartary in the year 1253, tells us, c. xliii. that Mangu Chan, Emperor of Tartary, talking to him of religion, said, “ As God hath given unto the hand divers fingers, so he hath given many  
 “ ways to men to come unto him; he hath given the Scribes  
 “ unto you; but he hath given unto us soothsayers, and we do  
 “ that which they bid us, and we live in peace.” The Jesuit Tachard tells us, that the king of Siam made much the same answer to the French ambassador, who moved him, in his master's name, to embrace the Christian religion—Je m'étonne que le roy de France mon bon ami s'intéresse si fort dans une affaire qui regarde Dieu, où il semble que Dieu même ne prenne aucune interest, et qu'il a entièrement laissé à notre discretion. Car ce vray Dieu, qui a créé le ciel et la terre et toutes les creatures qu'on



nier indeed speaks of this as a peculiar whimsy, which had entered the head of his Brachman. But had he been as conversant in history and Antiquity, as he was in modern philosophy, he would have known that this was a principle which accompanied Paganism through all its stages.

Let us now see the nature and genius of those Religions which were founded, as we say, in TRUE REVELATION. The first is the JEWISH; in which was taught the belief of one God, the Maker and Governor of all things, in contradistinction to all the false gods of the Gentiles: This necessarily introduced a DOGMATIC THEOLOGY. So that the followers of this Religion, if they believed it true, in the sense it was delivered to them, must needs believe all others to be false. But it being instituted only for themselves, they had, *directly*, no further to do with that falshood, than to guard themselves

qu'on y voit et qui leur a donné des natures et des inclinations si différentes, ne pouvoit-il pas, s'il eût voulu, en donnant aux hommes des corps et des âmes semblables, leur inspirer les mêmes sentimens pour la religion qu'il falloit suivre, et pour la culte qui luy étoit le plus agreable, et faire naître toutes les nations dans une même loy? Cet ordre parmi les hommes et cette unité de religion dependant absolument de la Providence divine, qui pouvoit aussi aisément introduire dans le monde que la diversité des sectes qui s'y sont établies de tout tems: ne doit-on pas croire que le *vray Dieu prend autant de plaisir à estre honoré par des cultes et des ceremonies différentes, qu'à estre glorifié par une prodigieuse quantité de creatures qui le louent chacune à sa maniere?* Cette beauté et cette variété que nous admirons dans l'ordre naturelle, seroient elles moins admirables dans l'ordre surnaturel, ou moins dignes de la sagesse de Dieu? *Voyage de Siam*, l. v. p. 231, 232. Amst. ed. 1688. The Abbé de Choisi, a coadjutor in this embassy, tells us, that the people were in the same way of thinking with their king.— Jusques ici ils [les missionnaires] n'ont pas fait grand chose dans le royaume de Siam. Les Siamois sont des esprits doux, qui n'aiment pas à disputer, et qui croient la plupart de toutes les religions sont bonnes. *Journal du Voyage de Siam*, p. 200. ed. Amst. 1688.

against

against the contagion of it, by holding no fellowship or communion with the Gentiles.

Yet so strong was this general prejudice of INTERCOMMUNITY, that all the provisions of the Law could not keep this brutal people from running into the idolatries of the Nations: For their frequent defections, till after the Babylonian Captivity, were no other than the joining foreign Worship to the Worship of the God of Israel.

After this Religion, comes the CHRISTIAN, which taught the belief of the same God, the supreme Cause of all things: and being a Revelation, like the other, from Heaven, must needs be built upon that *other*; or at least on the supposition of its truth. And, as this latter was not national, like the other, but given to all mankind, For that reason, but especially for some others, which will be fully considered in their place, it had a MORE COMPLETE system of dogmatick theology. The consequence of this was, that its followers must not only think Paganism false, and Judaism abolished, and so refuse all fellowship and communion with both; but must endeavour to propagate their Religion throughout the world, on the destruction of all the rest. And their dogmatic theology teaching them that TRUTH, (and not UTILITY<sup>1</sup>, as the Pagans, who had only public Rites and Ceremonies, supposed) was the end of Religion; it was no wonder, their aversion to *falsehood* should be proportionably increased. And so far all was right. But this aversion, cherished by piety, unhappily produced a blind, ungovernable zeal; which, when arguments failed, hurried them on to all the unlawful use of force

<sup>1</sup> For this the reader may see Dion. Harlicarnassous's discourse of the religion which Romulus introduced in his republic; and for his reason, see Book iii. and iv.



and compulsion. Hence the evils of PERSECUTION, and the violation of the laws of humanity, in a fond passion for propagating the Law of God<sup>m</sup>.

This

<sup>m</sup> M. Voltaire, in his *Le Siècle de Louis XIV.* having spoken of this persecuting spirit amongst the followers of Christ, and observed that it was unknown to Paganism, says very gravely, that "after having long searched for the cause of this difference between the two religions, both of which abounded with dogmatists and fanatics, he at length found it in the REPUBLICAN SPIRIT of the latter." — This was only mistaking the effect for the cause; and was no great matter in a writer, who in the same place can tell us, not as problematical, but as a known and acknowledged truth, that the Jews as well as Gentiles offered HUMAN sacrifices. — Cette fureur fut inconnue au Paganisme. Il couvrit la terre de ténèbres, mais il ne l'arrosa guerres que du sang des animaux; et si quelquefois CHEZ LES JUIFS, et chez les Païens on devoit des victimes humaines, ces devoirs, tout horribles qu'ils étoient, ne causèrent point de guerres civiles. — J'AI RECHERCHÉ LONGTEMPS comment et pourquoi cet esprit dogmatique, qui divisa les écoles de l'antiquité payenne sans causer le moindre trouble, en a produit parmi nous de si horribles. — Ne pourrait-on pas trouver peut-être l'origine de cette nouvelle peste qui a ravagé la terre, DANS L'ESPRIT REPUBLICAIN qui anima les premières églises. Tom. ii. chap. 32. *Du Calvinisme*, p. 23. Strange! that he should mistake thus, when he had the true cause almost in view, as he had when he made the following observation: La religion des Païens ne consistait que dans la morale et dans des fêtes. And again, in his *Abregé de l'Histoire Universelle* — la raison en est, que les Payens dans leurs erreurs grossières n'avoient point de dogmes, p. 63. The first question is, How he came by his observation? That it was no deduction of his own appears from his not seeing the consequence of the fact contained in it, which was great indifference in Religion: for he goes on with that old encomium on Paganism, which our Free-Thinkers (who did not see from whence the indifference arose) are always ready to give unto it. See p. 164. vol. 1. of the *Abregé*. The second question is, How the Christians came by their republican spirit? And this only is worth an answer. Without doubt it was the SPIRIT OF THEIR RELIGION which gave it to them, when the followers of Paganism had it not. Christianity consists in the belief of certain propositions necessary to salvation; which peculiarity virtually condemns all other Religions. So that these other having the civil power on their side, would endeavour to suppress so inhospitable a Novelty. And this directly violating

This is a true representation of the state of things, both in the Pagan, and in the Believing world. To give it the utmost evidence, we will next consider the reception true Religion met with amongst idolaters.

The Pagan world having early imbibed this inveterate prejudice concerning *intercommunity of worship*, men were but too much accustomed to new Revelations, when the JEWISH appeared, not to acknowledge its superior pretences. Accordingly we find by the history of this People, that it was esteemed a *true one* by its neighbours. And therefore they proceeded, in their usual way, to join it, on occasion, to their own: as those did, whom the king of Assyria sent into the cities of Israel in the place of the ten Tribes. Whereby it happened (so great was the influence of this Principle) that in the same time and country, the Jews of Jerusalem added the Pagan idolatries to their Religion; while the Pagans of Samaria added the Jewish religion to their idolatries.

But when this people of God, in consequence of having their *dogmatic Theology* more carefully inculcated to them after their return from the Captivity, became rigid in pretending not only that their Religion was true, but the only true one; then it was, that they began to be treated by their Neighbours, and afterwards by the Greeks and Romans, with the utmost hatred and contempt for this *THEIR INHUMANITY AND UNSOCIABLE TEMPER*. To this cause alone we are to ascribe all that spleen and rancour which appears in the histories of these latter Nations, concerning them. Celsus fairly reveals what

conscience, produced the *Republican spirit*, or the spirit of resistance; whose natural aim goes no further than *Liberty*; not to *Dominion*. Agreeably hereto, as is observed above, the first persecution for Religion was *borne*, not *inflicted*, by the Christian Church.

lay



lay at bottom, and speaks out, for them all: " If  
 " the Jews, on these accounts, adhere to their own  
 " Law, it is not for *that*, they are to blame: I  
 " rather blame those who forsake their own coun-  
 " try religion to embrace the Jewish. But if these  
 " People give themselves airs of sublimer wisdom  
 " than the rest of the world, and on that score re-  
 " fuse all COMMUNION with it, as not equally pure;  
 " — I must tell them that it is not to be believed  
 " that they are more dear, or agreeable to God,  
 " than other nations <sup>p</sup>." Hence, amongst the Pa-  
 gans, the Hebrew People came to be distinguished  
 from all others by the name of GENUS HOMINUM  
 INVISUM DEIS <sup>o</sup>, and with good reason <sup>p</sup>.

This was the reception the Jews met with in the  
 world: but not pretending to obtrude their Religion  
 on the rest of mankind, as it was given properly to  
 the Posterity of Abraham, they yet, for the most  
 part, escaped persecution.

When CHRISTIANITY arose, though on the foun-  
 dation of Judaism, it was at first received with great  
 complacency by the Pagan world. For they were  
 such utter strangers to the idea of one Religion's be-  
 ing built, or dependent on another, that it was a  
 long time before they knew this connection between  
 them. Even Celsus himself, with all his sufficiency,  
 saw so little how this matter stood, that he was not  
 satisfied whether the Jews and Christians worshiped  
 the same God;—was sometimes inclined to think  
 they did not. This ignorance, which the propa-

<sup>p</sup> Εἰ μὴν δὴ κατὰ ταῦτα περὶ ἑλλοιὺν Ἰουδαίῳ τὸν ἴδιον ἔμμεν, ἔμμεναι  
 αὐτῶν ἰκαίνοι δι' ἡμῶν τῶν καθ' ἡμῶν τὰ σφέτερα, καὶ τὰ Ἰουδαίων  
 προσποιουμένων· εἰ δ' ὡς τι σφώτερον εἰδότες σημεινοῦναι τι, καὶ τῇ ἄλλων  
 κοινωνίᾳ ἢ ἐξ ἴσου καθαρῶν ἀποτρέφουσαι — ἢ μὴν ὅδ' εὐδοκίμειν παρὰ τῷ  
 θεῷ καὶ γέγεσθαι διαφορῶς τι τῶν ἄλλων τέτρες εἰκός. Orig. cont. Cel-  
 sum, l. v. p. 259.

<sup>o</sup> Tacit. Hist., l. v.

<sup>p</sup> See Note (b) p. 56.

gators of our Religion were not too forward to remove<sup>3</sup>, for fear of hindering the progress of the Gospel, prevented the prejudice which the Pagans had to Judaism, from indisposing them to Christianity. So that the Gospel was favourably heard. And the superior evidence, with which it was enforced, inclined men, long habituated to pretended Revelations, to receive it into the number of the Establisht. Accordingly we find one Roman emperor introducing it amongst his closet Religions<sup>4</sup>; and another proposing to the Senate<sup>5</sup>, to give it a more public entertainment<sup>6</sup>. But when it was found to carry

<sup>3</sup> To this old Pagan blindness, some modern Christians seem to have succeeded. They pretend, that what is said in Scripture of the dependency and foundation of Christianity on Judaism, is said by way of ACCOMMODATION to the prejudices of the Jews; but that when the preachers of the Gospel applied themselves to the Gentiles, they preached up Jesus simply, as a divine Messenger, omitting the Jewish characters of the Messiah. Now, though nothing can be more false, or extravagant; yet the method employed by the first Preachers of the Gospel, to introduce Christianity amongst the Gentiles, gives this foolish Doctrine the little countenance it hath.

<sup>4</sup> Alexander Severus. *Lampridii*, c. 29.

<sup>5</sup> Tiberius retulit ad senatum ut INTER CETERA SACRA reciperetur. *Hier.* This, the Father says on the authority of Tertullian and Eusebius. M. Le Clerc, in his *Hist. Eccl. ann. xxix.* rejects the whole story, though it be as strongly supported as a civil fact can well be. What he urges against it is fully obviated by the principles here delivered. Indeed the chief force of his objection arises from several *false additions* to the fact: A circumstance, which may be found in, and hath been brought to the discredit of, the best attested facts of antiquity; such as the defeat of Julian's attempt to rebuild the Temple of Jerusalem. See my discourse on that subject.

<sup>6</sup> The not attending to the genius of Paganism, hath misled some of the best Critics into a very lame judgment on the first Apologists; who, they pretend, have unskillfully managed, in employing all their pains to evince what was so easy to be done, the falshood of Paganism, rather than to prove the truth of their own Religion. For, say these critics, were Paganism proved false,



carry its pretensions higher<sup>a</sup>, and to claim, like the Jewish, the title of the ONLY TRUE ONE, then it was that it began to incur the same hatred and contempt with the Jewish. But when it went still further, and urged a necessity for all men to forsake their national Religions, and embrace the Gospel, this so shocked \* the Pagans, that it soon brought upon

it did not follow that Christianity was true; but were the Christian Religion proved true, it followed that the Pagan was false. But the matter, we see, was just otherwise; and the Apologists acted with much good judgment. The truth of Christianity was acknowledged by the Pagans; they only wanted to have the compliment returned. As this could not be done, there was a necessity to assign the reasons of their refusal. And this gave birth to so many confutations of idolatrous Worship. It is true, when their adversaries found them persist in their unfociable pretences, they paid this harsh treatment in kind; and accused Christianity, in its turn, of falshood: but this was not till afterwards, and then faintly, and only by way of acquit. For want of due reflection on these things, both FABRICIUS and L'ENFANT have been betrayed into this wrong judgment.—Facilius subscribo (says the first) judicio viri celeberrimi atque eruditissimi Jacobi L'enfant, in *Diario Londinensi, Hist. of the works of the learned, A. 1709. p. 284.* Il y a long tems, qu'on a eu lieu de remarquer, que la religion Chrétienne est une bonne cause, qui de tout tems a été sujette à être aussi mal défendue, que mal attaquée. Ses PREMIERS APOLOGISTES la soutinrent mieux par leur zèle, par leur piété, et par leurs souffrances, que par les Apologies, qu'ils nous en ont laissées. — *Delectus argum. et syllabus script. qui relig. Christ. asser.* p. 209.

<sup>a</sup> This was not understood immediately by the Pagans, as appears from a remarkable passage of Lampridius in his life of Alexander Severus—Christo templum facere voluit [Alex. Severus] cumque inter deos recipere — Sed prohibitus est ab iis qui, consulentes sacra, repererant omnes Christianos futuros si id opato evenisset, et templa reliqua deferenda. Now those who rested this conclusion on an oracle, or divine premonition, could have no knowledge of the nature of Christianity.

\* The reader will not be displeased to hear a curious story, from the life of St. Ansbarius, which tends much to illustrate what we say, concerning the genius of Paganism, and the reason of its aversion to Christianity. This Saint travelling amongst the people of the North, fell into the following adventure: — Per-

upon itself the bloody storms which followed. Thus you have the true origin of *persecution for Religion*: (though not of the *intolerant principle*, as we shall see before we come to the end of this section.) A persecution not committed, but undergone, by the Christian Church.

Hence we see how it happened, that such good Emperors as Trajan and M. Antonine came to be found in the first rank of persecutors. A difficulty that hath very much embarrassed the enquirers into ecclesiastical antiquity; and given a handle to the Deists, who empoison every thing, of pretending to suspect that there must be something very much amiss in primitive Christianity, while such wise ma-

venit ad Byrcam, ubi invenit regem et multitudinem populi nimio errore confusam. Instigante enim Diabolo, contigit, eo ipso tempore, ut quidam illo adveniens diceret, se in conventu deorum, qui ipsam terram possidere credebantur adfuisse, et ab iis missum, ut hæc regi et populis nuntiaret: Vos, inquiunt, nos vobis propitios diu habuistis, et terram incolatus vestri cum multa abundantia nostro adjutorio in pace et prosperitate longo tempore tenuistis. Vos quoque nobis sacrificia et vota debita perolvistis. At nunc et sacrificia solita subtrahitis, et vota spontanea segnitius offertis, et, quod magis nobis displicet, alienum Deum super vos introducitis. Si itaque nos vobis propitios habere vultis, sacrificia omissa augete, et vota majora perolvite. Alterius quoque Dei culturam, quæ contraria nobis docetur, ne apud vos recipiatis, et ejus servitio ne intendatis. Porro si etiam plures Deos habere desideratis, et vobis non sufficimus, Ericum quondam regem vestrum nos unanimis in collegium nostrum adseiscimus, ut sit unus de numero Deorum. Mabillon A& SS. Ord. S. Bened. Sæc. iv. p. 2. And how little these Pagans doubted of Christianity's being a real Revelation from a God, we may see in another place of the same *Life*, where one of their piratical kings proposes, according to their custom, to enquire by divination what place they should next invade:—Interim rex præfatus cum Danis agere cœpit, ut forte perquirerent, utrum voluntate deorum locus ipse ab eis devastandus esset. Multi, inquit, ibi sunt Dii potentes et magni, ibi etiam olim ecclesia constructa est, et cultura Christi à multis Christianis ibi excolitur, qui fortissimus est Deorum, et potest sperantibus in se quomodo vult auxiliari—Quæsitum est igitur fortibus, etc. Cap. xvi.

gistrates



gistrates could become its persecutors. But now the reason is manifest: the Christian pretences overthrew a fundamental principle of Paganism, which they thought founded in nature; namely, *the friendly intercommunity of worship*. And thus the famous passage of Pliny the younger becomes intelligible. "For I did not in the least hesitate, but that whatever should appear on confession, to be their faith, yet that their frowardness and inflexible obstinacy would certainly deserve punishment." What was this inflexible obstinacy? It

The very learned and acute Mr. MOYLE says, *it was the greatest misfortune that could have befallen the Christians to be persecuted by so great and good a man [M. ANTONINE.]* *Post. Works*, v. ii. p. 274. And Lord SHAFTSBURY observes, *that nothing could have been a greater honour or advantage to Christianity than to be persecuted by a NERO.* Letter con. Enthuf. Sect. III. We shall know what to think of these observations, when we have considered how the case stood with regard to persecuting Emperors. In this class we find, on one side, Nero, Domitian and the Maximiani; on the other, Trajan, the Antonines, and Valerian. Had the Persecutors been all like the first set, Unbelievers would have said "No wonder that force and violence failed to root out the Christian sect, when employed by such Monsters as were hated by Gods and Men." Had the Persecutors, on the contrary, been all of the other kind, Unbelievers would then have said, "There must needs have been something very wrong in the Christian practice, or very impudent in the imposture of their pretences, to provoke the sanguinary resentments of Emperors so wise and clement." But now, to see CHRISTIANITY persecuted indifferently by the Good and Bad, is sufficient to reduce the enemies of Revelation to silence upon this topic: and is enough to satisfy unprejudiced men, assisted in their judgment by what has been said above, that Providence appeared anxious (as it were) to shew, by this disposition of things, that matters very foreign to the merits of the case set this violent machine a-going; whose issue, it was decreed, should convince the World that all it's Power was weakness, when opposed to the progress of the GOSPEL.

<sup>2</sup> Neque enim dubitabam, quaecunque esset quod faterentur, certe, pertinaciam et inflexibilem obstinationem debere puniri, Lib. x. Ep. 97.

could not consist in professing a *new Religion*: that was a thing common enough. It was the refusing all communion with Paganism; refusing to throw a grain of incense on their altars. For we must not think, as is commonly imagined, that this was at first enforced by the Magistrate to make them renounce their Religion; but only to give a *test* of its *social and hospitable* temper. It was indeed, and rightly, understood by the Christians to be a renouncing of their Religion; and so, accordingly, abstained from. The misfortune was, that the Pagans did not consider this *inflexibility* as a mere error; but as an *immorality* likewise. The *unsociable, uncommunicable* temper, in matters of religious worship, was esteemed by the best of them, as a *hatred and aversion to mankind*. Tacitus, speaking of the burning of Rome: “Haud perinde in  
“ crimine incendii quam ODIO HUMANI GENERIS  
“ convicti sunt \* [Christiani].” *Convicted*, he says, *of hate to all mankind*. But how? The confession of the Pagans themselves, concerning the purity of the Christian morals, shews this could be no other than a *conviction* of their rejecting all *intercommunity of Worship*; which, so great was their prejudice, they thought could proceed from nothing but *hate to mankind*. The like character the same historian gives of the Jews: “Apud ipsos FIDES OBSTINATA, sed adversus omnes alios HOSTILE ODIOUM <sup>b</sup>.” *Now the*

\* Ann. xv. Sect. 44.

<sup>b</sup> *Hist.* lib. v. c. 5. St. Paul tells us in what this *hostile odium* consisted, where speaking of their obstinate adherence to the Law against all the conviction of the Gospel, he says, *And they gloried not God, and are CONTRARY TO ALL MEN*, 1 *Thess.* ii. 15. They were not *contrary to all men* in their having different Rites: for each nation had rites different from one another: but in their condemning and reprobating all Rites but their own: which being (till the coming of Christianity) peculiar to themselves, was ascribed to their *hatred of mankind*.



Jews and Christians had nothing in common but this unfociable uncommunicable temper in religious matters, this *obstinata fides* which gave so much offence to Paganism. We are not to imagine, these excellent Pagan moralists so blind as not to see all the merit of a firm and fixed resolution of keeping a good conscience. They did see and own it, as appears by the famous "Justum et tenacem propositi virum," etc. of one of their moral poets. But, unluckily for truth, they did not see the *pervicacia et inflexibilis obstinatio* of the Christians in that light. Though it was nothing more than such a fixed resolution, as one who most severely censured them for it, the good emperor Marcus Antoninus, fairly confesses. In his book of *Meditations*, speaking of a wise man's readiness to die, he says, "He should be so prepared, that his readiness may be seen to be the effect of a well-weighed judgment, not of MERE OBSTINACY, like that of the Christians." This is a very heavy charge on the primitive Martyrs. But he himself removes it in his Constitution to the Community of Asia, given us by Eusebius. "I know," says he, the Gods are watchful to discover such sort of men. For it is much more fit that they themselves should punish those who REFUSE TO WORSHIP THEM, than that we should interfere

\* — τὰ δὲ εἰρημον τῶτα, ἵνα ἀπὸ ἰδιᾶς κρείττως ἀρχῆται, μὴ κατὰ βίαν παρὰ τὰς, ὡς οἱ Χριστιανοί. Lib. xi, § 3. But by this mere obstinacy, no more possibly might be meant than a rigid adherence to truth, which was not one of the distinguishing virtues of this royal Philosopher, as appears even from these *Meditations*. He represents L. Verus, his Colleague in the Empire, as a pattern of vigilance, sobriety and decency; and his Wife Faustina, as exemplary for her conjugal tenderness and fidelity. Might not then the same STOICAL PRIDE which thought fit to cover Luxury and Lust under the names of Temperance and Chastity, be ready to call the divine Heroism of the Christian Martyrs a brutal obstinacy?

“in it<sup>d</sup>.” Why then was it called *mere obstinacy*? The reason is seen above: universal prejudice had made men regard a refusal of this *intercommunity* as the most brutal of all dissociability. And the emperor Julian, who understood this matter the best of any, fairly owns, that the Jews and Christians brought the execration of the world upon them by their aversion to the Gods of Paganism, and their refusal of all communication with them<sup>e</sup>.

On this occasion, it may not be improper, once for all, to expose the ignorance and malice of those, whom the French call *PHILOSOPHERS*, and we English, *FREE-THINKERS*; who, with no more knowledge of Antiquity, than what the *modern sense* of a few latin and greek words could afford them, have his *odium humani generis* perpetually in their mouths, to disgrace the chosen People of God, or rather the Author of their Religion. Their favorite author, Tacitus himself, by extending the abuse, discomtences it. He makes this *odium humani generis* the characteristic *both of Jews and Christians*; and by so doing, shews us, in what it consisted. Nor do the Ancients in general, by affixing it as the common brand to these two *inhospitable Religions* contribute to this calumny, any otherwise than by the incapacity of our *Philosophers* to understand them. Diodorus Siculus speaking<sup>f</sup> of Antiochus's profanation of the *Jewish Temple*, and his contemptuous destruction of the *Sacred Books*, applauds the Tyrant's exploits, as those Books contained τα μυστέρινα νόμιμα, *Laws, which bore hate and*

<sup>d</sup> Εγὼ μὲν οἶδ' ὅτι καὶ τοῖς θεοῖς ἐπιμαλὲς ἔστι μὴ λαοθάνατον τοῖς αὐτοῖς· πολλὸν γὰρ μάλλον ἐκείνοι καλᾶσαι αἱ τὰς μὴ βυλομένης αὐτὸς προσκαταίειν ἢ ἡμεῖς. Euseb. Eccl. Hist. l. iv. c. 13.

<sup>e</sup> Ἀλλὰ τὸ, ὃ προσκυνοῦσι θεοῖς ἑτέροις· ὃ δὲ μίγα τῆς περὶ τὸ θεῖον φησι διαβολῆς· οὗτος γὰρ ζηλωτὴς φησι—ἀφ' οὗ τῶτον τὸν λῆρον, καὶ μὴ τηλικαύτην ἰφ' ὑμῶν αὐτῶν ἔλαβεν βλασφημίαν. Apud Cyrill. cont. Jul. l. v.

<sup>f</sup> Eclog. i. ex Deod. Sic. l. 31.



enmity to all the rest of Mankind. This pretended odium humani generis, we find then, was not any thing in the personal temper of the Jews, but in the nature and genius of their LAW. These Laws are extant and lie now before us; and we see, the only hate they contain is the hate of Idols. With regard to the race of Mankind, nothing can be more endearing than the Mosaic account of their common original; nothing more benign or salutary than the legal directions to the Jews concerning their treatment of all, out of the COVENANT. Whatever there might be of this odious temper fairly ascribed to the Jews, by our Philosophers, it received no countenance from the LAW, and is expressly condemned by the Almighty Author of it, when it betrayed itself amongst certain corrupt and apostate members of that Nation. These, indeed, the Prophet Isaiah describes, as saying to all others, — *Stand by thyself, come not near me; for I am holier than thou*<sup>r</sup>. And lest this should be mistaken for the fruits of the unhospitable genius of the Law, he takes care to inform us that these men were the rankest and most abandoned Apostates. — *A rebellious People who sacrifice in gardens, and burn incense upon Altars of Brick—who remain amongst the graves, and lodge in the monuments, which eat swine's flesh, &c.*<sup>b</sup> that is, a People thoroughly paganized.

Thus have I endeavoured to explain the true origin of that universal TOLERATION (as far as Religion influenced it) under Paganism; and the accidental causes of its violation under Christianity. The account will be further useful to many considerable purposes, as will be seen hereafter. At present I shall only take notice how well it obviates one specious objection against Christianity. “If this Religion say the

<sup>r</sup> If. c. 65. v. 5.

<sup>b</sup> v. 2—3—4.

Deists, were accompanied with such illustrious and extraordinary marks of truth, as is pretended; how happened it, that its truth was not seen by more of the best and wisest of those times? And if it were seen, (as it certainly was) how could they continue Pagans?" The answer is easy. The conviction of the truth of a *new* Religion was not deemed a sufficient reason, by men, overrun with the general prejudice of INTERCOMMUNITY, to quit their *old* ones.

The case indeed was different in a Jew, who held none of this *intercommunity*. If such a one owned the truth of Christianity, he must needs embrace it. We conclude, therefore, that the passage of Josephus (who was as much a Jew as the Religion of Moses could make him) which acknowledges, *Jesus to be THE CHRIST*<sup>1</sup>, is a rank forgery, and a very stupid one too<sup>k</sup>. But it hath been said, that Josephus was a *Jewish Convert*. If so, it must be *to* Judaism, and not *from* it. For where he affirms, against Apion, that *there ought to be but one Temple for one God*<sup>1</sup>, he speaks the very spirit of the LAW,

We have now seen the motives the civil Magistrate had to *tolerate*: — Of what nature that *toleration* was: — And how easily it was brought about.

But then, lest the People should abuse this right of worshiping according to their own will, to the detriment of the State in private and clandestine conventicles (which right the Magistrate supported for the civil benefit of it) He took care that such worship

<sup>1</sup> — Ἰησοῦς, σοφὸς ἀνὴρ. εἶπε Ἄνδρα αὐτὸν λέγειν χεῖρ ἢ γὰρ παραδόξων ἔργων ποιητής. Διδασκαλὸν ἀνθρώπων, τῶν ἡδοτῶν τὰ ληθῆ δεχομένων. — Ο ΧΡΙΣΤΟΣ ΟΥΤΟΣ ΗΝ. — Ἐφανη γὰρ αὐτοῖς τρίτη ἡμέρα πάλιν ζῶν τῶν θείων προφητῶν ταῦτα, καὶ ἄλλα μυρία θαυμάσια περὶ αὐτοῦ εἰρηκότων. *Antiq.* xviii. 3. 2.

<sup>k</sup> See a further proof of it, Vol. ii, Book v. Sect. 4.

<sup>1</sup> Lib. II.

should



should have the public approbation and allowance, before it was received on the footing of a *tolerated Religion*.

So, by the laws of ATHENS, no *strange God*, nor *foreign Worship* was permitted, till approved and licensed by the Court of AREOPAGUS. This is the reason why St. Paul, who was regarded as the bringer in of *foreign Gods*, *ΞΕΝΩΝ ΔΑΙΜΟΝΙΩΝ*, was had up to that Tribunal. Not as a criminal<sup>m</sup>,  
but

<sup>m</sup> St. Chrysostom supposed the Apostle was convened before the Areopagus as a CRIMINAL: and his authority hath made it the general opinion: From whence, the learned Author of a Tract intitled, *Observations on the conversion of St. Paul*, hath received it. I would rather think, that the *Philosophers*, who encountered him, invited him thither as a PUBLIC BENEFAC-  
TOR, who had a new Worship to propose to the people. My reasons are these:

1. St. Paul was taken up to this Court by the PHILOSOPHERS. Acts xvii. 19.—But the Philosophers, of that time, abhorred the character of delators or persecutors for Religion: this was a temper which sprung up amongst them with the progress of Christianity. The worst opinion they had of Paul was his being a *bab-  
bler*, as the Epicureans called him; though the Stoics thought more reverently of his character, as a *setter forth of strange gods*, *Ξένων δαιμονίων καταγγελλόμενος*; a discoverer of some *foreign Gods*; for their hospitality extended to all *strangers*, (as Julian tells us) whether *Gods* or *Men*; and this could not but be a welcome office to a people disposed to raise altars even to *Gods unknown*, v. 23.

2. Their address to him, when they had brought him thither, [*may we know what this doctrine, whereof thou speakest, is*, v. 19.] implies rather a request to a Teacher than an interrogatory to a Criminal.

3. At least, the reason they give for their request goes no further than to imply a desire of satisfaction concerning a doubtful matter — *For thou bringest certain strange things to our ears*, v. 20. *Ξένων δαιμονίων*, certain foreign ceremonies or customs. And Strabo, as we see, tells us, the Athenians were most addicted to *foreign worship*.

4. The very words of the sacred historian seem to shew that this was the whole of the matter. — *For all the Athenians, and strangers which were there* [i. e. such as resided there for education, or out of love for the Athenian manners] *spent their time*

but rather as a public benefactor, who had a *new Worship* to propose to a people, *religious above all others,*

*in nothing else but either to tell or to bear some new thing.* Had the historian understood the citation to be of the criminal form, he would surely have given a more pertinent reason for the Athenians' conduct; such as their jealousy of danger to the State, or the established Religion.

5. St. Paul's speech to the Court hath not the least air of an apology suiting a person *accused*; but is one continued information of an important matter, such as befitted a Teacher or Benefactor to give.

6. Had he appeared as a Criminal, the charge against him would have been simply, *The setting forth of strange Gods.* Now this charge of less importance he declines to answer; and yet confesses a much greater crime, of which he was not accused, namely a condemnation of their established Worship — *And the times of this ignorance God winked at, etc. v. 30.*

7. The behaviour of the Court towards him shews he was not heard as a Criminal. He is neither acquitted nor condemned: but dismissed as a man, *coram non judice.* — *And when they heard of the resurrection of the dead, some mocked: and others said, We will bear thee again of this matter, v. 32.*

8. He left the Court, as one thus dismissed. — *So Paul departed from amongst them, v. 33.* A strange way of intimating a juridical acquittal: but very naturally expressing a resentment for a slighted mission. For as some *mocked*, and others referred him to an indefinite time of audience, nothing was left him but to depart, and, according to his master's direction, *to shake the dust from off his feet.*

9. The historian's reflection on the whole supports all the foregoing reasons — *Howbeit, certain men clave unto him, and believed, etc. v. 34.* A very natural conclusion of the story, if only a transaction within the sphere of his Mission; for then, having related its ill success in general, *some mocking, and others putting off the bearing,* he adds, that however it was not altogether without effect, for a few converts he did make, *etc.* But if we suppose it a narrative of a juridical process, we shall not find in it one circumstance of a proper relation. We are not so much as told whether he was acquitted or censured, or gave caution for a new appearance: But, as if so illustrious a prosecution (where the most learned of the Apostles was the Criminal, the Greek Philosophers his *accusers*, and the Court of Areopagus his *Judges*) was below the historian's notice, we are told a thing quite foreign to the matter, — That he made but few converts.

In



others, ΩΣ ΔΕΙΞΙΔΑΙΜΟΝΕΣΤΕΡΟΙ; most ad-  
dicted, as Strabo tells us, to the recognition of *fo-  
reign Worship*<sup>n</sup>; and “ of all the Greeks, as Julian  
“ observes, most devoted to Religion, and most hos-  
“ pitable to strangers<sup>o</sup>.” Tully<sup>p</sup> makes Solon the  
founder of this Court. But the Arundel marbles,  
and Plutarch in his life of that Lawgiver<sup>q</sup>, contra-  
dict this opinion; and the latter, in support of his  
own, quotes a law of Solon’s, which makes men-  
tion of the Areopagus as already existing. The dif-  
ficulty is how to reconcile these accounts. I ima-  
gine this might be the case: Solon, we know, was  
employed by the Athenians to new-model their  
Commonwealth, by reforming the ill Constitutions,

In a word, take this history in the sense here explained, and  
the whole narrative is simple, exact, and luminous: Take it in  
the other, and it scarce affords us one single quality of a perti-  
nent relation, but is obscured from one end to the other, both  
by redundancies and omissions.

But had the interpreters not overlooked a plain fact, they  
would have given a different sense to this adventure. When  
Christianity first appeared, its two enemies, the Jews and Gan-  
tiles, had long administered their superstitions on very different  
principles. The Jews employed *persecution*; but the Gentiles  
gave a free *toleration*. And, though, soon after, the latter  
went into the *intolerant* measures of the other, yet, at this time,  
they still adhered to the ancient genius of Paganism. So that,  
of the many various persecutions of the Christian Teachers, re-  
corded in *The Acts of the Apostles*, there is not one but what was  
begun and carried on by Jewish Magistrates, or at least excited  
by their emissaries; if we except that at Philippi, which too was  
on pretence of an injury to private property. — But the good  
Father, like more modern Interpreters, was full of the ideas of  
his own times, when the Persecution of the Christian Faith was  
far advanced, rather than those of St. Paul, when it was not  
yet begun. And so I leave it (as it is a mistake) to be obstinately  
persisted in.

<sup>n</sup> Ἀθηναῖοι δ’ ὥσπερ περὶ τὰ ἄλλα φιλοξενήεις διαλέλυσαν, ἔτω καὶ  
περὶ τῆς θείας. πολλὰ γὰρ τῶν ξενικῶν ἱερῶν παρεδέξαντο. *Geogr.* l. x.  
<sup>o</sup> — ὡς καὶ φιλόδοιοι μάλιστα πάντων εἰσὶ, καὶ δίκαιοι πρὸς τὰς ξένους.  
*Misopog.*

<sup>p</sup> *De Officiis*, lib. i. c. 22.

<sup>q</sup> *Vitæ parall.* vol. i. p. 194. edit. Bryan.

and supplying such as were defective. So that in the number of his regulations, this might be one; The adding, to the Court of Areopagus, the peculiar jurisdiction in question; as of great moment to public utility. And having thus enlarged and ennobled its Jurisdiction, he was afterwards regarded as its founder. A passage in *Æschylus* seems, at first sight indeed, not to favour this opinion; but to insinuate, that this Jurisdiction was coëval with the Court. In the fifth act of his *Eumenides*, he makes the worship of the *Furies*, or the *venerable Goddesses*, as they were called, to be received and recognized in Athens, by a decree of *Minerva*, as head of the college of Areopagus, which the poet feigns she had just then instituted. But this plainly appears to have been contrived only for the sake of a poetical embellishment: and *Æschylus* seems to employ one circumstance in this scene, designedly to inform us of the order of time, in which the Court received its two different jurisdictions. It is, where he makes the *criminal* cause of *Orestes*, the first which was judged at that Tribunal; and the *religious* one, of the reception of the *Eumenides*, but the second. However this be, the Areopagus was, by far, the most formidable judicature in the republic. And it is observable, that *Aristophanes*, who spares neither the fleets, the armies, the Courts of justice, the person of the supreme Magistrate, the Assemblies of the people, or the Temples of the Gods themselves, does not dare to hazard the least injurious reflection on that venerable body.

The ROMANS had a law to the same purpose; which, as often as it was violated, was publicly vindicated by the authority of the State: as appears from the words of *Posthumius* in *Livy*, quoted in the last section: “*Quoties hoc patrum avorumque*  
“*ætatē negotium est magistratibus datum, ut sacra*  
“*externa*



“ externa fieri vetarent, sacrificulos vatesque foro,  
 “ circo, urbe prohiberent, vaticinos libros conqui-  
 “ rerent ?” etc. Which shews their care to have  
 all *tolerated* religions under the Magistrate’s in-  
 spection. And, if I am not much mistaken, Tul-  
 ly, in his *Books of Laws*, the substance of which  
 is taken from the *Twelve tables*, gives us that very  
 law; whereby, as we said, all foreign and clandes-  
 tine worship, unauthorized by the civil magistrate,  
 was forbid. SEPARATIM NEMO HABESSIT DEOS:  
 NEVE NOVOS, NEVE ADVENAS, NISI PUBLICE AD-  
 SCITOS, PRIVATIM COLUNTO. “ No man shall  
 “ worship

<sup>a</sup> Lib. xxxix. *Hist.*

<sup>a</sup> Lib. ii. c. 8. Thus, I think, the words ought to be read  
 and pointed. The common reading is, *separatim nemo habessit  
 deos neve novos: sed ne advenas, nisi publice adscitos, privatim co-  
 lunto*: which is absurd and unintelligible. The manuscript  
 quoted by Manutius reads, *neve novos sive advenas*. In a word,  
 this Law seems not to have been understood by the critics, from  
 their not apprehending the nature of Paganism, and the dis-  
 tinction between their *tolerated* and *established* religions. By the  
 first branch, *separatim nemo habessit deos*, is meant that the Gods  
 in general should not be worshiped in private CONVENTICLES,  
 or be had, as it were, in propriety; (*Suos deos*, says the com-  
 ment) but lie in common to all the Citizens. And by the se-  
 cond branch, *neve novos, neve advenas, nisi publice adscitos, pri-  
 vatim colunto*, is meant that PARTICULARS should not worship  
 any new or foreign god without licence and authority from the  
 State. For we must remember what hath been said, in the first  
 section of this book, concerning the two parts of Pagan religion;  
 the one public, and the other private; the one, which had the  
 State for its subject; the other, *particulars*. Now the State, as  
 such, worshiped only the country gods; and this was properly  
 the *established religion*. Particulars, as such, frequently grew  
 fond of new and foreign gods, and modes of worship: and  
 these, when allowed by the state, were their *tolerated religions*.  
*Privatim* therefore signifies [*by particulars*] not [*privately*], which  
 latter sense would make a contradiction in the sentence: *Nisi pub-  
 lifice adscitos, privatim colunto*: “ Let them not worship them  
 “ PRIVATELY, unless they be PUBLICLY allowed.” For how  
 could those be said to be *privately* worshiped, that were *publicly*  
 owned? By *deos novos*, both here and in the comment, I sup-  
 pose,

“ worship the Gods clandestinely, or have them separately to himself: nor shall any new or foreign God be worshiped by particulars, till such God hath been legally approved of, and tolerated by the magistrate.” The comment, as concise, and consequently as obscure as the text, follows in these words: SUOSQUE DEOS, AUT NOVOS, AUT ALIENIGENAS COLI, CONFUSIONEM HABET RELIGIONUM, ET IGNOTAS CEREMONIAS: NON A SACERDOTIBUS, NON A PATRIBUS ACCEPTOS DEOS, ITA PLACERET COLI, SI HUIC LEGI PARUERANT IPSI. “ For each man to have his Gods in peculiar,

posse, is meant *gods newly become such*: which in another place he calls — *quasi NOVOS et adscriptitios cives in calum receptos*. — *De nat. deer.* l. iii. c. 15. For the *dii minorum gentium* were a kind of every-day manufacture: such as Tully in the words immediately following thus describes: *Oillos quos endo cælo merita vocaverint*; or, *these gods had newly discovered themselves to men*. And by *ADVENAS*, the *known local gods of other countries*.

Lib. ii. c. 10. Thus I venture to correct the passage. The common editions have it — *Non a sacerdotibus, non a patribus acceptos deos, ita PLACET coli, si huic legi PARUERUNT ipsi*. Gruter says: *Ita me Deus amet, vix intelligo: hæreo, adhuc hæreo*. — And none of the critics have pretended to make sense of it, but Petit, in his comment on the Attic laws: *De advenis Diis (says he) sibi facit obijci Tullius, an non liceat acceptos a sacerdotibus aut a patribus alienigenas Deos colere? Respondet Cicero, Ecce, si, prout hac cavebatur lege, publice sint adsciti, non priva patrum aut sacerdotum auctoritate. Hic igitur verborum Tullii sensus est, qui latet et lectores fugit, qui excidit interrogationis nota, loco suo restituenda et reponenda ad hunc modum. Suosque deos, aut novos aut alienigenas coli, confusionem habet religionum, et ignotas ceremonias. Non a sacerdotibus, non a patribus acceptos deos? Ita placet coli, si huic legi PARUERINT ipsi*. But as plausible as this appears, it cannot, I think, be the true interpretation. Cicero is made to object impertinently: for who, from the words *novos, novos, neue advenas, nisi publicè adscitos, præstatim colimus*, could form any suspicion that, by this law, *the gods received by the priests or their forefathers*, (which certainly had long enjoyed the public allowance) were forbid to be worshipped? And those not publicly allowed, were forbid, from whatever quarter they were brought in. On the other hand, the

“culiar, whether *new* or *stranger* Gods, without  
 “public allowance, tends to defeat and confound  
 “all religion, and introduce clandestine worship:  
 “and had the priests and our forefathers had a due  
 “regard to this law, we should never have ap-  
 “proved of that kind of worship which we now  
 “pay to the Gods they introduced amongst us.”

But notwithstanding all this, Mr. Bayle, from the words above quoted from the speech of Posthumius in Livy, would persuade us <sup>u</sup>, that the Romans

the propriety of the sense, given above, is seen from hence:

1. That the observation is of the nature of an example to a precept. He delivers a *law* concerning the licensing new religions by the Magistrate; and then takes notice that, had it been well observed in Rome, it had prevented a great deal of superstition.  
 2. The frequent breach of this *law* in Rome was a notorious fact; as appears by the speech of Posthumius in Livy, quoted above; and therefore very likely to be taken notice of by Tully, when he was upon this subject. And what St. Austin says, in his second book of the *City of God*, concerning the actions told of the gods in their public worship at Rome, and the lubricity of that worship, shews the seasonableness of this animadversion. Further, as the general sense of the *law* justifies the emendation in the *Comment*; so the words, *aut novos, aut alienigenas*, in the *Comment*, confirm the correction in the *law*.—By, *confusionem religionum*, I suppose Tully meant, such a confusion of ceremonies, as would leave no distinction between the *established* and the *tolerated* worship; and thereby reduce Religion to so impotent a state, as to render it useless to civil Society: And by, *ignotas ceremonias*, rites, which the Magistrate, by reason of their celebration in private conventicles, could not take cognizance of; which might hurt the morals of society, by their lewdness, as happened in the Bacchanals at Rome; or endanger its peace by cabals and factions, supported and encouraged by the secrecy of their celebration. In the remaining words, Cicero gives a plain intimation, that, had this law been observed, many superstitions both in the *established* and *tolerated* religions had been avoided; which he hints had been introduced, without warrant from the State, by an interested Priesthood and an ignorant Ancestry. To conclude, the neglect of this law in Rome was very notorious: and, probably, owing to their having no standing judicature, as at Athens, for that purpose.

<sup>u</sup> *Pens. div. c. 221.*



did not admit or tolerate foreign worship; and that the care of the Magistrate, there taken notice of by the Consul, was to prohibit all religions, but the *established*: an opinion which the whole Roman history discredits; where we find the Magistrate, from time to time, *tolerated* all foreign religions with the utmost facility. The care then, which Posthumius meant, was surely that of preventing all clandestine worship, unlicensed by the Magistrate: This appears even from that other passage brought by Mr. B. from Livy to support his assertion: “Nec cor-  
 “pora modo affecta tabo, sed animos quoque mul-  
 “tiplex religio et pleraque externa invasit, novos  
 “ritus sacrificando, vaticinando *inferentibus in do-*  
 “*mos, quibus quæstui sunt capti superstitione ani-*  
 “*mi*.” But more particularly from the very affair, Posthumius was here engaged in. At this juncture, the State was above measure exasperated by the monstrous enormities committed in the clandestine rites of Bacchus: yet it is observable, that, in the edict passed in the very height of their resentment, the right of *toleration* was preserved inviolate: the Decree of the Senate forbidding “any celebration of  
 “the *Bacchanals* either in Rome or Italy. But that  
 “if any one should be possessed with a belief that  
 “this sort of rite was due by custom, and neces-  
 “sary; and that he could not omit the celebration  
 “of it without irreligion and impiety, he should lay  
 “his case before the city Pretor; the Pretor should  
 “consult the Senate, when there was not less than  
 “an hundred in council, to know if they approved  
 “of it. These cautions observed, the rites might  
 “be celebrated, provided that not more than five  
 “assisted at the sacrifice, that they had no com-

\* Lib. iv. *Hæ.*

"*mon purse, no priest, nor a master of the solemnities*."

As here, the Magistrate's care, in expelling foreign religions, was to prevent clandestine worship amongst the *tolerated*; so at other times, the same care was employed in preventing those foreign religions from mixing with the *established*, as we are informed by Valerius Maximus<sup>2</sup>. But neither in that case, nor in this, was the liberty of *particulars*, to worship as they thought fit, at all infringed, or impaired.

Dionysius of Halicarnassus plainly distinguishes between their *established* and *tolerated* religions. The passage is curious; and will not only serve to confute Mr. B.'s notion, but will afford us an opportunity of explaining what is further necessary to clear up this embarrassed subject. The words of this diligent enquirer into the roman Constitution, are these: "What, above all things, raised my admiration was, that, notwithstanding the vast multitudes which throng from all parts to Rome, who must there, consequently, worship their own country Gods, according to their country rites; yet the city never adopted any of these foreign worships into the PUBLIC religion; as hath been the custom for many other states to do<sup>3</sup>." Whence it appears, 1. That all strangers might freely wor-

<sup>2</sup> — Ne qua Bacchanalia Romæ, neve in Italia essent. Si quis tale sacrum solenne et necessarium duceret, nec sine religione et piaculo sed id omittere posse apud Prætorem urbanum profiteretur; Prætor senatum consularet, si ei permissum esset, quom in senatu centum non minus essent, ita id sacrum faceret, dum ne plus quinque sacrificio interessent, neu qua pecunia communis, neu quis magister sacrorum, aut sacerdos esset. Lib. xxxix.

<sup>3</sup> Lib. i. c. 3.

<sup>4</sup> Καὶ ὁ πᾶσι μάλιστα ἔγγυς τεταρμακα, καίπερ μυρίων ὄσων εἰς τὴν πόλιν ἐπληθυόντων ἔθνων, οἷς πολλὴ ἀνάγκη εἶναι τὰς πατρίδας διὰ τοῖς οἰκιστῶν νομίμοις, ἕθενος εἰς ἕτερον ἐκλάβει τῶν ξενικῶν ἐπιδημιῶν ἢ πόλιν δημοσίᾳ, ὃ πολλοῖς ἤδη συνέβη παθεῖν. *Antiq.* lib. ii.

ship in Rome according to their own way; the being debarred of that liberty, was not deemed, by him, a conceivable case: That such *particulars* as were so disposed, might join with them; and that, besides these *tolerated* religions, there was one *public*, and *established*, which admitted of no foreign mixtures. 2. We are not to understand the author as if his wonder was caused by the Romans having an *established* religion distinct from the *tolerated*; but, for that they mixed, or introduced into the *established* few or no foreign rites; which was the custom in the cities of Greece: for these are the *other states*, which the historian hints at. But modern writers not adverting to this, When they read of the Roman practice of admitting no *foreign* worship into their *public* religion, concluded wrongly, that they allowed no *toleration*: and when they read of the Greek practice of naturalizing *foreign* religions, by adopting them into their public worship, concluded, as wrongly, that they had no *establishments*. 3. The words, Η ΠΟΛΙΣ ΔΗΜΟΣΙΑ, are remarkable: He does not say, the city rejected foreign worship, but, that it admitted not of it PUBLICLY; that is, did not bring it into the *public* religion of the State. For, as we observed before, Paganism had two parts, the one public, the other private: the *State*, as such, was the subject of the one; and *Particulars*, as such, of the other. But they admitted of foreign rites *privately*; that is, allowed *particulars* to use them, after the Magistrate's licence had been obtained for that purpose. So that the *established* religion, every where, related to the *public* part of Paganism; and the *tolerated*, to the *private* part. 4. The historian observes, that, in this conduct, Rome differed from many other cities, meaning the Grecian. And indeed, it was less a wonder than he seems to make it: For Rome, rising on her own foundation, independent



dent on, and unrelated to any other State, and early possessed with the high enthusiasm of distinction and empire, would naturally esteem her tutelary Gods as her own peculiar; and therefore would reject all foreign mixtures. On the contrary, the Grecian States, related to, and dependent on one another, would more easily admit of an association and combination amongst their national Deities.

Such was the nature of *TOLERATION* in the Pagan world; and this the wise provision of ancient Policy, while Civil liberty could keep its own. But when now Government began to degenerate, and *ALL*, preposterously to submit to the will of *ONE*; when the Magistrate came to have a good, distinct from that of the People; and civil peace was estimated, not by the blessings it produced, but by the degree of subjection it was able to inflict; then the fashionable scheme of Politics began to turn solely on the maintenance of a Tyrant's power: and He having observed, that, though the *toleration* of religion, under the regulations above described, was evidently for the advantage of Society; yet, as those regulations were too apt to be neglected, he thought it best, by an absolute *intolerance*, and a thorough *uniformity*, to cut off all occasions and opportunities of mischief to himself, from private conventicles and conventions.

Agreeably to this system of power, we find Mæcenas, in Dion Cassius<sup>b</sup>, dissuading Augustus from allowing any *toleration* of religion at all: as, an indulgence in this matter, would indispose men towards the Magistrate, and make them less fond of the civil and religious Constitutions of their country; from whence factions, and confederacies against the State would unavoidably arise. He concludes

<sup>b</sup> Lib. Hist. 52.

his advice against *toleration* in these remarkable words: ΑΠΕΡ ΗΚΙΣΤΑ ΜΟΝΑΡΧΙΑ ΣΤΜΦΕΡΕΙ; “as a thing by no means agreeing with arbitrary power.” And Tacitus informs us<sup>c</sup>, the usurper followed it. Thus, we see, that the famous declaration of, ONE KING AND ONE RELIGION, is not a new maxim, for which we are indebted to French Politics.

So noble an original had the principle of INTOLERANCE: and so iniquitous are the adversaries of our holy religion, to throw it upon the *christian Faith*; when it appears to have been the pure offspring of *civil Tyranny*; how well soever it may have been afterwards nursed and fondled by some Fathers of the Church.

Thus have I attempted to give a plain account of the general methods used by ancient Policy to inculcate and support Religion. Were I to speak, as I once intended, of *those* which particular Lawgivers and Magistrates employed for the use of their proper Societies, I should have it in my power to throw great light upon the argument. But this, though the most curious part of all, must be omitted at present, by reason of its length. In the mean time, I presume, more than enough hath been said, even in those places which only shew the Legislator's care for religion in general, to prove the truth of the proposition, *That, in the opinion of ancient policy, the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments was indispensably useful to civil Society*: For having shewn that the doctrine of a future state was an

<sup>c</sup> Actum et de sacris Ægyptiis Judaicisque pellendis: factumque patrum consultum, ut quatuor millia libertini generis ea superstitione infecta, quis idonea ætas in insulam Sardiniam vherentur, coercendis illic latrociniiis, et si ob gravitatem cæli interfissent, vile damnum: ceteri cederent Italia, nisi, certam ante diem profanos ritus exuissent. Tac. *Annal.* l. ii. c. 85.

inseparable part of Pagan religion; and indeed the sole support of it, the proving their care for religion in general, proves their care for this doctrine in particular. Where, it is worth observing, that, though the ancient Lawgivers deviated from truth; and differed from one another, even in the most important points, concerning *property, marriage, dominion, &c.* yet they unanimously agreed in owning the use, and propagating the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments: And what stronger proof would any one desire of the necessity of that doctrine to RELIGION and SOCIETY?

We now see the close connection between *Civil government* and *Religion*. The following observation will still further explain the necessity of this union.

That benevolent spirit of Antiquity, described above, which set their Heroes upon polishing the barbarous manners of their fellow-creatures, and imparting to them the blessings of CIVIL LIFE, as divine as it appears, hath yet been far exceeded by the charity of these later ages, which sends MISSIONARIES into the furthest regions of the east and west, with the inestimable blessing of *the glad tidings of the Gospel*. But nothing is matter of more grief to serious men than the constant ill success of so charitable an undertaking. Something sure must have been greatly amiss, to defeat a design which all nature conspires to advance. This would be accounted for. *Catholic* (as they call themselves) and *protestant* Missionaries go promiscuously to either India. The *Catholics* have laboured most in countries civilized; but, giving a commentitious system for the gospel of Christ, it is no wonder the Pagans should not be greatly disposed to change *old* fables for *new*. And though the *protestant* Missionaries carry the *genuine Gospel* with them into America, yet they preach it to Savages, with no better success.



cess. The reason seems to be because they are *Savages*, without Government or Laws; and consequently of very rude, uncultivated minds. Now Christianity, plain and simple as it is, and fitted in its nature for what it was designed by its author, requires an intellect above that of a mere Savage to understand<sup>d</sup>. Something then must be previous to it. And what is that something but CIVIL SOCIETY? This is not at all to its dishonour. And if it hath sometimes happened, through the indefatigable labours of these Missionaries, both of the one and the other Communion, that numbers of savage converts have been made, they could never long preserve, or propagate amongst their tribes, the Christianity they had been taught: but their successors have always found the work was to begin anew, and in a little time, nothing left of the other's labours to advance upon. And if what we have said in this

<sup>d</sup> An intelligent missionary seemed to see where the thing stuck, when he says, Pour ce qui est des conversions, qu'on peut faire de ces gens la touchant l'Evangile, *on ne sauroit faire aucun fond sur eux*. Ces sauvages, de même que tous ceux de l'Amerique sont fort peu disposez aux lumieres de la foi, parce qu'ils sont *brutaux et stupides*, et que leurs mœurs sont *extremement corrompues*, et opposées au Christianisme. *Nouvelle Decouv. dans l'Ameriq. Sept. par le R. P. Louis Hennepin Missionnaire Recollet et Notaire Apostolique*, à Utr. 1697. p. 221. The corrupt manners of the savages here complained of, as indisposing them to the Gospel, we find, from this writer and others, are of such a kind as arise only from the want of civil government; and which civil government every where rectifies; such as *rapine, cruelty, and promiscuous mixtures*. Hans Egede, a Danish missionary, who had been five and twenty years in Greenland; in his description of that country, speaks to the same effect: "It is a matter which cannot be questioned (says this sensible writer) that, if you will make a man a Christian out of a mere savage and wild man, you must first make him a reasonable man." "It would contribute a great deal to forward their conversion, if they could, by degrees, be brought into a settled way of life," etc. p. 211, 12.

Sect. 6.<sup>th</sup> of MOSES demonstrated. 73

book be true, *That religion cannot long subsist without the aid of civil government*, we are not to wonder at it: for, from hence, we conclude, they began at the wrong end: and that to make our holy religion rightly understood, much more to propagate and perpetuate it, they should first have taught these Savages the arts of life: from whence (besides the benefit of that previous knowledge abovementioned) would have resulted this further advantage, that men so sensibly obliged, would have given a more favourable attention to their benefactors. As it is, I am afraid these Savages observing in the Missionaries (and they have sense enough to observe that the Europeans keep many things from them which it would be useful for them to know) a total disregard of their temporal concerns, would be hardly brought to think the matters pressed upon them of much importance, or the teachers greatly in earnest. The civilizing a barbarous people is in itself a work of such exalted charity, that to see it neglected, when a far nobler end than the arts of life may be procured by it, is matter of the utmost astonishment\*. But it is partly owing to this, that many of both missions have had too much of that *fanaticism* in their temper, which disposes men to an utter contempt of worldly things: they are therefore so far from preaching up the advantages of Society, and recommending civil Manners, that they are more disposed to throw aside their own; and have recourse to the dried skins and parched corn of the Savages. While others of them,

\* This justice is due to the JESUITS, That they have been wiser in their attempts on PARAGUAY, and on the coast of California; where they have brought the savage inhabitants to a love of agriculture and the mechanic arts. The mission in California was founded at the expence of a certain marquis de Valero; for which the reverend person, whose name was permitted to be put to the Account of *Lord Arson's Voyage round the world*, has suffered the Marquis to be called a *most magnificent Bigot*.

of a colder turn, and lower form of *superstition*, having taken it into their heads, that the vices of improved life would more *indispose* the Indians to the *precepts* of the Gospel, than their present brutality *incapacitates* them from comprehending the *doctrines* of it, have concluded it best, upon the whole, to keep their eyes shut to the advantages of civil life<sup>f</sup>. But without doubt so fatal a conduct arises chiefly from the false and inhumane policy of the European Colonies, a policy common to every sect and profession, which makes them do all in their power to keep the natives in a savage state; as suspecting that the neighbourhood of a civilized people would be too unfriendly to their private interests. However, this policy, as bad as it is, has yet something less

<sup>f</sup> This is the system of *Charlevoix* in the following passage; which is well worth the reader's notice: After having spoken of the shocking miseries attending the uncivilized condition of the Canadian savages, he goes on thus: Il faut néanmoins convenir que les choses ont un peu changé sur tous ces points, depuis notre arrivée en ce pays; j'en ai même vu chercher à se procurer des commodités, dont ils auront peut-être bientôt de la peine à se passer. Quelques-uns commencent aussi à prendre un peu plus leurs précautions pour ne pas se trouver au dépourvu, quand la chasse leur manquera; et parmi ceux, qui sont domiciliés dans la colonie, il y a bien peu à ajouter pour les faire arriver au point d'avoir un nécessaire raisonnable. Mais qu'il est à craindre que, quand ils en seront là, ils n'ail-  
lent *bientôt plus loin, et ne donnent dans un superflu, qui les rend*  
*plus malheureux encore, qu'ils ne sont présentement dans le*  
*sein de la plus grande indigence. Ce ne sera pas au moins les*  
*missionnaires, qui les exposeront à ce danger; persuadés qu'ils est*  
*moralement impossible de bien prendre ce juste milieu, et de*  
*s'y borner, ils ont beaucoup mieux aimé partager avec ces*  
*peuples ce qu'il y a de pénible dans leur manière de vivre, que*  
*de leur ouvrir les yeux sur les moyens d'y trouver des adoucissements.*  
Aussi ceux-mêmes, qui sont tous les jours témoins de leurs souffrances, ont-ils encore bien de la peine à comprendre comment ils y peuvent résister, d'autant plus qu'elles sont sans relâche, et que toutes les saisons ont leurs incommodités particulières. *Journal Hist. d'un voyage dans l'Ameriq. Septent. vol. vi.* p. 57, 58.

diabolical



diabolical in it than that other part of COLONY-RELIGION, which robs the opposite Continent of so many thousands of our species, for a yearly sacrifice to their great idol, Mammon, THE GOD OF GAIN. These Colonists, indeed, pretend to observe a kind of aversion in the savages to a civilized State. And it is no wonder if they should not be very forward to imitate the manners of their oppressors. But this is not the natural condition of things. Barbarians are never backward to partake of those advantages of civil life which they understand; except where ill usage has given them an abhorrence for their Instructors. The Goths and Vandals in Europe, together with the other benefits of their Conquests, joyfully embraced the Christian Faith: And the Turks in Asia, and other clans of Tartars in China, readily received Religion and Civility from the conquered nations. On the whole, however, I dare venture to foretell, that no great good will ever come of these Missions, till the two projects of *civilizing* and *saving* be joined in one.

As the matter stands at present, the forests of north and south America are good for little but to be made nurseries for PHILOSOPHERS and FREE-THINKERS. The inhabitants, by following simple nature, are already in possession of that blessing, which these illustrious Instructors so vainly wish'd for at home; namely the removal of all RELIGIOUS PREJUDICES from the education of their children. A learned voyager, who has been lately on a mathematical mission to the Equator, describes this happy and envied condition in very emphatic terms; which the reader may find below\*. What crops  
of

\* — J'ai cru reconnoître dans tous [les Indiens Américains, quoique différentes en langues, mœurs, et coutumes] un même fonds de caractère. L'insensibilité en fait le base. Je laisse à dé-

of *Free-thinking* may not be expected from so happy a climate ! But our *Philosophers* perhaps, on reflection, may think their favourite maxim here pushed a little too far. However, this freedom from religious prejudices, in the purity of its state here, may be of use, in disposing our *Philosophers* to review their favourite *maxim*, and to consider whether they be well founded, in recommending it in that extent in which it is here practised. It is true, a superstitious education is productive of great evils. But what then ? If, thro' these prejudices, the *Omaguas* of the southern continent think it piety, at the birth of their children, to flatten their heads, like a cheese, between two boards, that their faces may resemble their Deity, the *full moon*, Should the ridicule of this custom make it thought absurd in us, to bring up our children in the love of justice, of purity, and benevolence, that they may resemble the God of the Christians, whom we adore ? Our *Philosophers* will say, So far they are not unwilling to go. What they would have is, that the infant-mind be kept free from the deformed impressions of POSITIVE RELI-

à décider si on la doit honorer du nom d'apathie ; ou l'avilir par celui de stupidité. Elle naît sans doute du petit nombre de leurs idées, qui ne s'étend pas au delà de leurs besoins. Gloutons jusqu'à la voracité, quand ils ont de quoi se satisfaire ; sobres, quand la nécessité les y oblige, jusqu'à se passer de tout, sans paraître rien désirer ; pusillanimes et poltrons à l'excès, si l'ivresse ne les transporte pas ; ennemis du travail, indifférens à tout motif de gloire, d'honneur, ou de reconnaissance ; uniquement occupés de l'objet présent, et toujours déterminés par lui ; sans inquiétude pour l'avenir ; incapables de prévoyance et de réflexion ; se livrant, quand rien ne les gêne, à une joie puerile, qu'ils manifestent par des sauts et des éclats de rire immodérés, sans objet et sans dessein ; ils passent leur vie sans penser, et ils vieillissent sans sortir de l'enfance, dont ils conservent tous les défauts — on ne peut voir sans humiliation combien l'homme abandonné à la simple nature, privé d'éducation et de société, diffère peu de la bête. *Relation d'un voyage dans l'Amérique méridionale*, par M. de la Condamine, p. 51, et seq.

GION.

gion. But they must pardon us if we think, that in such minds, precepts are best enforced by *example*; and that the best example is that of the Deity in his dispensations to mankind, as delivered by *positive religion*.

Was the full definition of *man*, a GOOD PHILOSOPHER, and his only business, speculative truth, something might be said in favour of preserving his mind, a *rasa tabula*, till he was himself able to judge what was fit to be written on it. But as he was sent into the world to make a GOOD CITIZEN, in the observance of all the relations of civil, social, and domestic life; as he was born for practice and not for speculation, I should think that virtues, so necessary for the discharge of those relations, could not be insinuated too soon, or impressed too frequently; even though the consequence might happen to be, the acquiring an obstinate and unconquerable prejudice in favour of RELIGION.

On the whole, then, we see, that the ancient Lawgivers were as much superior to the modern Missionaries in the *execution*, as These are, to Them in the *design*. Those Sages saw plainly that religion and civil policy were inseparable; and therefore they always taught them together. The experience of all ages justified their conduct; and the *truth*, on which they acted, gives us the most transcendent idea of Divine goodness, which hath so closely united our *temporal* to our *spiritual* happiness. The sum of all is this, that whoever would secure CIVIL GOVERNMENT, must support it by the means of RELIGION; and whoever would propagate RELIGION, must perpetuate it by the means of CIVIL GOVERNMENT.

## B O O K III.

### S E C T. I.

**I**N the beginning of the last book, I entered upon the proof of my second proposition; namely, THAT ALL ANTIQUITY WAS UNANIMOUS IN THINKING THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS WAS NECESSARY TO THE WELL BEING OF SOCIETY: And the method I laid down for it, was, 1. To shew *the conduct of Legislators, and the founders of civil policy.* 2. *The opinions of the wisest and most learned of the ancient Sages.*

THE CONDUCT OF THE LEGISLATORS hath been fully examined in the last book.

II. THE OPINION OF THE ANCIENT SAGES, is the subject of the present.

THEY too, as well as the Lawgivers, were unanimous in this point, how discordant soever and a variance amongst themselves, in other matters. Whatever System of Policy the Historian favoured; whatever Theory of Nature the Philosopher espoused; THIS always remained an unquestionable principle. The favourer of arbitrary power deemed it the strongest bond of blind obedience; and the friend of civil liberty, the largest source of virtue and a public spirit. The Atheist, from the vastness of its social use, concluded religion to be but an invention of State; and the Theist, from that confessed utility, laboured to prove it of divine original.



To give the reader a detail of the discourses, where this truth is owned and supported, would be to transcribe Antiquity: for, with *this* begins and ends every thing they teach and explain of Morals, Government, human Nature, and civil Policy. I shall therefore content myself with two or three passages, as a specimen only, of the general voice of ancient Wisdom.

Timæus the Locrian, a very early Pythagorean, well practised in Affairs, and, in Plato's opinion, of consummate knowledge in philosophy, discoursing on the remedies to moral evil, after having spoken of the use of philosophy to lead well tempered minds to happiness, by teaching the measures of just and unjust; adds, that, for intractable spirits civil Society was invented; which keeps men in fear by the coercions of Law and Religion: "But if we come (says he) to a perverse ungovernable disposition, there, punishments should be applied; both those which civil laws inflict, and those which the terrors of religion denounce against the wicked from above and from below: as, that ENDLESS PUNISHMENTS attend the remains of unhappy men; and all those torments, which I highly applaud the Ionic poet for recording from ancient tradition, in order to cleanse and purify the mind from vice."

That sage historian, Polybius, (whose knowledge of mankind and civil Government was so celebrated, that Rome preferred him to the august employment of composing laws for Greece, now become a province to the republic) speaking of the ex-

† — Εἰ δὲ καὶ τις σκληρὸς ἢ ἀπειθὴς, τέττο δ' ἐπίτῳ κόλασις, αὐτὸς ἐκ τῶν νόμων ἢ ἐκ τῶν λόγων σύλλοινα ἐπάγοισι διμάλῃ τε ἐπωράναι καὶ τὰ καθ' ἑαυτὸν, ὅτι κολάσεις ἀπαραίτητοι ἀπόκεινται δυσθαίμοσι περὶ ἱεροῖς καὶ τὰλλα ὅσα ἱκανῶς τὸν Ἰωνικὸν ποιητὴν ἐκ παλαιῶς ποιούσιν αὖτως ἱναγέας. Περὶ ψυχῆς κόσμου.

cellence of the Roman Constitution, expresseth himself in this manner: " But the superior excellence  
" of this Policy, above others, manifests itself, in  
" my opinion, chiefly in the religious notions the  
" Romans hold concerning the Gods: that thing,  
" which in other places is turned to abuse, being  
" the very support of the Roman affairs; I mean  
" THE FEAR OF THE GODS, or what the Greeks  
" call *superstition*; which is come to such a height,  
" both in its influence on particulars, and on the  
" public, as cannot be exceeded. This, which  
" many may think unaccountable, seems plainly to  
" have been contrived for the sake of the Commu-  
" nity. If, indeed, one were to frame a civil  
" Policy only for wise men, it is possible this kind  
" of Institution might not be necessary. But since  
" the multitude is ever fickle and capricious, full of  
" lawless passions, and irrational and violent resent-  
" ments, there is no way left to keep them in order,  
" but by the terrors of FUTURE PUNISHMENT, and  
" all the pompous circumstance that attends such  
" kind of fictions. On which account the Anci-  
" ents acted, in my opinion, with great judgment  
" and penetration, when they contrived to bring in  
" these notions of the Gods, and of a FUTURE  
" STATE, into the popular belief; and the present  
" age as inconsiderately, and absurdly, in removing  
" them, and encouraging the multitude to despise  
" their terrors. For see now the consequence: in  
" Greece, the man who is entrusted with the public  
" money (to pass by other matters) though it be  
" but of a single talent, and though he give a ten-  
" fold security in the most authentic form, and  
" before twice the number of witnesses which the  
" Law requires, cannot be brought to discharge his  
" engagements; while, amongst the Romans, the  
" mere RELIGION OF AN OATH keeps those, who  
" have



“ have vast sums of money passing through their  
 “ hands, either in the public administration or in  
 “ foreign legations, from the least violation of their  
 “ trust, or honour. And whereas, in other places,  
 “ it is rare to find a man, who can keep his hands  
 “ clean, or forbear plundering his Country; in  
 “ Rome it is as rare to take any one offending in  
 “ this kind. That every thing which exists is sub-  
 “ ject to mutation and decay, we need not be told;  
 “ the unalterable nature of things sufficiently in-  
 “ forms us of this truth. But there being two ways,  
 “ whereby every kind of Policy is ruined and dis-  
 “ solved; the one from WITHOUT, and the other  
 “ from WITHIN; that destruction, which cometh  
 “ from without, cannot be constantly avoided by  
 “ any human provision: but then, there are known  
 “ and efficacious remedies for those evils which  
 “ arise from within.”

Polybius

<sup>1</sup> Μεγίστην δὲ μοι δοκεῖ διαφορὰν εἶχειν τὸ Ῥωμαίων πολιτεύμα πρὸς τὸ βέλτιον, ἐν τῇ περὶ θεῶν διαλήψει. Καί μοι δοκεῖ τὸ παρὰ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἀνθρώποις ἐνιδύμενον, τὸτο συνέχειν τὰ Ῥωμαίων πράγματα· λίγην δὲ τὴν διουσιδαίμονιαν· ἐπὶ τοσούτων γὰρ ἐκτίπραγμῶνδ' ἢ καὶ παρρησιάζονται τὸτο τὸ μέγεθος· παρ' αὐτοῖς εἰς τι τὸς κατ' ἰδίαν βίαις καὶ τὰ κοινὰ τῆς πόλεως, ὥστε μὴ καὶ ἀληθεῖς ὑπερβολῶν. ὃ καὶ δοξάζει ἐν πολλοῖς εἶναι βαρυνάμενον· ἐμοὶ γὰρ μὴ δοκεῖσι τῷ πλεονέκῳ χάριν τὸτο πεποινηκέναι. Εἰ μὲν γὰρ ἦν σοφῶν ἀνδρῶν πολιτεύμα συναγαγεῖν, ἴσως ἂν ἦν ἀναγκαῖον· ὃ τοιοῦτον ἔσται· ἐπεὶ δὲ πᾶσι πλεονέκῳ ἐστὶ ἐλαφρὸν καὶ πολλὰς ἐπιθυμιῶν παρανομιῶν, ὅργης ἀλόγης, θυμῷ βιαιῇ, λείπεται τοῖς ἀλλοῖς φόβος, καὶ τῇ τοιαύτῃ τραγῳδίᾳ τὰ πλεονέκῳ συνέχειν. Διόπερ οἱ παλαιοὶ δοκεῖσίν μοι τὰς περὶ θεῶν ἐπίστας, καὶ τὰς περὶ τῶν ἐν αὐτῇ διαλήψεις καὶ εἰκῇ καὶ ὡς ἐτυχον εἰς τὰ πλεονέκῳ παρρησιάζεσθαι· πολὺ δὲ μάλλον οἱ νῦν εἰκῇ καὶ ἀλόγως ἐκβάλλουσιν αὐτά. Τοιγαρὶν χωρὶς τῶν ἄλλων, οἱ τὰ κοινὰ χιρρίζουσιν, παρὰ μὲν τοῖς Ἑλλήσιν, ἐπὶ τὰ λαοὶ μόνον πιστευθῶσι, ἀληγοραφίῃ ἐχούσι δίκαν, καὶ σφραγίδας τοσαύτας, καὶ μάστιγας διπλάσις, ὥς δύνανται τηρεῖν τῇ πίστει· παρὰ δὲ Ῥωμαίοις οἱ καὶ αἱ τὰς ἀρχαὶς καὶ τὰς περιστάσεως πολὺ τι πλεονέκῳ χρεὶ μάστιγας χιρρίζουσιν δι' αὐτῆς τῆς κατὰ τοῦ ἔργου πίστεως, τηρεῖν τὸ καθεκόν. Καὶ παρὰ μὲν τοῖς ἄλλοις σπάνιον ἐστὶν εὐρεῖν ἀπειχόμενον ἄνδρα τῶν δημοσίων, καὶ καθαρεύουσα περὶ ταῦτα· παρὰ δὲ τοῖς Ῥωμαίοις σπάνιον ἐστὶ τὸ λαοὶν ἢ παρρησιάζεσθαι ἐπὶ τοιαύτῃ πράξει. Ὅτι μὲν ἐν πᾶσι τοῖς ἔθνεσιν ἐπὶ πότῃ καὶ φόβῳ καὶ μίαισιν, σχεδὸν ἢ πρὸς αὐτῷ λόγῳ· ἰκανὴ γὰρ ἡ τῆς φύσεως

Polybius says literally, There are two ways by which a state is brought to dissolution, from without and from within : *that* from without is uncertain and little known ; that from within is known and certain. By which words he must mean what I make him to say, as appears by what he immediately subjoins, where he shews how the power of the Great, when degenerated into tyranny, may be checked by the people : whose opposition to power produces, as it happens to be well or ill managed, either the best or worst form of government, a Democracy or Ochlocracy.

This long passage deserves our attention, and for many reasons. Polybius was a Greek, and, as all good men are, a tender lover of his Country, whose ancient glory and virtue were then fast on the decline, and the Roman mounting to its meridian. The melancholy reflections, arising from this view of things, were always uppermost in his thoughts : so that speaking here of the great influence which Religion had on the minds of the Romans, he could not forbear giving his countrymen a lesson, and instructing them in what he esteemed the principal cause of their approaching ruin ; namely, a certain libertinism, which had spread amongst the PEOPLE OF CONDITION, who, ashamed of the simplicity of their Ancestors, and despising the ignorance of the People, affected a superior penetration, which brought them to regard, and preposterously to teach others to regard, the restraints of religion as illusory and unmanly. This he confirms by shewing the strong influence religion hath on the morals of men. But to understand what follows, *of the two ways by which a state comes to ruin, from without and from with-*

φύσεως ἀνάγκη παραστῆσαι τῇ τοιαύτῃ πίστι· δύο δὲ τρόποι ὄντων καθ' ὡς φθίρεισθαι πέφυκε πᾶν γένος πολιτείας, τὸ μὲν ἐξ ὧν, τὸ δὲ ἐκ αὐτοῦ φθορῆναι· τὸ μὲν ἐκ τοῦ ἀγαθὸν ἔχειν συμβαίνει τῇ διαφθορᾷ, τὰ δ' ἐξ αὐτῶν πύλαγγιν. E. Polyb. *Historiarum*, lib. vi. c. 54, 55.



in, which seems to be brought in a little abruptly, we must suppose, that those, to whom the historian addresses himself, had objected, *That it was not a want of piety amongst themselves, but the force of the Roman arms without, which had broken the power of Greece; and that this disaster they were patiently to submit to, because all empires have their stated periods.* Let us suppose this, and the political reflection on the fall of States, will have a high propriety, and close connection with what preceded. It is to this effect: "I agree with you, says Polybius, that evils, coming suddenly on a State from without, cannot be easily warded; but then, those arising from within, as they are commonly foreseen, have their remedies at hand. Now I take our misfortunes to have proceeded from *these*: for had not a neglect of religion depraved the manners of the Greeks, Rome had wanted both pretence and inclination to invade us, and Greece would have continued able to support its own sovereignty: therefore your trite aphorism of the mutability of human things is here altogether misapplied."

But had this great man lived only one age later, he would have found large occasion of addressing this very admonition to the Romans themselves; when the same libertine spirit fore-ran and contributed to the destruction of *their* Republic; and religion had so lost its hold of those, whom, in the time of Polybius, it so entirely possessed, that Cæsar could dare, in full Senate, with a degree of licence unexampled in Antiquity, to declare, that the doctrine of a *future state of rewards and punishments* was all a groundless notion. This was a dreadful prognostic of their approaching ruin.

If this great politician then, may deserve credit, it would be worth while for our *People of condition* to look about them, and compute their gains by such a conduct: those of them I mean, if any such

there be, who profess to love their Country, and yet as publicly despise the Religion of it. One of them, who did both in an eminent degree, and who would substitute a TASTE, instead of a *future state*, for the government of the world, thus expresseth himself: "Even *conscience*, I fear, such as is owing " to *religious discipline*, will make but a slight " figure, where this TASTE is set amiss. Amongst " the vulgar perhaps it may do wonders: a *devil* " and a *hell* may prevail, where a *jail* and a *gallows* " are thought insufficient. But such is the nature " of the liberal, polished, and refined part of man- " kind; so far are they from the *mere simplicity of* " *babes and sucklings*, that, instead of applying the " notion of a future reward or punishment to " their immediate behaviour in society, they are " apt much rather, through the whole course of " their lives, to shew evidently that they look on " the pious narrations to be indeed no better than " children's tales and the amusement of the mere " vulgar<sup>k</sup>." I will not now ask, Where was the *religion*, but where was the *civil prudence* of this great patriot? For if it be indeed true, as he confesses, that *amongst the vulgar a devil and a hell may prevail, where a jail and a gallows are thought insufficient*; why would this *lover of his country* take off so necessary a restraint on the manners of the multitude? If he says he would not, I ask, why then hath he publicly ridiculed it? Or was it indeed his intention to make all his fellow-citizens MEN OF TASTE? He might as well have thought of making them all LORDS<sup>l</sup>.

So

<sup>k</sup> *Characteristicks*, vol. iii. p. 177. edit. 3.

<sup>l</sup> It may not be improper, on this occasion, to present the Reader with an extract from a Letter of the late President MONTESQUIEU to the Author, who had given him some account of Lord Bolingbroke's Posthumous Works, just then, on the point of publication—



So absurd and pernicious is the conduct of the Free-thinkers, even admitting them to be in the right. But if, instead of removing the rubbish of superstition, they be indeed subverting the grounds of true religion, what name must be given to this degree of madness and impiety?

On the whole, I fear we are in no right way. Whether in the Public too we resemble the picture this sage historian hath drawn of degenerated Greece, I leave to such as are better skilled in those matters to determine.

don— " J'ay lu quelques ouvrages de My Lord Bolingbroke—  
 " Or, Monsieur, dans cet ouvrage posthume, dont vous me  
 " donnez une idée, il me semble qu'il vous prepare une matière  
 " trop inutile de triomphe. Celui qui attaque la Religion ré-  
 " velée n'attaque que la Religion révélée; mais celui qui at-  
 " taque la Religion naturelle attaque toutes les Religions du  
 " monde. Si l'on enseigne aux hommes qu'ils n'ont pas ce  
 " frein ci, ils peuvent penser qu'ils en ont un autre: Mais  
 " il est bien plus pernicieux de leur enseigner qu'ils n'en ont pas  
 " du tout. Il n'est pas impossible d'attaquer une Religion ré-  
 " velée, parce qu'elle existe par des faits particuliers, et que les  
 " faits, par leur nature, peuvent être une matière de dispute:  
 " mais il n'en est pas de même de la Religion naturelle: elle  
 " est tirée de la nature de l'homme, dont on ne peut pas dispo-  
 " ser, et du sentiment intérieur de l'homme, dont on ne peut  
 " pas disputer encore. J'ajoute à ceci, Quel peut être le  
 " motif d'attaquer la Religion révélée en Angleterre? on l'y a  
 " tellement purgé de tout préjugé destructeur qu'elle n'y peut  
 " faire de mal, et qu'elle y peut faire, au contraire, une infinité  
 " de biens. Je sais, qu'un homme en Espagne ou en Portugal  
 " que l'on va brûler, ou qui craint d'être brûlé, parce qu'il ne  
 " croit point de certains articles de doctrine ou non de la Religion  
 " révélée, a une juste sujet de l'attaquer, parce qu'il peut avoir  
 " quelque espérance de parvenir à sa défense naturelle: Mais il  
 " n'en est pas de même en Angleterre, où tout homme qui at-  
 " taque la Religion révélée l'attaque sans intérêt, et où cet  
 " homme quand il réussiroit, quand même il auroit raison dans  
 " le fond, ne seroit que détruire une infinité de biens pratiques  
 " pour établir une vérité purement spéculative.

" J'ay été ravi, &c.

A Paris le 26 May 1754.

" MONTAIGNIER.



The great *Geographer*, whose knowledge of men and manners was as extensive as the habitable globe, speaks to the same purpose: "The multitude in society are allured to virtue by those enticing fables, which the poets tell of the illustrious achievements of ancient heroes, such as the labours of Hercules and Theseus; and the rewards conferred by the Gods, for well-doing. So again, they are restrained from vice by the punishments, the Gods are said to inflict upon offenders, and by those <sup>m</sup> terrors and threatnings which certain dreadful words and monstrous forms imprint upon their minds; or by believing that divine judgments have overtaken evil men. For it is impossible to govern women and the gross body of the people, and to keep them pious, holy, and virtuous, by the precepts of philosophy: this can be only done by the FEAR OF THE Gods; which is raised and supported by ancient fictions and modern prodigies. The Thunder therefore of Jupiter, the Ægis of Minerva, the Trident of Neptune, the Thyrsus of Bacchus, and the Snakes and Torches of the Furies, with all the other apparatus of ancient theology, were the engines which the Legislator employed, as bugbears, to strike a terror into the childish imaginations of the Multitude <sup>n</sup>."

Lastly,

<sup>m</sup> Strabo's words are — Καὶ φόβος, καὶ ἀπειλὰς, ἢ διὰ λόγων, ἢ διὰ τύπων αἰῶραι, "Fears and threatnings either by words or dreadful forms." Casaubon, who corrected the last word very justly, has given us no explanation of the allusion in this obscure sentence. I am persuaded, the author had in his mind the dreadful words spoken, and the representations exhibited in the *Mysteries*, for the very purpose the author here mentions: so ἀπειλὰς refers to λόγων, and φόβος to τύπων αἰῶραι. The reader, who remembers what has been said in the section of the *Mysteries*, in the foregoing book, concerning this matter, will be inclined to believe this to be the true explanation.

<sup>n</sup> Οἱ τε πολλοὶ τῶν τὰς πόλεις οἰκούντων εἰς μὲν πρόσροπὴν ἀγνοοῦσι τοὺς ἡρώων τῶν μυθῶν, ὅταν ἀκούσιν τῶν παλαιῶν ἀνδραγαθημάτων μυθώδη διηγεμύ-

Lastly, Pliny the elder “owns it to be expedient  
“for Society, that men should believe, that the  
“Gods concerned themselves in human affairs; and  
“that the punishments they inflict on offenders,  
“though sometimes late indeed, as from Governors  
“busied in the administration of so vast an Uni-  
“verse, yet are never to be evaded<sup>o</sup>.” Thus He,  
tho’ an Epicurean; but an Epicurean in his senses:  
from whom we hear nothing of the mad strains of  
Lucretius, “That all religion should be abolished,  
“as inconsistent with the peace of mankind.”

## S E C T. II.

**B**UT to give this matter its full evidence, it will  
be proper to set together the PUBLIC PROFES-  
SIONS, and the PRIVATE SENTIMENTS of the ancient  
THEISTICAL PHILOSOPHERS: who, notwithstanding  
they were for ever discoursing on the doctrine of a  
future state of rewards and punishments, to the  
People, yet were all the while speculating in private  
on other and different principles. A conduct which  
could proceed from nothing, but a full persuasion  
that this *doctrine* was the very vital part of Religion;

γυμνασίᾳ δὲ οἱ Ἡρακλῆος ἄθλος, ἡ Ὀησίως, ἡ τιμὰς παρὰ τοῖς θεοῖς ἡμι-  
μίαι, — εἰς ἀπόδοσιν δὲ, ὅταν κολάσῃς παρὰ θεῶν, καὶ φόβος, καὶ ἀπειλὰς,  
ἡ διὰ λόγων, ἡ διὰ τύπων αἰσθῆναι τῶν προσδιδυμῶν, ἡ καὶ πιστεύειν περὶ  
πιστῶν τιναί. Οὐ γὰρ ὅχλοι τε γυναῖκες, καὶ παῖδες χυδαῖς πολλήν ἐπα-  
γωγὴν λόγῳ διττῶν φιλοσόφων, καὶ προσκαλέσασθαι πρὸς εὐσεβίαν, καὶ  
εὐσεβείας, καὶ πίστεως, ἀλλὰ καὶ διὰ δεισιδαιμονίας: ταῦτα δ’ ἐκ αὐτοῦ μυθο-  
ποιῖαι, καὶ παραβλαῖες. Κερκυρὸς γὰρ, αἰγίς, καὶ τρίαινα, καὶ λαμπάδες, καὶ  
δρακόνες, καὶ θυρολόγια τῶν θεῶν ὅπλα, μύθοι καὶ πᾶσα θεολογία ἀε-  
χραῖκή: ταῦτα δ’ ἀποδείξαι οἱ τὰς πολιτείας καὶ ἀγαθῶν μορμολύκας  
τινάς, πρὸς τοῖς πτωχότοκας. Strabo, Geogr. l. i.

Verum in his Deos agere curam rerum humanarum credi, ex  
usu vitæ est; pœnasque maleficiis aliquando seras, occupato Deo  
in tanta mole, nunquam autem irritas esse. *Hist. Nat. l. ii. c. 7.*

and



and the only support of that influence, which divine worship hath on the minds of the Multitude.

Now, though after reading their *history*, reflecting on their *characters*, and examining their *writings* with all the care I was able, it appeared to me, that these men believed nothing of that *future state* which they so industriously propagated in the world; and therefore on this, as well as other accounts, deserved all that asperity of language with which they are treated by the *Sacred writers*; yet the contrary having been long and generally taken for granted, and their real opinions often urged by our ablest divines, as conformable and favourable to the Christian doctrine of a future state; I suspect that what I have here said, will be exclaimed against as an unreasonable and licentious *paradox*.

But, for all this, I do not despair of proving it a certain, though an unheeded, *truth*: and then I shall hope my reader's pardon for the length of this enquiry, as it is of no small moment to shew the sense Antiquity had of the *use* of a future state to Society: and as, in shewing that use, I shall be able to clear up a very important point of antiquity, doubly obscured, by length of time and perversity of contradiction.

But, before I enter on the matter, I shall, in order to abate the general prejudice, explain what is meant by that FUTURE STATE, which, I suppose, the THEISTICAL PHILOSOPHERS did not believe. And this the rather, because the contrary opinion has continued the longer unquestioned, through the lax and ambiguous use of the term. Thus, because it was evident, that all, or most of the theistical philosophers *believed*, as well as taught, the *immortality*, or rather the *eternity* of the *soul*, men, tied down to the associations of modern ideas, concluded that they  
believed,



believed, as well as taught, the doctrine of a *future state of rewards and punishments*.

To make the reader, therefore, master of the question, it will not be unfit, just to distinguish the several senses, in which the Ancients conceived the PERMANENCY of the human soul; and to reserve the explanation of them, and assignment of them to their proper authors, for another place.

This *permanency* was either,

- I. A SIMPLE EXISTENCE *after this life* : or,
- II. EXISTENCE IN A STATE OF REWARD AND PUNISHMENT, *according to men's behaviour here.*

Each of these was two-fold.

*Simple existence* was either,

- I. AN IMMEDIATE REFUSION OF THE SOUL, ON DEATH, INTO THE UNIVERSAL NATURE OF TO<sup>EN</sup>, FROM WHENCE IT PROCEEDED :

Or, II. A CONTINUANCE OF ITS SEPARATE AND DISTINCT EXISTENCE, ON DEATH, FOR A CERTAIN PERIOD, BEFORE ITS REFUSION INTO THE TO<sup>EN</sup>, IN A SUCCESSIVE TRANSITION THROUGH VARIOUS ANIMALS, BY A NATURAL AND FATAL, NOT MORAL DESIGNATION.

*Existence in a state of rewards and punishments* was either,

- I. A STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, IMPROPERLY SO CALLED; WHERE HAPPINESS AND MISERY WERE THE NATURAL AND NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES OF VIRTUE AND VICE; NOT POSITIVELY SO, OR BY THE FREE DESIGNATION OF WILL :

Or, II. A STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, PROPERLY SO CALLED; WHERE THE HAPPINESS AND MISERY CONSEQUENT ON VIRTUE AND VICE,

VICE, WERE THE POSITIVE AND FREE DESIGNATION OF WILL, AND NOT THE NECESSARY CONSEQUENCES OF THINGS.

The LAST is that notion of a future state, so useful to Society, which all the Lawgivers, Priests, and Philosophers publicly taught and propagated; and which the People throughout the whole earth universally believed. Of this, the METEMPSYCHOSIS was, generally, a part; and, what is more, continues to be so to this very day, amongst the civilized Gentiles of the East.

It is a FUTURE STATE, then, OF REWARDS and PUNISHMENTS IN GENERAL, and particularly the *second* and proper notion of it, (for as to the *first*, it was peculiar to the Platonists) which I pretend to prove the ancient Philosophers did not believe.

But before I proceed to explain the principles of each sect, it will not be improper to premise those GENERAL REASONS, which induced me to think *that the Philosophers did not always believe what they taught: And that they taught this doctrine without believing it.* And as the reader's chief prejudice, on this point, ariseth from the Philosophers' having talked and written so much in behalf of a future state of rewards and punishments; the three first of the following general reasons will shew, 1. That they all thought it lawful to say one thing, and think another. 2. That they perpetually practised what they thus professed to be lawful. And 3. That they practised it on the very point in question.

1. My *first* general reason was, *that the ancient Sages held it lawful, for the public good, to say one thing when they thought another.*

We have described the times of Antiquity very ill, if it doth not appear, from what is here said, that each People had the most religious regard to the



the laws and constitutions of their country. What raised this veneration (natural to all men, accustomed to a form of Policy) to such a height, was the popular prejudice in favour of their original. For, we have seen, the Founders pretended to receive their respective institutions from some PATRON GOD. At the time, they received the *civil policy*, they established the *national religion*; whose principal rites were objective to the *patron God*; which gave occasion to the PUBLIC PART OF RELIGION, explained above: whereby, the State, as such, became the subject of religious worship.

This making the *national Religion* one of the most necessary and essential parts of *civil Government*, it would become a general maxim, not only of mere politicians, but of all the best and wisest of those times, THAT EVERY ONE SHOULD CONFORM TO THE RELIGION OF HIS COUNTRY. We see, by the behaviour of SOCRATES himself, how much men were possessed with the fitness and importance of this rule. That excellent man, who made it the business of his life to search out, and expose the errors of human conduct, was most likely to detect the folly of this general prejudice. Yet when he comes to his defence before his judges; a defence, in which he was so scrupulous that he rejected what his friends would have added of confessed utility to his service, because not strictly conformable to that truth, by which he squared the rectitude of his life; when he comes, I say, to answer that part of the charge which accuses him of attempting to overturn the *popular Divinities*, he declares it, in the most solemn manner, as his opinion, that *every one should adhere to the Religion of his country*<sup>p</sup>. If it should still be suspected,

<sup>p</sup> And, without doubt, this was amongst the reasons for his declining, throughout the whole course of his life, the study and the teaching



suspected, that this was only said, as it made best for his defence, let us follow him in his last moments, retired amidst his philosophic friends and followers; and there we shall find him still true to this *great principle*, in a circumstance which hath much distressed, and still distresses, modern critics to account for; I mean the requesting his friends to sacrifice a cock to Æsculapius: a piece of devotion, on some account or other, no matter what, due from him, according to the customs of his country, which he had neglected to perform<sup>1</sup>.

But for all this, no one the least conversant in antiquity, will, I suppose, take it into his head that these Sages, because they held *every one should adhere to the religion of his country*, did not therefore see the gross errors of the national religions. Why then (it may be asked) was this strange violation of truth amongst men who employed all their studies to evince the importance of it, in general, to happiness?

teaching of *physics*, or *natural philosophy*, which had a direct tendency to shake and overturn one half of the national religion, namely the worship of, what were called, the celestial Gods, or *Hosts of Heaven*.

<sup>1</sup> We have, indeed, been told, that, to his *Cock* he might have added a *Bull*; for that the Philosopher was now in a delirium, occasioned by the cicuta, to which, Scribonius Largus attributes this effect. But I apprehend, the eminent persons who then attended the last moments of the expiring Philosopher (and must have been well apprised of the nature of a draught, whose legal application to criminals of state had made its effects familiar to every one) would have been the *first* to observe this symptom, if, indeed, the drug had any such property. Whereas they speak of Socrates as perfectly in his senses when he made this request; and I think *They* are rather to be relied on who understood what related both to the *sacrifice* and the *drug*, than *They* who know so little of either; especially as we find this rite was exactly suitable to the foregoing declaration of CONFORMITY, in his defence before his judges.

The

The explanation of the riddle is easy: the GENIUS of their national religions, consisting rather in the performance of *Rites* of Worship than in the profession of *Opinions*, taught them to conclude, THAT UTILITY AND NOT TRUTH WAS THE END OF RELIGION. And if we attentively consider those religions (formed in subserviency to the State) as is occasionally explained in the several parts of this work, we shall not much wonder at their conclusion. And then not rightly distinguishing between *particular* and *general* UTILITY; between that which ariseth from the *illegitimate*, and the *legitimate*, administration of civil policy, they universally embraced this other false conclusion, THAT UTILITY AND TRUTH DO NOT COINCIDE<sup>1</sup>. From this latter principle, a third necessarily arose, THAT IT WAS LAWFUL AND EXPEDIENT TO DECEIVE FOR THE PUBLIC GOOD. This all the ancient Philosophers embraced: and Tully, on the authority of Plato, thinks it so clear, that he calls the doing otherwise NEFAS, a *horrid wickedness*. The famous Scævola, the Roman Pontiff, frankly declares his opinion, (as St. Austin tells us) “that Societies should be deceived in religion<sup>2</sup>.” The last mentioned author goes on: “Varro, speaking of religions, says plainly, that there are many TRUTHS which it is NOT EXPEDIENT the vulgar should know; and many FALSHOODS which yet it is useful for the people to receive as truths<sup>3</sup>.” Upon which the Father remarks, “Here you have the whole arcana

<sup>1</sup> See the contrary proposition proved towards the beginning of the sixth section of the third book.

<sup>2</sup> Expedire existimat falli in religione civitates. *De Civ. Dei*, l. iv. c. 10.

<sup>3</sup> Varro de religionibus loquens, evidenter dicit, multa esse VERA, quæ vulgo scire non sit UTILE; multaque, quæ tametsi falsa sint, aliter existimare populum expediat.



“ of state ”.—Nothing shews more strongly, that, not truth, but utility, ruled all, in Paganism, than the case Livy mentions, of what happened in the 573d year of Rome. Some concealed books of Numa were discovered; which, on examination by the proper officers, being found to be injurious to the *established Worship*, were ordered, by Authority, to be burnt. Not one word is objected to them as containing any *falsehood*; on the contrary they were treated at their execution with the utmost reverence and respect; and the fire was lighted by the sacred Ministers who served at the Altar. — As we go along, we shall find *this* maxim universally received by the *theistical* Philosophers.

I would only observe, that it appears from hence, that the principles, which induced the ancient Sages to deem it lawful to LYE or deceive for the public good, had no place in the *nature*, or in the *consonant propagation* of the JEWISH and CHRISTIAN religions.

II. My *second* general reason was, *that the ancient Sages did actually say one thing when they thought another*. This appears from that general practice in the *Greek Philosophy*, of a TWOFOLD DOCTRINE; the EXTERNAL and the INTERNAL; a *vulgar and a secret*. The first openly taught to all; and the second confined to a select number. If this needed any other proof than what is given above, it might be supported by the very language used in speaking of the Philosophers — εἰς τὴν Πλάτωνος ἦγεν μυσαγωγίαν\*. — ἐπὶ τὴν Ἀριστοτέλους τοῖς μυσηρίοις†. Now what *initiation* or what *mystery* could there be in a sect that had nothing to *hide* from the Many, nothing to *communicate* to the Few? And how, but by saying one thing

\* Hic certe totum consilium prodidit SAPIENTIUM, per quos civitates et populi regerentur.

† Marinus in vita Procli.

‡ Themist. in Patr. ob.



and thinking another, could such a System be supported? Nor were they different doctrines or subjects, but one and the same, handled differently; popularly and scientifically; viz. according to OPINION, or according to TRUTH<sup>z</sup>.

PARMENIDES, we are told, had two doctrines concerning the nature of the universe; one, in which he taught that the world had been *made* and would be *destroyed*; another, in which he said, it was *ungenenerated*, and would never be *dissolved*; and that the first was his PUBLIC and the second was his PRIVATE teaching<sup>a</sup>.

<sup>z</sup> Duplex enim erat doctrinæ genus apud antiquas gentes, δημῶδες καὶ ἀποδῶδες, doctrina vulgaris & doctrina arcana; idque non tantum ob diversitatem materiæ, sed eandem sæpe materiam duplici modo tractabant, populari & philosophica. *Archæol. Phil.* l. i. c. 8. — See this matter explained at large by the very learned author of the *Critical inquiry into the opinions and practice of the ancient philosophers*, etc. second edit. Chap. xi, xii, and xiii.

<sup>a</sup> "The author of the philosophical piece commonly ascribed to Origen, says, *That he sometimes complied with the popular opinion, and declared that the universe would be one day destroyed.* Καὶ Παρμενίδης ἐν μὲν τῷ πᾶσι ὑποτίθεται, ΑἰΔΙΟΝ ΤΕ, καὶ ἀγέννητον, καὶ σφαιροειδές· ἐν δ' αὐτὸς ΕΚΦΕΥΓΩΝ ΤΗΝ ΤΩΝ πολλῶν ΔΟΞΑΝ, πῶς λέγων καὶ γῆν ΤΑΣ ΤΟΥ ΠΑΝΤΟΣ ΑΡΧΑΣ, τὴν μὲν γῆν, ὡς ὕλην· τὸ δὲ πῦρ, ὡς αἴτιον, καὶ ποιῆν ΤΟΝ ΚΟΣΜΟΝ ΕΙΠΕ ΦΘΕΙΡΕΣΘΑΙ. It appears too from this passage that he spoke popularly, when he said that the world was made, or had a beginning; and that this doctrine was merely popular may be seen too from the following words of Themistius. Καὶ γὰρ ὁ Παρμενίδης ἐν τοῖς πρὸς δόξαν, τὸ διεμὸν ποιεῖ καὶ τὸ ψυχρὸν ἀρχαί, ἐν τῷ μὲν πῦρ, τὸ δὲ γῆν προσαγορεύει. It is then evident from these passages that, in his *exoterics*, he gave the world both a beginning and an end. But then in his other writings he denied that it had either, I need not quote Cicero, Plutarch, or Eusebius, to prove this; the following verses of his own are sufficient for my present purpose.

"Αὐτὰρ ἀκίνητον μεγάλων ἐν πεύκῃσι δισμῶν

"Εἶν' ΑΝΑΡΧΟΝ, ΑΠΙΑΥΣΤΟΝ, ἐπὶ ΓΕΝΕΣΙΣ καὶ ΟΛΕΘΡΟΣ

"Τῆς μὲν μακ' ἐπὶ λήξειν, ἀπὸς δὲ πᾶσις ἀληθής.

See the *Critical enquiry into the opinions and practice of the ancient philosophers*, p. 225. 2d edit.

That PLATO followed the same practice, we learn from his own words, who, in a letter to his friends, says, according to Dr. Bentley's translation <sup>b</sup>, "As for the symbol or private note you desire, to know my serious letters, and which *contain my real sentiments*, from those that *do not*, know and remember that God begins a serious letter, and GODS one that is otherwise<sup>c</sup>." Now had not Plato used the *exoteric* doctrine, or delivered things not corresponding to the real sentiments of his mind, what occasion had his friends to desire this private mark or symbol to know when he was in earnest?

GALEN says, "Plato declares that animals have constantly a soul, which serves to animate and inform their bodies: as for stones, wood, and what we commonly call the inanimate parts of the creation; all these, he says, are quite destitute of soul. And yet in his *Timæus*, where he explains his principles to his disciples and select friends, he there gives up the common notion, declares that there is a soul diffused through the universe, which is to actuate and pervade every part of it. *Now we are not to imagine that in this case he is INCONSISTENT with himself, or maintains contrary doctrines, any more than Aristotle and Theophrastus are to be charged with contradiction, when they delivered to their Disciples their acroatic doctrines, and to the Vulgar, principles of another nature*." And, in the communication of

<sup>b</sup> See the Doctor's *Remarks on the disc. of free-thinking*, etc.

<sup>c</sup> Περὶ δὲ δὴ τῷ Εὐμένει τε καὶ τῷ Πλάτωνα τε ἐπιστολάς, ὅσας τε αὖ ἐπιστάλλω ΣΙΟΥΔΗ ΚΑΙ ΟΞΑΣ ΑΝ ΜΗ, οἶμαι μὲν σε μέμνησθαι ὅμως δ' ἐμοί. καὶ ταύτην πρόσθετος τὸν καὶ πολλοὶ γὰρ οἱ κλεινότεροι γράφουσιν, οἷς καὶ ῥαδίον φανερώς διαβιβάζουσι τῆς μὲν γὰρ στυγαίας ἐπιστολῆς Θεὸς ἀρχαῖος, οἷοι δὲ τῆς ἡλίου. Ep. xiii.

<sup>d</sup> Πλάτων μὲν αὐτὸς ἱερὸν καὶ μὲν αἰεὶ λέγει τὰ ζῶα, τὰς λίθους δὲ



of their *acroatic* or arcane opinions, the philosophers were as cautious as the teachers of the *Mysteries* were in theirs: and set about it with the same solemnity<sup>c</sup>.

SYNESIUS, a thorough Platonist, and scarce more than half a Christian, who perfectly well understood all the intrigues of Pagan philosophy, delivers it as the plain consequence of the practice of the *double doctrine*, "that philosophy, when it has attained the truth, allows the use of LIES AND FICTIONS<sup>f</sup>."

After this, it will hardly need to be observed, That their *external* doctrine was, either the invention of fables, or the propagation of what they held to be false: and their *internal*, the delivery of what they held, or discovered, to be the truth: Yet because a remarkable passage of MACROBIUS will, together with the proof of this point, tend to the further illustration of the general subject we are upon, I shall give it at large. — "Yet it is to be understood (says this author) that the PHILOSOPHERS did not admit into every kind of disputation, the false and fabulous, whether of their own invention or of public allowance<sup>g</sup>, but only

καὶ τὰς σόας, καὶ τὰ ἔξωτα, καὶ καθόλου φάσαι τὰ φῦτα πάντα τῶν ἀνθρώπων σωματικῶν εἶναι φαντασίαν· ἀλλ' ὅτις ἐν Τυχαίῳ τῶν φυσικῶν διαφέρει ἀνθρώποις ἀκροάται, καὶ ἀπολαύει ἐπιστημονικῶς, λόγῳ, θεωρίῃ, ἀποχρηστῶς τῶν τοῖς πολλοῖς δοκούντων, εἰς ὅσον τὸν κόσμον ἐκείνους εἶναι τῆς ψυχῆς αὐτῆς διαφάνει, ἢ καὶ τὸτο κινῆσαι εἶναι πάντες ἐκείνῳ παναίτια λόγῳ, ὥστε, ἐν Ἀριστοτέλει καὶ Θεοφράστῃ, τὰ μὲν τῶν πολλοῖς γινώσκονται, τὰς δὲ ἀκροάσεις τῶν ἰσχυρῶν. Galeni De substantia naturalium facultatum fragmentum.

<sup>c</sup> And in the same form of words:

ὁμιλῶμαι οἷς δέμῃ ἐστὶ, θυρεὶ δ' ἐνέθεσθαι βιβλίαν.

So, Porphyry in Eusebius introduces his internal doctrines.

<sup>f</sup> Νῦν δὲ φιλοσοφῶν ἐπὶ τοῖς ὡς ταῦτάς τις συνήγαγε τῇ χάριτι τῷ ΠΕΥΔΕΣΘΑΙ. Epist. cv.

<sup>g</sup> The text says, *fabulosa vel licita*. The two last words are found in all the old editions: the more modern, for an obvi-



“ only in those which treated of the SOUL, or of  
 “ ETHERIAL POWERS, or of the OTHER GODS<sup>h</sup>.  
 “ But when their discourse ventured to raise itself  
 “ to God, the origin and principle of all things,  
 “ Him whom the Greeks call the GOOD and the  
 “ FIRST CAUSE; OR, to MIND<sup>i</sup>, which the Greeks  
 “ call ΝΟΤΣ, the offspring of the supreme God,  
 “ which contains the original species of things called  
 “ ideas, when these things, I say, MIND and the  
 “ SUPREME GOD, are the subject, then all fable and  
 “ falshood is banished from the discourse. But  
 “ still let us observe, that if, on these subjects,  
 “ their discourse leads them to inculcate doc-  
 “ trines, which not only exceed the power of  
 “ speech, but even human ideas and cogitations,  
 “ they then fly to allusions, similitudes, and figures.  
 “ — But then again, on the other hand, when  
 “ the discourse is of the first kind, that is, concern-  
 “ ing the GODS and the HUMAN SOUL, where fable  
 “ and falshood are employed, the philosophers  
 “ have had recourse to this method, not out of an  
 “ idle or fantastical humour, or to please their audi-

ous reason, dropt them. Gronovius takes notice of the fraud,  
 and restores them to their place; but, in order, finally, to de-  
 grade them, on a fair hearing: which he does, and puts *vel*  
*fiſſa* in their place. But *licita* is, I believe, Macrobius's own  
 word, and signifies, those *theological fables allowed of by public*  
*authority*. So that *fabulæ vel licitæ* means, *either such fables*  
*as the philosophers invented, or such as they borrowed from the po-*  
*popular belief*.

<sup>h</sup> The text says— *de cælis ætheriisve potestatibus*; by which  
 the author means, the first natural Gods of Gentilism, the *heav-*  
*enly bodies*; as by — *vel de ceteris Diis*, he means, the second  
 class of false gods, *dead men deified*.

<sup>i</sup> — *ad mentem*. By *mind*, the author here means the third  
 hypostasis of the Platonic trinity, called *νς*, or *νοῦς*. For he  
 takes his example, of what he says, of the conduct of the  
 philosophers, from Plato; and illustrates an observation of his  
 own, in this place, by a passage in that philosopher.

“ enc<sup>c</sup>

“ence by an agreeable amusement; but because  
 “they know that a naked and open exposition of  
 “NATURE<sup>k</sup> is injurious to her; who, as she hides  
 “the knowledge of herself from gross and vulgar  
 “conceptions, by the various covering and dis-  
 “guise of *Forms*, so it is her pleasure, that her  
 “priests, the Philosophers, should treat her secrets  
 “in fable and allegory. And thus it is even in  
 “the sacred *Mysteries*, where the secret is hid, even  
 “from the initiated, under figurative and scenical  
 “representations<sup>l</sup>. And while princes and magi-  
 “strates only, with Wisdom<sup>m</sup> for their guide, are  
 “admitted to the naked truth<sup>n</sup>; the rest may be  
 “well content with outside ornaments, which, at  
 “the same time that they excite the beholder’s reve-  
 “rence and veneration<sup>o</sup>, are contrived to secure  
 “the dignity of the secret, by hiding it under  
 “that cover from the knowledge of the Vulgar<sup>p</sup>.”  
 The first observation I shall make on this long  
 passage

<sup>k</sup>—*quia sciunt inimicam esse naturæ apertam nudamque expositionemque sui.* He alludes here to the danger of explaining openly the physical nature of the heavenly bodies, because it would unsettle one half of vulgar polytheism. So Anaxagoras was accused, and some say convicted, of a capital crime for holding the sun to be a mere material mass of fire.

<sup>l</sup>—*figurarum cuniculis operiuntur, i. e. coniculis figurarum ad representationem aptis.* It alludes to the allegorical shews of the mysteries represented in subterraneous places.

<sup>m</sup>—*Sapientia interprete; Wisdom* is here put into the office of hierophant of the mysteries, who instructed the initiated in the secret.

<sup>n</sup>—*summatibus tantum viris veri arcani conscitis.* By these Macrobius means, heroes, princes, and legislators; alluding to their old practice of seeking initiation into the greater mysteries.

<sup>o</sup> *Contenti sint reliqui ad venerationem figuris, etc.* is equivalent to *Contenti sint reliqui apud venerationem figuris.*

<sup>p</sup> *Sciendum est tamen non in omnem disputationem philosophos admittere fabulosa vel licita, sed his uti solent, vel cum de ANIMA, vel de aëris ætherisque potestatibus, vel de ceteris Dis, loquuntur.* Ceterum cum ad summum et principem omnium Deum,

passage is, that the SAME SUBJECT, namely, the nature of superior beings, was handled in a TWO-FOLD manner: *exoterically*; and then the discourse was of the *national Gods: esoterically*; and then it was of the *first Cause of all things*. 2. That the *exoteric* teaching admitted fable and falshood, *fabulosa vel licita*: the *esoteric*, only what the teacher believed to be true, *nihil fabulosum penitus*. 3. That what was taught the Vulgar concerning the HUMAN SOUL was of the *exoteric* kind. 4. That the teaching of fables was one thing; and the teaching in fables, or by figurative expressions, quite another: the first being the cover of *error*; the second the vehicle of *truth*: that the passions and prejudices of men made the first necessary; that the latter became unavoidable through the weakness of human conception. This distinction was useful and seasonable, as the not attending to it, in those late times, in which Macrobius wrote, was the occasion of men's confounding these two ways of teaching with one another.

qui apud Græcos *ταύαθον*, qui *μυστήριον* *αἰτίον* nuncupatur, tractatus se audet attollere; vel ad *mentem* quam Græci *νῆς* appellant, originales rerum species, quæ *ἰδέαι* dictæ sunt, continentem, ex summo natam et profectam Deo: cum de his, inquam, loquuntur, *summo Deo et mente* nihil fabulosum penitus attingunt. Sed si quid de his assignare conantur, quæ non sermonem tantummodo, sed cogitationem quoque humanam superant, ad similitudines et exempla confugiunt — De *Diis* autem, ut dixi, *esteris*, et de *anima* non frustra se, nec, ut oblectent, ad fabulosa convertunt; sed quia sciunt inimicam esse naturæ apertam nudamque expositionem sui: quæ sicut vulgaribus hominum sensibus intellectum sui vario rerum tegmine operimentoque subtrahit; ita a prudentibus arcana sua voluit per fabulosa tractari. Sic ipsa *mysteria* figurarum cuniculis operiuntur, ne vel hæc adeptis nuda rerum talium se natura præbeat: sed summatibus tantum viris, Sapientia interprete, veri arcani conscii; contenti sint reliqui ad venerationem figuræ dependentibus a vilitate secretum. In *Somm. Scip.* lib. i. c. 2.

From  
1771



From all this it appears, that a right conception of the nature of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE was deemed the TRUE KEY to the ancient Greek philosophy.

On which account several writers of the lower ages composed discourses ON THE HIDDEN DOCTRINES OF THE PHILOSOPHERS<sup>1</sup>. But as these, which would have given much light to the subject, are not come down to us, we must be content to feel out our way to the original and end of the *double doctrine* as well as we are able. For it is not enough, that this method of teaching was general amongst the Greek philosophers: to bring it to our point, we must prove it was invented for the *good of Society*.

The original is little understood. It hath been generally supposed owing either to a barbarous love of mystery; or a base disposition to deceive. Toland, who made it the study of a wretched life, to shed his venom on every thing that was great and respectable, sometimes<sup>2</sup> supposes this *double doctrine* the issue of craft and roguery; at other times, a grave and wise provision against the bigotry and superstition of the Vulgar. And a different sort of man, the celebrated Fontenelle, when he calls *mystery*, which is the consequence of the double doctrine, *the apanage of barbarity*, does as little justice to Antiquity.

I shall shew *first*, that those, from whom the Greeks borrowed this method of philosophising, invented it for the service of Society. And *secondly*, that those who borrowed it, employed it for that

<sup>1</sup> Zacynthus scripsit τὰ ἀπόρρητα τῆς φιλοσοφίας, referente Laetio, Porphyrius τῶν φιλοσόφων τὰ ἀπόρρητα, teste Eunapio in ejus vita.

<sup>2</sup> See his *Tetradymus*, in what he call, *Of the exoteric and esoteric philosophy*.

purpose; however it might at length degenerate into craft and folly\*.

*First,*

\* One of the *Answerers* of the *Divine Legation* says, "What a noble field would have been here opened for the FATHERS, could they have charged the Pagan sages and philosophers with the dissimulation which Mr. W. has here done? Could they have loaded them with the crime of *believing one thing and teaching another*, with LYING, with imposing on the credulity of the people; what a display of rhetoric should we have had? could there have been a more fit occasion for *satire or declamation*——BUT THEY NEVER REPROACH THEM ON THAT ACCOUNT."—Dr. Sykes's *Exam.* p. 88. The gravity of all this is so rarely contrasted with its profound knowledge, that the Reader cannot find in his heart to be angry with him for what follows, from these FATHERS; with whom the good Doctor appears to be so well acquainted.

ARNOBIUS, speaking of this custom of *believing one thing and teaching another*, says: Nunc vero, cum ALIUD CREDITIS et ALIUD FINGITIS, et in eos estis contumeliosi, quibus id attribuitis, quod eos, confitemini non esse: et *irreligious* esse monstramini, cum id adoratis quod fingitis, non quod in re esse, ipsaque in veritate censetis. *L. iii. p. 109. Lugd. ed.*

EUSEBIUS reproaches *Plato* on this very account: charges him with mean dissimulation for teaching doctrines which he believed to be false, merely out of reverence to the laws of his country. Καὶ τὸ παρὰ γὰρ αὐτοῦ διὰ ταῦτα λέγειν τῶν νόμων ἵπκα διαβέβηκεν ἀρίστην ὁμολογήσας, ὅτι δέοι ἀπομένους τῷ νόμῳ πιστεύειν αὐτοῖς. *Præp. Evang. xiii. c. 1.*—ἀλλὰ γὰρ τέτοιον δὲ χάριν ἀπολειπόμενόν ἡμῶν ἔστω, δέοι θανάτου τὴν Ἀθηναίων δῆμον καθυποκρινάμενον. *c. 15.*

LACTANTIUS reproves *Cicero* for the same practice: Cum videamus etiam doctos et prudentes viros, cum religionum intelligent vanitatem, nihilominus tamen in iis ipsis, quæ damnant, colendis, NESCIO QUA PRAVITATE, persistere. Intelligebat *Cicero* falsa esse, quæ homines adorarent: nam cum multa dixisset, quæ ad everisionem religionum valerent; ait tamen non esse illa vulgo disputanda, ne susceptas publice religiones disputatio talis extinguat: Quid ei facies, qui, cum errare se sentiat, ultro ipse in lapides impingat, ut populus omnis offendant? Ipse sibi oculos eruat, ut omnes cæci sint? Qui nec de aliis bene meretur, quos patitur errare; nec de seipso, qui alienis accedit erroribus; nec utitur tandem sapientiæ suæ bono, ut factis impleat, quod mente percepit. *Div. Instit. l. ii. c. 3.*

St. *AUSTIN*'s account of *Seneca* is not at all more favourable. Sed iste quam philosophi quasi *liberum* \* fecerunt, tamen quia

\* Alluding to the Stoical *wise man*.

First, then, it is confessed by the Greeks themselves that all their learning and wisdom came from Egypt; fetched from thence either immediately by their own Philosophers, or brought round to them by the eastern Sages, by the way of Asia. In this, the Greeks are unanimous. Now Herodotus, Diodorus Siculus, Strabo, Plutarch, all testify that the Egyptian priests, with whom the learning of the place resided, had a TWOFOLD PHILOSOPHY, the one hidden and sacred, the other open and vulgar.

To know their end in this way of teaching, we must consider their character. Ælian tells us<sup>2</sup>, that in the most early times, the Priests, amongst the Egyptians, were Judges and Magistrates. So that the care of the People must needs be their chief concern under both titles: and as well what they divulged, as what they concealed, must be equally for the sake of Society. Accordingly we find them to have been the first who taught an intercourse with the Gods, a future state of rewards

illustris populi Romani Senator erat, colebat quod reprehendebat; agebat, quod arguebat; quod culpabat, adorabat. — Eo damnabilis, quod illa quæ MENDACITER agebat sic ageret, ut populus veraciter agere exultimaret. *De civ. Dei*, l. vi. c. 10.

But this Father concludes all the Pagan sages and philosophers under the same condemnation, for IMPOSING (as Dr. Sykes expresses it) ON THE CREDULITY OF THE PEOPLE, and with satire and declamation enough of conscience, if that will satisfy the Doctor. — Quod utique non aliam ob causam factum videtur, nisi quia homines velut prudentium et sapientium negotium fuit, POPULUM IN RELIGIONIBUS FALLERE, et in eo ipso non solum colere, sed imitari etiam Dæmones. Sicut enim Dæmones nisi eos quos fallendo deceperint, possidere non possunt, sic et homines principes non sane iusti sed Dæmonum similes, ea quæ vanæ esse noverant, religionis nomine populis tanquam vera suadebant, hoc modo eos civili societati velut artius alligantes. *De civit. Dei*, l. iv. c. 132.

<sup>1</sup> Οἱ ἱερεῖς — ΔΥΟ ΛΟΓΟΥΣ ἔχοντες, ὃν τὸν μὲν ἱερὸν καὶ ἀκέραιον — ὃ δὲ ὑπόμνημα καὶ ἀποχρηστικόν. — Περὶ Ἰσίδ. καὶ Ὀσίρ.

<sup>2</sup> Var. Hist. l. xiv. c. 34.

and



and punishments, and initiation into MYSTERIES, instituted for the support of that belief: The ἀπόρρητα of which was the doctrine of the UNITY.

Plutarch assures us of this truth, where he tells us, that it was chiefly to their Kings and Magistrates, to whom the SECRET doctrines of the College were revealed. "The Kings were chosen (says he) either out of the priesthood, or the soldiery: as *this* order for their valour, and *that* for their wisdom, were had in honour and reverence. But when one was chosen out of the soldiery, he was forthwith had to the college of the Priests, and instructed in their secret philosophy; which involves many things in fables and allegories, where the face of truth is seen, indeed; but clouded and obscured\*."

And in the same manner, and with the same view, the MAGI of Persia, the DRUIDS of Gaul, and the BRACHMANS of India, the genuine offspring of the Egyptian priests, and who, like them, shared in the administration of the State, had all their *external and internal doctrines*†.

What hath misled both ancient and modern writers to think the *double doctrine* to be only a barbarous and selfish craft of keeping up the reputation of the teacher, was a prevailing opinion, that moral and natural truths were concealed under the ancient fables of the Gods and Heroes. For then, these fables must have been invented by the ancient Sages; and invented for the sake of explaining them, and nothing more. So the learned Master

\* Οἱ δὲ βασιλεῖς ἀποδείκνυσι μὲν ἐκ τῶν ἱερῶν ἢ τῶν μαχιμῶν, τῷ μὲν δὲ ἀνδρείαν, τῷ δὲ διασφίαν, γένος ἀξίωμα, καὶ τιμὴν ἔχουσιν· ὁ δὲ ἐκ μαχιμῶν ἀποδεικνύμενος εὐθὺς ἐγγίγει τῶν ἱερῶν, καὶ μέλει αὐτῷ τῆς φιλοσοφίας ἐπιεικρομένης τὰ πολλὰ μύθοις καὶ λόγοις αἰνυμέναις ἐμφάσει τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ διαφασίς ἐχουσιν. Περὶ ΙΕ. καὶ ΟΕ. Steph. ed.

† Orig. cont. Celsum, l. i.

of the Charter-house, taking it for granted that the Sages were the inventors of the ancient mythology, concludes that one of these two things was the original of the *double doctrine*: "It arose either from the genius of Antiquity, especially of the Orientalists; or else from the affectation of making important things, difficult, and not easily understood at first sight." But that way of allegorizing the ancient fables was the invention of the later Greek philosophers. The old Pagan mythology was only the corruption of historical tradition; and consequently arose from the People; whose follies and prejudices occasion the *double doctrine*, to be employed for their service. But what it was that facilitated its use, we shall see hereafter, when we come, in the fourth book, to speak of the Egyptian HIEROGLYPHICS.

*Secondly*, We say, the Greeks, who borrowed this method of the *double doctrine*, employed it, like the Egyptians, who invented it, TO THE USE OF SOCIETY.

1. The first who went out of Greece to learn Egyptian wisdom, were the LEGISLATORS: Or such as, projecting to reduce the scattered tribes, which then over-ran Greece, into civil Society, travelled thither to learn the ART of LAWGIVING, from a nation the most celebrated for that knowledge. Of these, were Orpheus, Rhadamanthus, Minos, Lycaon, Triptolemus, and others; who concerned themselves with nothing of the Egyptian wisdom, but their public morals or *Politics*; and received the *double doctrine* along with it; as appears from their

\* Sive id factum fuerit pro ingenio priscorum hominum, maxime orientalium; sive ut ea, quæ pulchra erant, difficilia redderent, neque primo intuitu discernenda. *Archæol. Phil.* l. i. c. 3.

instituting the MYSTERIES (where this doctrine was practised) in their several civil establishments.

2. The next sort of men who went from Greece to Egypt for instruction (though the intercourse of the Lawgivers with Egypt was not interrupted, but continued down to the times of Draco, Lycurgus, and Solon) were the NATURALISTS; who, throughout their whole course, bore the name of SOPHISTS. For now Greece being advanced from a savage and barbarous state, to one of civil Policy, the inhabitants, in consequence of the cultivation of the arts of life, began to refine and speculate. But physics and mathematics wholly ingrossed the early sophists, such as Thales, Anaximander, Anaximenes, Xenophanes, Parmenides, and Leucippus. For as these studies were managed systematically and fitted to the vain and curious temper of that people, this, as the post of honour, would be first seized upon. Besides Greece being at this time over-run with petty TYRANTS\*, the descendants of their ancient HEROES, it was found unsafe to turn their speculations upon *morals*; in which *politics* were contained, and made so eminent a part. All then that this second class of Adventurers learnt of the Egyptians, was PHYSICAL AND MATHEMATICAL KNOWLEDGE: and as, in the cultivation of this, there was little occasion for, so their character of mere Naturalists made them have less regard to, the *double doctrine*. And in effect, we find little mention of it amongst the first Greek Sophists, who busied themselves only in these enquiries.

3. The last sort of people, who went to Egypt for instruction, were the PHILOSOPHERS, properly so called. A character exactly compounded of the

\* Δυνατώτερας δὲ γενομένης τῆς Ἑλλάδος, καὶ τῶν χρημάτων τὴν κτῆσιν ἔτι μάλλον ἢ πρότερον ποιούμενης, τὰ πολλὰ τυραννίδες ἐν ταῖς πόλεσι κατεβασίλο, τῶν πρὸς ὁδοὺν μίξιν γιγνομένων. Hist. l. i.



two preceding, the *Lawgiver* and the *Naturalist*. For when now, after various struggles, and revolutions, the Grecian States had asserted, or regained their liberties, MORALS, public and private, would become the subject most in fashion. From this time, the Grecian Sages became violently given to Legislation, and were actually employed in making laws for the several emerging Common-wealths: Hence Aristotle observed, that "the best Law-givers in ancient Greece, were amongst the "middle rank of men." The first (as well as most famous) of this class, and who gave *philosophy* its name and character, was PYTHAGORAS. He, and Plato, with others, travelled into Egypt, like their predecessors. But now having joined in one, the two different studies of Politics and Philosophy, a slight tincture of Egyptian instruction would not serve their purpose: to complete their Character, there was a necessity of being thoroughly imbued with the most hidden wisdom of Egypt. Accordingly, the Ancients tell us<sup>b</sup>, of their long abode there; their hard condition of admittance into the sacred Colleges; and their bringing away with them all the secret science of the priesthood. The result of all was, and it is worth our observation, that, from this time, the *Greek Sophists*, (now called *Philosophers*) began to cultivate the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments, and, at the very same time, the practice of the double doctrine: which two principles were the distinguishing badges of their Character.

Thus, by an intimate acquaintance with the Egyptian priesthood, the Greeks, at length, got amongst themselves a new species of SAGES, whose charac-

<sup>b</sup> Porph. *De vita Pythag.* — Strabo *de Platone*, l. xvii. *Geogr.* — Origen *Comm. in Ep. ad Rom.* c. iii.

ter much resembled that of their masters. But with this difference, that amongst the Egyptian Priests (and so amongst the Magi, the Brachmans, and the Druids) Philosophy was an appendix to Legislation; while amongst the Greeks, Legislation was but the appendix to Philosophy. For philosophy was the *first* acquést of the Greek Sages; and legislation, of the Egyptian. There was yet another difference; which was, that, in the *Greek Sophist*, the two characters of LEGISLATOR and PHILOSOPHER were always kept distinct, and conducted on the contrary principles: whereas in the *Egyptian Priest*, they were incorporated, and went together. So that in Greece, the *hidden doctrines* of the *Mysteries*, and the *συστήματα* of the *Schools*, though sometimes founded by one and the same person, as by Pythagoras, were two very different things; but in Egypt, still one and the same.

Greece was now well settled in popular Communities; and yet this legislating humour still continued. And when the Philosophers had no more work, they still kept on the trade; and from practical, became speculative Lawgivers. This gave birth to a deluge of visionary *Republics*, as appears from the titles of their works preserved by Diogenes Laertius; where, one is always as sure to find a treatise *De legibus*, or *De republica*, as a treatise, *De deo*, *De anima*, or *De mundo*.

But of all the sects, the Pythagoreans and Platonists continued longest in this humour. The Academics and Stoics, indulging to the disputatious genius of the Greek philosophy, struck out into a new road; and began to cultivate the last great branch of philosophy, LOGIC; especially the Stoics, who, from their great attachment to it, were surnamed *Dialectici*.



The reader hath here a short view of the progress of the GREEK PHILOSOPHY; which Plato aptly divided into PHYSICS, MORALS, and LOGIC<sup>c</sup>. We have shewn that this was the order of their birth: the study of *physics* and *mathematics* began while Greece groaned under its petty tyrants: *morals* public and private arose with their civil liberties: and *logic*, when they had contracted a habit of disputation and refinement.

But when now the liberties of Greece began to be again shaken by Tyrants of greater form and power, and every nobler province of Science was already possessed and occupied by the Sects above mentioned; some ambitious men, as EPICURUS, attempted to revive the splendor of ancient PHYSICS by an exclusive cultivation of them; rejecting LOGIC, and all the *public* part of MORALS, *Politics* and *Legislation*: and, with *them*, in consequence, (which deserves our notice) the use of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE<sup>d</sup>, as of no service in this reform. An evident proof of its having been employed only for the sake of *Society*: for were it, as Toland and his fellows pretend, for *their own*, it had found its use chiefly in *Physics*; because the celestial bodies being amongst the popular Gods, enquiries into their physical essence would hardly escape the public odium: Plutarch tells us how heavily it fell both on Protagoras and Anaxagoras<sup>e</sup>. Notwithstanding this, the

*first*

<sup>c</sup> Μίση δὲ φιλοσοφίας τρία, ΦΥΣΙΚΟΝ, ΗΘΙΚΟΝ, ΔΙΑΛΕΚΤΙΚΟΝ. Diog. Laert. *Proem.* § 18.

<sup>d</sup> Clemens Alex. indeed (*Strom.* 5.) says, that "the Epicureans bragged they had their *secrets*, which it was not lawful "to divulge;" but this was only arrogating to themselves a mark of Philosophy, which those, to whom it really belonged, had made venerable.

<sup>e</sup> Ὁ γὰρ πρῶτος σαφιστὴς γινώσκων καὶ διαπραγματεύων περὶ Σόλωνος καλαυρασμῶν καὶ σπουδῆς λόγων εἰς γραφὴν καλαβήσαντο. Ἀναξαγόρας, ὅς ποτε ἐν Πάρισι, ὅτι ἐ λόγῳ ἠδουζέτο, ἀλλ' ἀπέβητο ἔτι, καὶ δι' ἐλπίαν.



first and the last of the *Sophists*, who dealt only in *Physics*, equally rejected the *double doctrine*. While on the other hand, the *legislating* philosophers employed *this* very doctrine even in natural enquiries. We are told, that Pythagoras's popular account of earthquakes was, that they were occasioned by a synod of ghosts assembled under ground<sup>1</sup>. But Jamblichus<sup>2</sup> informs us, that he sometimes predicted earthquakes by the taste of well-water<sup>3</sup>.

It appears then, on the whole, that the *double doctrine* was used for the sake of *Society*; their high notions of which made them conclude the practice not

γὰρ, ἢ μετ' εὐλαθείας τινὸς ἢ πρίτως βαδίζαν· ἢ γὰρ ἡείχοιο τὰς φουρ-  
πὰς ἢ μετεωρολόσχας τότε καλεμίνως ὡς εἰς αἰτίας ἀλόγους ἢ δυνάμεις  
ἀπερονήτους ἢ καὶ ἀνακασμένα παθὴ διατρέχειας τὸ θεῖον· ἀλλὰ ἢ Πρω-  
ταγόρας ἔφυγε ἢ Ἀναξαγόραν εἰσέχθηνά μοις περιποιησάτο Περικλῆς.  
Vit. Nicæ.

<sup>1</sup> *Ælian. Var. Hist.* l. iv. c. 17.

<sup>2</sup> *Jamblicus Vit. Pythag.* l. i. c. 23.

<sup>3</sup> One scarce meets with any thing in antiquity concerning Pythagoras's knowledge in *physics*, but what gives us fresh cause to admire the wonderful sagacity of that extraordinary man. This story of his *predicting earthquakes*, has so much the air of a fable, that I believe it has been generally ranked (as it is by Stanley) with that heap of trash, which the enthusiastic Pythagoreans and Platonists of the lower ages have raked together concerning him. Yet a late relation, which I am about to quote, will shew, that although posterity could not profit by his knowledge, it has at least confirmed the veracity of this part of his history. Paul Dudley Esq. in the *Philos. Transact.* N<sup>o</sup> 437. p. 72. speaking of an earthquake which lately happened in New England, gives this reasonable and remarkable account of it: "A neighbour of mine that has a Well thirty-six feet deep, about three days before the earthquake, was surprized to find his water, that used to be very sweet and limpid, stink to that degree that they could make no use of it, nor scarce bear the house when it was brought in; and thinking some carrion was got into the Well, he searched the bottom, but found it clear and good, though the colour of the water was turned wheyish, or pale. In about seven days after the earthquake, his water began to mend, and in three days more returned to its former sweetness and colour."

only

only to be innocent, but laudable: whereas, were the motive either love of *mystery*, of *fraud*, or of *themselves*, it cannot be reconciled to any of their several systems of private morals.

III. My third general reason was, that *the ancient Sages seemed to practise the DOUBLE DOCTRINE, in the point in question*. I have observed, that those Sects which joined *legislation* to *philosophy*, as the Pythagoreans, Platonists, Peripatetics, and Stoics, always professed the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments: while those, who simply philosophised, as the Cyrenaic, the Cynic, and the Democritic, publicly professed the contrary. And just as those of the legislating class were more or less in the practice of that art, so were they more or less in the profession of a future state: as on the one hand, the Pythagoric and Platonic; and on the other, the Peripatetic and Stoic. Nay in one and the same sect, (as the Peripatetic, or the Stoic) when a follower of it studied legislation, he professed this belief; when he confined himself to private morals, or abstract speculations, he rejected it. Thus Zeno, amongst the Stoics, was a great assertor of it; while Epictetus openly denied it. And Seneca, who was but a mongrel, seems willing to expose the whole mystery. For in those parts of his writings, where he strictly philosophises, he denies a future state; and in those, where he acts the preacher or politician, he maintains it; and having, in this character, said what he thought fit in it's behalf, is not ashamed to add: "Hæc autem omnia ad MORES spectant, itaque suo loco posita sunt: at quæ a DIALECTICIS contra hanc opinionem dicuntur, segreganda fuerunt: et ideo seposita sunt." As much as to say, the doctrine was preached up as useful to So-

ciety, but intenable by reason. One might push this observation from sects to particulars. So Xenophon and Iocrates, who concerned themselves much in the public, declared for it; and Hippocrates and Galen, who confined themselves to natural studies, are inclined to be against it.

This totally enervates what might be urged in support of the common opinion, from those many professions in the writings of the Theistical philosophers in favour of a future state of rewards and punishments; as it shews that those professions only make part of the EXTERNAL or popular doctrines of men sects\*. It may likewise help to explain and reconcile an infinite number of discordances in their works in general; and more especially on this point, which are commonly, though I think falsely, ascribed to their inconstancy. How endless have been the disputes amongst the learned, since the revival of letters, about what Plato, Aristotle, and the Stoics held of the Soul? But it was not the Moderns only who found themselves at a loss; sometimes the Ancients themselves were embarrassed. Plutarch complains heavily of the *Repugnances of the Stoics*: and in his tract so intituled, accuses Chrysippus, now, for laughing at the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, as a Mismo, fit only to frighten women and children; and now again, for affirming seriously, that, let men laugh as they pleased, the thing was a sober truth.

IV. My *fourth* general reason is gathered from the opinions which Antiquity itself seems to have had of its philosophers on this point. The gravest writers (as

\* Yet neither could a truth so obvious, nor the notice here given of it, prevent the numerous writers against this book from perpetually urging, one from another, those professions in the EXOTERIC writings of the Philosophers, as a confutation of what is here delivered concerning their REAL SENTIMENTS.



we see in part, by the quotations above, from Timæus, Polybius, and Strabo) are full of apologies for the national Religions; that is, for what was taught in them, concerning a Providence here, and especially concerning the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, hereafter. They pretend that these things were necessary to keep the People in awe; but frankly own, that were Society composed all of wise men, THE RELIGION OF THE PHILOSOPHERS, which inforces morality by considerations drawn from the excellence of virtue, the dignity of our nature, and the perfection of the human soul, would be a fitter and more excellent way to good. Now, the *national Religions*, as they taught a doctrine of a future state, being here opposed to the *Religion of the philosophers*, which employed other motives, I conclude, that, in the opinion of these apologists, the Philosophers did not really believe *this doctrine*.

V. My *last* general argument against the common opinion, is collected from an extraordinary circumstance in the Roman history. CÆSAR, in his speech to the senate, to dissuade them from punishing the followers of Catiline with death, argues, "that death was no evil, as they, who inflicted it for a punishment, imagined, and intended it should be made." And thereon takes occasion, with a licentiousness till then unknown to that august Assembly, to explain and inforce the *avowed* principles of Epicurus (of whose sect he was) concerning the *mortality of the soul*<sup>1</sup>. Now when CATO and CICERO, who urged the death of the conspirators, come to reply to his argument for lenity; instead of opposing the

<sup>1</sup> De pœna, possum equidem dicere id quod res habet; in luctu atque miseris, mortem ærumnarum requiem; non cruciatum esse; eam cuncta mortalium mala dissolvere; ultra neque curæ, neque gaudio locum esse. Cæsar apud Sall. de Bell. Catilin.

principles of that philosophy by the avowed principles of a better, they content themselves with only saying, that “the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments was delivered down to them from their *ancestors*.” From this cold manner

<sup>m</sup> Cæsar (*says Cato*) bene et composite paulo ante, in hoc ordine, de vita et morte differuit, credo falsa existumans ea quæ de inferis MEMORANTUR. *Apud eund.* Cicero's reply is to the same purpose: Itaque ut aliqua in vita formido improbis esset posita, apud inferos ejusmodi quædam illi ANTIQUI supplicia impiis constituta esse voluerunt: quod videlicet intelligebant; his remotis, non esse mortem ipsam pertimescendam. *Orat. iv. in Catilin.* § 4. I cannot conceive what the very ingenious Mr. Moyle could mean in his *Essay on the Roman Government*, by saying—if the immortality of the soul (by which he means the doctrine of a future state of R. and P.) had been an ESTABLISHED doctrine, Cæsar would not have derided it in the face of the whole senate.—Do not the words of Cicero—*Antiqui supplicia impiis constituta esse voluerunt*, expressly declare it to be an established doctrine.

When Juvenal speaks of the impiety of Rome, with regard to this religious opinion, he exhorts the sober part of them to adhere to it, in these words.

Sed tu vera puta. Curius quid sentit, & ambo  
Scipiadæ? quid Fabricius manesque Camilli?

——quoties hinc talis ad illos

Umbra venit? cuperent lustrari, si qua darentur  
Sulphura cum tædis, et si foret humida laurus.

Illuc, heu! Miseri traducimur——

Those who understand these lines can never doubt whether a future State was the *established doctrine* in Rome.—Yet stranger than all this, the very learned Mosheim, in his *de rebus Christ. Commem.* p. 15. speaking of this licentious part of Cæsar's speech, seems to copy Mr. Moyle's opinion (whose works he had translated) in these words—“Ita magni hi Homines & Romanæ civitatis principes nunquam ausi fuissent loqui, in Concilio Patrum conscriptorum si Religio credere jussisset, mentes hominum perennes esse.” By his, *si Religio credere jussisset*, he must mean—if this had been the *Established Doctrine*—He could not mean—had the Pagan Religion in general enjoined it to be believed—For there was no national Religion of Paganism without it. But the reason he gives for his opinion exceeds all belief. He says “Cato is so far from blaming Cæsar for this declaration, that he rather openly applauds

manner of evading the argument, by retiring under the opinion of their Forefathers, I conclude, that these two great patriots were conscious that the real opinion of ancient philosophy would not support them: for nothing was more illogical than their reply, it being evidently *that authority of their Ancestors*, which Cæsar opposed with the principles of the Greek philosophy. Here then was a fair challenge to a philosophic enquiry: and can we believe, that Cicero and Cato would have been less favourably heard, while they defended the doctrine of a future state on the principles of Plato and Zeno, so agreeable to the opinions of their Ancestors, than Cæsar was in overthrowing it on the system of Epicurus? Or was it of small importance to the State, that an opinion, which Tully, in the words below, tells us was established by their Ancestors for the service of Society, should be shewn to be conformable to the conclusions of the most creditable Philosophy? Yet, for all this, instead of attempting to prove Cæsar a bad philosopher, they content themselves with only shewing him to be a bad citizen. We must needs conclude then, that these two learned men were sufficiently apprized, that the doctrine of their

applauds it."—"Quam Orationem M. PORTIUS CATO, illud  
 "Stoicæ Familæ præsidium et decus, tantum abest, ut repre-  
 "hendat, ut potius publice pariter in Senatu laudet." What  
 are these terms of praise?—"Sic enim BENE ET COMPOSITE,  
 "inquit, Cæsar paulo ante in hoc Ordine de vita & morte dis-  
 "seruit: falsa, credo, existimans quæ de inferis mirantur."  
 Surely this *bene & composite differunt*, was so far from being in-  
 tended by the rigid Stoic as a compliment on his capital Adver-  
 sary, that it was a severe censure, implying, in every term made  
 use of, that Cæsar's opinion was no crude or hasty sentiment,  
 taken up, as an occasional topic, out of an ill-judged compassion  
 for the Criminals, but that it was the System of his School in  
 this matter, deliberately dressed out with all the charms of his own  
 Eloquence, in a studied and correct dissertation.



Ancestors was unsupported by the *real* opinion of any Greek *sect* of Philosophy; whose *popular* profession of it would have been to no purpose to have urged against Cæsar, and such of the Senate as were instructed in these matters; because the practice of the *double doctrine*, and the part to which this point belonged, was a thing well known to them.

It may be true, that as to Cato, who was a rigid Stoic, this observation on his conduct will conclude only against one sect; but it will conclude very strongly: for Cato was so far from thinking that the principles of that philosophy should not be brought into the conclusions of State, where it could be done with any advantage, that he was even for having public measures regulated on the standard of their *paradoxes*; for which he is agreeably rallied by Cicero in his oration for Muræna. He could not then, we must think, have neglected so fair an opportunity of employing his beloved philosophy upon Cæsar's challenge, would it have served his purpose in any reasonable degree.

But though Cato's case only includes the Stoics; yet Cicero's, who made use indifferently of the principles of any sect to confute the rest, includes them all. It will be said perhaps, that the reason why he declined replying on any philosophic principle was because he thought the opinion of their Ancestors the strongest argument of all; having *so* declared it, in a more evident point; the very *being of a God* itself: *IN QUOD, MAXIMUM EST MAJORUM NOSTRORUM SAPIENTIA, qui sacra, qui ceremonias*, &c. But it is to be observed, that this was spoken to the People, and recommended to them as an argument they might best confide in; and therefore urged with Tully's usual prudence, who always

suit his arguments to his auditors; while the words under question were addressed to an audience of Nobles, who had, at that time, as great an affectation to philosophise as Cicero himself. Hear what he says in his oration for Muræna: Et quoniam non est nobis hæc oratio habenda aut cum IMPERITA MULTITUDINE, aut in aliquo conventu agrestium, audacius paulo de STUDIIS HUMANITATIS quæ et MIHI et VOBIS NOTA ET JUCUNDA sunt, disputabo °.

## S E C T. III.

HAVING premised thus much, to clear the way, and abate men's prejudices against a new opinion, I come to a more particular enquiry concerning each of those SECTS which have been supposed to BELIEVE the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.

The ancient Greek philosophy may be all ranged in the ELEATIC, the ITALIC, and the IONIC lines. The *Eleatic* line was wholly composed of Atheists of different kinds; as the Democritic, the Pyrrhonian, the Epicurean, &c. so these come not into the account. All in the *Italic* line derive themselves from PYTHAGORAS, and swear in his name. All in the *Ionic*, till SOCRATES, busied themselves only in Physics, and are therefore likewise excluded. He was the first who brought philosophy out of the clouds, to a clearer contemplation of HUMAN NATURE; and founded the *Socratic school*, whose subdivisions were the PLATONIC or OLD ACADEMY, the PERIPATETIC, the STOIC, the MIDDLE, and the NEW ACADEMY.

As to Socrates, Cicero gives this character of him, that *He was the first who called philosophy from*

heaven, to place it in cities, and introduce it into private houses<sup>p</sup>, i. e. to teach *public* and *private* morals. But we must not suppose, that Cicero *simply* meant, as the words seem to imply, *that Socrates was the first of the philosophers, who studied morals*; this being evidently false; for the Pythagoric school had, for a long time before, made morals its principal concern. He must therefore mean (as the quotation below partly implies) that He *was the first who called off philosophy from a contemplation of nature, to fix it ENTIRELY upon morals*. Which was so true, that Socrates was not only the *first*, but the *last* of the Philosophers who made this separation; having here no followers, unless we reckon Xenophon; who upbraids Plato, the immediate successor of his school, for forsaking his master's confined scheme, and imitating the common practice of the philosophers in their pursuit of general knowledge; he being as the same Cicero observes, *varius et multiplex et copiosus*.

However, This, which Socrates attempted in Philosophy, was a very extraordinary project: and, to support its credit, he brought in those principles of DOUBT and UNCERTAINTY, which some of his pretended followers, very much abused: For while *he* restrained those principles of *doubt*, to *natural* things, whose study he rejected; *they* extended them to every thing that was the subject of philosophical inquiry. This we presume was Socrates's true

<sup>p</sup> Primus Philosophiam devocavit e cœlo, et in urbibus collocavit, et in domos etiam introduxit. *Tuscul. Quæst.* lib. v. And again. *Acad.* l. i. Socrates mihi videtur, id quod constat inter omnes, primus a rebus occultis, et ab ipsa natura involutis, in quibus omnes ante eum philosophi occupati fuerunt, evocavisse Philosophiam, et ad vitam communem adduxisse, ut de virtutibus et vitiis, omninoque de bonis rebus et malis quæreretur; cœlestia autem vel procul esse a nostra cognitione censeret, vel, si maxime cognita essent, nihil tamen ad bene vivendum conferre.

character :



character: who thus confining his searches, was the only one of all the ancient Greek philosophers (and it deserves our notice) who really believed the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. How it happened that he was so singularly right, will be considered hereafter, when we bring his case to illustrate, and to confirm the general position here advanced.

From Socrates, as we said, came the *middle* and *New Academy*, as well as the *Old*, or *Platonic*. Arcesilaus was the founder of the *middle*; and Carneades of the *New*. Between the principles of these two there was no real difference, as Cicero tells us; and we may take his word; but both, I will venture to affirm, were as real *Sceptics*, as the *Pyrrhonians* themselves: I mean in their *principles* of philosophising, tho' not in the *professed conclusions* each pretended to draw from those *principles*. For the *Academics* as well as *Pyrrhonians* agreed in this, "That nothing could be known; and that, without interfering with any sentiments of their own, every thing was to be disputed." Hence the *Pyrrhonians* concluded, "that nothing was ever to be asserted to, but the mind to be kept in an eternal suspense:" The *Academics*, on the contrary held, "that the *PROBABLE*, when found, was to be asserted to; but, till then, they were to go on with the *Pyrrhonians*, questioning, disputing, and opposing every thing." And here lay the jest: they continued to do so, throughout the whole period of their existence, without ever finding the *probable* in any thing; except, in what was necessary to supply them with arms for disputing against every thing. It is true, this was a contradiction in their scheme: but Scepticism is unavoidably destructive of itself. The mischief was, that their allowing the *probable* thus far, made many, both ancients and  
moderns,

moderns, think them uniform in their concessions : In the mean time they gave good words, and talked perpetually of their *verisimile* and *probabile*, amidst a situation of absolute darkness, and scepticism ; like Sancho Pancha, of his island on the Terra Firma. This was Lucian's opinion of the *Academics* ; and no man knew them better ; speaking of the happy island, in his *true history*, and telling us in what manner it was stocked with the several Sects of Greek philosophy ; when he comes to the *Academics* he observes with much humour, that though they were in as good a disposition to come as any or the rest, they still keep aloof in the Confines, and would never venture to set foot upon the Island. For here truly they stuck ; they were not yet satisfied whether it was an Island or not <sup>9</sup>.

This I take to be the true key to the intrigues of the ACADEMY ; of which famous sect many have been betrayed into a better opinion than it deserved. If any doubt of this, the account which Cicero himself gives of them, will satisfy him. He, who knew them best, and who in good earnest espoused only the more reasonable part of their conduct, tells us, that they held nothing could be known, or so much as perceived : Nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse dixerunt—Opinionibus et INSTITUTIS omnia teneri ; nihil VERITATI relinquere deinceps omnia tenebris circumfusa esse dixerunt. Itaque *Arcefilaus* negabat esse quidquam quod sciri posset, ne illud quidem ipsum : That every thing was to be disputed ; and that the *probable* was not a thing to engage their assents, or sway their judgments, but to enforce their reasonings.—Carneades

<sup>9</sup> Τῶς δὲ Ἀκαδημαϊκοὺς ἔλεγον ἐθέλειν μὲν εἰδέναι, ἐπὶ χεῖν δ' ἔτι, καὶ διασκέπτεσθαι· μὴ δὲ γὰρ αὐτὸ τὸ πῶς καὶ λαμβάνειν, εἰ καὶ ἤσός τις τοιαύτη εἴη. Ver. Hist. l. ii.

<sup>1</sup> Acad. Quaest. l. i. c. 12, 13.

vero multo uberius iisdem de rebus loquebatur: non quo aperiret sententiam suam (hic enim mos erat patrius *Academiae* ADVERSARI SEMPER OMNIBUS in disputando) sed\*, &c.—Proprium sit *Academiae* iudicium suum nullum interponere, ea probare quæ simillima veri videantur; conferre causas, et quid in quamque sententiam dici possit expromere, nulla adhibita sua auctoritate, iudicium audientium relinquere integrum et liberum†: That, though they pretended their end was to find the *probable*, yet, like the *Pyrrhonians*, they held their mind in an eternal suspense, and continued going on disputing against every thing, without ever finding the *probable* to determine their judgments. And indeed how should it be otherwise, when, as Cicero tells us, in the case of the same *Arcefilaus*, they endeavoured to prove, that the moment, or weight of evidence, on each side the question, was exactly equal — Huic rationi, quod erat consentaneum, faciebat, ut contra omnium sententias dies jam plerosque deduceret: [diceret] ut cum in eadem re paria contrariis in partibus momenta rationum invenirentur, facilius ab utraque parte assensio sustineretur. This they held to be the case, even in the most important subjects, such as the soul. And in the most interesting questions concerning it, as whether it was, in it's nature, MORTAL or IMMORTAL. — Quod intelligi quale sit vix potest: et quicquid est, mortale sit, an æternum? Nam utraque in parte multa dicuntur. Horum aliquid vestro sapienti certum videtur: nostro ne quid maxime quidem probabile sit, occurrit: ita sunt in plerisque contrariarum rationum PARIÀ MOMENTA‡.

Thus

\* *De Orat.* lib. i. c. 18.

† *De Divin.* lib. ii. sub fin.

‡ *Acad. Quest.* l. iv. — The learned Mosheim has done me the honour of abridging my reasoning on this head in the following manner—*Academici*, meliores licet & sapientiores *Scepticis*



Thus it appears, that the sect was thoroughly sceptical<sup>2</sup>: And Sextus Empiricus, a master of this argument, says no less: who, though he denies the *Academics* and *Pyrrhônians* to be exactly the same, as some ancients affirmed, because, though both agreed that truth was not to be found, yet the *Academics* held there was a difference in those things which pretended to it (the mystery of which has been explained above) yet owns that *Arcefilaus*

*sicis videri vellent, æque tamen mali et perniciosi erant. Id ipsum enim dogma, in quo vis & ratio disciplinæ Scepticæ posita erat, probabant "Nihil cognosci, nihil percipi, nihil sciri posse, " et de omnibus idcirco rebus, nullo interposito judicio, disputandum esse." Hoc unum inter utrosque intererat, quod cum Sceptici statuerent, " nulli rei ad sentiendum, sed perpetuo disputandum esse," Academici e contrario sciscerent " in illis, " quæ veri speciem haberent seu probabilia viderentur, acquiescendum esse." Atqui hoc ipsum PROBABILE cui sapientem adsentiri volebant Academici, NUNQUAM ILLI REPERIEBANT. Quare non fecus ac Sceptici infirmare omnia & incerta reddere studebant. Id vero qui agunt, ut dubium prorsus et anceps videntur Utrum—Animi moriantur an supersint, &c. de rebus Cbristi. Comment. p. 22.*

<sup>2</sup> The reader may not be displeased to see the judgment of a learned French writer on the account here given of the *Academics* — L'on fait voir que l'on doit exclure de ce nombre [des sectes dogmatistes] les nouveaux Academiciens, purs sceptiques, quoy qu'il y ait quelques auteurs modernes qui pretendent le contraire, et entre autres M. Middleton, auteur de la nouvelle Vie du Ciceron Anglois. Mais si l'on examine la source où il a puisé ses sentimens, l'on trouvera que c'est dans les apologies que les Academiciens eux mêmes ont faites pour cacher le scepticisme qui leur étoit reproché par toutes les autres sectes; et de cette maniere on pourroit soutenir que les Pyrrhoniens mêmes n'étoient point sceptiques. Qu'on se ressouvienne seulement que, suivant le rapport de Cicéron, *Arcefilaus*, fondateur de la nouvelle *Academie*, nioit que l'on fut certain de sa propre existence. Après un trait semblable, et plusieurs autres qui sont rapportés — on laisse au lecteur à décider du caractère de cette secte et du jugement qu'en porte M. Middleton. — M. De S. *Diff. sur l'Union de la Religion, de la Morale, et de la Politique*, Pref. p. 12.

and

and Pyrrho had one common philosophy<sup>r</sup>. Origen, or the author of the fragment that goes under his name, seems to have transcribed the opinion of those whom Sextus hints at. "But another sect of philosophers (says he) was called the *Academic*, because they held their disputations in the *Academy*. Pyrrho was the head and founder of these: From whom they were called *Pyrrhonians*. He first of all brought in the *Ακαταληψία*, or incomprehensibility, as an instrument to enable them to dispute on both sides the question, without proving or deciding any thing<sup>r</sup>."

But now a difficulty arises which will require some explanation. We have represented the *Academy* as entirely *sceptical*: We have represented Socrates as a *Dogmatist*; and yet on his sole authority, as we are assured by Tully, did this sect hold its principles of *knowing nothing* and *disputing all things*. The true solution seems to be this.

\* Φασὶ μάλιστα τινες ὅτι ἡ Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ φιλοσοφία ἔστι αὐτὴ ἐν τῇ σκέψει. Ὁ μὲν τι Ἀγκισιάδης, ὃν τῆς μέσης Ἀκαδημαϊκῆς, ἐλέγχει, ἵπαι προτάται ἐν ἀρχαῖς, πᾶσι μοι δοκεῖ τοῖς Πυρρῶνιαις κοινῶς ἵστας, ὡς μὲν εἶναι σκεπτικὴν καὶ αὐτὴν ἀγαγόν ἐν τῇ ἡμετέραν. *Hypot. Pyrrh.* lib. i. c. 33. Agellius, 100, assures us, that the difference between the two sects amounted to just nothing. *Vetus autem quæstio et a multis scriptoribus Grecis tractata est, in quid et quantum Pyrrhoniæ et Academicis Philosophos intersit. Utrique enim ΣΚΕΠΤΙΚΟΙ, ἐφεληκτοί, ἀπορητικοί, dicuntur, quoniam utrique nihil affirmant, nihilque comprehendi putant — differre tamen inter sese — vel maxime propterea existimati sunt. Academici quidem ipsum illud nihil posse comprehendere, quasi comprehendunt, et nihil posse decerni quasi decernunt: Pyrrhoniæ ne id quidem ullo pacto videri verum dicunt, quod nihil esse verum videtur.* l. ii. c. 5.

\* Ἄλλα δὲ αἰτίαις φιλοσοφῶν ἐκλήθη Ἀκαδημαϊκὴ, διὰ τὸ ἐν τῇ Ἀκαδημίᾳ τὰς διὰ μὲν αὐτὸς ποιῆσαι, ὡς ἀρχαῖς ὁ Πύρρων, ἀφ' οὗ Πυρρῶνιαι ἐκλήθησαν φιλοσοφίαι, τὴν ἀκαταληψίαν ἀπώλιν πρῶτον εἰσάγαγον, ὡς ἐν ἀρχαῖς μὲν εἰς ἑκάστην, μὴ μάλιστα ἀποφαίνεσθαι μὴδὲν. *Orig. Philoſophica.* τὰς Ἀκαδημ.

1. SOCRATES, to deter his hearers from all studies but those of *morality*, was perpetually representing the obscurity, in which all other lay involved: not only affirming that he knew nothing of them, but that nothing could be known; while, in *Morals*, he was a dogmatist, as appears largely by Xenophon, and the less fabulous parts of Plato. But Arcefilaus and Carneades took him at his word, when he said *he knew nothing*; and extended that principle of uncertainty *ad omne scibile*.

2. Again, the adversaries, with whom Socrates had to deal, in his project of discrediting natural knowledge, and of recommending the study of *morality*, were the SOCRATISTS properly so called; a race of men, who by their eloquence and fallacies, had long kept up the credit of Physics, and much vitiated the purity of *Morals*: And These being the Oracles of science at that time in Athens, it became the modesty and humility of his pretensions, to attack them covertly, and rather as an enquirer than a teacher. This produced the way of disputing by interrogation; from the inventor, called the *Socratic*: And as this could not be carried on but under a professed admiration of their wisdom, and acquiescence in their decisions, it gave birth to the famous Attic Irony\*. Hence it appears, his method of confutation must begin in doubt; be carried on in turning their own arms against them, and end in *advancing nothing of his own*.

Now Arcefilaus and Carneades having, as we say, extravagantly extended the Socratic principle of *knowing nothing*; easily mistook this other, of *advancing nothing of his own*, when disputing with the

\* Socrates autem de se ipse detrahens in disputatione, plus tribuebat iis, quos volebat refellere. Ita cum aliud diceret atque sentiret, libenter uti solitus est ea dissimulatione, quam Græci *negativæ* vocant. Acad. I. ii. c. 5.



*Sophists*, as a necessary consequence of the former; and so made that a general rule for their school, which, in their master, was only an occasional and confined practice.

On these two mistaken principles was the *New Academy* erected. 1. *Omnia latere in occulto, nec esse quidquam, quod cerni aut intelligi possit.* 2. *Quibus de causis nihil oportere neque profiteri, neque affirmare quemquam, neque assertionem approbare*<sup>b</sup>.

They of the OLD ACADEMY<sup>c</sup>, who came first after Socrates, did, with more judgment, decline their

<sup>a</sup> *Acad. Quæst.* lib. i. c. 12.

<sup>c</sup> Tully assures us that those of the *Old Academy* were Dogmatists, *Quæst. Acad.* lib. i. Nihil enim inter PERIPATETICOS et ACADEMIAM illam VETEREM differebat; for that the Peripatetics were dogmatists no body ever doubted. Yet the same Tully, towards the conclusion of this book, ranks them with the sceptics, Hanc Academiam NOVAM appellabant, quæ mihi VETUS videtur; for such certainly was the *New Academy*. The way of reconciling Cicero to himself I take to be this: Where he speaks of the conformity between the Peripatetics and the *Old Academy*, he considers Plato as the founder of the *Old Academy*: this appears from the following words, *Academ.* l. ii. c. 5. Alter [nempe Plato] quia reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam, Peripateticos et Academicos, nominibus differentes, re congruentes: And where he speaks of the conformity between the *New Academy* and the *Old*, he considers Socrates as the founder of the *Old Academy*. For the *New*, as we here see, claimed the nearest relation to their master. Thus *De Nat. Deor.* l. i. c. 5. he says, Ut hæc in philosophia ratio contra omnia differendi, nullamque rem apertè judicandi, profecta à Socrate, repetita ab Arcesila, confirmata à Carneade, &c. But Tully, it may be said, in the very place where he speaks of the agreement between the *New* and *Old Academy*, understands Plato as the founder of the old: Hanc Academiam novam adpellant; quæ mihi vetus videtur, si quidem Platonem ex illa vetere numeramus; cujus in libris nihil affirmatur, et in utramque partem multa differuntur; de omnibus quæritur, nihil certi dicitur. But it is to be observed, that Plato had a twofold character: and is to be considered, on the one hand, as the *Disciple* and *Historian* of Socrates; and on the other, as the *Head of a Sect himself*, and

their master's method of disputation; easily perceiving that it was adapted to the occasion: and that

master of Xenocrates and Aristotle. As the disciple, he *affirms nothing*; as the master, he is a *Dogmatist*. Under the *first* character Socrates and he are the same; under the *second*, they are very different. Tully here speaks of him under the *first*, as appears from what he says of him, *nihil affirmatur*, &c. Plato, in this place, therefore, is the same as Socrates. The not distinguishing his double character, hath occasioned much dispute amongst the Ancients; as the not observing that Cicero *hath*, throughout his writings, made *that* distinction, hath much embarrassed the moderns. Diogenes Laertius tells us, there were infinite disputes about Plato's character; some holding that he did dogmatize, others that he did not. Ἐπεὶ δὲ πολλὰ γὰρ εἰς, καὶ οἱ μὲν φασιν αὐτὸν δογματίζειν, οἱ δ' ὅτι. Lib. iii. Seg. 51. Sextus Empiricus says the same thing, τὸν Πλάτωνα ἔν, οἱ μὲν δογματικὸν ἔφασκεν εἶναι, οἱ δὲ ἀπορηματικόν. He then tells you, some distinguished better. Κατὰ δὲ τι δογματικόν. ἐν μὲν γὰρ τοῖς γυμνασικοῖς φασὶ λόγους, ὅθα ὁ Σωκράτης εἰσαγύται ἔτοι παύειν πρὸς τινος ἢ ἀγωνίζεσθαι πρὸς σοφιστὰς, γυμνασικὸν τε καὶ ἀπορηματικὸν φασιν ἔχων αὐτὸν χαρακτηρίζειν. δογματικὸν δὲ, ὅθα σπουδάζων, ἀποφαίνειναι ἔτοι δια Σωκράτους, ἢ Τιμαίου, ἢ τινος τῶν τούτων. That Cicero made the distinction, delivered above, we shall now see. In the Academic questions, he speaks of him as the *disciple and historian* of Socrates; and, under that character, *nihil affirmatur*, et in utramque partem multa differuntur, de omnibus quaeritur, nihil certi dicitur. In his *Officiis* he speaks of him as different from Socrates, and the *founder of a sect*: and then he is a *Dogmatist*, and, as he says elsewhere, reliquit perfectissimam disciplinam Peripateticos et Academicos nominibus differentes, re congruentes. His words to his son are: Sed tamen nostra [nempe Academica] leges non multum a Peripateticis diffidentia, quoniam utrique et Socratici et Platonici esse volumus, i. e. He tells his son, that he would both dogmatize like Plato, and scepticize like Socrates. But Grævius not apprehending this double character of Plato, would change Socratici to Stoici. For, says he, qui dicere potest se utrumque esse voluisse Platonicum et Socraticum; perinde est ac si scripsisset utrumque se velle esse Peripateticum et Aristotelem. But there was a vast difference between Plato, founder of the Academy, and Socrates; though none between Plato the disciple and historian of Socrates, and Socrates.—The fortune of this note has been very singular; and will afford us a pleasant picture of the temper and genius of Answerers and their ways. One man writing something about Plato and the *ancients*; and reading what is here said

that to make it a general practice, and the characteristic of their school, would be irrational and absurd. But the MIDDLE and NEW, instead of profiting by this sage conduct of their Predecessors, made it a handle to extol their own closer adherence to their Master; and an argument that they were returned to his true principles, from which the *old* had licentiously digressed. A passage in Cicero will justify these observations; and these observations will explain that passage, which, I presume, without them would not be thought very intelligible. Thus the Roman Orator expresses himself, under the character of an Academic: *Primum, inquam, deprecor, ne me, tanquam philosophum, putetis scholam vobis aliquam explicaturum: quod ne in ipsis quidem philosophis magnopere unquam probavi: quando enim Socrates, qui parens philosophiæ jure dici potest, quidquam tale fecit? Eorum erat iste mos, qui tum Sophistæ nominabantur; quorum è numero primus est ausus Leontinus Gorgias in conventu poscere quæstionem, id est, jubere dicere, qua de re quis vellet audire. Audax negotium; dicerem impudens, nisi hoc institutum postea translatum ad philosophos nostros esset.* Sed et illum, quem nominavi, et ceteros Sophistas, ut è Platone intelligi potest, lufos videmus a Socrate. Is enim percunctando atque interrogando elicere solebat eorum opiniones, quibuscum differebat, ut ad ea, quæ ii respondissent, si quid videretur, diceret: QUI MOS CUM A POSTERIORIBUS NON ESSET RE-  
TENTUS, ARCESILAUS EUM REVOCAVIT, INSTI-

said of Plato's dogmatizing, abuses the author for making him a *dogmatist*: And another who had to do, I don't know how, with *Socrates*, and the *moderns*, and reading what relates to Plato's scepticising, is as plentiful, in his ribaldry and ill language, for making him a *sceptic*; while the author was, all the time, giving an historical relation of what others made him; and only endeavoured to reconcile their various accounts.



TUITQUE, ut ii, qui se audire vellent, non de se quærent, sed ipsi dicerent, quid sentirent: quod cum dixissent, ille contra<sup>a</sup>. Here Cicero has gilded the false, but shewy pretences of his Sect: which not only represented their scepticism, as a return to the true principles of Socrates; but would have the dogmatic sect of philosophy, against all evidence of antiquity, the later product of that race of Sophists, with whom the venerable Athenian had to do. But the *Old Academy*, we may be sure, thought differently of the matter: Lucilius says of Arcefilaus, Nonne cum jam philosophorum disciplinæ gravissimæ constitissent, tum exortus est ut in optima Rep. Tiberius Gracchus, qui otium perturbaret, sic Arcefilaus, qui constitutam philosophiam everteret<sup>c</sup>.

However, these bold pretensions of restoring the SOCRATIC SCHOOL to its integrity, deluded many of the Ancients; and made them, as particularly Diogenes Laertius, to rank Socrates in the number of the *Sceptics*.

But this is not strange, for it was in the fashion for all the Sects to pretend relation to Socrates. Proseminatæ sunt familiæ dissentientes, et multum disjunctæ et dispares, cum tamen OMNES se philosophi SOCRATICOS et dici vellent et esse arbitrarentur, says Cicero. And again, Fuerunt etiam alia genera philosophorum fere qui se OMNES SOCRATICOS esse dicebant: Eretricorum, Herilliorum, Magaricorum, PYRRHONEORUM<sup>f</sup>. The same thing, I believe, *Apuleius* meant to express, when speaking of *Socrates* he says, — cum nunc etiam egregii Philosophi sectam ejus sanctissimam præoptent, et summo beatitudinis studio jurent in ipsius nomen<sup>g</sup>.

On the whole it appears that the *Academics*, (*middle and new*) as distinguished from the *Plato-*

<sup>a</sup> *De Fin. Bon. et Mal.* ii. c. 1.

<sup>c</sup> *Acad.* l. ii. c. 5.

<sup>f</sup> *De Orat.* lib. iii.

<sup>g</sup> *Metam.* l. x.

nists, were mere Sceptics; and so, like the *Pyrrhonians*, to be thrown out of the account.

Those therefore which remain, are the *PYTHAGORIC*, the *PLATONIC*, the *PERIPATETIC*, and the *STOIC*: And if it be found that none of these four renowned schools (the *PHILOSOPHIC QUATERNION OF DOGMATIC THEISTS*) did believe, though all sedulously taught, the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, the reader, perhaps, will no longer dispute the conclusion, THAT IT WAS NOT THE REAL OPINION OF ANY GRECIAN SECT OF PHILOSOPHY.

I. *PYTHAGORAS* comes first under our inspection. He is said to have invented the name long after the existence of his trade; and was, as we may say, the middle link that joined together the *Lawgivers* and *Philosophers*; being indeed the only Greek, who was properly and truly both: though, from his time, and in conformity to his practice, not only those of his own school, but even those of the *other three*, dealt much in legislation: In which, his fortune was like that of *Socrates*, who was the first and last of the philosophers that *confined* himself to *morals*; though, in imitation of his conduct, *morals*, from thence, made the chief business of all the subdivisions of his school.

In the science of legislation, *ORPHEUS*<sup>b</sup>, for whom he had the highest reverence, was his master; and in philosophy, *PHERECYDES SYRUS*<sup>i</sup>.

After he had formed his character on two so different models, he travelled into *EGYPT*, the fountain-head of science; where, after a long and painful initiation, he participated of all the Mysteries of the priesthood.

He had now so thoroughly imbibed the spirit of legislation, that he not only pretended his *LAWs* were

<sup>a</sup> *Jamblichus de Vita Pyth.* c. 151.

<sup>i</sup> *Id. ib.* c. 184.



inspired, which most other Law-givers had done; but that his PHILOSOPHY was so, likewise<sup>\*</sup>; which no other Philosopher had the confidence to do.

This, we may be sure, would incline him to a more than ordinary cultivation of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE. "He divided his disciples (says Origen) into two classes, the one he called the ESOTERIC, the other, the EXOTERIC. For to *Those* he intrusted the more perfect and sublime doctrines; to *These* he delivered the more vulgar and popular<sup>†</sup>." And, indeed, he was so eminent in this practice, that the *secret* or *esoteric doctrine* of Pythagoras became proverbial. For what end he did it, Varro informs us, in St. Austin, where he says, that "Pythagoras instructed his auditors in the science of legislation LAST OF ALL, when they were now become learned, wise, and happy." And on what subject, appears from a common saying of the sect, that "in those things which relate to the Gods, ALL was not to be revealed to ALL<sup>m</sup>."

The Communities he gave laws to, the Cities he set free, are known to every one. And that nothing might be wanting to his *legislative character*, He, likewise, in conformity to general practice, instituted MYSTERIES; in which was taught, as usual, "the unity of the divine nature." So Jamblichus: "They say too he taught lustrations and INITIATIONS, in which were delivered the MOST EXACT KNOWLEDGE of the Gods. They say farther that he made a kind of union between *divine philosophy* and *religious worship*; having learnt some things from the ORPHIC rites; some, from the

<sup>\*</sup> Jamblichus de Vita Pyth. c. i.

<sup>†</sup> Οὗτος τὰς μαθητὰς διείλετο, καὶ τὰς μὲν ΕΣΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΥΣ, τὰς δὲ ΕΞΩΤΕΡΙΚΟΥΣ ἐκάλεσεν. Τοῖς μὲν γὰρ τὰ τελειώτερα μαθήματα ἐπέτρεψε, τοῖς δὲ τὰ μέλειώτερα. Fragm. de Philos. περὶ Πυθαγ.

<sup>m</sup> Μὴ εἶναι πρὸς πάντας πάντας ἄνθρωποις.



“ÆGYPTIAN PRIESTS; some, from the *Chaldeans*  
“and *Magi*; and some from the INITIATIONS CE-  
“lebrated in ELEUSIS, *Imbros*, *Samothrace* and  
“*Delos*; or wherever else, as amongst the *CELTS*,  
“and *Iberians*.” Nay so much did his *legisla-*  
*tive* Character prevail over his *philosophic*, that he  
brought not only the principles ° of the *Mysteries*  
into the *schools*, but likewise many of the observ-  
ances; as abstinence from *Beans* and several kinds  
of animals; which afterwards contributed not a little  
to confound the *secret doctrines* of the *Schools* and the  
*Mysteries*. This conformity was, without doubt,  
the reason why the *Crotoniates*, or the *Metapont-*  
*ines* (for in this authors differ †) turned his house or  
*school*, after his death, into a TEMPLE OF CERES.

Thus the fame and authority of Pythagoras be-  
came unrivalled over all Greece and Italy. Herodo-  
tus calls him, *the most authoritative of philosophers* ‡.  
Cicero says of him: Cum, Superbo regnante, in Ita-  
liam venisset, tenuit Magnam illam Græciam cum  
HONORE EX DISCIPLINA, tum etiam AUCTORI-  
TATE. And

“—Ἀλλήλων δὲ αὐτῶν τοὺς καθαρμούς, καὶ τὰς λογισμὰς ΤΕΛΕΤΑΙ,  
τῶν ΑΚΡΙΒΕΣΤΑΤΗΝ ΕΙΔΗΞΙΝ ΑΥΤῶΝ (τῶν δὲ αὐτῶν) ἰσχύν. ἐν δὲ  
φασὶ καὶ συνθέσει αὐτῶν ποιῆσαι τὰς διὰ τὴν φιλοσοφίαν καὶ διατριβὴν ἅ μιν  
μαθήσια παρὰ τῶν ΟΡΦΙΚΩΝ, ἃ δὲ παρὰ τῶν ΑΙΓΥΠΤΙΩΝ ΙΕΡΕΩΝ,  
ἃ δὲ παρὰ Χαλδαίων καὶ Μάγων, ἃ δὲ παρὰ τῆς ΤΕΛΕΤΗΣ, τὰς ἐν  
ΕΛΕΥΣΙΝΙ γινώσκουσιν, ἐν Ἰμβρῶ τε, καὶ Σαμοθράκῃ, καὶ Δέλῳ, καὶ ἑτέροις  
παρὰ τοῖς λοιποῖς, καὶ περὶ τὰς ΚΕΛΕΤΟΥΣ καὶ τὴν Ἱστορίαν. *Jambli. de*  
*Vit. Pyth.* § 151.

° See Book II. Sect. 4. p. 198, 199.

† *Diog. Laert.* lib. viii. § 17. *Porph. de Vit. Pyth.* N° 4.

‡ —Οὐ τῷ ἀσθενεστάτῳ σφισιν Πρωτογενῆ. —lib. iv. § 95. *liter-*  
*ally, not of the least authority*: a common mode of expression in  
the ancient languages. So Homer, in the 15th *Iliad*, calls  
Achilles, ἐκ ἀφαιροτάτου Ἀχαιῶν, *not the worst sildier of the*  
*Greeks*; meaning, we know, the *best*.

§ *Tusc. Disp.* l. i. c. 16. — *Honore* refers to his *philosophic* cha-  
racter; and *auctoritate* to his *legislative*. The common reading  
is, cum honore et disciplinâ, tum etiam auctoritate. Dr. B. in  
his emendations on the *Tusc. Quæst.* saw this was faulty; but not  
reflecting

And this was no transient reputation: it descended to his followers, through a long succession; to whom the cities of Italy frequently committed the administration of their affairs<sup>a</sup>; where they so well established their *authority*, that St. Jerom tells us, very lasting marks of it were remaining to his time: *Respice omnem oram Italiae, quæ quondam Magna Græcia dicebatur; et Pythagoreorum dogmatum incisa publicis literis æra cognosces*<sup>b</sup>.

reflecting on the complicated character of Pythagoras, and, perhaps, not attending to Cicero's purpose (which was, not to speak of the *nature* of his philosophy, but of the *reputation* he had in Magna Græcia) he seems not to have hit upon the true reading. He objects to *Honore*, because the particles *cum* and *tum* require a greater difference in the things spoken of, than is to be found in *bonos* and *authoritas*: which reasoning would have been just, had only a *philosophic* character, or only a *legislative*, been the subject. But it was Cicero's plain meaning, to present Pythagoras under both these views. So that *bonos*, which is the proper consequence of succeeding in the first; and *authoritas*, of succeeding in the latter; have all the real difference that *cum* and *tum* require; at least Plutarch thought so, when he applied words of the very same import to the Egyptian *soldiery* and the *priesthood*; to whom, like the legislator and philosopher, the one having *power* and the other *wisdom*, *authoritas* and *bonos* distinctly belong: — τὴ μὲν δὲ αὐδείαν, τὴ δὲ διὰ σοφίαν, μίνας ΑΞΙΩΜΑ καὶ ΤΙΜΗΝ ἔχουσιν. *De Isid. & Osir.* Another objection, the learned critic brings against the common reading, has more weight; which is, that in *honore et disciplina*, two words are joined together as very similar in sense, which have scarce any affinity or relation to one another: on which account he would read *MORE et disciplina*. But this, as appears from what has been said above, renders the whole sentence lame and imperfect: I would venture therefore to read, (only changing a single letter) tenuit Magnam illam Græciam cum honore ex disciplina, tum etiam auctoritate; and then all will be right, *disciplina* referring equally to *honore* and *authoritate*, as implying both his philosophic and civil institutions.

<sup>a</sup> Πυθαγόρας δ' ἔχει πολλὴ κατὰ τὴν Ἰταλίαν ἔως ἰθαμαξίῳ αὐτὸς τε καὶ οἱ συνοδοὶ αὐτοῦ ἰταῖροι, ὡς καὶ τὰς πολεῖας τοῖς ἀπ' αὐτοῦ ἐκπατρίων τὰς πόλεις. *Porpb. de Vit. Pyth. N° 54.*

<sup>b</sup> *Cont. Ruf. lib. ii.*



But there are two circumstances, which must needs give us the highest idea of Pythagoras's fame in point of legislation.

1. The *one* is, that almost every Lawgiver of eminence, for some time *before* and *after*, as well as *during his time*, was numbered amongst his disciples: for the general opinion was, that nothing could be done to purpose in the legislating way, which did not come from Pythagoras.

2. The *other* is, that the doctrine of the dispensation of Providence by a METEMPSYCHOSIS, or transmigration of the soul, though taught in all the Mysteries, and an inseparable part of a future state in all the Religions of paganism, became, in common speech, the *peculiar doctrine* of Pythagoras.

And here the reader will pardon a short remark or two, not a little illustrating the point we are upon.

There is not a more extraordinary book in all Antiquity, than the METAMORPHOSIS OF OVID; whether we regard the matter or the form. The subject appears prodigiously extravagant, and the composition irregular and absurd: had it been the product of a dark age, and a barbarous writer, one might have been content to rank it in the class of our modern *Oriental Tales*, as a matter of no consequence. But when we consider it as written when Rome was in its meridian of science and politeness: and by an Author, whose acquaintance with the Greek tragic writers, had informed him of what belonged to a work or composition, we cannot but be shocked at so grotesque an assemblage of things: Unless we would rather distrust our *modern judgment*, and conclude the deformity to be only in appearance: And this, perhaps, we shall find to be the case: though it must be owned, the common opi-

See the discourse on Zaleucus's laws B. II. Sect. 3.



nion seems supported by Quintilian, the most judicious critic of Antiquity, who thus speaks of our Author and his Work: Ut Ovidius LASCIVIRE in *Metamorphosi* solet, quem tamen excusare necessitas potest, RES DIVERSISSIMAS IN SPECIEM UNUS CORPORIS COLLIGENTEM \*.

But to determine on proper grounds, in this matter, we must consider the origin of the ancient fables in general.

There are *two opinions* concerning it.

I. The *first* is of such who think the fables contrived, by the ancient Sages, for repositories of their mysterious wisdom: and, consequently, that they are no less than *natural, moral, and divine* truths, fantastically disguised. Greg. Naz. characterises these *allegories* well, where he calls them *monstrous explanations, without principles*; in which there is nothing stable, but a way of interpretation which, if indulged, would enable you to make any thing out of any thing<sup>7</sup>. But what must eternally discredit the fancy, that the first Mythologists were Allegorists, is, that if they indeed invented these fables to convey under them *natural, moral, and divine* truths, they must have been wise and virtuous men, lovers of Mankind, and the friends of Society. But how will this character agree to the abominable leudness, injustice, and impiety with which most of these popular fables abound; and which they could not but foresee would (as in fact they did) corrupt all the principles of moral practice. For both these reasons, therefore, we must conclude that a system which gives us nothing for the *moral*, but what, as Greg. Naz. observes, is uncertain, groundless and

\* *Instit. Orat.* lib. iv. c. 1. sub fin.

<sup>7</sup> Εἰτ' ἱπποπόδα τοῖσι ἀλληγορήματα καὶ τερατεύματα, καὶ τῶν περικειμένων ἐκπύπλων ὁ λόγος εἰς βαρυνθεὶς χωρεῖται καὶ κρημνὸς θεωρίας ἀκρίβειας τὸ εὐαίσμηται. *Orat.* iii.

capricious;

capricious; while the *Fable* presents nothing but what is absurd and obscene<sup>†</sup>; must be an after-thought employed to serve a purpose. However, it was well for truth; that none of these ancient Allegorists were able to do better; that none of them entered upon their task with any thing like the force of our BACON<sup>‡</sup>; the creative power of whose genius so nearly realized these inventions, as sometimes to put us to a stand, whether we should not prefer the riches and beauty of his imagination, to the poor and meagre Truth that lies at bottom.

II. The *other opinion* of the origin of the fables, is that which supposes them to be the corruptions of civil history; and consequently, as having their foundation in real facts: And this is unquestionably the truth. But this system did not find so able an expositor formerly in *Palæphatus*, as the other more groundless conceit did of late in *Bacon*. It would lead me too far from my subject, to shew, in this place, which of the fables arose from the *ambiguity of words*, ill translated from some eastern languages; which, from proper names ill understood; which, from the *high figures of poetry*, well invented to affect barbarous minds; and which, from the *politic contrivances of statesmen*, to tame and soften savage Manners: and how the *universal passion of ADMIRATION* procured an easy admittance into the mind, for all these various delusions.

But we must not omit, that the followers of this better opinion are divided into two factions; *One* of which would have the ancient fables the corruption of PROFANE history only; the *Other*, only of SACRED.

This *Last* seems unsupported by every thing but an ill directed zeal of doing honour to the Bible: For by

<sup>†</sup> — οὐκ ἔστιν οὐδὲν τὸ νοήματι ἀξίονον καὶ τὸ προβεβημένον ἐκείνων. ib.

<sup>‡</sup> In his Book, *De sapientia veterum*.



what we can collect from Pagan, or even Jewish writers, the history of the Hebrews was less celebrated, even less known, than that of *any* other people whose memory Antiquity hath brought down to us. But, known or unknown, it is somewhat hard, methinks, that GREECE must not be allowed the honour of producing one single Hero; but all must be fetched from PALESTINE. One would have thought the very number of the Gentile worthies, and the scarcity of the Jewish, might have induced our critics, in mere charity, to employ some home-spun Pagans, for Heroes of a second rate, at least. But this, it seems, would look too like a sacrilegious compromise. So, an expedient is contrived to lessen that disparity in their number: and Moses alone is discovered to be Apollo, Pan, Priapus, Cecrops, Minos, Orpheus, Amphion, Tiresias, Janus, Evander, Romulus, and about some twenty more of the Pagan Gods and Heroes. So says the learned and *judicious* Mr. Huet<sup>b</sup>: who, not content to seize, as lawful prize, all he meets within the waste of fabulous times, makes cruel inroads into the cultivated ages of history, and will scarce allow Rome its own Founder<sup>c</sup>.

<sup>b</sup> *Demonstratio Evangelica*; which, because the World would not accept for *demonstration*, and because he had no better to give, after a long and vain search for *certainity* throughout all the Regions of Erudition, he attempted, by the help of *Sextus Empiricus*, in order to keep himself in credit, to shew that no such thing was to be had. And so composed his Book of the *Weakness of human understanding*. Malebranch has laid open his ridiculous case with great force and skill. — “ Il est vrai qu'il y en a quelques-uns qui reconnoissent après vingt ou trente années de temps-perdu, qu'ils n'ont rien appris dans leurs lectures; mais il ne leur plaît pas de nous le dire avec sincérité. Il faut auparavant qu'ils aient prouvé, à leur mode, qu'on ne peut rien savoir; et puis après ils le confessent; parce qu'alors ils croient le pouvoir faire, sans qu'on se moque de leur ignorance.”

<sup>c</sup> Si fidem sequimur historiarum, fabulosa pleraque de eo [Romulo] narrari. *Prop. iv. c. 9. § 8.*

Nay,



Nay, so jealous are they of this fairy honour paid to Scripture, that I have met with those who thought the BIBLE much disparaged, to suppose any other origin of *human sacrifices* than the command to Abraham, to offer up his son. The contending for so extraordinary an honour being not unlike that of certain Grammarians, who, out of due regard to the glory of former times, will not allow either the *great* or *small-pox* to be of modern growth, but vindicate those special blessings to this highly favoured Antiquity.

The *other party* then, who esteem *the fables* a corruption of Pagan history, appear in general to be right. But the misfortune is, the spirit of system seems to possess these likewise, while they allow nothing to Jewish history: For, that reasoning, which makes them give the Egyptian and Phenician a share with the Grecian, should consequentially have disposed them to admit the Jewish into partnership; though it might perhaps contribute least to the common stock. And he who does not see<sup>d</sup> that Philemon and Baucis is taken from the story of Lot, must be, very near, blind: Though he<sup>e</sup> who can discover the expedition of the Israelites from Egypt to Palestine, in the fable of the Argonauts, must certainly be gifted with the *second-sight*.

<sup>d</sup> La fable de Philemon et de Baucis — les personnages sont inconnus, et j'en ai rien d'intéressant à en dire: car de penser avec Mr. Huet, qu'elle nous cache l'histoire des Anges qui allèrent visiter Abraham, c'est une de ces imaginations hasardées dans lesquelles ce savant prelat, &c. *Banier les Metam. d'Ovid. explic. des fables* 7, 8, 9, & 10. lib. viii.

<sup>e</sup> See *Lavaur*, one of the best and latest supporters of this system, in his *histoire de la fable conférée avec l'histoire Sainte*. — Ainsi cette fable est toute composée des traditions que les Chanaanéens ou Phéniciens avoient rapandues dans leurs voyages. On y voit des traits des figures par ces traditions, mais CERTAINEMENT pris de l'histoire des Israélites sous Moïse et sous Josué. *Cap. Jason et les Argonautes* — à la fin.

Lastly,

Lastly, as it is the fault of these to allow nothing to Jewish history, so it is the fault of both to allow nothing to the system of the *Allegorists*: for though without all question the main body of the ancient fables is the corruption of civil History, yet it is as certain that some few, especially of the late ones, were invented to convey *physical* and *moral* TRUTHS.

Such was the original of the *fables* in general: But we must be a little more explicite concerning that species of them called the METAMORPHOSIS.

The *metempsychosis* was the method, the religious ancients employed to explain the ways of Providence; which, as they were seen to be unequal *here*, were supposed to be set right *hereafter*. But this inequality was never thought so great, as to leave no foot-steps of a superintendency: For the people of old argued thus: If there were *no* inequality, *nothing* would want to be set right; and if there were nothing *but* inequality, there would be *no one* to set it right. So that a *regular* Providence, and *none at all*, equally destroyed their foundation of a *future state*.

It being then believed, that a Providence was administered here as well as hereafter, tho' not with equal vigour in both states; it was natural for them to suppose that the mode of it might be much the same, throughout. And as the way of punishing, in a different state, was by a *transmigration of the soul*; so in *this*, it was by a *transformation of the body*: The thing being the same, with only a little difference in the ceremonial of the transaction: the soul in the first case going to the body; and, in the latter, the body coming to the soul: *This* being called the

† But this being the voice of our common nature, it is no wonder we should find the doctrine of the *metempsychosis* operating, as an old Opinion, amongst the uninstructed natives of South America. See *Charlevoix's hist. of Paraguay*, v. 2. p. 151.



*metamorphosis*; and *That*, the *metempsychosis*. Thus, each made a part of the popular doctrine of Providence. And it is remarkable, that wherever the doctrine of *transmigration* was received, either in ancient or modern times, there the belief of *transformation* hath prevailed likewise<sup>5</sup>. It is true, that in support of the first part of this superstition, *Reason* only suffer'd; in support of the latter, the *Senses* too were violated. But minds grossly passion'd never want attested facts to support their extravagancies. What principally contributed to fix their belief of the *metamorphosis* was, in my opinion, the strong and disordered imagination of a *melancholy habit*; a habit, more than any other, producing religious fear, and most affected by what it produces. There was a common distemper, arising from this *habit*, well known to the Greek physicians by the name of the *LYCANTHROPY*; where the patient fancied himself turned into a wolf, or other savage animal. Why the disordered imagination should take this ply, is not hard to conceive, if we reflect that the *metempsychosis* made part of the popular doctrine of Providence; and that a *metamorphosis* was, as we have said, the same mode of punishment, differing only in time and place. For the *religious belief*, we may be assured, would work strongly on a diseased fancy, racked by a consciousness of crimes, to which that *habit* is naturally obnoxious; and, as it did in the case of Nebuchadnezzar, make the patient conclude himself the object of divine justice. Indeed, Daniel's *prediction* of that monarch's disgrace, evidently shews it to have been the effect of divine vengeance; yet the circumstances of his punishment, as recorded in holy Writ, seem to shew, that it was

<sup>5</sup> The modern eastern tales are full of *metamorphoses*; and it is to be noted that those people, before they embraced mahometanism, were pagans and believers of the *metempsychosis*.

inflicted



inflicted by common and natural means. And that the vulgar superstition generally gives the bias to the career of a distempered mind, we have a familiar instance. No people upon earth are more subject to *atrabilaire* disorders than the English: Now while the tales of magicians, and their transformations were believed, nothing was more symptomatic in this distemper, than such fancied changes by the power of witchcraft. But since these fables lost their terror, very different whimsies, we find, possess our melancholic people.

These sickly imaginations therefore, proceeding from the impressions of the religious notion of the *metamorphosis*, would in their turn add great credit to it; and then any trifle would keep it up; even an equivocal appellation; which, I do not doubt, hath given birth to many a fable; though to many more, it hath served only for an after-embellishment. But it is remarkable, that fabulous Antiquity itself assists us to detect its own impostures. For, although it generally represents the punishments for impiety, as *actual transformations*; yet, in the famous story of the daughters of Proetus, it has honestly told us the case; that it was no more than a *deep melancholy*, inflicted by Juno, which made them *fancy* themselves turned into heifers; so the poet.

“ Proetides implerunt falsis mugitibus agros.

and of this, Melampus cured them by a course of physic<sup>b</sup>.

Thus

<sup>b</sup> Proetides, Proeti, et Stenobœæ, sive Antiopæ secundum Homerum, filiae fuerunt, Lyippe, Ipponoe, Cyrianassa. Hæ se cum prætulissent Junoni in pulchritudine; vel, ut quidam volunt, cum essent antilites, ausæ sunt vesti ejus aurum detractum in usum suum convertere: illa irata hunc furorem earum immisit mentibus; ut putantes se vacas in saltus abirent, et plerumque mugirent,

Thus the METAMORPHOSIS arose from the doctrine of the *metempsychosis*; and was, indeed, a mode of it; and, of course, a very considerable part of the Pagan theology<sup>i</sup>: So that we are not to wonder if several grave Writers made collections of them; such as Nicander, Boeus, Callisthenes, Dorotheus, Theodorus, Parthenius, and Adrian the sophist. Of what kind these collections were, we may see by that of Antonius Liberalis, who transcribed from them: Thence, too, Ovid gathered his materials; and formed them into a poem on the most sublime and regular plan, A POPULAR HISTORY OF PROVIDENCE; carried down in as methodical a manner as the graces of poetry would allow, from the creation to his own times, through the EGYPTIAN, PHENICIAN, GREEK, and ROMAN histories: And this the elegant Paterculus seems to intimate, in the character he gives of the poet and his work<sup>k</sup>.

Now the proper introduction, as well as foundation and support, of this kind of history is a THEISTICAL COSMOGENY. Accordingly, we find our Poet introduceth it with such a one. And this likewise in imitation of his Grecian Originals. Theopompus, by the account Servius gives of him, seems to have composed such a History, and so prefaced; but on a more ingenious plan. He feigns that some of Midas's shepherds took the God, Silenus,

mugient, et timerent aratra; quas Melampus, Amythaonis filius, pactâ mercede ut Cyrianassam uxorem cum parte regni acciperet, placatâ Junone, infecto fonte, ubi solitæ erant bibere, purgavit et in pristinum sensum reduxit. Servius in *Bucol. Virgilii* vi. v. 48.

<sup>i</sup> It plainly appears to have been in general credit by its making the foundation of the following epigram, one of the finest in antiquity.

Ἐκ ζωῆς μὲ θεοὶ τινέαν λίθον· ἐκ δὲ λίθοιο

Ζωὴν Περαιετιδὸς ἱστορᾶν ἐργάσατο.

<sup>k</sup> Nais perfectissimi in forma operis sui. *Hist. Rom.* l. ii. c. 36.

asleep,



asleep, after a debauch; and brought him bound to their master. When he came into the Presence, his chains fell from him of their own accord; and he answered to what was required of him, concerning NATURE and ANTIQUITY<sup>1</sup>. From hence, (as Servius remarks) Virgil took the hint of his SILENUS: the subject of whose song is so exact an epitome of the contents of the METAMORPHOSIS of Ovid, that amongst the ancient titles of that Eclogue, the name of *Metamorphosis* was one; which therefore makes it worth considering;

“ Namque canebat uti magnum per inane coacta

“ Semina &c.

—— “ et ipse tener mundi concreverit orbis. —

“ Hinc lapides Pyrrhæ jactos, Saturnia regna,

“ Caucasiasque refert volucres, furtumque Pro-  
“ methei——

“ Tum Phaëtoniadas musco circumdat amaræ

“ Corticis——

“ Quid loquar aut Scyllam Nisi, quam fama  
“ secuta est,

“ Candida succinctam latrantibus inguina mon-  
“ stris,

“ Dulichias vexasse rates ——

“ Aut ut mutatos Terei narraverit artus : &c.

Here we have the *formation of the world, the golden age, and the original and renovation of man*; together with those *ancient fables* which taught the government of the Gods, and their punishment of impiety, by the *change of human, into brutal and*

<sup>1</sup> Sane hoc de Sileno non dicitur fictum a Virgilio, sed a Theopompo translatum. Is enim apprehensum Silenum a Midæ regis pastoribus, dicit crapula madentem, et ex ea soporatum; illos dolo adgressos dormientem vinxisse; postea vinculis sponte labentibus liberatum et rebus NATURALIBUS et ANTIQUIS Midæ interroganti respondisse. Serv. ad. Eclog. vi. ver. 13.



vegetable forms. It is evident from hence, that both the latin poets drew from one source; and particularly from Theopompus: whom Virgil hath epitomised; and Ovid paraphrased. And if Ovid neglected to borrow a great beauty from his original, to adorn his own poem; Virgil (which is much more surprizing) by deviating, in one material circumstance, from their common source, hath committed a very gross blunder. OVID, in neglecting to lay the scene of his History in the adventure of Midas's shepherds; and so disabling himself from making SILENUS the Narrator throughout, hath let slip the advantage of giving his sacred History the sanction of a divine Speaker, and, by that means, of tying the whole composition together in the most natural and artful manner. But then VIRGIL, either in fondness to the philosophy of Epicurus, or in compliment to Varus, who was of that School, instead of making his Cosmogony *theistical*, (as without doubt Theopompus did, and we see, Ovid hath done) from whence the popular history of Providence naturally followed, hath made it the product of BLIND ATOMS;

—“ per inane coacta  
“ Semina,”

from whence, nothing naturally follows, but *Fate* or *Chance*. And yet Virgil talks like a *Theist*, (indeed, because he talks *after Theists*) of the renovation of Man, the golden Age, and the punishment of Prometheus. Servius seems to have had some obscure glimpse of this absurdity, as appears from his embarras to account for the CONNECTION between the *Epicurean origin* of the world, and the *religious fables* which follow. In his note on the words *hinc lapides Pyrrhæ factos*, he says,—“ quæf-

“tio est hoc loco: nam, relictis prudentibus rebus  
 “de mundi origine, subito ad fabulas transitum fecit. Sed dicimus, aut exprimere eum voluisse  
 “sectam Epicuream, quæ *rebus seriis* semper inserit  
 “*voluptates*: aut fabulis plenis admirationis puerorum corda mulceri.”

The old Scholiast, we see, was much a stranger to that conceit of *Catrou's*, that as Epicurus's *Physics* are followed in the origin of the World, so his *Morals* are explained in the Fables. Without doubt Servius thought it absurd to suppose, that the Poet would explain the most obnoxious part of Epicurus's Philosophy, (his *Physics*) so *clearly*, and the useful part, (his *Morals*) so *obscurely*.—However, in other respects, the Eclogue is full of beauties.

On the other hand, Ovid not only found advantages in making his Cosmogony *theistical*, but improved what he found with wonderful art. Describing the formation of man to be from *earth*, he shuts up his account in these beautiful lines,

“Sic modo quæ fuerat rudis, et sine imagine

“*Tellus*

“Induit ignotas hominum, *conversa figuras*,”

Insinuating that this was the first of those *CHANGES* which he had promised to speak of; and thereby finely preparing his Reader for the following *conversions* of Men into brutes, stocks, stones and the several elements, by shewing that they were only returned into that, out of which they had been taken, by a no less surprising *Metamorphosis*.

But to go back to his Poem. Now altho', to adorn and enliven his Subject, he hath followed the bent of his disposition, in filling it with the love-stories of the Gods; which, too, their Traditions had



had made sacred; yet he always keeps his end in view, by taking frequent occasion to remind his reader, that those punishments were inflicted by the Gods, for impiety. This appears to have been the usual strain of the writers of METAMORPHOSES. — *As long as they preserved their piety to the Gods, they were happy*<sup>m</sup>, being the constant prologue to a tragic story. So that, what Palæphatus says of the mythologic poets in general may with a peculiar justness be applied to Ovid: *The poets* (says he) *contrived fables of this kind to impress on their hearers a reverence for the Gods*<sup>n</sup>.

But this was not all. Ovid jealous, as it were, of the secret dignity of his Work, hath taken care, towards the conclusion, to give the intelligent reader the master key to his meaning. We have observed, that though the *metempsychosis* was universally taught and believed long before the time of PYTHAGORAS; yet the greatness of his reputation, and another cause, we shall come to presently, made it afterwards to be reckoned amongst his peculiar doctrines. Now Ovid, by a contrivance, which for its justness and beauty may be compared with any thing in Antiquity, seizes this circumstance, to instruct his reader in these two important points: 1. *That his poem is a popular history of Providence*: And 2. *That the Metempsychosis was the original of the Metamorphosis*. For in the conclusion of his book, he introduceth Pythagoras, teaching and explaining the TRANSMIGRATION of things to the people of Crotona. This was ending his Work in

<sup>m</sup> Ἀλλ' ὡς θεοῖς ἱεῖμας, εὐδαίμονες ἦσαν. *Ant. Liberalis Met.*  
c. xi.

<sup>n</sup> Τοῦτο δὲ μύθος τοῦτον συνέταξε οἱ πρεσβυτέραι, ἵνα οἱ ἀκροαταὶ καὶ ἐκείνων οἱ τοῦ θεοῦ. *De incred. Hist.* c. 3.



that just philosophic manner, which the elegance of pure and ancient wit required.

The Abbé Banier not entering into this beautiful contrivance, is at a loss ° to account for Ovid's bringing in Pythagoras so much out of course. The best reason he can assign, is that the poet having finished the *historical* metamorphosis, goes on to the *natural*; which Pythagoras is made to deliver to the Crotoniates. But this is not fact, but hypothesis: The poet had not finished the *historical* metamorphosis: for having gone through the episode of the *natural change of things*, he re-assumes the proper subject of his work, the *historical*, or moral, *metamorphosis*, through the remaining part of the last book; which ends with the change of Cæsar into a comet. Had not Ovid, therefore, introduced Pythagoras for the purpose here assigned, we should hardly have found him in this place; but in the Greek *division*, to which he properly belonged. Where the famous circumstance of his GOLDEN THIGH, and the exhibition of it at the Olympic Games, would have afforded a very artful and entertaining Episode, in a narrative of a CHANGE begun and left unfinished; a proof of the truth of the doctrine of the *Metamorphosis*, at least as strong as that which the Alchymists bring for the reality of the *transmutation* of Metals, from the Nails, half gold and half iron, now to be seen in the Cabinets of the German Virtuosi.

What hath been said, I suppose, will tend to give us a different and higher notion of this extraordinary work; and lessen our surprize at the Author's presumption, in so confidently predicting immortality to his performance.

° *Mét. de Ovid. Et des Expl. Hist.* tom. iii.

“ Jamque

" Jamque opus exegi, quod nec Jovis ira, nec ignis,  
 " Nec poterit ferrum, nec edax abolere vetustas.

To proceed with our subject. From what hath been said of Pythagoras's character, it appears, that he taught several doctrines which he did not believe; and cultivated opinions merely on account of their utility. And we have the express testimony of Timæus Locrus, that, in the number of these latter, was the popular doctrine of the *metempsychosis*. This very ancient Pythagorean, after having said, that the propagating the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, was necessary to society, goes on in this manner: " For as  
 " we sometimes cure the body with unwholesome  
 " remedies, when such as are most wholesome  
 " have no effect; so we restrain those minds by  
 " false relations, which will not be persuaded by the  
 " truth: There is a necessity therefore of instilling  
 " the dread of those FOREIGN TORMENTS. As  
 " that the soul shifts and changes its habitation;  
 " that the coward is ignominiously thrust into the  
 " body of a woman; the murderer imprisoned  
 " within the furr of a *savage*; the lascivious  
 " condemned to invigorate a boar or sow; the  
 " vain and inconstant changed into birds; and the  
 " slothful and ignorant into fishes. The dispensa-  
 " tion of all these things is committed in the second  
 " period, to Nemesis the Avenger; together with  
 " the infernal Furies, her Assessors, the Inspectors of  
 " human actions; to whom God, the sovereign  
 " Lord of all things, hath committed the govern-  
 " ment of the world, replenished with Gods and  
 " Men, and other animals; all which were formed

See the first section of this book.



“ after the perfect model of the eternal and intellectual ideas.”

Timæus's testimony is precise; and, as this notion of the *metempsychosis* was an inseparable part of the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, if the Pythagoreans disbelieved the *one*, they must necessarily reject the *other*.

But, here it may be proper to explain, and inforce a *distinction*, which by being totally overlooked, hath much embarrassed the whole matter.

The doctrine of the *metempsychosis*, as it signified a *moral designation of providence*, came originally from *Egypt*, and was, as we have said, believed by all mankind. But Pythagoras, who had it, with the rest of the world, from thence, gave it a new modification, and taught, “ that the successive transition of the soul into other bodies, was physical, necessary, and exclusive of all moral considerations whatever.” This is what *Diogenes Laertius* means, when he tells us “ That Pythagoras was reported to be the FIRST who taught the “ migration of the soul, from one body to another, “ by a PHYSICAL NECESSITY.” This doctrine was, indeed, *peculiarly his*, and in the number of the *esoterics*, delivered in his School, to be believed.

<sup>a</sup> Ὡς γὰρ τὰ σώματα ποσῶδες ποικίλα ὑγιαζόμενα, εἴκα μὴ εἰκὴ τοῖς ὑγιαίνεισιν ἔτι τὰς ψυχὰς ἀπειρόμενες ψευδῶς λόγους, εἴκα μὴ ἀγνοῖται ἀληθείᾳ· λέγουσι δ' ἀναγκαίως καὶ ΤΙΜΩΝΙΑΙ ΞΕΝΑΙ, ὡς μετεμψομεῖσθαι τὰν ψυχὰν, τῶν μὲν δειλῶν, ἐς γυναικεία σκάνεα, ποθ' ὕβριν ἐκδομένην· τῶν δὲ μαιφρόνων, ἐς θηρίων σώματα, ποθὶ πόρνας καὶ λαῖνας δ' ἐς σὺν ἡ κῆρυγι μορφάς· κῆρυγ δὲ καὶ μέλιων, ἐς πτηνῶν αἰετοπάρων· ἀργῶν δὲ καὶ ἀσπράγγων, ἀμαθῶν τε καὶ ἀνοήτων, ἐς τὰν τῶν ἐνύδρων ἰδέαν· ἀσπρίαν δὲ ταῦτα ἐν ἐνύδρῳ περιέδωκε Νέμεσις συνδιδέκρινε, σὺν δαίμοσι παλαμναίοις χθονίοις τε, τοῖς ἐποπταῖς τῶν ἀνθρώπων· οἷς δ' ἐπείλειον ἀγνῶν διὰς ἐπὶ τέρειν διοίκεισιν κόσμῳ· συμπληρωμένων ἐκ θεῶν τε καὶ ἀνθρώπων, τῶν τε ἄλλων ζώων· ὅσα διδάμειν ἔστιν ποτ' εἰκότα τὰν ἀρετῶν εἰδοῖ· αἰώνιῳ καὶ ποσῶ· De Anima Mundi, sub fin.

Πρῶτον δὲ φασὶ τοῦτον ἀποφῆναι τὴν ψυχὴν ΚΥΚΛΟΝ ΑΝΑΤΚΗΣ ΑΜΕΙΒΟΥΣΑΝ, ἀλλοίᾳ ἄλλοις ἐκδιδῆσθαι ζώοις. L. viii. § 14.

How



How destructive this *proper pythagoric* notion of the *metempsychosis* was to the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, Ovid, who well understood the secret of the *distinction*, evidently perceived, where he makes Pythagoras, in delivering the *esoteric* doctrine of his school to the Crotoniates, reject a future state of rewards and punishments, on the very principle of *his own metempsychosis*, tho' the *general metempsychosis* was an inseparable and essential part of that state :

O genus attonitum gelidæ formidine mortis,  
Quid Styga, quid tenebras, et nomina vana  
timetis,

Materiem vatum, falsique piacula mundi?

Corpora, sive rogi flammâ, seu tæbe vetustas

Abstulerit, mala posse pati non ulla putetis.

Morte carent animæ: SEMPERQUE priore relictâ

Sede, novis domibus habitant vivuntque receptæ.

The not attending to this *distinction* hath much perplexed even the best modern writers on the subject of Pythagoras. Mr. Dacier, in his life of that philosopher, when he comes to speak of the doctrine of the *metempsychosis*, advances crudely, that all Antiquity have been deceived in thinking Pythagoras really believed it. And, for his warrant, quotes the passage from *Timeus*, given above. Mr. Le Clerc<sup>a</sup>, scandalized at this assertion, affirms as crudely, that he did believe it; and endeavours to prove his point by divers arguments, and passages of ancient writers. In which dispute, neither of them being aware of the two different kinds of *Metempsychosis*, each of them have with much confusion, taken of the true and false in this question, and divided it between them. Dacier was surely in the

<sup>a</sup> L. xv. <sup>a</sup> Bibl. Choise, tom. x. Art. ii. Sect. 5.

right, in supposing *Pythagoras* did not believe the *Metempsychosis*, as delivered by his disciple *Timæus*; but as certainly in the wrong to conclude from thence, that he believed none at all. And *Le Clerc* was not mistaken in thinking the philosopher did believe some sort of *Metempsychosis*; but apparently in an error in supposing that it was the popular and moral notion of it. In a word, the proofs which *Dacier* brings, conclude only against *Pythagoras's* believing a moral transmigration; and those, *Le Clerc* opposes, conclude only for his believing a natural one. While neither, as we say, apprehending there were two kinds, the one common to all, the other peculiar to that Philosopher, they have both fallen into great mistakes.

Let me give an instance from *Le Clerc*; as it will contribute in general to illustrate the subject, and, at the same time, throw light on the latter part of the passage, we have but now quoted from *Timæus*. *Dacier* had urged that passage to prove *Pythagoras* did not believe the *Metempsychosis*; and *Le Clerc* had urged it, to prove he did; because the author in conclusion expressly affirms, *that the dispensation of the Metempsychosis is committed in the second period to Nemesis the avenger*. Ἀνάστα δὲ ταῦτα ἐν δευτέρῳ περιόδῳ ἡ Νέμεσις ΣΥΝΔΙΕΚΡΙΝΕ. *Le Clerc* says, *I have translated these words verbatim, that the reader may see he talks seriously*. But whoever reads the whole passage, which expressly speaks of the doctrine as *useful* and not as *true*, will be forced to own, that by the phrase, *Nemesis decrees*, is meant, *it must be taught that Nemesis decrees*. But this circumstance of *Nemesis* is remarkable; and enough to put the matter out of question.

\* J'ai traduit ces dernières paroles de *Timée* mot pour mot, afin que l'on pût voir, qu'il parle sérieusement. *Bibl. Choisie*, tom. x. p. 193.



There were two kinds, as we have said, of the *Metempsychosis*, which the Pythagoreans taught; the *moral* and the *natural*. The latter they believed, the first they only preached. So that Timæus speaking here of the *Metempsychosis* as a fable, useful for the people to credit; lest the reader should mistake him as meaning the *natural*, he adds the circumstance of Nemesis, the poetical Avenger of the crimes of men; to confine all he had said, to the *moral Metempsychosis*.

To support what is here observed, it may not be improper to insert the sentiments of some of the most considerable of Pythagoras's DISCIPLES on this point: which I shall transcribe from my very learned Friend, the author of the *critical inquiry into the opinions and practices of the ancient philosophers*: where the reader may see them admirably well explained and defended from a deal of idle chicanery. Plutarch tells us "that EMPEDOCLES held death to be a separation of the fiery substance from the other parts, and therefore supposed that death was common to the soul and body\*." Sextus Empiricus says, "it is evident that Epicurus stole his principles from the poets. As to that famous tenet of his, that *death is nothing to us*, he borrowed it from EPICHRMUS, who says, I neither look upon the act of dying, or the state that succeeds it, as of any consequence and importance to me†."

\* Εμπεδοκλής τὸν θάνατον γινώσκειν διαχωρισμὸν τῶ πυρώδους, ἐξ ᾧ ἢ συνκεῖται τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ συναρθῆναι ὥστε κατὰ τὸτο κοινὸν εἶναι τὸν θάνατον σώματος καὶ ψυχῆς. De Plac. c. 25. Cicero says, Empedocles animum esse censet cordi suffusum sanguinem. 1 Tusc. 9. alluding to Empedocles's own words in that famous verse:

Αἷμα γὰρ ἀνθρώποις περικαρδίον ἐστὶ νόημα.

† ὁ δὲ Επίχρμος φησὶναι τὰ κράτιστα τῶν δογμάτων παρὰ ποιητῶν ἀποτακτικῶς—τὸν δὲ θάνατον ὅτι οὐδὲν ἐστὶ πρὸς ἡμᾶς, Επίχρμος αὐτῷ περὶ σμύθησιν, εἰδὼν ἀποθανεῖν ἢ τιθῆναι ὁ μὲν διαφέρει. ad Gram. § 273.



Plutarch likewise in his *consolation to Apollonius*, cites the following words of *EPICHRMUS*. "The parts of which you are composed will be separated at death; and each will return to the place from which it originally came. The earth will be restored to earth, and the spirit will ascend upwards; what is there terrible or grievous in this?"

As for this ascent of the spirit upwards, *Lucretius* will explain it.

Cedit enim retro, de terra quod fuit ante,  
In terras: et quod missum est ex ætheris oris,  
Id rursum coeli rellatum templa receptant.

Lib. ii.

*TELES*, another follower of *Pythagoras*, thus addresses himself to one grieved and afflicted for the loss of a deceased friend; "You complain (says he) that your friend will never exist more. But remember, that he had no existence ten thousand years ago, that he did not live in the time of the Trojan war, nor even in much later periods. This, it seems, does not move you: all your concern is, because he will not exist for the future." *Epicurus* uses the very same language on the same occasion:

Respice item quam nil ad nos ante acta vetustas  
Temporis æterni fuerit, quam nascimur ante.  
Hoc igitur nobis speculum natura futuri  
Temporis exponit, post mortem denique nostram.

Lucr. l. iii.

So far, my learned friend,

\* Καλῶς δὲ ὁ *Ἐπίχαρμος* συνεκρίθη. φησὶ, διεκρίθη καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν  
ὄντων ἦλθε πάλιν, γὰρ μὴν εἰς γὰρ, πνεῦμα δ' αἶψα τί τῶνδε χαλεπότη;

\* Αλλ' ἐκτίειται. ἡ δὲ γὰρ ἡν μνηστον ἔτι, ἡ δ' ἐπὶ τῇ Τροικῇ,  
ἐπὶ κατὰ τῆς προπαπτης σου. σὺ δ' ἐπὶ μὲν τῶνδε οὐκ ἀχθῇ, ὅτι δὲ ἡς  
ἔγεραι οὐκ ἔσαι, δυσχεραίνεις. *Stobæus Mor. Ec. c. 106.*

II. PLATO is next in order: He likewise greatly affected the character of *Lawgiver*; and actually composed laws for several people, as the Syracusians and Cretans; but with what kind of spirit we may judge, by his refusing that employment for the Thebans and Arcadians, as soon as he understood they were averse to equality of possessions<sup>b</sup>. The truth is, his *philosophic* character, which was always predominant (as in Pythagoras the *legislative*) gave his politics a cast of refinement which made his schemes of Government very impracticable, and even unnatural. So that, tho' his knowledge of mankind was indeed great and profound, and therefore highly commended by Cicero<sup>c</sup>, yet his fine-drawn speculations brought him at length into such contempt as a writer of politics, that Josephus tells us, notwithstanding *he was so high in glory and admiration amongst the Greeks, above the rest of the Philosophers, for his superior virtue, and power of eloquence, yet he was openly laughed at, and bitterly ridiculed by those who pretended to any profound or high knowledge of politics*<sup>d</sup>.

The only Greek masters he followed, were Pythagoras and Socrates: These he much admired. From the first, he took his fondness for geometry, his fanaticism of numbers, his ambition for law-giving, and the doctrine of the *Metempsychosis*: From the latter, the study of morals, and the mode of disputing.

<sup>b</sup> See *Ælian. Var. Hist.* l. ii. c. 42.

<sup>c</sup> Deus ille noster Plato in πολιτεία. See B. ii. § 3.

<sup>d</sup> Πλάτων δὲ θαυμάζομεν παρὰ τοῖς Ἕλλησιν, ὡς καὶ σιμωτῆς βίᾳ διαγῶν καὶ δυνάμει λόγων, καὶ παιδοῖ παύλας ὑπερέτας τῆς ἐν φιλοσοφίᾳ γλῶσσης, ὑπὸ τῶν φασκόντων δεινῶν εἶναι τὰ πολίτικα, μικρὰ δὲ χλευάζομεν, καὶ κωμωδούμεν διατελεῖ. *Cont. Ap.* l. ii. § 31.



This was a monstrous mis-alliance\*: I mean, the incorporating into one Philosophy, the doctrines of two such discordant Schools: the first of which dogmatized in the most sublime questions of nature; the other gave up the most vulgar, as inscrutable. The Philosopher of Samos aimed at glory, the Legislator of Samos followed utility; but the simple Moralist of Athens laboured after truth.

We need not therefore any longer wonder at the obscurity which Plato's frequent contradictions throw over his writings. It was caused not only by the *double doctrine*, a practice common to all the Philosophers; but likewise by the joint profession of two such contrary Philosophies. This effect could not escape the observation of Eusebius: *Hear then* (says he) *the Greeks themselves, by their best and most powerful speaker, now rejecting, and now again adopting the FABLES*†.

However it was the abstruse philosophy of Pythagoras with which he was most taken. For the sake of this, he assumed also the legislative part; and in imitation of his master, travelled into Egypt;

\* Geddes, or his Glasgow editors, (to mention them for once) in the *essay on the composition of the ancients*, are here very angry at the author for charging Plato with making a *monstrous mis-alliance*, merely (as they say) because he added the study of *physics* to that of *morals*; and employ six pages in defending Plato's conduct. As these insolent scribblers could not see then, so possibly they will not be ready to learn now, that the term of *monstrous mis-alliance*, which I gave to Plato's project, of incorporating the *Pythagoric* and *Socratic* Schools, referred to the opposite and contrary geniuses of those Schools in their *MANNER* of treating their Subjects, not to any difference which there is in the Subjects themselves. The mis-alliance was not in joining *Physics* to *Morals*; but in joining a Fanatic Mysticism to the cool logic of common sense.

† *Αὐτὸς δὲ ὁ αὐτὸν ἑρμηνεύων ἐν τῷ αὐτῷ ἀφίει, τὸτὶ μὴ ἰσχυρῶς ἐρῶν τὸν αὐτὸν ἑρμηνεύοντα τὸς μύθους. Præp. Evang. p. 47. Steph. Ed.* See what has been further said on this matter, p. 127. Note (c).

where



where he was initiated into the Mysteries of the priesthood. It was this which made Xenophon, the faithful follower of Socrates, say, that Plato had adulterated the pure and simple philosophy of their Master; and *was in love with Egypt, and the fortentious wisdom of Pythagoras*<sup>a</sup>. And even occasioned Socrates himself, on reading his romantic Dialogues, to exclaim, *I, a God, what a heap of lies has this young man placed to my account*<sup>b</sup>?

But of all the Egyptian inventions, and Pythagoric practices, nothing pleased him more than that of the *double doctrine*, and the division of his auditors into the exoteric and esoteric classes: He more professedly than any other, avowing those principles, on which that distinction was founded; such as, —*That it is for the benefit of mankind, that they should be often deceived—That there are some truths not fit for the people to know—That the world is, not to be entrusted with the true notion of God*; and more openly philosophizing upon that distinction, in his writings. Thus, in his books of Laws, (which we shall see presently were of the exoteric kind) he defends the popular opinion, which held the sun, moon, stars, and earth, to be Gods, against the theory of Anaxagoras, which taught the sun was a mass of fire, the moon an habitable earth, &c. Here, his objection to the NEW PHILOSOPHY, (as he calls it) is, that it was an inlet to atheism; for the common people, when they once found those to be no Gods, which they had received for such, would be apt to conclude, there were none at all. But in his Cratylus, which was of the esoteric

<sup>a</sup> Ἀγνοῦντες ἡρώδου, καὶ τῆς Πυθαγόρου παραδόχου σοφίας.

<sup>b</sup> Φασὶ δὲ καὶ Σωκράτης κηρύττειν τοῦ Διονυσίου ἀναγνωσκόντος Πλάτωνος. Ἡρώδης, ἰππικὴ, ὡς πολλὰ μὲν καλὰ εἶναι ὁ πάνσοφος. Diog. Laert. l. iii. § 35.

kind, he laughs at their Forefathers for worshipping the sun and stars, as Gods.

In a word, the Ancients thought this distinction of the *double doctrine*, so necessary a key to Plato's writings, that they composed discourses on it. Numenius, a Pythagorean and Platonist both in one, wrote a treatise (now lost) of the *secret doctrines* (that is, the real opinions) of Plato<sup>1</sup>; which would probably have given much light to this question, had the question wanted it. But Albinus, an old platonist, hath, in some measure, supplied this loss, by his *introduction to the dialogues of Plato*<sup>2</sup>. From which it appears, that those very books, where Plato most dwells on the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, are all of the *exoteric* kind. To this, it hath been said, that some of these were of the *political* and *civil* kind: and so say I; but nevertheless of the *exoteric*, called *political*, from their subject, and *exoterical* from their manner of handling it. But if the nature of the subject will not teach these objectors that it must needs be handled exoterically, Jamblichus's authority must decide between us; who, in his life of Pythagoras<sup>3</sup>, hath used *political* in the sense of *esoterical*: And in that class, Albinus ranks<sup>m</sup> the Criton, Phædo, Minos, Symposium, Laws, Epistles, Epinomis, Menæxenus, Clitophon, and Philebus.

There is an odd passage in Cicero<sup>n</sup>, which seems to regard the Phædo in the light of a mere *exoteric* composition, so far as it concerns the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. The *auditor* is advised to read the Phædo, to confirm

<sup>1</sup> Περὶ τῶν Πλάτωνος ἀπορρήτων. Teste Euseb. l. xiii. c. 4, 5. *Præp. Evang.*

<sup>2</sup> Apud Fabric. *Bibl. Græc.* lib. iii. c. 2.

<sup>3</sup> Sect. 150.

<sup>m</sup> Sect. 5.

<sup>n</sup> *Tusc. Disp.* l. i. c. 5.



his belief in this point: to which he replies, *Feci mehercule, & quidem sapius: sed NESCIO QUOMODO, dum lego assentior: cum posui librum, & mecum ipse de immortalitate animorum capi cogitare, assensio omnis illa elabitur.* The only reasonable account I can give of this reflection, (for to suppose it an imitation of something like it in the Phædo itself, applied to a very different purpose, gives us none at all) I say the only reasonable account is, that the Phædo being an *exoteric* dialogue, and written for the people, was held amongst the learned, in the rank of a philosophical romance: but while one of these better sort of readers, is very intent on such a work, a master-piece, like this, for composition and eloquence, he becomes so captivated with the charms and allurements of these graces, that he forgets, for a moment, the hidden meaning, and falls into the vulgar deceit. But having thrown aside the book, grown cool, and reflected on those principles concerning God and the soul, held in common by the Philosophers (of which more hereafter) all the bright colouring disappears, and the gaudy vision shrinks from his embrace. A passage in Seneca's *epistles*, will explain, and seems to support, this interpretation. *Quomodo molestus est JUCUNDUM SOMNIUM VIDENTI, qui excitat; aufert enim voluptatem, etiamsi falsam, effectum tamen vere habentem; sic epistola tua mihi fecit injuriam; revocavit enim me cogitationi apte traditum, & iturum, si licuisset, ulterius. Juvabat de æternitate animarum querere, imo mehercule credere. Credebam enim facile opinionibus magnorum virorum, rem gratissimam promittentium magis quam probantium! Dabam me spei tantæ. Jam eram fastidio mihi, jam reliquias ætatis infractæ contemnebam, in immensum illud tempus & in possessionem omnis ævi transturus: cum subito experreo-*



ius sum, epistola tua accepta; & tam BELLUM SOMNIUM perdidit<sup>o</sup>.

The Platonic philosophy being then entirely Pythagorean in the point in question, and this latter rejecting the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, we might fairly conclude them both under the same predicament.

But as PLATO is esteemed the peculiar patron of this doctrine; chiefly, I suppose, on his being the first who brought REASONS for the ETERNITY of the soul<sup>b</sup>: on this account, it will be proper to be a little more particular.

1. First then, it is very true, that Plato hath argued much for the *eternity*, or, if you will, for the *immortality* of the soul. But to know what sort of immortality he meant, we need only consider what sort of arguments he employs. Now these, which he was so famous for inventing and enforcing, were *natural* and *metaphysical*, taken from the essence and qualities of the soul; which therefore concluded only for its *permanency*: and this he certainly believed<sup>c</sup>. But for any *moral arguments*, from which only a future state of rewards and punishments can be deduced, he resolves them all into tradition, and the religion of his country.

2. As the inventing reasons for the immortality of the soul, was *one* cause of his being held the great patron of this doctrine; so *another*, was his famous refinement (for it was indeed *his*) of the *natural Metempsychosis*, the peculiar notion of the

<sup>a</sup> Epist. 102.

<sup>b</sup> Tusc. Disp. l. i. c. 17. *Primum de animarum ETERNITATE non solum sensisse idem quod PYTHAGORAS, sed RATIONEM etiam attulisse.*

<sup>c</sup> Tot rationes attulit [Plato] ut velle ceteris, sibi certè persuasisse videatur. *Civ. Tusc. Disp. l. i. c. 21.* Καθάρως δὲ ὑπεστήκει τὸ νόμον, as he expresses it in his twelfth book of laws.

Pythagoreans. This natural *Metempsychosis* was, as we have said, that the successive transition of the soul into other bodies was physical and necessary, and exclusive of all moral designation whatsoever. Plato, on receiving this opinion from his master, gave it this additional improvement; that those changes and transitions were the purgations of impure minds, unfit, by reason of the pollutions they had contracted, to re-ascend the place from whence they came, and rejoin that SUBSTANCE from whence they were discerped; and consequently, that pure immaculate souls were exempt from this transmigration. Thus Plato's *Metempsychosis* (which was as peculiarly his, as the other was Pythagoras's) seemed indeed to have some shadow of a moral designation in it, which his master's had not: neither did it, like that, necessarily subject all to it, without distinction; or for the same length of time. In this then they differed: But how much they agreed in excluding the notion of all future state of reward and punishment, will be seen, when in the next section we come to shew what a kind of existence it was, which Pythagoras and Plato afforded to the soul, when it had rejoined that universal SUBSTANCE, from which it had been discerped.

We have now explained the three sorts of *Metempsychosis*;—The popular;—That which was peculiar to Pythagoras; and lastly, That peculiar to Plato. The not distinguishing the Platonic from the Pythagoric; and both, from the Popular, has occasioned even the Ancients to write with much obscurity on this matter. What can be more inexplicable and contradictory than the account Servius hath given of it?

“Sciendum, non omnes animas ad corpora reverti.  
 “Aliquæ enim propter vitæ merita non redeunt  
 “propter malam vitam; aliquæ propter fati necessitatem.” *In Æn. vi. ver. 713.* Here, he has



jumbled into *one*, as the current doctrine of the *Metempsychosis*, these *three* different and distinct sorts: *aliquæ propter vitæ MERITA non redeunt*, belonging to the popular notion; *aliquæ redeunt propter fati necessitatem*, belonging to Pythagoras's; and *aliquæ propter MALAM vitam* to Plato's.

3. However it is very true, that Plato in his writings inculcates the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments: but this, always in the gross sense of the populace: that *the souls of ill men descended into asses and swine*;—that *the uninitiated lay in mire and filth*;—that *there were three judges of hell*; and talks much of Styx, Cocytus, Acheron, &c. and all so seriously\*, as shews he had a mind to be believed. But did he indeed believe these fables? we may be assured he did not: for being the most spiritualized of the Philosophers, had he really credited a *future state* of rewards and punishments, he would have refined and purified it, as he did the doctrine of the *eternity* of the soul, which he certainly believed. But he has as good as told us what he really thought of the matter, in his *Epinomis*; where writing of the condition of a good and wise man after death, he says, *of whom, both in jest and in earnest, I constantly affirm, that when such a one shall have finished his destined course by death, he shall at his dissolution, be stript of those many senses which he here enjoyed; and then only partitipate of one simple lot or condition. And, of MANY, as he was here, being become ONE, he shall be happy, wise, and blessed*†. In this passage, I understand

\* In his *Gorgias*, *Phædo*, and *Republic*.

† Οὐ καὶ δυσχερὲς μοίρας παύειν καὶ σπένδειν ἅμα, ὅτι θανάτῳ τις τῶν τοιούτων τὴν αὐτὴ μοῖραν ἀναπλήσει, χρεὼς ἑαυτῷ ἀποβαλὼν ἢ, μὴτε μάλιστα πολλὰν τότε καθάπερ νῦν αἰσθάνεται, μίας τε μοίρας μετληφότα μόνον, καὶ ἐκ πολλῶν ἓνα γινώσκει, εὐδαιμόνιαν τε ἔσσεσθαι καὶ σοφώτατον ἅμα καὶ μακάριον. *Sub fin.*



Plato *secretly* to intimate, that, when he was in *jest*, he held the future happiness of good men in a peculiar and distinct existence, which is the *popular* and *moral* notion of a future state: but, when in *earnest*, he held, that this existence was not personal or peculiar, but a *common life*, without distinct sensations; a *resolution* into the *τὸ ἐν*. And it is remarkable that the whole sentence has an elegant ambiguity, capable of either meaning. For *πολλῶν αἰσθησέων* may either signify our many *passions and appetites*, or our *many cogitations*. To deny we have the *first* of these in a future state, makes nothing against a distinct existence; but to deny the *second*, does. His disciple Aristotle seems to have understood him as meaning it in this *latter* sense, when in earnest; and has so paraphrased it as to exclude all peculiar existence<sup>†</sup>. There is the same ambiguity in *ἐκ πολλῶν ἕνα*, which may either signify, that, of his many sensations, he hath only one left, the feeling happiness; or that, from being a part, and in the *number of many individuals* of the same species, he is become *one*, and entire, by being joined to, and united with the universal nature. Plato affirms all this still more plainly, in his commentary on *Timæus*, where he agrees to his author's doctrine of the fabulous invention of the FOREIGN TORMENTS<sup>‡</sup>.

4. In confirmation of the whole, (*i. e.* of Plato's disbelief of the religious doctrine of a future state, as founded on the will and providence of the Gods) we observe, in the last place, that the most intelligent of the Ancients regarded what Plato said of a future state of rewards and punishments, to be said only in the *exoteric* way to the people.

The famous Stoic, *Chrysippus*<sup>§</sup>, when he blames Plato, as not rightly deterring men from injustice,

<sup>†</sup> See p. 221.  
*Stoic. respug.*

<sup>‡</sup> See p. 149.

<sup>§</sup> *Plut. de*

by frightful stories of future punishments, takes it for granted that Plato himself gave no credit to them: for he turns his reprehension, not against that philosopher's wrong belief, but his wrong judgment, in imagining such childish terrors<sup>2</sup> could be useful to the cause of Virtue.

Strabo plainly declares himself of the same opinion, when speaking of the Indian Brachmans, he says, that *they had invented fables in the manner of Plato, concerning the immortality of the soul, and a future judgment in the shades below; and other things of the same nature*<sup>1</sup>.

Cellus owns that every thing which Plato tells us of a future state, and the happy abodes of the virtuous, is an allegory. "But what (says he) we are to understand by these things, is not easy for every one to find out. To be master of this, we must be able to comprehend his meaning, when he says, *They cannot, by reason of their imbecillity and sluggishness, penetrate into the highest region. But were their nature vigorous enough to raise itself to so sublime a contemplation, they would then come to understand, that this was the true heaven, and the true irradiation*<sup>2</sup>." To understand this *true irradiation*, the ἀληθινὸν Φῶς, we must consider that *light* was one of the most important circumstances of the Pagan Elysium, as we may see in the chapter of the Mysteries; where a certain ravishing and divine

<sup>1</sup> Ὡς ἐδὴν διαφέρουσα τῆς Ἀρκῆς καὶ τῆς Ἀλφειῆς, δι' ὧν τὰ παιδαίματα τῶ κακοσχολῶν αἱ γυναῖκες ἀπειργασί.

<sup>2</sup> Παραπλέκεται δὲ καὶ μυθεῖς, ὥσπερ καὶ ΠΛΑΤΩΝ, περὶ τῆς ἀφθαρσίας ψυχῆς, καὶ τῶν καθ' αὐτὰ κρίσεων, καὶ ἄλλα τοιαῦτα. Geogr. l. xv. p. 1040. Gron. Ed.

<sup>3</sup> Τί δὲ διὰ τούτων ἐμφανίζει, εἰ παιὶν γινῶναι ῥαδιον· εἰ μὴ ὅστις ἐπαίειν δύναται, τί ποτ' ἐστὶν ἐκεῖνο ὃ φησὶν ὑπ' ἀσθενείας καὶ βραδύτητος ἔχειν τ' εἶναι διεξελθεῖν ἐπ' ἔσχατον τὸν αἴρα· καὶ εἰ ἡ φύσις ἱκανὴ εἴη ἀνασχίσθαι θεωρεῖσα, γινῶναι αὖ ὅτι ἐκεῖνός ἐστιν ὁ ἀληθὺς ἕρως καὶ τὸ ἀληθινὸν φῶς. Orig. cont. Cels. l. vii. p. 352. Sp. Ed.

light is represented, as making those abodes so commendable;

Largior hic campos æther & lumine vestit  
Purpureo——

But this remarkable passage of Celsus, besides the general conclusion to be drawn from it, confirms what we have said of the peculiar Platonic *Metempsychosis*. For here Celsus resolves all Plato's meaning, in his representations of a future state of rewards and punishments, into that *Metempsychosis*: and we shall see hereafter, that *that* was resolvable into the reunion of the soul with the Divine Nature, when it became vigorous enough to penetrate into the highest region<sup>a</sup>.

The emperor Julian addressing himself to Heraclius the Cynic, on the subject of that sect, when he comes to speak of the *double doctrine*, and the admission of *fable* into the teachings of the philosophers, observes, that it hath its use chiefly in *Ethics*, (in which he includes Politics<sup>b</sup>) and in that part of *theology relating to initiation, and the mysteries*<sup>c</sup>. To support which he presently quotes the example

<sup>a</sup> The unfairness of readers when their passions have made them become writers, is hardly to be conceived: some of these have represented the three last testimonies as given to prove that Plato believed no future state at all: tho' the author had plainly and expressly declared but a page or two before, p. 161. as well as at p. 92. that there was a sort of *future state* which Plato did believe; he refers to it again at p. 161, 162. and, what is more, observes here, on this last passage, that Celsus alludes to this very future state of Plato. And what was it but this,—that future happiness and misery were the natural and necessary consequences of Virtue and Vice; Vice being supposed to produce that imbecility and sluggishness which clogged and retarded the Soul, and hindered it from penetrating into the higher regions.

<sup>b</sup> —ἡλικος ἐκκοσμηκῶς δὲ, τὸ περὶ Νέας ἡλικίας πολιτικῶς δὲ, τὸ περὶ ἐπιδαν. Orat. 7.

<sup>c</sup> Καὶ τὰ θεολογικῶς, τὰ τελεστικῶς, καὶ μυστικῶς. Ib.



of Plato, who, when he writes of *Theology*, or as a *Theologer*, is full of fables in his accounts of the infernal regions<sup>a</sup>. From hence it appears that, in the opinion of this learned emperor, Plato did not only not speak his real sentiments of these matters, but that when he did treat of them, it was not as a Philosopher, but as a Theologer; in which character the ancient Sages never thought themselves obliged to keep within the limits of truth. What these *fabulous relations* were, he intimates, when he previously speaks of the fables taught in the *Mysteries*; by which he could only mean their representations of a future state: The great *Secret* of the *Mysteries*, the doctrine of the *Unity*, being, in his opinion, of a nature directly contrary to the other.

We now come to the PERIPATETICS and STOICS, who will give us much less trouble. For these having in some degree, though not entirely, thrown off the legislative character, spoke more openly against a future state of rewards and punishments. Indeed the difference in this point, between them and the Platonists, was only from less to more reserve, as appears from their all having the same common principles of philosophising<sup>c</sup>.

III. ARISTOTLE was the disciple of Plato, and his Rival. This emulation, though it disposed him to take a different road to fame, in a province yet unoccupied, and to throw off the legislative character; yet it set him upon writing books of *laws* and *politics*, in opposition to his Master; whom he takes every occasion to contradict.

He stuck indeed to the ancient method of the *double doctrine*, but with less caution and reserve.

<sup>a</sup> — ἐπεὶ καὶ Πλάτων πολλὰ μυθολογεῖται περὶ τῶν ἐν ᾧδε πραγμάτων θεολογῶν. *Ib.*

<sup>c</sup> *Acad. Quæst. lib. i.*

For, whereas the Pythagoreans and Platonists kept it amongst the *secrets* of their schools, he seems willing that all the world should take notice of it, by giving public directions to distinguish between the two kinds<sup>f</sup>. Accordingly, in his *Nicomachean Ethics*, he expresses himself without any ceremony, and in the most dogmatic way, against a future state of rewards and punishments. *Dead* (says he) *is of all things the most terrible. For it is the final period of existence. And beyond that, it appears, there is neither good nor evil for the dead man to dread or hope<sup>g</sup>.*

And in another place he tells us, that the soul, after it's separation from the body, will neither joy nor grieve, love nor hate, nor be subject to any passions of the like nature. And lest we should suspect that this was said of the *ANIMAL* life only, he goes further, and observes, that it will then neither remember, think, nor understand<sup>h</sup>. It must, therefore, according to this Philosopher, be absolutely lost, as to any separate existence.

IV. ZENO, the Founder of the Porch, followed the mode, in writing of *Laws* and a *Republic*. Agreeably to this part of his character, we find, by Lactantius, that he taught a future state of rewards and punishments in the very terms of Plato: *Esse inferos Zeno Stoicus dicit; Et sedes piorum ab impiis esse discretas; Et illos quidem quietas ac delectabiles incolere regiones, hos vero luere penas in tenebro-*

<sup>f</sup> See Cic. *Ep. ad Att.* lib. ix. Ep. 16. — in singulis libris [de republica] utro procerum, ut Aristoteles in his, quos *ἀσκήσεις* vocat —

<sup>g</sup> Φθισήσας δ' ὁ θάνατος αἰσας γὰρ καὶ εἰς τὸν αὐτὸν αἰῶνα δόσι, οὔτις αἰσάν, οὔτις κακὸν ἴδωσι. *Eth. ad Nicom.* lib. iii. c. 6. p. 130. Ed. Han. 1610. 8vo.

<sup>h</sup> τὸ δὲ ΔΙΑΝΟΕΙΣΘΑΙ, καὶ ΘΙΑΡΙΝ ἢ ΜΙΛΕΙΝ, οὔτις τὸν αἰῶνα ᾧ αἰσάν, ἀλλὰ τὰς τῶν ἑαυτοῦ αἰῶνα ἢ αἰῶνα ἑαυτοῦ, διὰ καὶ τὴν φανερὰν, οὔτις ΜΝΗΜΟΝΕΥΕ, οὔτις φοβᾶται. *De anima*, 1. v.

*sis locis atque in cæni voraginibus horrendis*<sup>1</sup>. Yet, we know that he and the whole Porch held, that God governed the world only by his general Providence; which did not extend either to Individuals, Cities or People<sup>2</sup>: And, not to insist that his follower Chrysippus laughed at these things, as the most childish of all terrors, we know too, that the philosophic principle of his School was, *that the soul died with the body*<sup>3</sup>. Indeed to compliment their WISE MAN, the Stoics taught that *his* soul held it out till the general Conflagration: by which, when we come to speak of their opinion concerning the nature and duplicity of the soul, we shall find they meant just nothing.

However, it was not long before the *Stoics* entirely laid aside the legislative character; for which their Master appears to have had no talents, as we may judge by what he lays down in his *Republic*, that *States should not busy themselves in erecting temples; for we ought not to think there is any thing holy, or sacred, or that deserves any real esteem, in the work of masons and labourers*<sup>m</sup>. The good man had forgot that he was writing Laws for a *People*; and so turned impertinently enough, to philosophise with the *stoical Sage*. The truth is, this sect had never any great name for Legislation: The reason is evi-

<sup>1</sup> *Inß.* lib. vii. sect. 7.

<sup>2</sup> *Nat. Deor.* l. iii. c. 39.

<sup>3</sup> Οἱ Στωικοὶ ἐξῆλθαν τῶν σωμάτων υποφέρειν τὴν μὲν ἀσθενεῖαν ἅμα, τοῖς συκρημασι γενέσθαι (ταυτὴν δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀπαιδεύτων) τὴν δὲ ἰσχυροῦσαν οὐκ εἰς περὶ τῆς ΣΟΦΟΥΣ, καὶ μέχρι τῆς ἐκφυγῶσιν. *Plut. de Plac. Phil.* lib. iv. c. 7.—See the *Critical inquiry into the opinions and practice of the ancient philosophers*, p. 27—to 37. 2d Ed.

<sup>m</sup> Προσθήσομεν δὲ καὶ ἡμεῖς, ὅτι καὶ Ζήνων ὁ Κιτῆσιος ἐν τῇ πολιτείᾳ φησὶν· ἱερὰ τε οἰκοδομεῖν εὐδὲν δεήσει, ἱερὸν γὰρ εὐδὲν χρητὸς νομίζειν, εὐδὲ πολλὰ ἄξιον καὶ ἁγίον οἰκοδομῶν τε ἐργὸν καὶ βαταύσαν. *Apud Orig. cont. Cels.* p. 6.



dent. This part of Ethics, more than any other, requires the cultivation of, and adherence to, what is called COMMON NOTICES. Whereas, of all the ancient systems of Philosophy, the Stoical *Morals* most deviated from Nature<sup>n</sup>. They soon felt the effects which the doctrines of their School had on common life, and therefore in good time laid the study of Politics quite aside. After which, they wrote, without the least reserve, against a future state of rewards and punishments.

Thus EPICTETUS, a thorough Stoic, if ever there was any, speaking of death, says, “But whither do you go? no where to your hurt: you return from whence you came: to a friendly consociation with your kindred elements: what there was of the nature of fire in your composition, returns to the element of fire; what there was of earth, to earth; what of air, to air; and of water, to water. There is no *Hell*, nor *Acheron*, nor *Cocytus*, nor *Pyrriphlegethon*.”

In another place, he says, “The hour of death approaches. Do not endeavour to aggravate, and make things worse than they really are: Represent them to yourself in their true light. The time is now come when the materials of which you are compounded will be resolved into the

<sup>n</sup> This will explain the cause of a fact which Cicero observes concerning them, where he speaks of the liberty which the greek Philosophers had taken, in inventing new Words—“ex omnibus Philosophis Stoici plurima novaverunt.” *de fin.* l. 2. c. 2. For the more a Teacher deviates from common notions, and the discipline of Nature, the less able he will be to express himself by Words already in use.

<sup>o</sup> — Πῦρ; εἰς ἑὸν δυνάμι, ἀλλ’ ὅθεν ἔγινε, εἰς τὰ φίλα καὶ συγγενή, εἰς τὰ συνήματα ὅσον καὶ ἐν σοὶ αὐτῷ, εἰς τοὺς ἀπαισιν, ὅσον καὶ ἡ γῆ, εἰς γῆν ὅσον πνευματικά, εἰς πνευμάτιον ὅσον ὕδατι, εἰς ὕδατιον ὅσον ἅλει, καὶ Ἀχέρων, καὶ Κόκυτος, καὶ Περὶφλεγέθων. *Apud Arrian.* lib. iii. c. 13.

"elements from which they were originally taken.  
 "What hurt or cause of terror is there in this? or  
 "what is there in the world that ABSOLUTELY  
 "PERISHETH?"

ANTONINUS says, "He who feareth death, either  
 "fears that he shall be deprived of all sense, or  
 "that he shall experience different sensations. If  
 "all sensations cease, you will be no longer sub-  
 "ject to pain and misery; if you be invested with  
 "senses of another kind, you will become another  
 "creature, and will continue to exist as such."

SENECA, in his consolation to Marcia, daughter  
 of the famous Cremutius Cordus the Stoic, is not  
 at all behind hand, in the frank avowal of the same  
 principles. *Cogita, nullis defunctum malis affici: il-  
 la quæ nobis inferos faciunt terribiles, FABULAM esse:  
 nullas imminere mortuis tenebras, nec carcerem, nec  
 flumina flagrantia igne, nec oblivionis amnem, nec  
 tribunalia, & reos & in illa libertate tam laxa ullos  
 iterum tyrannos. Luserunt ista poëtæ, & vanis nos  
 agitare terroribus. Mors omnium dolorum & solu-  
 tio est, & finis: ultra quam mala nostra non exeunt,  
 quæ nos in illam tranquillitatem, IN QUÀ, ANTE-  
 QUAM NASCEREMUR, jacuimus, reponit.*

LUCIAN, who, of all the Ancients, best under-  
 stood the intrigues and intricacies of ancient Philo-  
 sophy, appears to have had the same thoughts of  
 the Stoics upon the point in question. In his *Ju-  
 piter Tragicus* or *discourse on Providence*, Damis, the  
 Epicurean, arguing against Providence, silences the

P "Ἦδη καιρὸς ἀποθανεῖν· μὴ τραγωδίῃ τὸ πρᾶγμα, ἀλλ' εἴπερ ὡς  
 ἔχει ἤδη καιρὸς τὴν ὕλην, ἐξ ᾗν συστήθην, εἰς ἡκεῖνα πάλιν ἀναλυθῆναι,  
 καὶ τί θνήσκον, τί μέλλει ἀπόλλυσθαι τῶν ἐν τῷ κόσμῳ. l. iv. 7. 1.

Q "Ὁ τὸν θάνατον φοβούμενος, ἥτοι ἀνακισθησὶν φοβεῖται, ἢ αἰσθησὶν  
 ἑτέριαν, ἀλλ' εἴτε οὐκέτι αἰσθήσῃ, ἢ δὲ κακῇ τινος αἰσθήσῃ, εἴτε ἄλλοις-  
 τείας αἰσθήσῃ κτήσῃ, ἄλλοις ζῶσι ἴση, καὶ τὸ ζῆν ἢ παύσῃ. viii. 58.

\* Cap. 19.

Stoic, Timocles, when he comes to the *inequality of events*; because the Author would not suffer his Stoic to bring in a *future state* to remove the difficulty. And, that nothing but decorum, or the keeping each Sect to its own principles, made him leave the Stoic embarrassed, appears from his *Jupiter confuted, or discourse on destiny*; where, when Cyniscus presses Jupiter with the same arguments against Providence, Jupiter easily extricates himself: "You appear by this, Cyniscus, to be ignorant what dreadful punishments await the wicked after this life, and what abundant happiness is reserved for the good".

I will only observe in taking leave of this subject, that the famous STOICAL RENOVATION (which hath been opposed to what is here represented) seems to have been conceived on the *natural Metempsychosis* of Pythagoras. Origen gives the following account of it: "The generality of the *Stoics* not only subject every thing mortal to these RENOVATIONS, but the Immortals likewise, and the very Gods themselves. For after the conflagration of the Universe, which hath happened already, and will happen hereafter, in infinite successions, the same face and order of things hath been and ever will be preserved from the beginning to the end". It is true, the men of this School, to ease a little the labouring absurdity,

con-

\* Οὐ γὰρ οἶσθα, ὦ Κυνίσκι, ἡλικίας, μετὰ τὸν βίον, δι' ὧν ποινῆς τὰς κολάσεις ὑπομένουσιν, ἢ ἐν ὧν οἱ χρεστοὶ εὐδαιμονίᾳ διατρίβουσιν.

† Στοιχείων οἱ πολλοὶ ἐν μόνον τῇ τῶν θνητῶν περιόδῳ τοιαύτην εἶναι φασί, ἀλλὰ καὶ τὴν τῶν ἀθανάτων καὶ τῶν κατ' αὐτῆς θεῶν, μετὰ γὰρ τὴν τῆ παλαιᾶς ἐκπύρωσιν ἀπτεράκις γεννημένην, καὶ ἀπτεράκις ἐσομένην, ἡ αὐτὴ τάξις ἀπ' ἀρχῆς μέχρι τέλους παλίων γίγνεται καὶ ἴσται. περιώμενοι μάλιστα διακρίνουν πῶς καὶ ἀπτεράκις οἱ ἀπὸ τῆς Στοας, ἐκ οὗδ' ὅπως, ἀπαρὰ λαλῶντες φασὶν εἶσθαι κατὰ περιόδον τοῖς ἀπὸ τῶν προτέρων περιόδων παλίας.



contend for no more than the most exact resemblance of things, in one *renovation*, to those of another. Thus the next Socrates was not individually the same with the last, but one exactly like him; with exactly such a wife as Xantippe, and such accusers as Anytus and Melitus". Which, however, shews the folly of bringing this *renovation* for a proof, that the Stoics believed a future state of rewards and punishments.

Having now gone through these FOUR FAMOUS SCHOOLS, I should have closed the section, but that I imagined the curious reader would be well pleased to know what CICERO thought, on this important point; Cicero, who finished the Conquests of his countrymen in Greece, and brought home in triumph, those only remains of their ancient grandeur, their PHILOSOPHY and ELOQUENCE". But there are

σάβιας· ἵνα μὴ Σωκράτης σάβην γένηαι, ἀπαράλλακτός τις τῷ Σωκράτει, γαμήσων ἀπαράλλακτον τῇ Ξανθίππῃ, καὶ κατηγορησόμενος ὑπὸ ἀπαράλλακτων Ἀνιτοῦ καὶ Μελίτω. Origenes *contra Celsum*, l. iv. Ed. Spen. p. 208, 209. The nature of this *renovation* is examined at large, and admirably developed in the *Critical inquiry into the opinions of the ancient philosophers*.

" This strange Stoical fancy that the same Scenes of men and things should revive and reappear, can be only well accounted for by the credit they gave to the dotages of Judicial Astrology, to which their doctrine of Fate much disposed them. This renovation was to happen in the GREAT PLATONIC YEAR, when all the heavenly Bodies were supposed to begin their courses anew, from the same points from which they first set out, at their Creation. So Aufonius,

—" Consumpto *Magnus* qui dicitur anno

" Rursus in antiquum venient vaga sidera cursum,

" Qualia dispositi steterant ab Origine Mundi."

" — Τὸν δ' Ἀπολλώνιον — εἰπεῖν, Σὲ μὲν, ὦ Κικέρων, ἱστάνω καὶ θαυμάζω, τῆς δὲ Ἑλλάδος εἰκλίσσω τὴν τύχην, ὁρῶν, ὅτι μόνα τῶν καλῶν ἡμῖν ὑπελείπει, καὶ ταῦτα Ῥωμαίοις διὰ σὲ προσγεγνημένα ΠΑΙΔΕΙΑΝ τῇ καὶ ΔΟΞῃ. Plut. *Vit. Cic.*

great

great difficulties in getting to his real sentiments. I shall mention some of the chief.

1. First, that which arises from the use of the *double doctrine*; a circumstance common to the Greek philosophy; of it's essence; and therefore, inseparable from it's existence. The Ancients who lived after Cicero, such as Clemens Alex. Origen, Synesius, Sallust the philosopher, Apuleius, do in fact speak of it as an instrument still in use; nor do any other ever mention it as a thing become obsolete. So that when Cicero undertook to explain the Greek Philosophy to his countrymen, he could not but employ so fashionable a vehicle of science. But how much it contributed to hide the real sentiments of the user, we have seen above.

2. Another difficulty arises from the peculiar genius of the Sect he espoused, the *New Academy*; which was entirely *sceptical*: It professed a way of philosophising, in which there was no room for any one to *interfere* with his own opinions; or, indeed, to *have* any. It is true, were we to consider Cicero as a *strict Academic*, in the Grecian sense of adhering to a Sect, our enquiry would be presently at an end; or at least very impertinent: but he professed this Philosophy in a much laxer way; as we shall now see.

3. And this leads us to another difficulty, arising from the manner, in which the Greek Philosophy was received in Italy. The Romans in general were, by their manners and dispositions, little qualified for speculative science. When they first got footing, and had begun a commerce for arts, in Greece, they entertained great jealousies of the Sophists, and used them roughly: and it was long before they could be persuaded to think favourably of a set of men, who professed themselves always able and ready to dispute for or against VIR-

TUE indifferently\*: and even then, the Greek Philosophy was introduced into Rome, but as a more refined species of luxury, and a kind of table-furniture, set apart for the entertainment of the Great; who were yet very far from the Grecian humour, *jurare in verba magistri*: they regarded the doctrines of the Sect they espoused, not as a rule of life, but only as a kind of Apparatus for their rhetoric schools; to enable them to invent readily, and reason justly, in the affairs of life. Cicero, who best knew upon what footing it was received, says no less, when he ridicules Cato for an unfashionable fellow. *Hæc homo ingeniosissimus M. Cato auctoribus eruditissimis inductus, arripuit, NEQUE DISPUTANDI CAUSA, UT MAGNA PARS, sed ita vivendi*†. The least, then, we may conclude from hence is, that Cicero, laughing at those who espoused a Sect vi-  
vendi

\* Cicero makes the famous orator, M. Antonius, give this as the reason why he hid his knowledge of the Greek Philosophy from the People.—Sic decrevi [inquit Antonius] philosophari potius, ut Neoptolemus apud Ennium, *paucis: nam omnino haud placet*. Sed tamen hæc est mea sententia, quam videbar exposuisse. Ego ista studia non improbo, moderata modo sint: opinionem istorum studiorum, & suspicionem artificii apud eos, qui res judicent, oratori adversariam esse arbitror. Imminuit enim & oratoris auctoritatem & orationis fidem. *De Orat.* l. ii. c. 37.

† *Orat. pro Muræna*. It must be owned, that these words, at first sight, seem to have a different meaning. And the *disputandi causa* look as if the observation was confined to *Stoicism*. For this Sect had so entirely engrossed the *Dialectics*, that the followers of Zeno were more frequently called *Dialectici* than *Stoici*. Notwithstanding this, it plainly appears, I think, from the context, that the other sense is the true. Tully introduces his observation on Cato's singularity in these words: *et quoniam non est nobis hæc oratio habenda aut cum imperita multitudine, aut in aliquo conventu agrestium, audacius paulo de studiis humanitatis, quæ & mihi & vobis nota & jucunda sunt, disputabo*. Here he declares, his design is not to give his thoughts of the Stoics in particular, (though they furnished the occasion) but of the Greek philo-



*vendi causa*, did himself espouse the Academic, *causa disputandi*: which indeed he frankly enough confesses to his adversary, in this very oration: *fatebor enim, Cato, me quoque in adolescentia, diffusum ingenio meo, quæsisse adjumenta doctrinæ*. Which, in other words, is, I myself espoused a Sect of philosophy, for it's use in disputation. Quintilian, having spoken of Cicero as a Philosopher, when he comes to Cato's nephew, Brutus, (in his Philosophy, as much in earnest as his Uncle) of him, by way of Contrast to Cicero, he says, *Egregius vero, multoque quam in Orationibus præstantior Brutus, sufficit ponderi rerum: scias enim sentire quæ dicit*. As much as to say, "in this he was like Cicero, that he was equal to his subject; in this however he was unlike, that *he always said what he thought*." This slippery way, therefore, of professing the Greek philosophy, must needs add greatly to the embarrass we complain of.

4. A fourth difficulty arises from Tully's purpose in writing his works of philosophy; which was, not to deliver his own opinion on any point of ethics or metaphysics, but to explain to his countrymen, in the most intelligible manner, whatever the Greeks had taught concerning them. In the execution of which design, no Sect could so well serve his turn as the NEW ACADEMY, whose principle it was, *not to interfere with their own opinions*: and a passage, in his Academic questions, inclines me to think, he entered late into this Sect, and not till he had formed his project. Varro,

philosophy in general, *de studiis humanitatis*. He then runs through the Stoical paradoxes, and concludes—*Hæc homo ingeniosissimus M. C. arripuit, &c.* But had it been his intention to confine the observation to the Stoics, on account of their great name in Logic, he must have said *hanc*, not *hæc*: it being their *logic*, not their *paradoxes*, which was of use in *disputation*.

one of the dialogists, says to him: *sed de teipso quid est quod audio?* Tully answers: *quam de re?* Varro replies: *relictam a te VETEREM JAM, tractari autem NOVAM.* Varro hints at it again, where speaking afterwards to Tully, he says, *tua sunt nunc partes, qui ab antiquorum ratione NUNC desceiscis, & ea, quae ab Arcefila novata sunt probas, docere &c.*<sup>2</sup> This further appears from a place in his *Nature of the Gods*<sup>3</sup>, where he says, that his espousing the *New Academy* of a sudden, was a thing altogether unlooked for. *Multis etiam sensi mirabile videri, eam nobis potissimum probatam esse philosophiam, quae lucem eriperet & quasi noctem quandam rebus offunderet, desertæque disciplinæ, & jam pridem relictæ patrociniū NEC OPINATUM a nobis esse susceptum.* The change then was late; and after the ruin of the Republic; when Cicero retired from business, and had leisure, in his recess, to plan and execute this noble undertaking. So that a learned Critic appears to have been mistaken, when he supposed the choice of the *New Academy* was made in his youth. *This Sect* (says he) *did best agree with the vast genius and ambitious spirit of YOUNG CICERO*<sup>4</sup>.

5. But the principal difficulty proceeds from the several and various characters he sustained in his life, and writings; which habituated him to feign and dissemble his opinions. He may be considered as an Orator, a Statesman, and a Philosopher. I. As a STATESMAN, he discharged the office of a PATRIOT, *urbis conservator & parens*, in a Government torn in pieces by the dissensions between Senate and People. But could this be done by speak-

<sup>2</sup> Manutius and Davies, who, I suppose, did not attend to what passed before, agree to throw out the word *nunc*, as perfectly useless and insignificant.

<sup>3</sup> Lib. i. c. 3.

<sup>4</sup> *Remarks upon a late discourse of free thinking*, Part ii. Rem. 53.  
ing

ing his real sentiments to either? both were very faulty; and, as faulty men generally are, too angry to hear reason. I have given an instance below, in the case of the *Catiline conspiracy*. And the issue of it declares the wisdom of his conduct. He saved the Republic. 2. As a PHILOSOPHER, his end and design in writing was not to deliver his own opinion, but to explain the Grecian *Philosophy*. On which account he blames those men as too curious, who were for knowing his own sentiments. In pursuance of this design he brings in Stoics, Epicureans, Platonists, Academics new and old, in order to instruct the Romans in their various opinions, and several ways of reasoning. But whether it be himself or others that are brought upon the stage, it is the *Academic*, not Cicero; it is the Stoic, the Epicurean, not Balbus nor Velleius, who deliver their opinions. 3. As an ORATOR, he was an *Advocate for his client*, or more properly *personated* him. *Verum etiam* (says Quintilian) in his causis quibus advocamur, eadem differentia diligenter est custodienda. *Utimur enim fitione personarum*, et velut ore alieno loquimur. In this case, then, he was to speak the sentiments of his client, not his own. So that in all these cases, tho' he acted neither a weak nor an unfair part, he becomes totally inscrutable. For these were Characters, all equally *personated*; and no one more the real man than the other: but each of them taken up, and laid down, for the occasion. This appears from the numerous inconsistencies we find in him; throughout the course of his sustaining them. In his oration *de Harusp. respon. in senatu*, when the popular superstition was inflamed by present prodigies, he gives the highest character of the wisdom of their Ancestors, as Founders of their established Religion: "Ego vero primum habeo auctores ac



“magistros religionum colendarum majores nos-  
 “tros: quorum mihi tanta fuisse sapientia videtur,  
 “ut fatis superque prudentes sint, qui illorum pru-  
 “dentiam, non dicam assequi, sed, quanta fuerit,  
 “perspicere possint.” Yet in his treatise of *Laws*,  
 as the reader has seen above<sup>c</sup>, he frankly declares;  
 that the folly of their Ancestors had suffered many de-  
 pravities to be brought into Religion. Here the Phi-  
 losopher confuted the Statesman: As, in another  
 instance, the Statesman seems to have got the bet-  
 ter of the Philosopher. He defends the paradoxes  
 of the Stoics in a philosophical dissertation: But in  
 his oration for *Muræna*, he ridicules those para-  
 doxes with the utmost freedom. Nor under one  
 and the same Character, or at one and the same  
 time, is he more consistent. In the orations against  
*Catiline*, when he opens the conspiracy to the *Se-  
 nate*, he represents it as the most deep laid design,  
 which had infected all orders and degrees of men  
 in the City. Yet, when he brings the same affair  
 before the *People*, he talks of it as only the wild  
 and senseless escape of a few desperate wretches; it  
 being necessary for his purpose, that the *Senate* and  
*People*, who viewed the *Conspiracy* from several sta-  
 tions, should see it in different lights.

We meet with numbers of the like contradic-  
 tions, delivered in his own person, and under his  
 philosophic character. Thus, in his *books of divi-  
 nation*, he combats all augury, &c. and yet, in his  
 philosophic treatise of *laws*, he delivers himself in  
 their favour; and in so serious and positive a  
 manner, that it is difficult not to believe him in  
 earnest. In a word, he laughed at the opinions of  
 State, when he was amongst the Philosophers; he  
 laughed at the doctrines of the Philosophers, when

<sup>c</sup> See book ii. sect. 6.

he was cajoling an Assembly; and he laughed heartily at both, when withdrawn amongst his friends in a corner. Nor, is this the worst part of the story. He hath given us no MARK to distinguish his meaning: For, in his *Academic questions*<sup>d</sup>, he is ready to swear he always speaks what he thinks: Jurarem per Jovem Deosque penates, me & ardere studio veri reperiendi, & ea sentire quæ dicerem<sup>e</sup>: Yet, in his *Nature of the Gods*<sup>f</sup>, he has strangely changed his note: Qui autem requirunt, quid quaque de re ipsi sentiamus, curiosius id faciunt quam necesse est.

If it be asked then, in which of his writings we can have any reasonable assurance of his true sentiments? I reply, scarce in any, but his EPISTLES. Nor is this said to evade any material evidence that may be found in his other works, in favour of a future state of rewards and punishment: on the contrary, there are many very glaring instances of his disbelief, as far as we can hazard a judgment of his mind. As in his *Offices*, which bids the fairest of any to come from his heart, he delivers him-

<sup>d</sup> Lib. iv. Sect. 20.

<sup>e</sup> Lucullus had been declaiming very tragically against the Academy, when Tully entered on it's defence; in which he thought it proper to premise something concerning himself. Aggrediar igitur, (says he) si pauca ante, quasi de FAMA MEA dixerō. He then declares, that, had he embraced the Academy out of vanity, or love of contradiction, it had not only reflected on his sense, but on his honour. Itaque nisi ineptum putarem in tali disputatione id facere, quod cum de republica disceptatur fieri interdum solet: jurarem per Jovem &c. From hence, I gather that though the question here be of the Academic philosophy, and of Cicero as an Academic, yet, as he tells us, he is now to vindicate himself in a point in which his honour was concerned, the protestation is general, and concerns his constant turn of mind; which always inclined him, he says, to speak his sentiments.

<sup>f</sup> Lib. i. Sect. 5.

self very effectually against it; as will appear in the next section. And in his oration for Cluentius to the Judges, he speaks with yet more force on the same side of the question: "Nam nunc quidem quid tandem illi mali mors attulit? nisi forte ineptiis ac *fabulis* ducimur, ut existimemus illum apud inferos impiorum supplicia perferre, &c. Quæ si falsa sunt, id quod omnes intelligunt, quid tandem aliud mors eripuit præter sensum doloris?"

Nor will most of *those* passages, which are usually brought in support of the opinion, that Tully did really believe the *immortality of the soul*, stand in any account against *these*: Because, as will be shewn, in the next section, they best agree to a *kind of immortality* very consistent with a thorough disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments. As to the celebrated argument of Plato for the immortality of the soul, explained and enforced by Cicero, it is so big with impiety and nonsense, that one would wonder how any christian Divine could have the indiscretion to recommend it as doing credit to ancient Philosophy; or to extol the inventers and espousers of it, as having delivered and entertained *very just, rational, and proper notions* concerning the immortality of the human soul. If we examine this Philosophy as it is delivered us by Plato in his Phædrus, or as it is translated by Cicero in his first Tusculan, we shall find it gives the human soul the attributes of the Divine Being, and supposes it to have been from eternity, uncreated and self-existent. Speaking of the *principle of motion*, or the *soul*, it says, *principiū autem nulla est origo: nam e principio oriuntur omnia: ipsum autem nullā ex re aliā nasci potest: nec enim esset id principium quod gigneretur aliunde.—Id autem nec nasci potest, nec mori.—Hæc est propria natura*



natura animi atque vis; quæ si est una ex omnibus, quæ se ipsa semper moveat, *neque nata* certe est, et *æterna* est. 1 *Tusc.* c. 2, 3. It is plain too, that this argument assigns the human soul a NECESSARY immortality, or an immortality which arises from it's nature and essence, or from it's original and inherent powers; and not from the Will or appointment of God. We are told that the soul is immortal, because it is a self-moving substance; for that a self-moving substance can never cease to be, since it will always have a power of existing within itself, independent of any foreign or external cause. And what can be said more of God himself? sentit igitur animus se moveri, quod cum sentit, illud una sentit se vi sua, non aliena, moveri; *nec accidere posse, ut ipse unquam a se deseratur.* 1 *Tusc.* c. 23. Here it's immortality is not supposed to arise from the influence of any foreign or external cause, but is resolved into the natural and inherent powers of the soul itself. Plato says, ἐπειδὴ δὲ ἀγέννητον καὶ ἀδιάφθορον αὐτὸ ἀνάγκη εἶναι—τὸτο δὲ ὅτε ἀπόλλυσθαι ὅτε γίνεσθαι δυνατόν, ἐξ ἀνάγκης ἀγέννητόν τε καὶ ἀθάνατον ψυχὴ αὐτῆς εἶναι. The necessity here spoken of was supposed to arise from an internal faculty and power of the soul, or from the principle of self-motion. The force of all this, has been shuffled over by the writers against the D. L. with only repeating, that, Cicero *inferred the immortality of the soul from it's wonderful powers and faculties, on it's principle of self-motion, it's memory, invention, wit and comprehension.* As to *self-motion* the word is equivocal, and may either signify the power given to a being to begin motion; or a power inherent and essential to a Being, who has all things within itself, and receives nothing from without. Now we have shewn, that Plato and his followers used *self-motion*, when applied to the soul, in this latter

latter sense; and from thence inferred a NECESSARY immortality in that Being which had it, an immortality which implied increation and self-existence. As to the other powers and faculties of memory, invention, wit and comprehension, whatsoever immortality may be logically deduced from them, it is not that which Cicero deduces; For as we see, *this* is a strict and proper immortality, an existence from all eternity, to all eternity: In a word, the immortality of the Supreme Being himself. Si cernerem (says Tully) quemadmodum nasci possent [facultates animi] etiam quemadmodum interirent viderem. 1 *Tusc.* c. 24. And again, when he proves the immortality of the soul against Panætius, he goes upon the principle that the soul cannot be shewn to be immortal, but on the supposition of its being actually ungenerated. Volt enim [Panætius] quod nemo negat, quicquid *natum* sit interire; — nasci autem animos, quod declaret eorum similitudo — nihil necessitatis adfert cur nascatur, animi similitudo. — 1 *Tusc.* c. 32, — 3. I would therefore have the friends of REASON, not to say of REVELATION, consider whether these extravagant notions of the human soul, do any honour to ancient Philosophy? and whether Tully had not acted a more decent and modest part to have held consistently, even with Epicurus, the mortality of the soul, than with Plato that it was *uncreated, self-existent, and necessarily eternal?*

It is only then (as we say) in his EPISTLES to his friends, where we see the *man* divested of the *Politician*, the *Sophist*, and the *Advocate*: And there he professes his disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments in the frankest and freest manner. To L. Mescinius he says: “Sed ut illa secunda moderate tulimus, sic hanc non solum adversam, sed funditus eversam fortunam fortiter ferre debemus;



“bemus; ut hoc saltem in maximis malis boni  
 “consequamur, ut mortem, quam etiam beati  
 “contemnere debeamus, propterea quod NULLUM  
 “SENSUM esset habitura, nunc sic affecti, non mo-  
 “do contemnere debeamus, sed etiam optare.”

In his epistle to Torquatus, he says: “Ita enim vi-  
 “vere ut non sit vivendum, miserrimum est. Mori  
 “autem nemo sapiens miserum dixit, ne beato qui-  
 “dem—sed hæc consolatio levis est; illa gravi-  
 “or, qua te uti spero: Ego certe utor. Nec  
 “enim DUM ERO, angar ulla re, cum omni vacem  
 “culpa: Et si NON ERO, sensu omnino carebo.”

Some have taken the *ero* and *non ero*, in this pas-  
 sage, to relate generically, to existence or non-exist-  
 ence absolutely; and not, as Tully certainly meant  
 it, specifically, to the state of existence or non-ex-  
 istence *here*, i. e. *life* or *death*. But if that were  
 his meaning, that *if he had no being he should have*  
*no sense*, Torquatus, for so wonderful a discovery,  
 might well have returned him his proverb quoted  
 in this Epistle, *γλαῦκ' εἰς Ἀθήνας*. But the forego-  
 ing passage from the epistle to Mescinius, in which  
 we find the same thought, and in the same expres-  
 sion, puts the meaning out of doubt. Add to  
 this, that it was the very language of the Epicu-  
 reans, and used by Lucretius as an antidote against  
 the fear of death,

“Scilicet haud nobis quidquam, qui NON ERI-  
 MUS tum,

“Accidere omnino poterit SENSUMQUE movere.

But let it be observed, that when Cicero talks of  
 death as of the end of man, he does not make this  
 conclusion on the Epicurean principle, that the  
 soul was a mere *quality*, but on the Platonic, that

\* *Fam. Ep.* l. v. Ep. 21.

† *Lib. vi. Ep.* 3.



it was resolved into the substance from whence it was extracted, and had no longer a *particular* existence. Again, to the same person<sup>1</sup> he says; “Deinde quod mihi ad consolationem commune tecum est, si jam vocer ad exitum vitæ, non ab ea republica avellar, qua carendum esse doleam, præsertim cum id SINE ULLO SENSU futurum sit.” And again to his friend Toranius<sup>2</sup>: “Cum consilio profici nihil possit, una ratio videtur, quicquid evenierit, ferre moderate, præsertim cum omnium rerum mors sit extremum.” That Cicero here speaks his real sentiments, is beyond all doubt. These are letters of consolation, to his friends, when he himself, by reason of the ill state of Public Affairs, much wanted consolation; a season when men have least disguise, and are most disposed to lay open their whole hearts:

Nam veræ voces tum demum pectore ab imo  
Ejiciuntur, & eripitur PERSONA, manet RES.

Lucret.

Here his *real* sentiments are delivered positively; which in his *Tusculan disputations* he advances only hypo-

<sup>1</sup> Lib. vi. Ep. 4.

<sup>2</sup> Lib. vi. Ep. 21.

<sup>3</sup> The learned Author of the exact and elegant *history of Cicero*, hath since turned this *circumstance* to the support of the contrary opinion, with regard to his Hero's sentiments:—“But some (says he) have been apt to consider them [*i. e.* the passages in Tully's philosophic writings in favour of a future state] as the flourish rather of his eloquence than the conclusions of his reason. Since in other parts of his works he seems to intimate not only a diffidence, but a disbelief of the immortality of the soul, and a future state of rewards and punishments, and especially in his letters, where he is supposed to declare his mind with the greatest frankness. But—in a melancholy hour, when the spirits are depressed, the same argument would not appear to him with the same force, but doubts and difficulties got the ascendant, and what humoured his present chagrin find the readiest admission. The passages

hypothetically; but with a clearness that well comments the conciseness of the foregoing passages.

"M. Video

"passages alledged [i. e. in this place of the *Div. Leg.*] were  
 "all of this kind, written in the season of his dejection, when  
 "all things were going wrong with him, and in the height of  
 "Caesar's power." &c. Vol. II. p. 561. Ed. 4. Thus, every  
 thing hath two Academical handles. But still, my candid friend  
 will allow me to say they cannot both be right. It is confessed  
 that a desponding temper, like that of Cicero's, will, in a  
 melancholy hour, be always inclined to fear the worst. But to  
 what are it's fears confined? Without doubt to the issue of  
 that very affair, for which we are distressed. A melancholy  
 hour would have just the contrary influence on our other cogita-  
 tions. And this by the wise and gracious disposition of Nature;  
 that the mind may endeavour to make up by an abundance of  
 hope in one quarter, what through the persuasion of its fears,  
 it hath suffered itself to part from, in another. So that unless  
 Cicero were made differently from all other men, one might  
 venture to say, his *hopes of future good* (had Philosophy per-  
 mitted him to entertain any hopes at all) would have risen in  
 proportion to his *fears of the present*. And this is seen every  
 day in fact. For it is nothing but this natural disposition that  
 makes men of the world so generally fly even to Superstition for  
 the solace of their misfortunes. But the excellent author of the  
*critical inquiry into the opinions of the ancient philosophers* goes fur-  
 ther. "Cicero (says he) very frankly declares in his *Tusculans*  
 "themselves that this [the mortality or the no separate existence of  
 "the soul] was the most real and effectual, the most solid and  
 "substantial comfort that could be administered against the  
 "fear of death. In his first *Tusculan*, he undertakes to prove,  
 "that death was not an evil; and this, 1<sup>st</sup>, Because it was not  
 "attended with any actual punishment, or positive and real  
 "misery. 2<sup>dly</sup>, He rises higher, and labours to prove, that  
 "men ought to look upon death as a blessing rather than an  
 "evil, as the soul, after its departure from the body, might be  
 "happy in another life. In the first part he supposes the mor-  
 "tality and extinction of the soul at death; in the second he  
 "plainly supposes, that it will survive the body. Now the  
 "question is, on which doctrine does he lay most stress; or,  
 "which of these two notions, in the opinion of Cicero, would  
 "serve best to fortify and prepare men against the fear of death?  
 "And luckily Cicero himself has long since determined this  
 "point for us; having in the first *Tusculan* brought several rea-  
 "sons to prove the immortality of the soul, he after all very  
 "frankly



" M. Video te altè spectare & velle in cœlum migrare. A. Spero fore, ut contingat id nobis.

" frankly declares, that they had no great *validity and force*:  
 " that the most solid and substantial argument, which could be  
 " urged against the fear of death, was the very consideration ad-  
 " vanced in his letters, *or the doctrine which makes it the utter*  
 " *period of our being*: And in the remaining part of the book he  
 " proceeds to argue chiefly on this supposition, *as being the best*  
 " *calculated to support men against the fear and terror of Death*.  
 " The arguments which he urged to prove the immortality of  
 " the soul, seem sometimes to have had great weight with the  
 " person, to whom they were immediately address'd; he de-  
 " clares himself fond of the opinion, and resolves not to part  
 " with it. *Nemo me de immortalitate depellet*. To this Cicero  
 " replies, *laudo id quidem; etsi nihil nimis, oportet considerare*:  
 " *movemur enim sæpe aliquo acute concluso: labamus muta-*  
 " *musque sententiam clarioribus etiam in rebus: in his est enim*  
 " *aliqua obscuritas*. Id igitur si acciderit, *simus armati*. c. 32.  
 " He does not seem to lay any great stress on the notion of a  
 " future state; *nihil oportet nimis considerare*. He owns that  
 " the arguments, alledged in support of it, were rather speci-  
 " ous than solid: *movemur enim sæpe aliquo acute concluso*.  
 " That they were not plain and clear enough to make any  
 " strong and lasting impression: *Labamus mutamusque senten-*  
 " *tiam clarioribus etiam in his rebus; in his est enim aliqua*  
 " *obscuritas*.—That therefore the best remedy at all events,  
 " would be the notion that the soul dies with the body: *id igi-*  
 " *tur si acciderit, simus armati*. Having then explained what  
 " he had to say on the immortality of the soul, he proceeds to  
 " shew that death could not be considered as an evil, on the sup-  
 " position that the soul was to perish with the body.

" When therefore he would teach men to condemn the ter-  
 " rors of death, he grounds his main argument on the morta-  
 " lity of the soul. As to the notion of a future state, it was  
 " maintained by arguments too subtle to work a real and lasting  
 " conviction; it was not thought clear enough to make any  
 " deep and strong impression. He has therefore recourse to the  
 " extinction of the soul, as the most comfortable consideration  
 " that could be employed against the fear of death. This was  
 " not then a topic that was peculiar to the season of dejection  
 " and distress; it was not thrown out only accidentally, when  
 " he was not considering the subject, but was used in the works  
 " that were deliberately and professedly written on this very  
 " point. It could not therefore be *occasional* only, and suited to  
 " the present circumstances, as Dr. Middleton in his reasoning  
 " all along supposes."

" Sed



“ Sed fac, ut isti volunt, animos non remanere  
 “ post mortem. — M. Mali vero quid affert ista  
 “ sententia? Fac enim sic animum interire, ut  
 “ corpus. Num igitur aliquis dolor, aut omnino  
 “ post mortem SENSUS in corpore est? — Ne in ani-  
 “ mo quidem igitur SENSUS remanet, ipse enim nus-  
 “ quam est. — Hoc premendum etiam atque etiam  
 “ est argumentum, confirmato illo, de quo, si mor-  
 “ tales animi sunt, dubitare non possumus, quin  
 “ tantus interitus in morte sit, ut ne minima qui-  
 “ dem suspicio SENSUS relinquatur.” Now, this  
 is the very language of the Epicureans, as appears  
 from the following words of Pliny: “ Post sepul-  
 “ turam aliæ atque aliæ manium ambages. Om-  
 “ nibus a suprema die eadem, quæ ante primum:  
 “ nec magis a morte SENSUS ullus aut corpori aut  
 “ animæ quam ante natalem. Eadem enim vani-  
 “ tas in futurum etiam se propagat, — alias im-  
 “ mortalitatem animæ, alias transfigurationem, alias  
 “ sensum inferis dando, & manes colendo, deum-  
 “ que faciendo, qui jam etiam homo esse desierit.  
 “ — Quæ (malum) ista dementia, iterari vitam  
 “ morte? Quæve genitis quies unquam, si in  
 “ sublimi SENSUS ANIMÆ manet.”

PLUTARCH was amongst the Greeks, what Ci-  
 cero was amongst the Latins, as far as concerned  
 the business of delivering and digesting the various  
 opinions of the Philosophers. In his famous tract  
 of SUPERSTITION he uses their common arms to  
 combat that evil; and expresses himself with un-  
 common force where he speaks of a *future state* as  
 an error essential to *superstition*, and what the ge-  
 neral voice of Reason, interpreted by sound Philoso-  
 phy, disclaims. “ Death is the final period of our

*Tuse. Disp. lib. i. c. 24—36.*  
*Nat. Hist. lib. vii. c. 55.*

“being. But SUPERSTITION says NO.——She stretches out life beyond life itself. Her fears extend further than our existence. She has joined to the idea of death, that other inconsistent idea of eternal life in misery. For when all things come to an end, then, in the opinion of Superstition, they begin to be endless.”——

I will beg leave to conclude this section with two observations relative to the general argument.

1. We have just given a passage from the oration for Cluentius, in which, Cicero having ridiculed the popular fables concerning a future state, he subjoins, *if these be false, as all men see they are, what hath death deprived him of, besides a sense of pain?* From this inference of the Orator it appears, that we have not concluded amiss, when, from several quotations, interspersed throughout this work, in which a disbelief of the common notion of a future state of rewards and punishments is implied, we have inferred the writer's disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments in general. 2. We have seen the Philosophers of every Sect, one while speaking directly for, and at another, as directly against a future state of rewards and punish-

ο — πῶς ἐστὶ βίη πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ἡ θάνατος τῆς δὲ διδασκαλίας, οὐδ' ἔτι ἀλλ' ὑπερβαλλὲς τοὺς ὅρους ἐτίμεινα τῇ ζῆν, μαρτυροῦμαι τῇ βίῃ ποιούσα τὴν φύσιν καὶ συνάπλουσα τῷ θανάτῳ κακῶν ἐπινοῖαν ἀθανάτων καὶ ὅτε πάντως πραγμάτων ἀρχιστάται δοκούντα μὴ πανομένους.

P Quæ si falsa sunt, id quod omnes intelligunt, quid ei tandem aliud mors eripuit præter sensum doloris?——Seneca reasons in the same manner. Mors contemni debet magis quam solet: multa enim de illa credimus. Multorum ingenii certatum est ad augendam ejus infamiam. Descriptus est carcer infernus, & perpetua nocte oppressa regio, in qua

——“ ingens janitor orci, &c.

Sed etiam cum persuaseris istas fabulas esse, nec quicquam defunctis superesse quod timeant, subit alius metus, æquæ enim timor ne apud inferos fiat, quam ne nusquam. Ep. 83.

ments,



ments, without intimating the least change in their principles, or making the least hesitation in their professions: So that either we must hold them guilty of the most gross and impudent contradictions, which their characters will not suffer us to conceive of them; or else admit the explanation given above of the DOUBLE DOCTRINE, and the different methods of their *exoteric* and *esoteric* discipline.

Yet to all this it hath been said, "If the Philosophers disbelieved the popular Divinities, and yet really believed the being of a God; why might they not reject the popular opinions of a future state, and yet, at the same time, hold a future state of real rewards and punishments?" Now as they who did not believe Hercules and Æsculapius to be Gods, did not for that reason disbelieve the existence of a governing Mind; so they that did not believe Æacus or Minos to be judges of Hell, did not for that reason disbelieve all future rewards and punishments<sup>1</sup>. I answer, the two cases are nothing alike; the common fate of this Writer's Parallels.

1. At the very time the Philosophers discard the popular Divinities they declare for the being of a God. Thus when Varro had said that Hercules and Æsculapius, Castor and Pollux were not Gods; he adds, *they only have a right notion of God, who conceive him to be a Soul, actuating and governing all things by his power and wisdom*. But now, when

<sup>1</sup> Dr. Sykes.

Quæ sunt autem illa, quæ prolata in multitudinem vocent? Hæc, inquit, non esse Deos Herculem, Æsculapium, Castorem, Pollucem. Proditur enim a doctis, quod homines fuerint, et humana conditione defecerint.—But the same Varro says,—Quod hi soli ei videantur animadvertisse, quid esset Deus, qui crediderunt eum esse animam, motu et ratione mundum gubernantem. Apud August. de Civ. Dei, l. iv. c. 27—31.

these



these Philosophers exploded Styx, Acheron, and Cocytus, did they ever substitute any other future state of rewards and punishments in their place?

2. The Philosophers give the popular stories of the infernal regions as the *only foundation and support* of future rewards and punishments; so that, if they explode the popular stories, they must explode the things themselves. And what is more, THEY TELL US THAT THEY DID SO. But was this the case concerning their popular Divinities? Do they ever represent *these* as the *only foundation and support* of the belief of a Deity?

3. Lastly, The Philosophers held a PRINCIPLE (and we are now about to enter upon that matter) which was inconsistent with a future state of rewards and punishments: in consequence of which they formally, and in express words, disclaim and reject all *such state* and condition. But I know of no *principle* they held, inconsistent with the belief of a God; nor of any declarations they ever made against such belief. We conclude, therefore, that the two cases are altogether dissimilar and unrelated.

#### § E C T. IV.

NOTWITHSTANDING this full evidence against the PHILOSOPHERS; I much doubt, the general prejudice in their favour, supported by the reasonableness of the doctrine itself, will be yet apt to keep the reader's opinion on this point suspended.

I shall therefore, in the last place, explain the CAUSES which withheld the Philosophers from *believing*: and these will appear to have been certain fundamental PRINCIPLES of the ancient Greek Philosophy,

losophy, altogether inconsistent with the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments.

But to give this its due force, it will be proper to premise, that the constitution of that Philosophy, being above measure refined and speculative, it was always wont to judge and determine rather on METAPHYSICAL than on MORAL maxims; and to stick to all consequences, how absurd soever, which were seen to arise from the former.

Of this, we have a famous instance in the ancient Democritic Philosophy: which holding, that not only *sensations*, but even the *cogitations* of the mind, were the mere passion of the Thinker; and so, all *knowledge* and understanding, the same thing with *sense*; the consequence was, that there could not be any error of false judgment; because all passion was true passion, and all appearance true appearance. From hence it followed, that the sun and moon were no bigger than they seemed to us; and these men of reason chose rather to avow this conclusion, than to renounce the *metaphysic* principle which led them into it.

So just is that censure which a celebrated French writer passes upon them: *when the Philosophers once besot themselves with a prejudice, they are even more incurable than the People themselves; because they besot themselves not only with the prejudice, but with the false reasonings employed to support it*.

The regard to *metaphysic* principles being so great, the Greek Philosophers (as we shall see) must needs reject the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, how innumerable and invincible soever the *moral* arguments are which may be brought

\* Quand les philosophes s'entêtent une fois d'un préjugé, ils sont plus incurables que le peuple même; parce qu'ils s'entêtent également & du préjugé & des fausses raisons dont ils le soutiennent. Fontenelle *Hist. des Oracles*.



to support it. For now we come to shew, that there were two METAPHYSICAL PRINCIPLES concerning God and the soul, universally embraced by all, which necessarily exclude all notion of a future state of reward and punishment.

The FIRST PRINCIPLE, which led the Philosophers to conclude against such a state was, THAT GOD COULD NEITHER BE ANGRY NOR HURT ANY ONE. This, Cicero assures us, was held universally; as well by those who believed a Providence, as by those who believed not: "At hoc quidem commune est omnium philosophorum, non eorum modo, qui Deum nihil habere ipsum negotii dicunt, & nihil exhibere alteri: sed eorum etiam qui Deum semper agere aliquid & moliri volunt, NUMQUAM NEC IRASCI DEUM NEC NOCERE." What conclusion the Epicureans drew from hence, (those who, he here says, held, Deum nihil habere ipsum negotii) he tells us in another place, by the mouth of Velleius their spokesman. "Intelligitur enim," (an expression denoting that, in this point, the philosophers were agreed) "à beata, immortalique natura, & iram & gratiam se gregari: quibus remotis, nullos a superis impendere METUS." And that the other Sects drew the same conclusion (which infers the denial of a future state of rewards and punishments) we shall now see by Cicero himself, who speaks for them all.

He is here commending Regulus for preferring the public good to his own, and the *honest* to the *profitable*; in dissuading the release of the Carthaginian prisoners, and returning back to certain misery, when he might have spent his age at home in peace and pleasure. All this, he observes, was

\* *Offic. lib. iii. cap. 28.*

\* *De Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 17.*  
done



done out of regard to his oath. But it may, perhaps, says he, be objected, what is there in an oath? The violator need not fear the wrath of Heaven; for all Philosophers hold, that *God cannot be angry nor hurt any one*. He replies, that, indeed, it was a consequence of the principle of *God's not being angry*, that the perjured man had nothing to fear from divine vengeance: but then it was not this *fear*, which was really NOTHING, but justice and good faith, which made the sanction of an oath. The learned will chuse to hear him in his own words: "M. Atilius Regulus Carthaginem rediit: neque eum caritas patriæ retinuit, nec suorum. Neque vero tum ignorabat se ad crudelissimum hostem, & ad exquisita supplicia proficisci: Sed iusjurandum conservandum putabat. Quid est igitur, dixerit quis, in iurejurando? Num iratum timemus Iovem? At hoc quidem commune est omnium philosophorum. — NUMQUAM NEC IRASCI DEUM, NEC NOCERE. — Hæc quidem ratio non magis contra Regulum, quam contra omne iusjurandum valet: Sed in iurejurando, non qui metus, sed quæ vis sit, debet intelligi. Est enim iusjurandum affirmatio religiosa: Quod autem affirmatè, quasi Deo teste, promiseris, id tenendum est: Jam enim non ad iram Deorum, quæ NULLA EST; sed ad iustitiam & ad finem pertinet." It is true, the same Tully says\*, "deos placatos pietas efficiet et sanctitas," which looks as if he thought the Gods might be angry: and that, therefore, by, *quæ nulla est*, in the words above, he did not mean, what the words imply, — *quæ vana et commentitia est*; but, what they do not imply — *quæ nihil ad rem pertinet*. But, *placatos* is not here used in

\* Cap. 26, 27, 28, 29.

\* Offic. ii. 3.

the strict specific sense of *appeased*, which infers preceding *anger*; but in the more loose generic sense of *propitious*, which infers no such thing. And my reason for understanding the word in this sense, is, that, two or three lines afterwards, he declares it to be the opinion of the Philosophers (to which he agrees) *Deos non nocere*: But this opinion was founded on that other, in question, *Deos non irasci*.

Here then, we see, Tully owns the consequence of this universal principle; that it overthrew the notion of divine punishments: And it will appear presently, that he was not singular in this confession; but spoke the sense of his Grecian masters.

A modern reader, full of the philosophic ideas of these late ages, will be surprized, perhaps, to be told, that this consequence greatly embarrassed Antiquity; when he himself can so easily evade it, by distinguishing between the human passions of anger and fondness, and the divine attributes of justice and goodness; on which the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments is invincibly established. But the Ancients had no such precise ideas of the divine Nature.

Dacier, who understood the genius of Antiquity very well, was of the same opinion, as appears from his comment on these words of Antoninus—*If there be Gods, then leaving the world is no such dreadful thing; for you may be sure they will do you no harm.*—*εἰ μὲν θεοὶ εἰσιν, ὅθεν δεινὸν. κακῶ γὰρ σε ἐν αὐτῷ περιβάλλοιεν.*—Comme les Stoïciens n'avoient aucune idée ni de peines, ni de recompenses éternelles après la mort, et que le plus grand caractère qu'ils reconnoissoient en Dieu, étoit une BONTÉ INFINIE, ils étoient persuadés qu'après cette vie on n'avoit rien à craindre, et que c'étoit une chose entièrement opposée à la nature de Dieu, de faire du mal. La  
I  
véritable

veritable religion a tiré les hommes d'une securité si pernicieuse, &c.—The learned Critic, indeed, expresses himself very ill, confounding the premisses and conclusion, the cause and effect, all the way, one with another; but his meaning is plain enough, that (in his opinion) the Ancients were very inexpert in their attempts to sever (if ever they attempted it) *anger* from God's justice, and *fondness* from his goodness. We shall shew, by an illustrious instance, that he was not mistaken; lest the reader should suspect that, of an obscure speculative Principle, we have feigned *one* of general credit and influence.

LACTANTIUS, from a forensic Lawyer, now become an Advocate for *Christianity*, found nothing so much hindered its reception with the Learned as the doctrine of a FUTURE JUDGMENT; which, their universal principle, *that God could not be angry*, directly opposed. To strike at the root of this evil, he composed a discourse, which Jerom calls, *pulcherrimum opus*, intituled, DE IRA DEI: For he had observed, he tells us; that this Principle was now much spread amongst the common People<sup>a</sup>; he lays the blame of it upon the Philosophers<sup>b</sup>; and tells us, as Tully had done before, that all the Philosophers agreed to exclude the passion of anger from the Godhead<sup>c</sup>.

So that the general syllogism, Lactantius proposed to answer, was this:

*If God hath no affections of fondness or hatred, love or anger; he cannot reward or punish.*

<sup>a</sup> Animadverto PLURIMOS existimare non irasci Deum.

<sup>b</sup> Idem tamen a Philosophis irreciti, & falsis argumentationibus capti.

<sup>c</sup> Ita omnes Philosophi de ira consentiunt.



*But he hath no affections;—  
Therefore, &c.*

Let us see then, how he manages: For although his knowledge in the true genius of Christianity was, perhaps, very imperfect, he was exquisitely well skilled in the strong and weak side of pagan Philosophy. A modern Answerer would certainly have denied the *major*; but *that* was a Principle received by all parties, as Lactantius himself gives us to understand, when he says, that the Principle of God's not being angry destroyed all religion, by taking away a future state<sup>c</sup>. He had nothing left then but to deny the *minor*: And this, he tells us, is his purpose to undertake<sup>d</sup>.

His business is to prove, that God hath human passions: And though, by several expressions, dropped up and down, he seems to be fully sensible of the grossness of this Principle; yet, on the other hand, all Philosophy agreeing to make it the necessary support of a future state, he sets upon his task in good earnest, avoids all refinements, and maintains that there are in God, as there are in man, the passions of *love* and *hatred*. These indeed are of two kinds in man, *reasonable* and *unreasonable*; in God, the *reasonable* only are to be found. But to make all sure, and provide a proper subject for these passions, he contends strongly for God's *having a human form*: No discreditable notion, at that time, in the Church; and which, if I might be indulged a conjecture, I would suppose, was first

<sup>c</sup> Qui sine ira Deum esse credentes, dissolvunt omnem religionem—Sive igitur gratiam Deo, sive iram, sive utrumque detraxeris, religionem tolli necesse est.

<sup>d</sup> Hæc [*nempe ut irascatur Deus*] tuenda nobis, & asserenda sententia est: in ea enim summa omnis & cardo religionis pietatisque versatur.

introduced for that very purpose, to which, Lactantius here enforces it.

But it is very observable, that our Author introduceth this monstrous notion of *God's having a human form*; with an artful attempt, supported by all his eloquence, to discredit *human reason*; in order to dispose the Reader to believe him, that nothing could be known of God but by *Revelation*. This is an old trick of the Disputers of all times, to make reprisals upon Reason; which when found too upright to deflect, must be represented as too weak to judge. And when once we find an Author, who would be valued for his logic, begin with depreciating Reason; we may be assured he has some very unreasonable paradox to advance. So when the learned Huetius would pass upon his readers a number of slight chimerical conjectures for *Demonstrations*, he introduces his work by cavilling at the certainty of the principles of Geometry.

1. Here we see how the *Orthodox* evaded this conclusion of pagan philosophy, against a state of future punishment. Would you know how the *Heretics* managed? They went another way to work, which it may be just worth while to mention. The Creator of the *invisible* world (or the first Cause) the Marcionites called the GOOD; and the Creator of the *visible* world, the JUST. Si de Marcionis argueris hæresi, quæ alterum *bonum*, alterum *justum* Deum ferens, illum invisibilium, hunc visibilium creatorem—*Hieron. Ep. ad Pammach.* Now they agreed in this, with the Pagans, that the GOOD could not punish, but that the JUST would; whose office it was to execute vengeance on the wicked. And, at the same time, holding an EVIL PRINCIPLE, they called this *Just*, the MIDDLE, whose office is thus described in the *dialogue against Marcion*.—*To those who conform themselves to the GOOD, the MIDDLE PRINCIPLE*

gives peace; but to those who obey the EVIL, the MIDDLE inflicts tribulation and anguish. Ἡ ἡ μίση ἀρχὴ ὑπηρετοῖ τῷ ἀγαθῷ ἀνεῖν διδόνη, ὑπηρετοῖ δὲ τῷ πονηρῷ θλίψιν δίδωσι. Thus did these Heretics divest the first Cause, or the Good, of his attribute of justice; and gave it to the Middle Principle, because they were not able to sever it from anger. Upon the whole, as Lactantius, himself a Philosopher, was admirably well versed in all the pagan Systems, he could not but understand a Principle, which all the Philosophers held; nor could he mistake a Consequence, which they all drew from it. And as St. Jerom has dignified this tract *de ira Dei*, with the title of PULCHERRIMUM OPUS, we must needs conclude that the method Lactantius took to support a future Judgment was strictly conformable to THE OLD POSTURE OF DEFENCE, and approved by the Orthodox of that time.

I. But it may be objected, perhaps, that this principle, of *God's not being angry*, only concluded against a future state of *punishments*, and not of *rewards*: Many of the philosophers holding the affection of *grace and favour*; though they *al* denied that of *anger*; as Lactantius expressly assures us: *Ita omnes philosophi de ira consentiunt, de gratia discrepant*. To this, I reply,

1. That, when the sanction of *punishment* is taken off, the strongest influence of a future state is destroyed. For while the Ancients made the rewards of Elysium only *temporary*,

Has omnes, ubi mille rotam volvere per annos, &c.

they made the punishments of Tartarus *eternal*.

Sedet, æternumque sedebit  
Infelix Theseus.

This



This, Plato teaches in several places of his works\*. And Celsus is so far from rejecting it, that he ranks it in the number of those doctrines which should never be abandoned, but maintained to the very last†.

It is true, that several passages of Antiquity may be objected to what is here said against the *eternity of rewards*; particularly this of Cicero: “Omni-  
bus qui patriam conservarint, adjuverint, aux-  
rint, certum esse in coelo ac definitum locum, ubi  
“beati æVO SEMPITERNO fruuntur‡.” But we are to know, that the Ancients distinguished the souls of men into three species: the HUMAN, the HEROIC, and the DEMONIC. The *two last*, when they left the body, were indeed believed to enjoy eternal happiness, for their public services on earth; not in *Elysium*, but in *Heaven*; where they became a kind of demi-gods. But all, of the *first*, which included the great body of Mankind, were understood to have their designation in *Purgatory*, *Tartarus*, or *Elysium*: The *first* and *last* of which abodes were *temporary*; and the *second* only *eternal*. Now those who had greatly served their Country, in the manner Tully there mentions, were supposed to have souls of the *heroic* or *demonic* kind<sup>b</sup>.

\* Οἱ δ' αἱ δέξωνται ἀνάτως ἔχον, διὰ τὰ μεγέθη τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων, ἢ  
προσουλίας πολλῆς καὶ μεγάλης, ἢ φόνος ἀδικίας καὶ παρὰ νόμους πολλὰς ἐξερ-  
γασμένοι, ἢ ἄλλα ὅσα τυγχάνει ἔλα τοιαῦτα, τέτρες δὲ ἡ προσήκουσα μοί-  
ρα εἶπται εἰς τὸν Τάρταρον, ὅθεν ὑποῖε ἰκθαίνουσιν. *Phædo*, p. 113 —

Ἄλλοι δὲ οἰοῦνται οἱ τέτρες ὁρώμεν διὰ τὰς ἀμαρτίας τὰ μέγιστα καὶ ὀδυνη-  
ρότατα καὶ φοβερότατα πάθη πάσχουσας τὸν αἰῶνα χρόνον. *Gorgias*, p. 525.

† Τέτο μὲν γὰρ ὁρθῶς νομίζουσιν, ὡς οἱ μὲν εὖ βιώσαντες εἰδαίμωνήσουσιν,  
οἱ δὲ ἀδικοὶ πάντων αἰώνιος κακὸς συνίσχεται; καὶ τότε δὲ τὸ ὄγγμαλθαι  
μήτ' ἔσται, μήτ' ἄλλῃ αἰθερώπων μηδὲς ποτε ἀποδοῖ, ἀποτιμῶντες.  
*Apud Orig. cont. Cels.* lib. viii.

‡ *Somn. Scip.* cap. 3.

<sup>b</sup> Eusebius speaking of the political Gods of Egypt, supports what is here delivered of those *heroic* or *demonic* souls, αὐτοὺς δὲ  
ἐκ τέτταρ' ἐπιγέμεν μύθεσσι, φασίν, ὑπερβασίας μὲν ὀνήτας, διὰ δὲ σύνεσιν  
καὶ κοινῇ ἀνθρώπων ευφροσύνης τελευχίας τῆς ΑΘΑΝΑΣΙΑΣ. — *Præp.*  
*Evangel.* l. iii. c. 3.

2. But secondly, in every sense of a future state as a *moral designation*, rewards and punishments necessarily imply each other: So that where one is wanting, the other cannot possibly subsist. This was too visible not to be seen by the ancient Philosophers: Lactantius thus argues with them, on common principles. “*If God be not provoked at impious and wicked men, neither is he pleased with the good and just.*” For contrary objects must either excite contrary affections, or no affections at all. So that he who loves good men, must at the same time hate the ill; and he who hates not ill men, cannot love the good: Because both to love good men proceedeth from an abhorrence of ill; and to hate ill men from a tenderness to the good<sup>1</sup>. And so concludes, that the denying God’s attribute of *anger*, which removes the *punishments* of a future state, overturns the *state* itself, “*Sive igitur gratiam Deo, sive iram, sive utrumque detraxeris, religionem tolli necesse est.*”

In all this (as we say) he does not in the least misrepresent the common conclusions of philosophy. Plutarch delivering the sentiments of learned Antiquity on this head, expressly makes the denial of *future misery*, to infer the denial of a *future state*, “*Death is the final period of our being.*” But Sufferption says, *no*. She stretches out life beyond life itself. Her fears extend further than our existence. She has joined to the idea of death, that other inconsistent idea of eternal life in misery. “*For when all things come to an end, then, in*

<sup>1</sup> Si Deus non irascitur impiis & injustis, nec pios utique justosque diligit: In rebus enim diversis, aut in utramque partem moveri necesse est, aut in neutram. Itaque qui bonos diligit, & malos odit; & qui malos non odit, nec bonos diligit: Quia & diligere bonos, ex odio malorum venit; & malos odisse, ex bonorum caritate descendit.

“ the opinion of Superstition, they begin to be endless. Then, I can’t tell what, dark and dismal gates of Tartarus fly open: then, rivers of fire, with all the fountains of Styx are broken up, &c. — Thus doth cursed Superstition oppose the voice of God, which hath declared death to be the end of suffering<sup>k</sup>.” *Death*, says he, *is the end of suffering*, therefore *the end of being*. Only with the ὑπερτον ὑπερτερον of the rhetoricians he has here, in the most rhetorical of all his discourses, put the conclusion before the premisses.

3. But lastly, I shall shew (under the next head, to which we are going) that the Philosophers did not consider the attribute of *grace and favour* (which they allowed) to be a *passion or affection*; though they considered *anger* (which they allowed not) under that idea.

II. As the foregoing objection would insinuate that the universal Principle of *God’s not being angry*, doth not prove *enough*; so, the next pretends, that it proves *too much*: For, secondly, it may be objected, that this principle destroys God’s Providence here, as well as a future state of rewards and punishments hereafter; which Providence several of the theistical Philosophers, we know, did believe.

This will require consideration.

Lactantius says: “ All the philosophers agree about the *anger*; but concerning the *grace or favour* they are of different opinions<sup>l</sup>.” And taking it for granted, that they considered the *grace or favour*, which they held, as well as the *anger*, which they denied, to be a *passion or affection*, he argues against them as above: and adds, “ Therefore the er-

<sup>k</sup> ἂν οὐ τις ἀνίσταται πύλαι βαθείαι, καὶ ποταμοὶ ποταμοὶ ὅμοιοι καὶ τρυφὴ ἀποβροχὴς ἀναπηταίνονται—ὕτως ἡ κακοδαίμων διανομασία καὶ θεὸς τὸ μὴ παθεῖν ἐκπέφυγεν.—*De Superst.*

<sup>l</sup> Omnes philosophi de ira consentiunt, de gratia discrepant.



“ror of those who take away both *grace* and *anger* is “the most consistent.” But methinks, the absurdity of the error here imputed, should have taught Lactantius, that the Philosophers, who had rejected *anger* because it was an human passion, could never give their God *favour* or *fondness*, which is another human passion: For though they sometimes dogmatized like lunatics, they never syllogized like idiots; though their principles were often unnatural, their conclusions were rarely illogical. He should therefore have seen, that those, who held the *gratia* or benevolence of the divine Nature, considered it not as a *passion* or *affection*, but as an *efflux from its essence*”; on which they built their notion of a general Providence. So that when he says, *concerning the grace or favour, they are of different opinions*, we are to understand no more, than that some of them held a Providence, and others denied it.

Let us see then what kind of Providence the theistical Philosophers believed. The PERIPATETICS and STOICS went pretty much together in this matter. It is commonly imputed to Aristotle, that he held no Providence to be extended lower than the moon: But this is a calumny which Chalcidias raised of him. What Aristotle meant by the words, which gave a handle to it, was *that a particular providence did not extend itself to individuals*: For being a fatalist in natural things, and at the same time maintaining free-will in man, he thought, if Providence were extended to individuals, it would either impose a necessity on human actions, or, as employed on mere contingencies, be it self frequently defeated; which would look like impotency: and not seeing any way to reconcile free-will and pre-

<sup>a</sup> Ergo constantior est error illorum, qui & iram simul, & gratiam tollunt.

<sup>a</sup> See the following quotation from Sallust the philosopher.  
science,

science, he cut the knot, and denied that Providence extended its care over individuals. Zeno's notion of Providence, seems to have been as loose<sup>o</sup>, yet his fatalism was more uniform; and, indeed, better supported, for he denied free-will in man: Which was the only difference in this matter between him and Aristotle.

Here we have a Providence very consistent with a disbelief of a future state of rewards and punishments; nay, almost destructive of it.

But the PYTHAGOREANS and PLATONISTS will not be put off so: They held a particular Providence, extending itself to Individuals: A Providence, which, according to ancient notions, could not be administered without the *affections of love and anger*. Here then lies the difficulty: These Sects removed all passions from the Godhead, especially *anger*; and, on that account, rejected a future state of rewards and punishments; while yet they believed a Providence, which was administered by the exercise of those very passions. For the true solution of this difficulty, we must have recourse to a prevailing principle of Paganism, often before hinted at, for the clearing up many obscurities in Antiquity: I mean, that of *local tutelar Deities*. Pythagoras and Plato were deep in the Theology which taught, that the several regions of the earth were delivered over, by the Creator of the Universe, to the vicegerency and government of inferior Gods. This opinion was originally Egyptian; on whose authority these two Philosophers received it; though it had been long the popular belief all over the pagan world. Hence, we see the writings of the Pythagoreans

<sup>o</sup> Cotta, in Cicero, explaining the doctrine of the Stoics, says, Non curat [Deus] singulos homines. Non mirum, ne civitates quidem. Non eas? Ne nationes quidem et gentes. N. D. iii. 39.

and Platonists so full of the DOCTRINE OF DEMONS: A doctrine, which even characterized the Theology of those Sects. Now, these *Demons* were ever supposed to have *passions and affections*. On these principles and opinions the Greeks formed the *name* of that mixed moral mode, SUPERSTITION: they called it *δεισιδαιμονία*, which signifies the fear of Demons or inferior Gods. And these being supposed, by the *Philosophers*, to have *passions*; and a Species, or at least one of them (called, by the people, THE EVILIOUS DEMON) to be more than ordinary capricious and cruel in the exercise of the passions, these notions gave birth to all the extravagant Rites of attonement<sup>p</sup>: the practice of which, as we say, they called *δεισιδαιμονία*; intimating, in the very term, the *passion* which gave birth to them; and by which alone, the Ancients understood a particular Providence could be administered. And here it is worthy our observation, that Chalcidias gives *this* as the very reason why the Peripatetics rejected a particular Providence, (he says indeed, though falsely, all Providence below the moon) namely, because they held nothing of the administration of inferior Deities. His words are these: “ Aristotle holds that the  
 “ providence of God descends even to the region of  
 “ the moon; but that, below that orb, things were  
 “ neither governed by the decrees of God, nor up-  
 “ held by the wisdom and aid of *Angels*. Nor does

<sup>p</sup> Dion Cassius tells us, t<sup>t</sup> at in the year of Rome 689 the Government consulted, what the Historian calls, the *Augury of safety*; a sort of Divination to learn, if the Gods received in good part the Prayers for the Safety of the People. This Ceremony was only to be performed in that year, during the course of which, no Allies of Rome had deserted from her, no Armies had appeared in the field, and no Battle had been fought. A Ceremony which plainly arose from the ancient notion of an *evilious Demon*, then most to be dreaded when the felicity of States or of private men was at its height.

“ he



“ he suppose any providential intervention of *Demons*.” So closely united, in the opinion of this writer, whom Fabricius calls *gnarissimus veteris philosophiæ*, was the doctrine of a particular Providence, and the doctrine of Demons and subaltern Deities.

But when now the Soul is disengaged from the body, it is no longer, in their opinion, under the government of Demons; nor consequently subject to the effects of the Demonic passions. And what becomes of it then, we shall see hereafter. A remarkable passage in Apuleius, will explain and justify the solution here given: “ God (*saieth this author*) cannot undergo any *temporary* exercise of his power or goodness: And therefore cannot be affected with indignation or anger; cannot be depressed with grief, or elated with joy. But, being free from all the passions of the mind, he neither sorrows nor exults; nor makes any *instantaneous* resolution to act, or to forbear acting. Every thing of this kind suits only the middle nature of the Demons: For they are placed between Gods and Men; as well in the frame and composition of their minds, as in the situation of their abodes, having immortality in common with the former, and *affections* in common with the latter. For they are subject, like us, to be every way irritated and appeased; so as to be inflamed by anger, melted by compassion, allured by gifts, softened by prayers, exasperated by neglect, and soothed again by observance. In a word, to be affected by every thing that can make

¶ Aristoteles Dei providentiam usque ad lunæ regionem progredi censet; infra vero neque providentiæ scitis regi, nec angelorum ope consultisque sustentari: nec vero Dæmonum prospicientiam putat intervenire. *Com. in Platonis Timæum.*

¶ *Bib. Lat.* l. iii. c. 7.

“impression on the human mind.” Plutarch says the same thing, but with this remarkable addition, that it was the very doctrine of PLATO and ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΑΣ<sup>1</sup>.

On the whole then it appears, that the Principle of God's not being angry, which subverted the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, did not at all affect a particular Providence here; and that the *grace or favour* which some of them left unto the Deity was no passion or affection, like the *anger*, which they took away; but only a *simple benevolence*, which, in the construction of the Universe, was directed to the best; but did not interfere to prevent disorders in particular Systems. A benevolence too, that went not from the *will*, but the *essence* of the supreme Being<sup>2</sup>.

SALLUST,

\* —Debet Deus nullam perpeti vel operis vel amoris temporalem perfunctionem; & idcirco nec indignatione nec ira contingi, nullo angore contrahi, nullâ alacritate gestire: sed ab omnibus passionibus animi liber, nec dolere unquam, nec aliquando lætari, nec aliquid repentinum velle vel nolle. Sed & hæc cuncta, ut id genus cætera, Dæmonum mediocritati congruunt. Sunt enim inter homines & deos, ut loco regionis, ita ingenio mentis interfiti, habentes communem cum superis immortalitatem cum inferis passionem. Nam perinde ut nos, pati possunt omnia animorum placamenta vel incitamenta; ut & ira incitentur, & misericordia flectantur, & donis invitentur, & precibus leniantur, & contumeliis exasperentur, & honoribus maleceantur, aliisque omnibus, ad similem nobis modum variantur. *De Deo Socratis.*

<sup>1</sup> Βέλτιον ἐν οἷς τὰ περὶ τὸν Τυφῶνα καὶ Ὅσιον καὶ Ἰσὺν ἰσορέματα, μῆτε θεῶν παθήματα, μῆτε ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ ΔΑΙΜΟΝΩΝ ΜΕΓΑΛΩΝ εἶναι νομίζουσιν, ὡς καὶ ΠΛΑΤΩΝ, καὶ ΠΥΘΑΓΟΡΑΣ, καὶ Περικλέης, καὶ Χρυσίππῳ, ἰσόμενοι τὸς ΠΑΛΑΙΟΘΕΟΛΟΓΟΥΣ, ἐξέμνηστεύουσιν μὴ ἀνθρώπων γέγονεαι λόγους, καὶ πολλὰ τῇ δυνάμει τῶν φύσιν υπερφύουσις ἡμῶν, τὸ δὲ θεῶν οὐκ ἀμύγεις, ἐδὲ ἀκράτοις ἐχούσας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς φύσει καὶ σώματι αἰσθάνει ἰσχυρὴν ἀνάγκην, ἥδονην διχομένῃ καὶ πᾶσι ὅσα ταῦτα εἰληγόμενα ταῖς μεταβολαῖς πάθη, τὰς μὲν μάλλον, τὰς δὲ ἥτις ἐπιπαρανομοῦνται γίνονται γὰρ ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ δαίμοσιν, ἀλλῶς διαφοραὶ καὶ κακίαι. *De I. c. 3. p. 642.*

<sup>2</sup> So Seneca informs us: Quæ causa est Diis bene faciendi? NATURE. Errat, si quis putat illos nocere velle: Non possunt. Nec

SALLUST, the Philosopher, writing of the *Gods and the World*, proposes in his fourteenth chapter, to speak to this question, *how the immutable Gods may be said to be angry and appeased*? In the first place, he says, that God hath no human passions; he *neither rejoices, is angry, nor appeased with gifts*<sup>2</sup>: So far is certainly agreeable to truth. But how then? Why, the Gods are *eternally beneficent* (that is, as Seneca says below, *causa Diis benefaciendi NATURA*) and beneficent only, and never hurtful<sup>3</sup>. Thus having avoided one extreme, he falls into another; and supposeth it to be *blind Nature*, and not *Will*, which determines God's beneficence. The inference from which is, that the rewards and punishments of Heaven are the *natural and necessary effects of actions*; not *positive, arbitrary consequences, or the designation of Will*: And so our Philosopher maintains. For now the difficulty being, that if *nature be the cause of the beneficence of the Godhead*, how can Providence bestow good on the virtuous man, and evil on the wicked? Our Sophist resolves it thus: "While we are good, we are joined by  
"similitude of nature to the Gods; and when evil,  
"separated, by dissimilitude. While we practise  
"virtue, we are in union with them; but defec-  
"tion to vice makes them our enemies: not be-  
"cause they are *angry* at us, but because our crimes  
"interpose between us and their divine irradiations,  
"and leave us a prey to the avenging Demons.—

Nec accipere injuriam queunt, nec facere; lædere etenim lædi-  
que conjunctum est. Summa illa ac pulcherrima omnium natura,  
quos periculo exemit, nec periculosos quidem fecit. Ep. 95.

<sup>2</sup> Πως οι Θεοι μη μεταβαλλόμενοι, ὀργίζονται καὶ θερπύσσονται λέγου-  
ται.

<sup>3</sup> Οὐ χαίρει Θεός—οὐδὲ ὀργίζεται—οὐδὲ δαίμονι θρασυτέραι.

<sup>4</sup> Ἐκείνοι μὲν αγαθοὶ τε ὡν ΑΕΙ, καὶ ἀφένεσι μέντοι· θανάσιον δὲ  
οὐδὲ ποτε.



“ So that to say, God is turned away from the wicked, is the same as to say, THE SUN IS HID FROM A BLIND MAN.” An apt comparison: and very expressive of the principle of this philosophy; which supposes the influence of the *Deity*, to be like that of the *Sun*, physical and necessary; and, consequently all reward and punishment not the *moral*, but the *natural*, issue of things: A Platonic notion, entirely subversive of the proper doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, as conceived every where by the People, and taught by the Christian Religion: which holds, that they arise out of God’s Goodness and Justice, not by way of emanation, as light from the Sun, but as the designation of *Will*; which disparts *freely*, though not fancifully or capriciously; as, with equal malignity and folly, my reasoning in this place hath been represented.

On the whole, then, we find, that the Pagans in taking away *human passions* from God, left him nothing but that kind of natural excellence, which went not from his *will*, but his *essence* only; and consequently, was destitute of *morality*. This was one extreme. The primitive Fathers, (as Lactantius) understanding clearly that the Platonic notion of God overturned a *future judgment*, and not finding the medium, which their Masters in Science, the Philosophers, had missed, supposed (as we have seen) that God had *human passions*. This was the other extreme. And whence, I would ask, did both

“ Ἡμεῖς δὲ ἀγαθοὶ μὴ ὅτις δι’ ὁμοιότητα Θεοῦ συνάψιμεθα, κακοὶ δὲ γινόμενοι δι’ ἀνομοιότητα χωρίζομεθα· καὶ κατ’ ἀρετὰς ζῶντες, ἐχόμεθα τῶν Θεῶν, κακοὶ δὲ γινόμενοι ἐχθεροὶ ἡμῖν ποιοῦμεν ἐκείνους· οὐκ ἐκείνων ἀρνησόμενοι, ἀλλὰ τῶν ἀμαρτημάτων Θεοῦ μὴ ἡμῖν ὅτις πάντων ἰδύμεναι, Δαίμονες δὲ κατὰ φύσιν συνάψιμεν.—ὥς ὁμοίον τὸν Θεὸν λέγει τὰς κακὰς ἀποτρέφειν, καὶ τὸν ἌΛΙΟΝ τοῖς ἱερημένοις τῶν ὀφείων κρύπτειν.”

these

these extremes arise, but from neither party's being able to distinguish between *human passions* and the divine attributes of GOODNESS AND JUSTICE? the true medium between *human passions* on the one hand, and a *blind excellence of nature*, on the other.

II. I proceed now to the OTHER CAUSE, which kept the Philosophers from believing a future state of rewards and punishments. As the first was an erroneous notion concerning the *nature* of GOD, so this was a much more absurd one concerning the *nature* of the SOUL. For, as our epic Poet sings,

“ Much of the SOUL they talk, but all awry.”

There are but two possible ways of conceiving of the *Soul*: we must hold it to be, either a QUALITY, or a SUBSTANCE.

1. Those Ancients who believed it to be only a *Quality*, as Epicurus, Dicæarchus, Aristoxenus, Asclepiades, and Galen, come not into the account; it being impossible that these should not believe its total annihilation upon death. The ingenious conceit of it's SLEEP was reserved to do honour to modern *Invention*.

2. But the generality of the Philosophers held it to be a *Substance*; and ALL who so held, were unanimous that it was a DISCERPED PART OF A WHOLE; and that this *Whole* was GOD; into whom it was again to be *resolved*.

But concerning this *Whole* they differed.

SOME held that there was only *one* Substance in Nature: Others held *two*.

THEY who maintained the *one* Universal Substance, or TO' EN, in the strictest sense, were ATHEISTS; and altogether in the sentiments of the modern Spinozists; whose Master apparently caught

<sup>a</sup> *Par. Reg.* Book iv. ver. 313.



this epidemical contagion of human reason from Antiquity.

The OTHERS, who believed there were *two* general Substances in nature, GOD and MATTER, were taught to conclude, by their way of interpreting the famous maxim of *ex nihilo nihil fit*, that they were both *eternal*. These were their THEISTS; though approaching sometimes, on the one hand, to what is called *Spinozism*; sometimes, on the other, to *Manicheism*.

For they, who held *two* Substances, were again subdivided.

Some of them, as the Cyrenaics, the Cynics, and the Stoics, held *both* these Substances to be *material*; which gave an opening to *Spinozism*: Others, as the Pythagoreans, the Platonists, and Peripatetics, held only *one* to be *material*; which gave the like opening to *Manicheism*.

Lastly, the maintainers of the *immateriality* of the divine Substance, were likewise divided into two parties; the first of which held but *one* person in the Godhead; the other, *two* or *three*. So that as the *former* believed the Soul to be part of the supreme God; the *latter* believed it to be part only of the second or third *Hypostasis*. Origen, speaking of the Greek Philosophers, says, "They plainly suppose the whole World to be God. The Stoics make it the *first* God. As to the followers of Plato, some make it the *second*, and some the *third* God<sup>b</sup>."

As they multiplied the Persons of the Godhead, so they multiplied the subsistence of the Soul; some giving *two*, and some, more liberally, *three* to every man. But it is to be observed, that they esteemed only one of these to be part of God; the others were only elementary matter, or mere qualities.

<sup>b</sup> Σαφῶς δὲ τὸν ὅλον κόσμον λέγουσιν εἶναι θεόν. Στωικοὶ μὲν τὸν πρῶτον. Οἱ δ' ἀπὸ Πλάτωνος τὸν δεύτερον· τινὲς δὲ αὐτῶν τὸν τρίτον. *Cont. Cels.* l. v.

These



These things are but hinted at, as just sufficient to our purpose: A full explanation of them, though both curious and useful, would take up too much room, and lead us too far from our subject.

Now, however They, who held the Soul to be a real substance, differed thus in circumstantial, yet in this consequence of its substantiality, *that it was part of God, discerped from him, and would be resolved again into him*, they all, we say, agreed. For those who held but *one* substance, could not but esteem the soul a part of it; and those who held *two*, considered those *two* as conjoined, and composing an *Universe*; just as the soul and body composed a *man*. Of which Universe, God was the soul; and matter, the body. Hence they concluded, that as the human body was resolved into its Parent Matter, so the soul was resolved into its Parent Spirit.

Agreeably to this explanation, Cicero delivers the common sentiments of his Greek masters on this head: "A natura Deorum, ut doctissimis sapientissimisque placuit, HAUSTOS ANIMOS & LIBATOS habemus<sup>c</sup>." And again: "Humanus autem animus DECERPTUS EX MENTE DIVINA, cum alio nullo nisi cum ipso Deo (si hoc fas est dictu) comparari potest<sup>d</sup>."

And, in another place, he says,—"animos hominum quadam ex parte extrinsecus esse tractos & haustos, ex qua intelligimus esse ex ra divinum animum humanus unde ducatur<sup>e</sup>." He after-

<sup>c</sup> De Divin. l. i. c. 49.

<sup>d</sup> Tusc. Disp. l. v. c. 13. The words, *si hoc fas est dictu*, had been omitted by accident, in my quotation.—But Ansgereus saw a mystery in this omission, which could be nothing but my consciousness that the omitted words made against me. They are now inserted to shew that they make intirely for me; and that Cicero used the word *decerptus* in the *literal* sense; for, if only in a *figurative*, he had no occasion to soften it with a *solea reverenti*.

<sup>e</sup> De Divin. l. i. c. 32.

wards gives the whole system, from Pacuvianus, more at large,

“ Quicquid est hoc, omnia animat, format, alit,  
auget, creat,

Sepelit, recipitque in sese omnia, omniumque  
idem est Pater ;

Indidemque, eademque oriuntur de integro, atque  
eodem occidunt <sup>1</sup>.”

And St. Austin did not think them injured in this representation. In his excellent work of the *City of God*, he thus exposes the absurdity of that general principle.—“ Quid infelicius credi potest, quam Dei  
“ partem vapulare, cum puer vapulat? Jam vero  
“ partes Dei fieri lascivas, iniquas, impias, atque  
“ omnino damnabiles quis ferre potest, nisi qui  
“ prorsus insanit? ”

Now, lest the reader should suspect that these kind of phrases, such as, *the soul's being part of God*; — *discerped from him*; — *of his Nature*; which perpetually occur in the writings of the Ancients, are only *highly figurative expressions*, and not measurable by the severe standard of metaphysical propriety; he is desired to take notice of one consequence drawn from this principle, and universally held by Antiquity, which was this, *That the soul was eternal, à parte ANTE*, as well as, *a parte POST*; which the Latins well expressed by the word *SEMPITERNUS* <sup>2</sup>.

For

<sup>1</sup> *De Divin.* l. i. c. 57.

<sup>2</sup> *L. iv.* c. 13.

<sup>3</sup> It properly signifies, *what hath neither beginning nor end*; though frequently used in the improper sense of *having no end*. And indeed, we may observe in most of the Latin writers, an unphilosophic licence in the use of *mixed modes* by substituting one for another: The providing against the ill effects of this abuse, to which these sort of words are chiefly liable, gave the ancient Roman lawyers great trouble; as appears from what one of them observes, “ *Jurisconsultorum summus circa verborum*  
“ *PROPRIETATEM labor est.*” Hence, the Composers of the Justinian *Digest* found a necessity of having one whole book of their

*Pandectæ*,



For this we shall produce an authority above exception: "It is a thing very well known (says the accurate Cudworth) that, according to the sense of Philosophers, these two things were always included together, in that one opinion of the Soul's immortality, namely, its *pre-existence*, as well as its *post-existence*. Neither was there ever any of the Ancients, before *Christianity*, that held the Soul's future permanency after death, who did not likewise assert its *pre-existence*; they clearly perceiving that if it was once granted, that the soul was generated, it could never be proved but that it might be also corrupted: And therefore the assertors of the Soul's immortality commonly began here; first to prove it's *pre-existence*, &c." What this learned man is quoted for, is the fact: And, for that, we may safely take his word: As to the reason given, *that*, we see, is visionary; invented, perhaps, to hide the enormity of the Principle it came from. The true reason was its being a natural consequence of the opinion, that *the Soul was part of God*. This, Tully plainly intimates, where, after having quoted the verses from Pacuvianus given above, he subjoins, "Quid est igitur, cur domus sit omnium una, eaque communis, cumque animi hominum *semper fuerint futurique sint*, cur hi, quid ex quoque eveniat, & quid quamque rem significet, perspicere non possint?" And again as plainly, "Animorum nulla in terris origo inveniri potest: — His enim in naturis nihil inest, quod vim memoriæ, mentis,

*Pandectæ*; employed *de verborum significatione*. The abuse arose, in a good measure, from their not being early broken and inured to abstract reasoning: It is certain at least, that the Greeks, who were eminent for speculation, are infinitely more exact in their use of *mixed modes*: nor but something must be allowed for the superior abundance of the Greek language.

*Intell. System*, p. 38.



“ cogitationis habeat; quod & præterita teneat, &  
 “ futura provideat, & complecti possit præsentia;  
 “ quæ sola divina sunt. Nec invenietur unquam,  
 “ unde ad hominem venire possint, nisi a Deo. —  
 “ Ita quicquid est illud, quod sentit, quod sapit,  
 “ quod vult, quod viget, cœleste & divinum est;  
 “ *OBTEAMQUE REM ÆTERNUM SIT NECESSE EST*.\*”

It hath been observed, in the last section, that the famous argument of Plato, explained, and strongly recommended by Cicero, supposes the soul to have been from eternity, because it is a self-existent substance; which is plainly supposing it to have been eternal *a parte ante*, because it is *a part of God*.

Here then is a *consequence*, universally acknowledged, which will not allow the principle, from whence it proceeded, to be understood in any other sense than one strictly metaphysical. Let us consider it a little. We are told they held the soul to be *eternal*: If eternal, it must be either independent on God, or part of his substance. Independent it could not be, for there can be but one independent of the same kind of substance: The Ancients, indeed, thought it no absurdity to say, that God and Matter were both self-existent, but they allowed no third; therefore they must needs conclude that *it was part of God*.

And in that sense, indeed they called it (as we see in the last section) *independent*, when, on account of it's original, they gave it this attribute of the Deity; and, with that, joined the others of *ungenerated*, and *self-existent*.

But when the Ancients are said to hold the *pre- and post-existence* of the Soul, and therefore to attribute a proper eternity to it, we must not suppose that they understood it to be eternal in its *distinct*

\* *Fragm. de consolatione.*

and peculiar existence; but that it was *discerped* from the substance of God, in *time*; and would, in *time*, be rejoined, and *resolved* into it again. This they explained by a closed Vessel filled with sea-water, which swimming a while upon the ocean, does, on the Vessel's breaking, flow in again, and mingle with the common mals. They only differed about the time of this reunion and resolution: The greater part holding it to be at death<sup>1</sup>; but the Pythagoreans, not till after many transmigrations. The Platonists went between these two opinions; and rejoined pure and unpolluted souls immediately, to the universal spirit: but those which had contracted much defilement, were sent into a succession of other bodies, to purge and purify them, before they returned to their Parent Substance<sup>m</sup>. And these were the two sorts of the NATURAL METEMPSYCHOSIS, which we have observed above, to have been really held by those two Schools of philosophy<sup>n</sup>.

That we have given a fair representation of the ancient belief in this matter, we appeal to the learned Gassendi: "Interim tamen vix ulli fuere (quæ hu-

<sup>1</sup> See the *Critical inquiry into the opinions and practice of ancient philosophers*, p. 125, et seq. 2d Edition.

<sup>m</sup> Nec enim omnibus iidem illi sapientes arbitrati sunt eundem cursum in cœlum patere. Nam vitiiis & sceleribus contaminatos deprimi in tenebras, atque in cœno jacere docuerunt: castos autem, puros, integros, incorruptos, bonis etiam studiis atque artibus expolitos, levi quodam ac facili lapsu ad Deos, id est, ad naturam sui similem pervolare. *Fragm. de consolatione.*

<sup>n</sup> It hath been objected to me, that this doctrine of the *refusion of the soul* was very consistent with the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments, in the *intermediate space* between death and the resolution of the soul into the  $\tau\omicron\varsigma\alpha$ . But these Objectors forgot that it had been shewn, that those Philosophers who held the refusion not to be immediate, *believed* the soul to be confined to a successive course of transmigrations entirely physical. So that there was no more room for a moral state of reward and punishment hereafter, than if the resolution had been immediate.



"manæ mentis caligo, atque imbecillitas est) qui  
 "non inciderint in errorem illum de REFUSIONE IN  
 "ANIMAM MUNDI. Nimirum, sicut existimârunt  
 "singulorum animas particulas esse animæ mun-  
 "danæ, quarum quælibet suo corpore, ut aqua  
 "vase, includeretur; ita & reputârunt unamquam-  
 "que animam, corpore dissoluto, quasi diffracto  
 "vase, effluere, ac Animæ mundi, e qua deducta  
 "fuerit, iterum uniri; nisi quod plerumque ob  
 "contractas in impuro corpore sordeis, vitiorum-  
 "que maculas, non prius uniantur, quàm sensim  
 "omneis sordeis exuerint, & aliæ seriùs, aliæ ocyùs  
 "repurgatæ, atque immunes ab omni labe evase-  
 "rint." A great Authority! and the greater, for  
 that it proceeded from the plain view of the fact  
 only; Gassendi appearing not to have been sensible  
 of the consequence here deduced from it, namely,  
*that none of the ancient philosophers could believe a*  
*future state of rewards and punishments.* Otherwise,  
 we may be sure, he had not failed to urge that conse-  
 quence, in his famous Apology for Epicurus; whose  
 monstrous errors he all along strives to palliate, by  
 confronting them with others as bad, amongst the  
 Theistic sects of Philosophy.

Thus we see, that this very opinion of the *Soul's*  
*eternity*, which hath made modern writers conclude  
 that the ancient Sages believed a future state of re-  
 ward and punishment, was, in truth, the very reason  
 why they believed it not.

The *primitive christian* writers were more quick-  
 sighted: They plainly saw, this Principle was de-  
 structive of such future state, and therefore em-  
 ployed all their Eloquence, and more successfully  
 than they did their Logic, to oppose it. Thus Arno-  
 bius (not indeed attending to the *double doctrine* of the

*Animæ. in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii, p. 550.*

ancient



ancient Philosophy) accuses Plato of *contradiction*, for holding this Principle, and yet, at the same time, preaching up a future state of reward and punishment.

But it must be confessed, some of the *Fathers*, as was their custom, ran into the opposite extreme; and held the Soul to be naturally *mortal*; and, to support this, maintained its *materiality*: Just as in the case before, to support *human passions* in the God-head, they gave him a *human form*. Tatian, Tertullian, and Arnobius fell into this foolish error. Others indeed, as Justin Martyr, and Irenæus, went more soberly to work; affirming only, against the notion of its *eternity*, that it was *created* by God, and depended continually upon him for its duration. In the heat of dispute, indeed, some unwary words may now and then drop from the soberest of them, which seem to favour the doctrine of the Soul's *materiality*: But it is but candid to correct them by the general tenor of their sentiments.

This was the true original of every thing looking so untowardly, in the writings of the *Fathers*: which had Mr. Dodwell considered, he had never written so weak a book as his *epistolary discourse* against the

Quid? Plato idem vester in eo volumine, quod de animæ immortalitate composuit, non Acherontem, non Stygem, non Cocytum fluvios, & Pyriphlegetontem nominat, in quibus animas asseverat volvi, mergi, exuri? Et homo prudentiæ non prava, & examinis judicii perperis, rem inenodabilem suscipit, ut cum animas dicat immortales, perpetuas, & corporali soliditate privatas; puniri eas dicat tamen, & doloris afficiat sensu. Quis autem hominum non vidit, quod sit immortale, quod simplex, nullum posse dolorem admittere; quod autem sentiat dolorem, immortalitatem habere non posse? Et qui poterit terribi formidinis alicujus horrore, cui fuerit persuasum, tam se esse immortalem quam ipsum Deum primum; nec ab eo judicari quidquam de se posse, cum sit una immortalitas in utroque, nec in alterius altera conditionis possit æqualitate vexari? *Adver. Gentis*, l. ii. p. 52—64. Ed. Lug. Bat. 1651. Quarto.

Soul's

Soul's immortality, from the judgment of the Fathers; whose opinions he hath one while egregiously mistaken; at another, as grossly misrepresented.

Having now seen that the Philosophers in general, held *the Soul to be part of God, and resolvable into him*; lest any doubt should remain, I shall shew in the next place, that this was, more especially, believed by the famous PHILOSOPHIC QUATERNION: And if held by them, we cannot have the least doubt of the rest.

Cicero, in the person of Velleius, the Epicurean, accuses PYTHAGORAS, for holding that the human soul was discerped from the substance of God, or the universal nature. "Nam Pythagoras; qui censebat animum esse per naturam rerum omnem intentum & commeantem, ex quo nostri animi carentur, non vidit distractione humanorum animorum discerpi & lacerari Deum &c." Here, Velleius does not (as hath been pretended) exaggerate or strain matters, to serve his purpose. Pythagoras held the old maxim *ex nihilo nihil fit*, and, therefore, must needs hold the soul to be taken from some foreign and external substance. And he allowed only two substances, *God* and *matter*; therefore, as he taught the Soul was immaterial, he could not possibly conceive it to be any other than a Part of God. So that Velleius's consequence naturally follows, that as Pythagoras held the soul to be a Substance not a Quality, he must suppose it to be torn and discerped from the Substance of God. To the same purpose, Sextus Empiricus: — Pythagoras and Empedocles, and the whole company of the Italic school, hold that our Souls are not only of the same nature with one another, and with the Gods, but likewise with the irrational souls of brutes: For that there is one spirit that

<sup>1</sup> Nat. Dew. l. i. c. 11.





PLATO, without any softening, frequently calls the Soul, God; and part of God, ΝΟΤΝ ΑΕΙ ΘΕΟΝ. Plutarch says, *Pythagoras and Plato held the soul to be immortal: For that launching out into the Soul of the universe, it returns to its parent and original*<sup>2</sup>. Tertullian charges this opinion home upon him. “Primo quidem oblivionis capacem animam non cedam, quia tantam illi concessit divinitatem, ut Deo adequetur<sup>3</sup>.” Arnobius does no less, where he apostrophises the Platonists in this manner: “Ipse denique animus, qui immortalis à vobis & Deus esse narratur, cur in ægris æger sit, in infantibus stolidus, in senectute defessus? Delira, & fatua, & insana<sup>4</sup>!” The latter part of the sentence is commonly read thus; — *Cur in ægris æger sit, in infantibus stolidus, in senectute defessus, delira, & fatua, & insana?* The Critics think something is here wanting before the three last words. But it appears to me only to have been wrong pointed; there should be a note of interrogation instead of a comma at *defessus*? — *Delira, & fatua, & insana*, making a sentence of itself, by means of *narratis* understood. Hermias in his *Irris. Gent. Phil.* expresses himself, on the same occasion, pretty much in the same manner: ταῦτα ὅν τί χρη καλεῖν; ὡς μὲν ἐμοὶ δοκεῖ, τερατίαν, ἢ ἀνοϊαν, ἢ μανίαν, ἢ γασιν. Eusebius expressly says, that Plato held the soul to be *ungenerated*, and to be derived by way of *emanation from the first cause*; as being unwilling to allow that it could be *made out of nothing*. Which necessarily implies, that, according to Plato’s doctrine, God was the material or substantial cause of the Soul, or that the Soul was part of his substance<sup>5</sup>.

There

<sup>2</sup> Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, ἀφθάρτου εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν· ἐξῆλθαι γὰρ εἰς τὴν πᾶσι παρὰ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἀναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὁμοιωμένον. *De Plac. Phil.* l. iv. c. 7.

<sup>3</sup> *De anima*, c. xxiv.

<sup>4</sup> *Adv. Gentes*, l. ii. p. 47.

<sup>5</sup> Ὅ δὲ γὰρ Πλάτων, ἀσωμάτους μὲν καὶ ἰσητάς ὕσας, τὰς λογικὰς φύσεις

There is indeed a passage in Stobæus, which hath been understood by some, to contradict what it here delivered as the sentiments of Plato. It is where Speusippus, the nephew and follower of Plato, says, *that the MIND was neither the same with THE ONE, nor THE GOOD; but had a peculiar nature of its own*. Our Stanley supposes ' him to speak here of the *human mind*: And then, indeed, the contradiction is evident. But that learned man seems to have been mistaken, and misled by his author, Stobæus; who has misplaced this *placit*, and put it into a chapter with several others, which relate to the *human mind*. I conceive it to be certain that Speusippus was here speaking of a different thing; namely, of the nature of the third hypostasis in the Platonic Trinity; the ΝΟΥΣ, or ΛΟΓΟΣ, so intitled by his uncle; which he would, by the words in question, personally distinguish from the ΤΟ ὄΝ, the ONE, the first person; and from the ΤΑΓΑΘΟΝ, the GOOD, the second in that Trinity.

ARISTOTLE thought of the Soul like the rest, as we learn from a passage quoted by Cudworth ' out of his Nichomachean *ethics*; where having spoken of the sensitive soul, and declared it to be mortal, he goes on in this manner: *It remains that the mind or intellect, and that alone (pre-existing) enter from without, and be only DIVINE* '.

But then he distinguishes again concerning this *Mind or intellect*, and makes it two-fold; *agent and*

οὗτος ὁμοίως ἑβραίοις ὑφίσταται, διακρίνεται δὲ τῆς ἀκολουθίας· ἀρχὴν μὲν, ἀγνώστους ἵσαι φάσκον αὐτὰς ὥσπερ καὶ πᾶσαι ψυχῆς ἐκτατα εἰς ἀπὸρ-  
ρῆσιν τῆς τῶ μὴ ὡς αὐτὰς γινώσκαι δοῦναι βούλεται. *Præp. Evang.*  
l. xiii. c. 15.

" Ἐπεὶ οὐκ ἔστι τοῦ καὶ ἔτε τῶ ἐν, ἔτε τῶ ἀγαθῷ τοῦ αὐτοῦ, ἰδιοφύ-  
ξι. *Eccel. Phys.* l. i. c. 1.

<sup>c</sup> *Hist. of Phil.* Part v. Art. SPEUSIPPUS, c. 2.

<sup>d</sup> *Intell. System*, p. 55.

<sup>e</sup> Αὐτὸς δὲ τὸν καὶ μόνον δόξαται ἐπιστάναι, καὶ θεὸς εἶναι μέντοι.

*patient :*



patient: The former of which, he concludes to be *immortal*, and the latter *corruptible*.—*The agent Intellect is only immortal and eternal, but the passive is corruptible*<sup>1</sup>. Cudworth thinks this a very doubtful and obscure passage; and imagines Aristotle was led to write thus unintelligibly, by his doctrine of *forms and qualities*; which confounds corporeal, with incorporeal substances: But had that excellent person reflected on the general doctrine of the TO "EN, he would have seen, the passage was plain and easy; and that Aristotle, from the common principle of the Human Soul's being part of the Divine Substance, draws a conclusion against a future state of separate existence; which, though (as it now appears) all the Philosophers embraced, yet all were not so forward to avow. The obvious meaning of the words then is this: *The agent Intelligent* (says he) *is only immortal and eternal, but the passive, corruptible, i. e.* The particular sensations of the soul (*the passive Intelligent*) will cease after death; and the substance of it (*the agent Intelligent*) will be resolved into the Soul of the Universe. For it was Aristotle's opinion, who compared the Soul to a *rasa tabula*, that human sensations and reflections were passions: These therefore are what he finely calls, the *passive Intelligent*; which, he says, shall cease, or is corruptible. What he meant by the *agent Intelligent*, we learn from his commentators; who interpret it to signify, as Cudworth here acknowledges, the DIVINE INTELLECT; which gloss Aristotle himself fully justifies, in calling it ΘΕΙΟΝ, *divine*. But what need of many words? The Learned well know, that the *intellectus agens* of Aristotle was the very same with the *anima mundi* of Plato and Pythagoras.

<sup>1</sup> Τὸ το μόνον αθάνατον καὶ αἰώνιον, ὃ δὲ παθητικὸν καὶ φθαρτὸν.



Thus, this seeming extravagance in dividing the human mind into *agent* and *patient*, appears very plain and accurate: But the not having this common key to the ancient Metaphysics, hath kept the followers of Aristotle long at variance amongst themselves, whether their master did, or did not believe the Soul to be immortal. The anonymous writer of the life of Pythagoras, as we find it in the Extract, by Photius, says, *that Plato and Aristotle with one consent agree that the Soul is immortal: Though some, not fathoming the profound mind of Aristotle, suppose that he held the Soul to be mortal*<sup>2</sup>; that is, mistaking the *passive Intelligent* (by which Aristotle meant the present partial sensations) for the Soul itself, or the *agent Intelligent*. Nay, this way of talking of the *passive Intelligent*, made some, as Nemesius, even imagine that he held the Soul to be only a quality<sup>3</sup>.

As to the Stores, Cleanthes held (as Stobæus tells us) that every thing was made out of one, and would be again resolved into one<sup>1</sup>. But let Seneca speak for them all.—And why should you not believe something divine to be in him, who is indeed PART OF THE GODHEAD? That WHOLE, in which we are contained, is ONE, and that ONE is GOD; we being his Companions and Members<sup>2</sup>.

Epictetus lays, the Souls of men have the nearest relation to God, as being parts, or fragments of him, discerped and torn from his Substance. Ευαγγελίς τῷ Σίμῳ, αὐτὸ αὐτὰ νοοῦν ὅτι καὶ ἀποσπασμένα. This passage

\* "Οτι Πλάτων, Φοῖ, καὶ Ἀριστοτέλης, ἀδελφεοὶ ἐμῶν; λέγουσι τὴν  
 λογὴν εἶναι τὴν εἰς τὴν Ἀστρονομίαν καὶ οὐκ ἐμμετρονίαν, διότι οὐκ  
 ἔστιν ἀντικείμενον. Phot. Bibl. Cod. 209.

<sup>h</sup> Οἱ μὲν ἄλλοι τῆς ψυχῆς εἶναι λόγους ἔσταν, Ἀριστοτέλης δὲ καὶ Δε-  
καργ. ἀνέσιον. De Nat. Hom.

<sup>1</sup> *Eclog. Phys.* c. 20.

\* Quid est autem, cur non exillimes in eo divini aliquid ex-  
istere qui Dei pars est? Totum hoc, quo continemur, & unum  
est, & Deus: & totus ejus sumus, & membra. Ep. 92.

among it

amongst others, equally strong, is quoted by the learned Dr. Moor, in his book of the *Immortality of the soul*<sup>1</sup>. And one cannot but smile at the good Doctor's explanation of a general Principle which he could by no means approve. *These expressions* (says he) *make the Soul of man a ray or beam of the Soul of the World, or of God. But we are to take notice, THEY ARE BUT METAPHORICAL PHRASES.* So, the Socinian, to texts of scripture full as strong for the doctrine of the Redemption. And so, indeed, men of all Parties, when they would remove what stands in their way. They first change Things into Figures; and then change Figures into nothing.—But here the learned Dr. was, more than ordinary, unlucky in the application of his solution: for Arrian, the Interpreter of Epicetetus, tells us, by an apt comparison, what is meant by being part of the το ἐν, *I am*, says he, *a man, a part of the το παν, as an hour is part of the day; ἐμὶ ἄνθρωπος, μέρος των πάντων, ὡς ὥρα ημερας—*

Lastly, Marcus Antoninus, as a consolation against the fear of death, says, *To die is not only according to the course of nature, but of great use to it.* We shall consider how closely man is united to the GODHEAD, and in what part of him that union resides; and what will be the condition of that part or portion when it is resolved into the ANIMA MUNDI<sup>m</sup>. Here the doctrine of the το ἐν is hinted at; but writing only to Adepts, he is a little obscure. The Editors have made a very confused comment and translation: the common reading of the latter part of the passage is, *Καὶ ὅταν πῶς ἔχῃ διακέναι τὸ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ μέρος* which is certainly corrupt. Gataker very accurately transposed the words thus: *Καὶ πῶς ἔχῃ ὅταν*, and

<sup>1</sup> Book iii. chap. 16.

<sup>m</sup> Τὸτο μέντοι ἢ μόνον φύσεως ἔργον εἶναι, ἀλλὰ καὶ συμφέρον αὐτῇ πῶς ἀπλεται θεῷ ἀνθρώπῳ, καὶ κατὰ τί αὐτῷ μέρος, καὶ πῶς ἔχῃ ὅταν διακέναι τὸ τῷ ἀνθρώπῳ τὸ μέρος. Εἰς αὐτῶν, L. ii. c. 12.



for διακέναι, read διέκηναι. Mer. Casaubon, more happily, διαχέναι. They have the true reading between them: But not being aware that the doctrine of the *refusion* was here alluded to, they could not settle the text with any certainty. The last word ΜΟΡΙΟΝ can signify nothing else but a discerped particle from *the Soul of the world*. Epictetus uses it in that sense, in the passage above; and it seems to be the technical term for it.

But though here the imperial Stoic must be owned to be a little obscure; yet we have his own elucidating comment upon it, in another place. “You have hitherto existed as a PART [or have had a particular existence] you will hereafter be absorbed and lost in the Substance which produced you: or rather, you will be assumed into the Divine Nature, or the Spermatic Reasons.” And again, “Every Body will be soon lost and buried in the universal Substance. Every Soul will be soon absorbed and sunk in the Universal Nature.”

After all this, one cannot sufficiently admire how Cudworth<sup>p</sup> came to say, — “All those Pagan Philosophers who asserted the incorporeity of Souls, must of necessity, in like manner, suppose them not to have been made out of pre-existing matter, but by God, out of nothing. Plutarch being only here to be excepted, by reason of a certain odd hypothesis which he had, that was peculiarly his own, of a third principle besides God and Matter, an evil Demon, self-existent; who therefore seems to have supposed all particular hu-

<sup>p</sup> ΕΝΤΥΠΕΣΤΗΣ ΩΣ ΜΕΡΟΣ' ΕΝΑΦΑΝΙΣΘΗΣΗ ΤΩ ΓΕΝΝΗΣΑΝΤΙ· μάλλον δὲ ἀναληφθήσῃ εἰς τὸν λόγον αὐτὸς τὰ σπειρματικὸν καὶ ἀμεταβολόν. I. iv. c. 14.

<sup>p</sup> Πᾶσι τὸ εἶδος ἐμφανίζεται τάχις αὐτῇ τῶν ὅλων ὁσία, καὶ πᾶσι αὐτῇ· αἰς τοὺς τοῦ ὅλων λόγους τάχις ἀναλαμβάνεται. L. vii. c. 10.

<sup>p</sup> *Intell. System*, p. 741.



“ man souls to have been made neither out of nothing, nor yet out of matter or body pre-existing, but out of a certain strange commixture of the substance of the evil Soul, and God blended together; upon which account he does affirm souls to be not so much *ἔργον*, as *μέρος* Θεῶν, not so much *the work of God, as part of him.*” Plutarch’s words are these: “ The soul is not so much the work and production of God, as a part of him, — nor is it made by him, but from him, and out of him.” Ἡ δὲ ψυχὴ — ἐκ ἔργον ἐστὶ τῷ Θεῷ μόνον ἀλλὰ καὶ μέρος — ὅθ’ ὅτι αὐτοῦ, ἀλλ’ ἀπ’ αὐτοῦ, καὶ ἐξ αὐτοῦ γέγονεν.<sup>9</sup> On all which I will only make this observation: If Plutarch called the Soul *a part of God*, only in a figurative or popular sense, what hindered him from considering it as the *mere work and production of God*? Nay how could it have been considered otherwise? for figurative expression relates not to the *Nature of ideas*, but only to the *Mode of conveying them.*

1. But Cudworth thinks those Philosophers, who held the *incorporeity* of the Soul, must of necessity believe it to be made by God *out of nothing.* Why so? Because they could not possibly suppose it to be made out of *pre-existing Matter.* But is there no other pre-existing Substance in being, besides Matter? Yes the *divine.* Out of this, then, it might have been made. And from this, in fact, the Philosophers did suppose it to be made. The learned author, therefore, has concluded too hastily.

2. He thinks Plutarch was *single*, in conceiving the soul to be a *part*, rather than a *work* of God; and that Plutarch was led into that error by the Manichean principle: But how this principle should lead any one into such an error is utterly inconceivable. It is true, indeed, that he who already be-

<sup>9</sup> Plat. Quæst.

Sect. 4. of MOSES demonstrated. 227

lieves the Soul to be μέρος, or μέρος Σει, a part or particle of the Divinity, if at the same time he hold TWO PRINCIPLES, will naturally suppose the Soul to take a part from each. And so indeed did Plutarch: And in *this only*, differed from the rest of the Philosophers: who, as to the general tenet of μέρος, and not ἑσὺ Σει, that the soul was *rather a part, than a work of God*, were all of the same opinion with him.

SUCH was the general doctrine on this point, before the coming of CHRIST: But then, those Philosophers, who held out against the FAITH, contrived, after some time, to new model both their Philosophy and Religion; making their Philosophy more religious, and their Religion more philosophical: Of which I have given many occasional instances, in the course of this work. So, amongst the philosophic improvements of Paganism, the softening this doctrine was one; the modern Platonists confining the notion of *the Soul's being part of the divine Substance, to those of brutes*: Every irrational power (says PORPHYRY) *is resolved into the life of the whole*.

And,

Ἄνθρωποι ἐκείνη δύναμις ΑΛΟΓΟΙ εἰς τὴν ὅλην ζῶν τῷ παντί. But the elder Platonists talked another language; if Virgil may be allowed to know what they said:

Esse apibus partem divinæ mentis, & haustus  
Ætherios dixere. Deum namque ire per omnes.

But they were not content to speak a language different from their Master. They would, sometimes, make him speak theirs. So Hierocles tells us, Plato said, that "When God made the visible world, he had no occasion for pre-existent matter to work upon. His will was sufficient to bring all creatures into being." Ἀρχὴν γὰρ αὐτῷ εἰς ὑπόστασιν τῶν ὄντων τὸ ὁμοῖον εἶναι. *De fato & prov. ap. Phot.* But where Plato said this we are yet to learn.

Terrasque, tractusque maris, cælumque profundum  
Hinc pecudes, armenta, viros, genus omne ferarum,  
Quemque sibi tenues nascentem arcessere vitas.  
Scilicet huc reddi deinde, ac RESOLUTA referri  
Omnia;

Georg. iv. v. 225.

But



And, it is remarkable, that then, and not till then, the Philosophers began *really* to believe a future state of rewards and punishments. But the wiser of them

But now what temptation could the *later* Platonists have to make this alteration in favour of Paganism, if their master and his first followers called the human soul, *a part of God* only in a loose metaphorical sense? for such a sense could have reflected no disgrace upon their systems.

A passage of Plutarch will shew us the whole change and alteration of this system in one view; where speaking of the *opinions of the philosophers*, he says, "PYTHAGORAS and PLATO held the Soul to be immortal; for that launching out into the Soul of the universe, it returns to its Parent and original. The Stoics say, that on it's leaving the body the more infirm (that is, the Soul of the ignorant) suffers the lot of the body: But the more vigorous (that is, the Soul of the wise) endures to the conflagration. Democritus and Epicurus say, the Soul is mortal and perishes with the body: PYTHAGORAS and PLATO, that the reasonable Soul is immortal (for that the Soul is not God, but the workmanship of the eternal God) and that the irrational is mortal." Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων, ἀθάarton εἶναι τὴν ψυχὴν· ἐξῆσθαι γὰρ εἰς τὸ τῷ πατρὶος ψυχῇ αναχωρεῖν πρὸς τὸ ὅλον γένος. Οἱ Στωϊκοὶ ἐξῆσαν τῶν σωμάτων υποφέρειν τὴν μὲν ἀσθενέστεραν αἵμα τοῖς συγκρίμασι γινώσθαι (ταυτὴν δὲ εἶναι τῶν ἀπαιδευτῶν) τὴν δὲ ισχυροτέραν, δια ἐπὶ περὶ τῆς σοφίας, ἢ μέχρι τῆς ἐκπύρωσεως. Δημοκρίτης, Ἐπικύρησθαι φθαρτὴν, τῷ σώματι συνδιαφθερομένην. Πυθαγόρας, ἢ Πλάτων τὸ μὲν λογικόν, ἀθάarton (ἢ γὰρ τὴν ψυχὴν, ἢ θεόν, ἀλλ' ἔργον τῷ αἰδίῳ θεῷ ὑπάρχον) τὸ δὲ ἀλογον, φθαρτόν. Περὶ τῶν ἀρεσ. τοῖς φιλοσ. βιβλ. δ'. κ. ζ.

There is something very observable in this passage. He gives the opinions of the several Philosophers concerning the Soul. He begins with Pythagoras and Plato; goes on to the Stoics, Democritus and Epicurus; and then returns back to Pythagoras and Plato again. This seems to be irregular enough; but this is not the worst. His account of the Pythagorean and Platonic doctrine concerning the Soul, with which he sets out, contradicts that with which he concludes. For, *the launching out into the soul of the universe*, which is his *first* account, implies, and is, the language of those who say, that the Soul was *part of the substance* of God; whereas his *second* account expressly declares that the Soul was *not* God, that is, *part of God*, but only his *workmanship*. Let me observe too, that what he says further, in this *second* account, of the rational Soul's being immortal, and the irrational, mortal, contradicts what he in another place of the

same



them had no sooner laid down the Doctrine of the TO' EN than the Heretics, as the Gnosticks, Manicheans, and Priscillians, took it up. These delivered it to the Arabians, from whom the Atheists of these ages have received it.

Such then being the general notion concerning the nature of the Soul, there could be no room for the belief of a future state of rewards and punishments: and how much the Ancients understood the disbelief of the one to be the consequence of holding the other, we have a remarkable instance in STRABO. This excellent writer speaking of the Mosaic Religion, thus expresseth himself: *For he [Moses] affirmed and taught that the Egyptians and Libyans conceived amiss, in representing the Divinity under the*

same tract, quoted above, tells us, was the doctrine of Pythagoras and Plato concerning the soul; namely, that the human and brutal, the rational and irrational, were of the same nature, Πυθαγόρας, Πλάτων λογικὰς μὲν εἶναι καὶ τῶν ἀλόγων ζωὴν καθεμένην τὰς ψυχὰς οὐ μὴν λογικῶς ἐνεργοῦσας παρὰ τὴν δυσκρασίαν τῶν σωματίων. How is all this to be accounted for? Very easily. This tract of the *placits of the Philosophers* was an extract from the author's common-place: in which, doubtless, were large collections from the Pythagoreans and Platonists, both *before* and *after* Christ. It is plain then, that in the passage in question he begins with those who went *before*; and ends with those who came *after*. And it was the language of those *after*, to call the human soul, not (like their predecessors) a *part* of God, but his *workmanship*: so Plotinus, who came still later, tells us, that *the soul is from God, and yet has a different existence*: It was in their language, to call the *brutal soul*, *mortal*: and so afterwards Porphyry, we find, says, *every irrational power is resolved into the life of the whole*: for, this *resolution* or *λυσις*, was qualified with the title of *αἴσθησις*, or *φθάρματα* indifferently, as they were disposed to *hide* or to *reveal* it's real nature. While they held all souls subject to this resolution, they would, of course, keep it amongst their *SECRETS*, and call it *immortality*. When they began to make a distinction, and only subjected the *irrational* soul to this *resolution*, as in the passage of Porphyry, then they would call it *mortality*, as in this passage of Plutarch: a passage though hitherto esteemed an indigested heap of absurdity and contradiction, is now, we presume, reasonably well explained and reconciled to itself.

form of beasts and cattle: and that the Greeks were not less mistaken, who pictured him in a human shape; for God was that only ONE, which contains all mankind, the earth, and sea, WHICH we call HEAVEN, THE WORLD AND THE NATURE OF ALL THINGS. This, indeed, is the rankest *spinozism*: But very unjustly charged on the Jewish Lawgiver, who hath delivered, in his divine writings, such an idea of the Deity, that had he drawn it on set purpose to oppose to that absurd opinion, he could not have done it more effectually. What then, you will say, could induce so ingenuous a writer to give this false representation of an Author, to whose Laws he was no stranger? The solution of the difficulty (which Toland has written a senseless dissertation to aggravate and envenom) seems to be this: Strabo well knew, that all who held the TO'EN, necessarily denied a future state of reward and punishment; and finding in the Law of Moses so extraordinary a circumstance as the omission of a future state, in the national Religion, he concluded backwards, that the reason could be no other than the Author's belief of the TO'EN: For these two ideas were inseparably connected in the philosophic imagination of the Greeks. He was supported in this reasoning by the common opinion of the Greek Philosophers of that time, that the τὸ εὖ was an Egyptian doctrine: and he was not ignorant from whence Moses had all his learning.

But now, though the notion is shewn to be so malignant, as, more or less, to have infected all

\* Ἐφ' ἧς ἐκείνῳ καὶ ἐδίδασκεν, ὡς οὐκ ὁρθῶς φρονέουσιν οἱ Αἰγύπτιοι θεοὺς ἐκαστοὺς, καὶ βροσκήμασι τὸ θεῖον· ἅδ' οἱ Διόντες· οὐκ εὖ δὲ ἅδ' οἱ Ἕλληνες, ἀνθρωπομορφῶς τυπέντες· εἴη γὰρ ἐν τούτῳ μόνον θεὸς τὸ περιέχον ἡμᾶς ἀπασίας, καὶ γῆν καὶ θάλατταν, ὃ καλοῦμεν ἕρᾶν καὶ κόσμον καὶ τὰ τῆν ὅλων φύσιν. *Geog. lib. xvi.*

<sup>u</sup> See his *Origines Judaicae*.



the ancient Greek philosophy; yet no one, I hope, will suspect, that any thing so absurd and unphilosophical will need a formal confutation. Mr. Bayle thinks it even more irrational than the plastic atoms of Epicurus: *The atomic system is not, by a great deal, so absurd as spinozism* \*. And judges it cannot stand against the demonstrations of Newton: *In my opinion (says he) the Spinozists would find themselves embarrassed to some purpose, if one obliged them to admit the demonstrations of Mr. Newton* \*. In this he judged right; and we have lately seen a treatise, intitled, *An inquiry into the nature of the human soul*, &c. so well reasoned on the principles of that philosophy, as totally to dispel the impious phantasm of *spinozism*. He who would have just and precise notions of God and the Soul, may read that book; one of the best pursued pieces of reasoning, that, in my humble opinion, the present times, greatly advanced in true philosophy, have produced.

But it will be asked, From whence then did the Greeks learn this strange opinion? for we know they were not ΑΥΤΟΔΙΔΑΚΤΟΙ. It will be said, perhaps, from Egypt; where they had all their other learning: And the books which go under the name of TRISMEGISTUS, and pretend to contain a body of the ancient Egyptian wisdom, being very full and explicit in favour of the doctrine of the TO'EN, have very much confirmed this opinion: Now though that imposture hath been sufficiently exposed, yet on pretence, that the writers of those

\* Le Systeme des atomes n'est pas à beaucoup près aussi absurde que le spinozisme. *Crit. Dict. Article DEMOCRITE.*

\* Je croi que les spinozistes se trouveroient bien embarrassés, si on les forçoit d'admettre les demonstrations de Mr. Newton. *Ibid. Art. LEUCIPPE. Rem. (G) à la fin.*

† *Uf. Casaubon cont. Bar. Exerc. 1. No. 18.*



books took the substance of them from the ancient Egyptian physiology, they preserve, I don't know how, a certain authority amongst the learned, by no means due unto them.

However, I shall venture to maintain, that the notion was purely GRECIAN.

1. For first, it is a refined, remote, and far fetched, yet imaginary conclusion from true and simple principles. But the ancient Barbaric philosophy, as we are informed by the Greeks, consisted only of detached placits or tenets, delivered down from tradition; without any thing like a pursued hypothesis, or speculation founded on a system<sup>7</sup>. Now refinement and subtilty are the consequence only of these inventions.

But of all the Barbarians, this humour would be least seen in the Egyptians; whose Sages were not sedentary scholastic *Sophists*, like the Grecian; but men employed and busied in the public affairs of Religion and Government. Men of such characters, we may be sure, would push even the more solid sciences no farther than to the uses of life. In fact, they did not, as appears by a singular instance, in the case of Pythagoras. Jamblichus tells us, that *he spent two and twenty years in Egypt, studying astronomy and geometry*<sup>8</sup>: And yet after his return to Samos, he himself discovered the famous 47<sup>th</sup> prop. of the first book of Euclid. This, though a very useful, is yet a very simple theorem; and not being reached by the egyptian Geometry, shews

<sup>7</sup> Ἄλλ' ὅδ' οἱ παλαιοὶ τῶν φιλοσόφων ἐπὶ τὸ ἀμφοτέρῃν καὶ ἀποδείξει καὶ ὁρίεσθαι—οἱ μὲν γὰρ πρότεροι τῶν παρ' Ἑλλήσι φιλοσόφων ὑπὸ φιλοτιμίας κινήσας τε καὶ ἀτελεῖς, ἐλεγκτικῶς, ἅμα καὶ ἐριστικῶς, εἰς τὴν ἀχρηστον ἐξέωσαν φιλαρίαν· ἔμπροσθεν δὲ ἡ βαρβαρὸς φιλοσοφία, τὴν πᾶσαν ἐμὴν ἐκβάλλουσα.—Clem. Alex. Strom. l. viii. in prin.

<sup>8</sup> Δύο δὲ καὶ εἴκοσι ἔτη κατὰ τὴν Αἴγυπτον ἐν τοῖς ἀδούτοις διέτριβεν ὁ γεραιώτατος καὶ γειραιώτατος.—Vit. Pyth. c. 4.

they had not advanced far in such speculations. So again, in Astronomy: Thales is said to be the first who predicted an eclipse of the sun; nor did the Egyptians, nor any other Barbarians, pretend to dispute that honour with him. To this it may be said, that the Egyptians certainly taught Pythagoras the true constitution of the Solar system in general: and, what is more extraordinary, the doctrine of Comets in particular, and of their revolutions, like the other planets, round the sun<sup>b</sup>; which is esteemed a modern discovery; at least it needed the greatest effort of Newton's genius to render it probable; and still the periods of their revolutions are only guessed at. We grant they taught him this: but it is as true, that they taught it not scientifically, but dogmatically, and as they received it from Tradition; Of which, one certain proof is, that the Greeks soon lost or entirely neglected it, when they began to hypothesise<sup>c</sup>.

<sup>b</sup> It is recorded by Aristotle and Plutarch: and thus expressed by Amm. Marcellinus.—“*Stellas quasdam, ceteris similes, quarum ortus obitusque, quibus sint temporibus præstituti humanis mentibus ignorari.*” l. xxv. c. 10.

<sup>c</sup> *Fixas* in supremis mundi partibus immotas persistere, & planetas his inferiores circa solem revolvi, terram pariter moveri cursu annuo, diurno vero circa axem proprium, & solem ceu focum universi in omnium centro quiescere, antiquissima fuit philosophantium sententia. Ab Ægyptiis autem aliorum antiquissimis observationibus propagatam esse hanc sententiam verisimile est. Et etiam ab illis & a gentibus conterminis ad Græcos gentem magis philologicam quam philosophicam, philosophia omnis antiquior juxta & sanior manasse videtur. Subinde docuerunt Anaxagoras, Democritus, & alii nonnulli, terram in centro mundi immotam stare, & astra omnia in occasum, aliqua celerius, alia tardius moveri, idque in spatiis liberrimis. Namque orbis solidi postea ab Eudoxo, Calippo, Aristotele, introducti sunt; declinante in dies philosophia primitus introducta, & novis Græcorum commentis paulatim prævalentibus. Quibus vinculis antiqui planetas in spatiis liberis retineri, deque cursu rectilineo perpetuo retractos, in orbem regulariter agi docuere, non constat. In hujus rei explicationem orbis solidos excogitatos fuisse opinor, *Newton. de mundi systemate.*

It will be asked then, in what consisted this boasted Wisdom of Egypt; which we have so much extolled throughout this work; and for which liberty we have so large warrant from *holy Scripture*? I reply, In the science of LEGISLATION and CIVIL POLICY: But this, only by the way.

That the Egyptians did not philosophise by hypothesis and system, appears farther from the character of their first Greek disciples. Those early *Wise men*, who fetched their Philosophy from Egypt, brought it home in detached and independent *placits*; which was, certainly, as they found it. For, as the ingenious writer of *the enquiry into the life of Homer* says, *there was yet no SEPARATION of WISDOM; the philosopher and the divine, the legislator and the poet were all united in the same person*. Nor had they yet any Sects, or succession of Schools. These were late; and therefore the Greeks could not be mistaken in their accounts of this matter.

One of the first, as well as noblest systems of Physics, is the Atomic theory, as it was revived by Des Cartes. This, without doubt, was a Greek invention; nothing being better settled, than that Democritus and Leucippus were the authors of it<sup>d</sup>. But Posidonius, either out of envy or whim, would rob them of this honour, and give it to one Moschus a Phenician. Our excellent Cudworth has gone into this fancy; and made of that unknown

<sup>d</sup> It is remarkable that Democritus the Master of Epicurus gave but two qualities to MATTER, *figure and bulk, i. e. extension*. His disciple gave three, by adding GRAVITY. This quality was as sensible as the other two. What shall we say? That Democritus penetrated so far into MATTER, as to see that GRAVITY did not essentially belong unto it, but was a quality superinduced upon it. Certain it is, what Dr. Clarke conjectures, in his dispute with Leibnitz, that *Epicurus's Philosophy was a corrupt and atheistical perversion of some more ancient, and perhaps better Philosophy*.

Moschus,



Moschus, the celebrated Lawgiver of the Jews. But the learned Dr. Burnet hath clearly overthrown this notion, and vindicated the right of the discovery to the two Greeks \*.

This being the case, we may easily know what Plato meant in saying, that the *Greeks improved whatever science they received from the Barbarians* †. Which words, Celsus seems to paraphrase, where he says, the Barbarians were good at INVENTING OPINIONS, but the Greeks were only able to PERFECT and SUPPORT them ‡. And Epicurus, whose spirit was entirely systematic as well as atheistic, finding none of these delicacies amongst the Barbarians, used to maintain that *the Greeks only knew how to philosophise* §. So much was the author of the *voyage of Cyrus* mistaken in thinking that *the Orientalists had a genius more subtle and metaphysical than the Greeks* ¶. But he apparently formed his judgment in this matter, from the modern genius of the people, acquired since the time they learnt to speculate of the Greek Philosophers; whose writings, since the

\* “ Præterea non videtur mihi sapere indolem antiquissimorum temporum iste modus philosophandi per hypothèses & principiorum systemata; quem modum, ab introductis atomis, statim sequebantur philosophi. Hæc Græcæ sunt, ut par est credere, & sequioris ævi. Durasse mihi videtur ultra Trojanæ tempora philosophia traditiva, quæ ratiociniis & causarum explicatione non nitebatur, sed alterius generis & originis doctrinâ, primigeniâ & πατροπαράδοτῃ.” *Archæol. Phil.* l. i. c. 6.

† Διὸ καὶ ὡς ὁ Πλάτων φησιν, ὅ, τι ἂν καὶ παρὰ βαρβάρων μάνθημα λάβωσιν οἱ Ἕλληνες, τὸτο αἰμένοι ἐκφέρειν. *Anon. de Vit. Pyth. ap. Photium, Cod.* 249.

‡ Καὶ ἐγγύμως γε οὐκ ὀνειδίζει ἐπὶ τῇ ἀπὸ βαρβάρων ἀρχῇ τῷ λόγῳ, ἵπαινοι ὡς ἱκανὸς εὐρεῖν διγμάλα τῆς βαρβαρίας, ἀπορίθισσι δὲ τούτοις, ὅτι κριταὶ καὶ βελαιώσανται τὰ ὑπὸ βαρβάρων εὐρεθέντα αἰμίτους εἰσὶν Ἕλληνες. *Orig. cont. Celsum, p.* 5.

§ Ο δὲ Ἐπίκουρος ἱμναλιν, ὑπολαμβάνει μόνως φιλοσοφῆσαι Ἕλληνας ὀδύσανται. *Clem. Alex. Strom.* l. i. p. 302, Ed. Morel. 1629.

¶ *Voiez Disc. sur la mythologie,*

Arabian conquests, have been translated into the languages of the east.

It appears therefore, from the nature of the Barbaric philosophy, that such a notion as the TO "EN could not be Egyptian.

2. But we shall shew next, that it was in fact a Greek invention; by the best argument, the discovery of the Inventors.

TULLY, speaking of PHERECYDES SYRUS, the Master of Pythagoras, says, that he was the first who affirmed the souls of men were ETERNAL, "Quod literis extet, Pherecydes Syrus primum dixit animos hominum esse SEMPITERNOS; antiquus sane; fuit enim meo regnante gentili. Hanc opinionem discipulus ejus Pythagoras maximè confirmavit." This is a very extraordinary passage. If it be taken in the common sense of the interpreters, that Pherecydes *was the first, or the first of the Greeks, who taught the IMMORTALITY of the soul*, nothing can be more false or groundless. Tully himself well knew the contrary, as appears from several places of his works, where he represents the *immortality of the soul*, as a thing taught from the most early times of memory, and by all mankind; the author and original of it, as Plutarch assures us, being entirely unknown; which indeed might be easily gathered, by any attentive considerer, from the very early practice of deifying the dead. Cicero therefore, who knew that Homer taught it long before; who knew that Herodotus recorded it to have been taught by the Egyptians from the most early times, must needs mean a different thing; which the exact propriety of the word *sempiternus* will lead us to understand. Donatus the

\* *Tusc. Disp.* l. i. c. 16.



grammarian says, that *SEMPITERNUS* properly relates to the Gods, and *PERPETUUS* to men; *Sempiternum ad Deos, perpetuum proprie ad homines pertinet*<sup>1</sup>: Thus a proper *ETERNITY* is given to the Soul; a consequence which could only spring, and does necessarily spring from the principle, of the Soul's being part of God. So that Cicero hath here informed us of a curious circumstance; which not only fixes the doctrine of the *TO* *EN* to Greece, but records the Inventor of it: And this is farther confirmed by what he adds, that Pythagoras, the scholar of Pherecydes, took it from his master; and by the authority of his own name added great credit to it. So great indeed, that, as we have seen, it soon overspread all the Greek philosophy. And I make no question but it was Pherecydes's broaching this impiety, and not hiding it so carefully as his great Disciple did afterwards, by the *double doctrine*, which made him pass with the people, for an Atheist. And if the story of his mocking at all religious worship, which *Ælian*<sup>m</sup> mentions, be true, it would much support the popular opinion.

Tatian is the only ancient writer I know of, who seems to be apprized of this intrigue; or to have any notion of *Pherecydes's* true character. Tatian writing to the Greeks, against their Philosophers, says, *Aristotle is the heir of Pherecydes's Doctrine; and traduces the notion of the soul's immortality*<sup>n</sup>; i. e. rendered the notion odious, διαβάλλει; as such an immortality certainly was to the Christian Church. How true it is that Aristotle was heir to this Doctrine, may be seen above in the Interpretation of a passage in the *Nichomachean ethics*<sup>o</sup>. But it hath

<sup>1</sup> In *And. Ter. Act. v. Sc. v.*

<sup>m</sup> *Var. Hist. l. iv. c. 28.*

<sup>n</sup> Ο δὲ Ἀριστοτέλης τῷ Φερεκύδῳ δόγματι κληρονομῶν ἐστὶ, καὶ τῆς ψυχῆς διαβάλλει τῇ ἀθανασίᾳ. *Orat. ad Gr. c. 412.*

<sup>o</sup> See p. 221.

much



much embarrassed Tatian's commentators to find on what his censure was grounded.

That *Phercydes* was the inventor of this notion, and not barely the first bringer of it to the *Greeks*, may not only be collected from what hath been said above of the different genius of the *Greek* and *Barbaric* philosophy, but from what *Suidas* tells us of his being self-taught, and having no master or director of his studies<sup>p</sup>.

But as the *Greeks* had two Inventors of their best physical principle, *Democritus* and *Leucippus*; so had they two likewise of this their very worst in metaphysics. For we have as positive attestation that *Thales* was one of them, as that *Phercydes* was the other. *There are* (says *Laertius*) *who affirm, that Thales was the first who held the souls of men to be IMMORTAL*<sup>q</sup>; ἈΘΑΝΑΤΟΣ, an epithet, in the philosophic ages of Greece, which as properly signified the immortality of the *Gods*; as ἈΦΘΑΡΤΟΣ signified the immortality of *men*<sup>r</sup>. The same objection holds here against understanding it in the common sense, as in the case of *Phercydes*.

The sum then of the argument is this: *Thales* and *Phercydes*, who, we are to observe, were contemporaries, are said to be the *first* who taught the immortality of the soul<sup>s</sup>. In the common sense of this assertion, they were not the first; and known not to be the first, by those who affirmed they were so. The same Antiquity informs us, that they held the doctrine of the ΤΟ ἄΕΝ; which likewise, com-

<sup>p</sup> Ἄντὸν δὲ οὐκ ἰσχυρίσθαι καθήκον, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἀσχεῖσαι. *Voc. Pherecyd.*

<sup>q</sup> Ἐν οἷς δὲ καὶ αὐτοὶ πρῶτον εἰπεῖν φασὶν ἀθανάτους τὰς ψυχὰς. l. i. § 24.

<sup>r</sup> So Eusebius speaking of the political Gods of Egypt, says: Ἄλλως δὲ ἐκ τούτων ἐπιγινώσκουσι φασὶν, ὑπαρχέσθαι μὲν ΘΝΗΤΟΙΣ, διὰ δὲ συνέσει καὶ κοινῇ ἀνθρώπων ἐνεργείᾳ τετυχεῖσθαι τῆς ἈΘΑΝΑΣΙΑΣ—*Præp. Evang.* l. iii. c. 3.

<sup>s</sup> Suidas speaking of *Phercydes* says: Ἐξελοτῶσαι δὲ τὸν Θάλαττο· δοξάν. *Voc. Pherecyd.*

monly went by the name of the *immortality*. Nor is there any person earlier than these on record, for holding this doctrine. We conclude therefore, that those who tell us they were the first who taught the *immortality of the soul*, necessarily meant that they were the first who held it to be *part of the divine substance*. This, I say, we may conclude, although Plutarch had not expressly affirmed it of *one* of them, where he says, that Thales was the *FIRST* who taught the soul to be an eternal-moving, or a self-moving Nature<sup>1</sup>. But none, but God alone, was supposed to be such a Nature: Therefore the Soul, according to Thales, was part of the divine Substance; and he, according to Plutarch, was the *first* who held this opinion.

3. But though the Greeks were the inventors of this impious notion; yet we may be assured, as they had their first learning from Egypt, it was the recognition of some Egyptian Principles which led them into it. Let us see then what those principles were.

The Egyptians, as we are assured by the concurrent testimony of Antiquity, were amongst the first who taught that the soul survived the body and was *immortal*. Not, like the Greek Sophists, for speculation; but for a support to their practical doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment: and, every thing being done in Egypt for the sake of Society, a future state was enforced to secure the general doctrine of a Providence. But still there would remain great difficulties concerning the *ORIGIN OF EVIL*, which seemed to affect the moral attributes of God. And it was not enough for the purposes of Society, that there was a divine Providence, unless that Providence was understood to be

<sup>1</sup> Θαλῆς ἀπεφάνητο ΠΡΩΤΟΣ τὴν ψυχὴν, φύσιν ἈΕΙΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ ἢ ἈΥΤΟΚΙΝΗΤΟΝ. *Plac. Phil.* l. iv. c. 2.



perfectly good and just. Some solution therefore was to be given; and a better could not be well found, than the notion of the METEMPSYCHOSIS, or transmigration of Souls; without which, in the opinion of Hierocles<sup>a</sup>, the ways of Providence are not to be justified. The necessary consequence of this doctrine was, that the *Soul* is elder than the *Body*: So having taught before, that the *Soul* was eternal, *a parte post*; and now, that it had an existence before it came into the *Body*, the Greeks, to give a rounding to their system, taught, on the foundation of its pre-existence, that it was eternal too, *a parte ante*. This is no precarious conjecture; for Suidas, after having told us that Pherecydes (whom we have shewn above to be one of the inventors of the notion of the Soul's *proper eternity*) had no master, but struck every thing out of his own thoughts; adds, that *he had procured certain secret Phenician books*<sup>b</sup>. Now we know from Eusebius's account of Sancho-niatho, and the famous fragment there preserved, that these secret Phenician Books contained the Egyptian wisdom and learning.

The Greeks having thus given the Soul *one* of the attributes of the Divinity; another Egyptian doctrine soon taught them to make a perfect God *almighty* of it.

We have observed, that the *Mysteries* were an Egyptian invention; and that the great *secret* in them was the *unity of the Godhead*. This was the first of the ἀπορρήσια; in which, we are told, their Kings, and Magistrates, and a select number of the best and wisest, were instructed. It is clear then that the doctrine was delivered in such a manner as was most useful to Society: But the principle of the ΤΟ ἘΝ

<sup>a</sup> *Lib. de prov.* apud Phot. *Bib. Cod.* 214.

<sup>b</sup> Αὐτὸν δὲ οὐκ ἐσχηκέναι καθηγεῖναι, ἀλλ' ἑαυτὸν ἀσκῆσαι, κλησαμένους τὰ ΦΟΙΝΙΚΩΝ ἀπόκρυφα βιβλία.



is as destructive to Society, as Atheism can well make it. However, having suitable conceptions of the Deity thus found, they represented him, as a SPIRIT diffusing itself through the world, and intimately pervading all things. Παρ' αὐτοῖς τὸ παντὸς κόσμος τὸ δῆκόν ἐστι πνεῦμα, says Horapollo. And Virgil, where he gives us the ἀπόρρητα of the Mysteries, describes the Godhead in the same manner:

SPIRITUS intus alit, totamque infusa per artus  
MENS agitat molem, & magno se corpore miscet.

And thus, the Egyptians, in a figurative and moral sense, teaching that GOD WAS ALL THINGS<sup>r</sup>; the Greeks drew the conclusion, but in a literal and metaphysical; that ALL THINGS WERE GOD, "Εν τι τὰ πάντα, say the poems going under the name of Orpheus; and so ran headlong into what we now call *Spinozism*. But these propositions the Greeks afterwards father'd upon the Egyptians. The *Asclepian dialogue* translated into Latin by Apuleius, says, OMNIA UNIVS ESSE, ET UNUM ESSE OMNIA. And again: *Nonne hoc dixi OMNIA UNUM ESSE, ET UNUM OMNIA?* Μόρια τὴ θεῶν πάντα ἐσιν· εἰ δὲ πάντα μόρια, πάντα ἄρα ὁ θεός· πάντα ἔν ποιῶν, ἑαυτὸν ποιῶν. — εἰ τις ἐπιχείρησιν τὸ πᾶν ἢ ἐν χωρίσαι, τὸ πᾶν τὴ ἐνὸς λύσει ἀπολέει τὸ πᾶν, πάντα γὰρ ἔν εἶναι δεῖ. This passage cannot be well understood without recollecting what has been just observed above, of the Egyptian *premises* and the Greek *conclusion*. Now the Platonist, who forged these books, conscious of the Greek *conclusion*, artfully endeavours, in these words, to shew, it was a necessary consequence of the Egyptian *premises*; which, he would make us believe, conveyed an imperfect representation of the Universe without it. *If any man* (says he) *go about to separate*

<sup>r</sup> Δοκί' αὐτοῖς διχὰ θεῶν μηδὲν ὅλως συνιστάει. *Idem.*

<sup>s</sup> Lib. xvi. of the works of Trismegist, published by Ficinus.

*the All from the One, he will destroy the All; for All ought to be One.*

4. But this mistake concerning the birth-place of Spinozism, for a mistake it is, being chiefly, as we see, supported by the books, which go under the name of *Hermes Trismegistus*, it will be proper to say something to that matter.

The most virulent enemies, the CHRISTIAN FAITH had to encounter, on its first appearance in the world, were the PLATONISTS and PYTHAGOREANS. And *nation-l Paganism*, of which, these Sects set up for the defenders, being, by its gross absurdities, obnoxious to the most violent retortion, their first care was to cover and secure it, by *allegorizing* its GODS, and *spiritualizing* its WORSHIP. But lest the novelty of this invention should discredit it, they endeavoured to persuade the world, that this refinement was agreeable to the ancient mysterious wisdom of Egypt: in which point, several circumstances concurred to favour them. 1. As first, that known, uncontroverted fact, that the Greek RELIGION and PHILOSOPHY came originally from Egypt. 2. The state of the Egyptian *philosophy* in their times. The power of Egypt had been much shaken by the Persians; but totally overturned by the Greeks. Under the Ptolemies, this famous Nation suffered an entire revolution in their Learning and Religion; and their Priests, as was natural, began to philosophise in the Grecian mode; At the time we speak of, they had, for several ages, accustomed themselves so to do; having neglected and forgotten all the old Egyptian learning: which, if we consider their many subversive revolutions, will not appear at all strange to those who know, that this Learning was conveyed from hand to hand, partly by unfaithful *Tradition*, and partly by equivocal *Hieroglyphics*. However an opinion of Egypt's being the repository



tory of the true old Egyptian Wisdom, derived too much honour to the colleges of their Priests, not for them to contrive a way to support it. 3. This they did (and it leads me to the third favourable circumstance) by forging books under the name of HERMES TRISMEGISTUS, the great Hero and Law-giver of the old Egyptians. They could not have thought of a better expedient: For, in the times of the Ptolemies, the practice of forging books became general; and the Art arrived at its perfection. But had not the Greeks of this time been so universally infatuated with the delusion of mistaking their own Philosophy for the old Egyptian, there were marks enough to have detected the forgery. Jamblichus says, *the books that go under the name of Hermes do indeed contain the Hermaic doctrines, though they often use the language of the philosophers: For they were translated out of the Egyptian tongue by men not unacquainted with philosophy*<sup>a</sup>. These, it must be owned, were Translators of trust! who, instead of giving the *Egyptian Philosophy* in greek, have given us the *greek Philosophy* in the Egyptian tongue; if at least what Jamblichus says be true, that these forgeries were first fabricated in their own country language. But whether this Writer saw the cheat, or was himself in the delusion, is hard to say: He has owned enough; and made the matter much worse by a bad vindication. But the credit of these forgeries, we may well imagine, had its foundation in some genuine writings of Hermes. There were in fact, such writings: and, what is more, some fragments of them are yet remaining; sufficient indeed, if we wanted other proof, to convict the *books that go*

<sup>a</sup> Τα μὲν φερόμενα, ὡς Ἑρμῆ ἱερμαϊκὰ; περιέχει διδασκ. εἰ κ' ἐν τῇ τῶν φιλοσοφῶν γλώττῃ πολλὰ κείναις χρῆται, μεταγλωττίσας γὰρ ἀπὸ τῆς Αἰγυπτίου; γλώττης ἐν ἀλλοτρίᾳ φιλοσοφίᾳ οὐκ ἀπείρους ἐκχέουσι. *De Myst.*



under the name of Hermes, of imposture. For what Eusebius hath given us, from SANCHONIATHO, concerning the *Cosmogony*, was taken from the genuine works of Thoth or Hermes: and in them we see not the least resemblance of that spirit of refinement and speculation, which makes the character of those forged writings: every thing is plain and simple; free of all hypothesis or metaphysical reasoning; those inventions of the later Greeks.

Thus the Pythagoreans and Platonists, being supplied both with open *prejudices* and concealed *forges*, turned them, the best they could, against Christianity. Under these auspices, Jamblichus composed the book just before mentioned, OF THE MYSTERIES; meaning the profound and recondite doctrines of Egyptian wisdom: Which, at bottom, is nothing else but the *genuine Greek Philosophy*, imbrowned with the dark fanaticism of eastern cant.

But their chief strength lay in the *forgery*: And they even interpolated the very *forgery*, the better to serve their purpose against *Christianity*.

It is pleasant enough to observe how some primitive *Apologists* defended themselves against the authority of these books. One would imagine they should have detected the cheat: which, we see, was easy enough to do. Nothing like it: Instead of that, they opposed fraud to fraud: for some Heretics (the learned Beausobre, in his *history of Manichæism*, very reasonably supposes a Gnostic to have been concerned) had added whole books to this noble collection of *Trismegist*: In which they have made Hermes speak plainer of the mysteries of the christian Faith, than even the Jewish Prophets themselves. All this was done with a spirit not unlike that of the two law-solicitors, of whom the story goes, that when one of them had forged a bond, the other, instead of losing time to detect the cheat, produced  
evidence

evidence to prove that it was paid at the day: But this was the humour of the times: for the Grammarians, at the height of their reputation under the Ptolemies, had shamefully neglected *critical learning*, which was their province, to apply themselves to the *forging of books*, under the names of old authors. There is a remarkable passage in Diogenes Laertius, which is obscure enough to deserve an explanation; and will shew us how common it was to oppose forgery to forgery. He is arguing against those who gave the origin of Philosophy (which he would have to be from Greece) to the Barbarians; that is, the Egyptians. — *But these* (says he) *ignorantly apply to the Barbarians the illustrious inventions of the Greeks; from whence not only Philosophy, but the very Race of mankind had its beginning. Thus we know Musæus was of Athens, and Linus of Thebes: The former of these, the son of Eumolpus, is said to be the first, who wrote, in verse, of the sphere, and of the generation of the Gods; and taught, that ALL THINGS PROCEED FROM ONE, AND WILL BE RESOLVED BACK AGAIN INTO IT*<sup>b</sup>. To see the force of this reasoning, we are to suppose, that they whom Laertius is here confuting, relied principally on this argument, to prove that Philosophy came originally from the Barbarians, namely, that the great principle of the Greek Philosophy, the TO<sup>EN</sup> and the REFUSION, was an Egyptian notion. To this he replies, not so: Musæus taught it originally in Athens. The dispute, we see, is pleasantly conducted: His adversaries, who supported the common, and indeed, the true opinion of Phi-

<sup>b</sup> Λαθάνει δ' αὐτὸς τὰ τῶν Ἑλλήνων καθιερόμενα, ἀφ' ὧν μὴ ὅτι γὰρ φιλοσοφία, ἀλλὰ καὶ γινώσκοντες ἡγεῖται, Βαρβάρους προσάτιόντες. ἰδοὺ γὰρ παρὰ μὲν Ἀθηναίοις γινώσκοντες Μεσσηνίους, παρὰ δὲ Θηβαίους Δινῶν καὶ σὺν μὲν, Εὐμόλπου παῖδα φασὶν, ποιῆσαι δὲ θεολογίαν καὶ σφαῖραν πρῶτον φασὶν τι εἶς ἐκ τῶν πάντων γινώσκειν, καὶ ἵνα ταῦτα ἀναλυσθῶσι. Lib. i. § 3.

losophy's coming first from the Barbarians, by the false argument of the *τὸ πρῶτον* being originally Egyptian, took this on the authority of the forged books of *Trismegist*; and Laertius opposes it by as great a forgery, the fragments which went under the name of Musæus<sup>c</sup>.

These are my sentiments of the Imposition. Cassaubon supposes the whole a forgery of some Platonic Christians: But Cudworth has fully shewn the weakness of that opinion; yet is sometimes inclined to give them to the pagan Platonists of *those times*; which seems full as weak.

1. Because they are always mentioned, both by *Christian* and *Pagan* writers, as works long known, and of some considerable standing. 2. Because, had *those Platonists* been the authors, they would not have delivered the doctrine of the soul's consubstantiality with the Deity, and its refusal into him, in the gross manner in which we find it in the books of *Trismegist*. For, as we have shewn above by a passage from Porphyry<sup>d</sup>, they had now confined that irreligious notion to the Souls of brutes. At other times, this great Critic seems disposed to think that

<sup>c</sup> But this has been the humour of the zealous Partizans of a favourite Cause, in all Ages. Honest ANTHONY WOOD, recommending a MS. of a brother Antiquarian, one Henry Lyte, intitled, *Conjectural notes touching the original of the University of Oxon and city of Britain*, observes with great complaisancy—“in this are many *pretty fancies*, which may be of some use, “*as occasion shall serve, by way of reply for Oxon, against the “far-fetched antiquities of Cambridge.*”——A dispute had arisen between these two famous Universities, not concerning the superior Excellence of the one or other Institution; but of the superior Antiquity only. In a contention of the first kind, the Disputants would have had some need of Truth; all that was wanted in the latter, was well-invented Fable. Wisely therefore did our reverend Antiquary recommend to the Managers of this important question, the *PRETTY FANCIES* of this Oxford Champion, to oppose to the *pretty fancies* of the *far-fetched Antiquities* of the Cambridge Athlet.

<sup>d</sup> See note (†) p. 227.

they



they might indeed be genuine, and translated, as we see Jamblichus would have them, from old Egyptian originals: But this, we presume, is sufficiently overthrown by what has been said above.

In a word, these forgeries (containing the rankest *spinozism*\*) passed unsuspected on all hands; and the Principle of the *το ἐν* and *the refusion* went currently, at that time, for Egyptian: And though, since the revival of learning, the cheat hath been detected, yet the false notion of their original hath kept its ground. The celebrated M. La Croze has declared himself in favour of it. This is nothing strange; for learned, like unlearned men, are often carried away by Party. But that so discerning a man should think the notion well supported by a passage in a greek Tragic, (where the Writer, to keep decorum, puts the sentiment into the mouth of an *Egyptian Woman*,) is very strange. Theonoe, the Daughter of Proteus is made to say, *The mind or soul of the deceased doth not live*, [i. e. hath no separate existence] *but hath an immortal sensation, sliding back again into the immortal Æther*†.

Why I have been thus solicitous to vindicate the pure EGYPTIAN WISDOM from this opprobrium, will be seen in its place.

And now, to sum up the general argument of this last section. These two errors in the *metaphysical* speculations of the Philosophers, concerning *the nature of GOD, and of the SOUL*, were the things which necessarily

\* As in the following passage: Οὐκ ἤκησας ἐν ταῖς Γενεαῖς, ὅτι ἀπὸ μᾶλλον ψυχῆς τῆς τῶν πάντων πάσαι αἱ ψυχαὶ εἰσι; — As where it is affirmed of the world, πάντα ποιεῖ, καὶ εἰς αὐτὸν ἀποποιεῖν. — Of the incorruptibility of the soul; πᾶς μὲν τι δύναται φθαρεῖναι τῷ αἵματι, ἢ ἀπολέσθαι τι τῷ θνήσκειν — ὅς τις οὐκ ἐστὶν ἀπολλίμενός· τῆς ἐσότητος· τὸ θνήσκειν, ἀλλ' ὥσπερ ἐπλωμένον· καθάπερ τὸ τῷ ἡλίῳ φῶς.

† ὁ Νῦξ  
τῶν καθαρῶν ζῇ μὲν ἐν, γνῶν δ' ἔχει,  
Ἀθάνατον, εἰς ἀθάνατον Ἀδὴρ ἱμπεριῶν. Helen. Eurip.

kept them from giving credit to a doctrine, which even their own moral reasonings, addressed to the People, had rendered highly probable in itself. But as we observed before, it was their ill fate to be determined rather by *metaphysical* than *moral* arguments. This is best seen by comparing the belief and conduct of SOCRATES with the rest. He was singular, as we said before, in *confining* himself to the study of morality; and as singular in *believing* the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments. What could be the cause of his belief but this restraint; of which his belief was a natural consequence? For having confined himself to MORALS, he had nothing to mislead him: Whereas the rest of the philosophers applying themselves, with a kind of fanaticism, to *physics* and *metaphysics*, had drawn a number of absurd, though subtil conclusions, which directly opposed the consequences of those moral arguments. And as it is common for parents to be fondest of their weakest and most deformed issue, so these men, as we said, were easier swayed by their *metaphysical* than *moral* conclusions. But SOCRATES, by imposing this modest restraint upon himself, had not only the advantage of believing steadily, but of informing his hearers, of what he really believed; for not having occasion for, he did not make use of, the *double doctrine*. Both these circumstances, Cicero (under the person of Lelius) alludes to in the Character he gives of this divine Sage.— Qui Apollinis Oraculo sapientissimus est judicatus, *non tam hoc, tum illud, ut in plerisque, sed IDEM dicebat semper, ANIMOS HOMINUM ESSE DIVINOS: iisque cum e corpore excessissent reditum in Cælum patere optimisque et justissimo cuique expeditissimum*.\*— By which words, Cicero, as we observe, seems to refer to the *double doctrine* of the

\* De Amicitia, c. iv.

rest of the Philosophers, who sometimes pretended to believe a future state, and sometimes professed to hold the extinction or refusal of the human soul.

Thus, as the Apostle PAUL observes, the Philosophers PROFESSING THEMSELVES TO BE WISE, BECAME FOOLS<sup>b</sup>. Well therefore might he warn his followers lest they too should BE SPOILED THROUGH VAIN PHILOSOPHY<sup>i</sup>: and one of them, and he no small fool neither, is upon record for having been thus *spoiled*; SYNESIUS bishop of Ptolemais. He went into the church a Platonist; and a Platonist he remained; as extravagant and as absurd as any he had left behind him<sup>k</sup>. This man, forsooth, could not be brought to believe the *Apostle's Creed*, of the resurrection: And why? Because he believed with *Plato* that the soul was before the Body; that is, eternal, *a parte ante*: and the consequence they drew from this was, (as we have shewn) the very thing which disposed the Platonists to reject all future state of rewards and punishments. However, in this station, he was not for shaking hands with *Christianity*, but would suppose some grand and profound mystery to lie hid under the Scripture account of the RESURRECTION. This again was in the very spirit of *Plato*; who, as we are told by *Celsus*, concealed many sublime things of this kind, under his popular doctrine of a future state<sup>l</sup>. It was just the same with the Jewish Platonists at the time when the doctrine of a future state became national amongst that people. And *Philo* himself seems disposed to turn the notion of Hell into an allegory, signifying an impure and sinful life<sup>m</sup>.

<sup>b</sup> Rom. i. 22.

<sup>i</sup> Colos. ii. 8.

<sup>k</sup> See a full account of this man, his principles, his scruples, and his conversion, in the *critical Inquiry into the opinions of the Philosophers*, &c. c. xiv.

<sup>l</sup> See note (y) p. 164.

<sup>m</sup> See his tract *De conz. effu quærendæ eruditionis causâ*.

But



But it was not peculiar to the *Platonists* to allegorize the doctrine of the *resurrection*. It was the humour of all the *Sects* on their admission into *Christianity*. Et ut carnis restitutio negetur (says *Tertullian*) de una OMNIUM PHILOSOPHORUM SCHOLA fumitur<sup>a</sup>. Yet in another place he tells us, that *every Heresy received it's SEASONING in the school of Plato*. Dolco bona fide Platonem factum HÆRETICORUM OMNIUM Condimentarium<sup>o</sup>. For the Philosophers being, in their moral lectures in their schools (in imitation of the language of the *Mysteries*, whose phraseology it was the fashion to use both in *Schools* and *Courts*) accustomed to call vicious habits, *death*; and reformation to a good life 'ΑΝΑΨΤΑΣΙΣ or a *resurrection*, they were disposed to understand the RESURRECTION OF THE JUST in the same sense. Against these pests of the Gospel it was<sup>p</sup> that the learned apostle Paul warned his Disciple Timothy. SHUN (says he) PROFANE AND VAIN BABBLEDG, for they will increase unto more ungodlinefs. And their word will eat as doth a canker: of whom is Hymenæus and Philetus, who concerning the Truth have erred, saying that THE RESURRECTION IS PAST ALREADY; and overthrow the faith of some<sup>q</sup>.

And here I will beg leave to observe, that whenever the holy Apostles speak of, or hint at the Philosophers or Philosophy of Greece, which is not freedom, they always do it in terms of contempt or abhorrence. On this account I have not been ashamed nor afraid to shew, at large, that the reasons they had for so doing were just and weighty. Nor have I thought myself at all concerned to manage the re-

<sup>a</sup> De præsc. adv. Hæret.

<sup>o</sup> De Anim. c. 23.

<sup>p</sup> Hinc illæ subulæ & genealogiæ indeterminabiles, & quæstiones instructuofæ, & Sermones serpentes velut cancer: à quibus nos Apostolus refrænans, nominatim philosophiam; &c. *Tertul.* de præsc. adv. Hæret.

<sup>q</sup> 2 TIM. ii. 16.

putation of a set of men, who, on the first appearance of *Christianity*, most virulently opposed it, by all the arts of sophistry and injustice: and when, by the force of its superior evidence, they were at length driven into it, were no sooner in, than they began to deprave and corrupt it'. For from their *profane and vain babblings*, Tertullian assures us, every heresy took its birth. *Ipsi illi SAPIENTIÆ PROFESSORES, de quorum ingeniis omnis hæresis animatur*'. And, in another place, he gives us their genealogy. " Ipsæ  
 " denique hæreses à PHILOSOPHIA subornantur.  
 " Inde Æones & formæ, nescio quæ, & trinitas  
 " hominis apud *Valentinum*: PLATONICUS fuerat.  
 " Inde *Marcionis* deus melior de tranquillitate, a  
 " STOICIS venerat; & uti anima interire dicatur, ab  
 " EPICUREIS observatur: ET UT CARNIS RESTI-  
 " TUTIO NEGETUR, DE UNA OMNIUM PHILOSOPHO-  
 " RUM SCHOLA SUMITUR; et ubi materia cum deo  
 " æquatur, ZENONIS disciplina est: et ubi aliquid  
 " de igneo deo allegatur, HERACLITUS intervenit.  
 " Eædem materiæ apud hæreticos & philosophos  
 " volutantur; iidem retractatus implicantur. Unde  
 " malum, & quare? & unde homo, & quomodo?  
 " Et quod proximè *Valentinus* proposuit, unde deus?  
 " Scilicet & de Enthymesi, ectromate inferunt ARI-  
 " STOTELEM, qui illis dialecticam instituit, artificem  
 " struendi & destruendi, versipellem in sententiis  
 " coactam, in conjecturis duram, in argumentis  
 " operariam, contentione molestantem, etiam sibi ipsi  
 " omnia retractantem, nequid omnino tractaverit.

\* See the Introduction to *Julian*, or a discourse concerning his attempt to rebuild the Temple.

\* Adv. Marc. l. i. The author of a fragment concerning the Philosophers going under the name of Origen, says the same thing: ἀλλ' ἐν αὐτοῖς [Aristoteli] τὰ δοξαζόμενα ἀρχὴν μὲν ἐκ τῆς ἑλληνικῆς σοφίας λαβούσα, ἐκ δὲ μακρῶν φιλοσοφούμενων, καὶ ΜΥΣΤΗΡΙΩΝ ἱπποκρίσεων καὶ ἀστρολογικῶν εἰμβολιῶν.

" Hinc

"Hinc illæ fabulæ & genealogiæ indeterminabiles, & quæstiones infructuosæ & SERMONES "SERPENTES VELUT CANCER, a quibus nos apostolus refrænans", &c." One would almost imagine, from these last words, that Tertullian had foreseen that ARISTOTLE was to be the founder of the SCHOOL DIVINITY.

He observes, that the Heresy, which *denies the Resurrection of the Body*, arose out of the whole School of Gentile philosophy. But he omits another, which we have shewn stood upon as wide a bottom; namely, that which *holds the HUMAN SOUL TO BE OF THE SAME NATURE AND SUBSTANCE WITH GOD*; espoused before his time by the Gnostics, and afterwards, as we learn by St. Austin, by the Manichæans and Priscillianists.

Why the heathen Philosophers of our times should be displeased to see their ancient brethren shewn for knaves in practice, and fools in theory, is not at all strange to conceive: but why any else should think themselves concerned in the force and fidelity of the drawing, is to me a greater mystery than any I have attempted to unveil. For a stronger proof of the necessity of the Gospel of Jesus Christ cannot, I think, be given than this, That the SAGES OF GREECE, with whom all the WISDOM of the world was supposed to be deposited\*, had PHILOSOPHISED themselves out of the most evident and useful TRUTH with which mankind hath any concern.

\* *De præf. adv. Hæret.* p. 70, 71. Ed. Par. 1580.

"Priscillianistæ quos in Hispania Priscillianus instituit, maxime Gnosticorum & Manichæorum dogmata permixta sectantur; quamvis et ex aliis hæresibus in easordes, tanquam in sentinam quandam horribili confusione confluerint. Propter occultandas autem contaminationes & turpitudines suas habent in suis dogmatibus & hæc verba, Jura, perjura, secretum prodete noli. Hi ANIMAS DICUNT EJUDEM NATURÆ ATQUE SUBSTANTIÆ CUIUS EST DEUS. Aug. *De Hæresibus.*

1 COR. i. 20.

Besides,



Besides, what greater regard could any one shew to the authority of the Sacred Writers than to justify their CENSURE of the Greek Philosophy; a censure which Deists and Fanatics, though for different ends, have equally concurred to represent as a condemnation of human learning in general?

In conclusion, it is but fit we should give the reader some account why we have been so long and so particular on this matter.

One reason was (to mention no other at present) to obviate an objection, which might possibly be urged against our proof, of *the divine legation of MOSES, from the omission of a future state*. For if now the Deists should say (and we know they are ready to say any thing) that *Moses did not propagate that doctrine, because he did not believe it*; we have an answer ready: having shewn from fact, that *the not believing a doctrine so useful to society, was esteemed no reason for the Legislator not to propagate it*. I say, having shewn it from the practice of the Philosophers: For as to the Lawgivers, that is, those who were not Philosophers professed, it appears, by what can be learnt from their history and character, that they *all believed*, as well as taught, a future state of rewards and punishments. And indeed how should it be otherwise? for they were free from those *metaphysical whimsies*, concerning God and the SOUL, which had so befuddled the Greek Philosophers. And I know of nothing else that could hinder any man's believing it.

Against all this force of *evidence*, weak, indeed, as it is against the force of *prejudice*, the learned Chancellor of Gottingen has opposed his Authority, which is great, and his talents of reasoning and eloquence, which are still greater. “*Magnam non ita pridem (says he) ut Antiquiores mittam, ingenii vim et doctrinæ copiam impendit, ut in hanc*

nos sententiam induceret GUILIELMUS WARBURTONUS, vir aliquo in egregius et inprimis acutus, in celeberrimo et eruditissimo libro, quem, *The divine Legation of Moses demonstrated*, inscripsit Lib. iii. Sect. 4. Jubet ille nos existimare OMNES PHILOSOPHOS, qui animorum immortalitatem docuerunt, eandem clam negasse, Naturam rerum revera Dei loco habuisse atque mentes hominum Particulas censuisse ex mundi anima decerptas, et ad eam post corporum obitum reversuras. Verum, ut taceam, Græcorum tantum Philosophos eum testari, quum aliis tamen Populis sui etiam Philosophi fuerint, a Græcorum sententiis multis modis semoti, ut hoc, inquam, seponam, non apertis & planis testimoniis causam suam agit Vir præclarus, quod in tanti momenti accusatione necessarium videtur, sed conjecturis tantum, exemplis nonnullis, denique consuetudinibus ex institutis quibusdam et dogmatibus Philosophorum quorundam ductis—*De rebus Christ. ante Constantinum Magnum*, p. 18. Here the learned Critic supposing the question to be,—What the Philosophers of the ancient World in general thought concerning a future state? charges the Author of the Divine Legation with falling short in his proof, which reaches, says he, only the Greek Philosophers, though there were many other in the world besides, who dogmatized on very different principles. Now I had again and again declared, that I confined my Inquiry to the Greek Philosophers. We shall see presently, for what reason. What then could have betrayed this great Man into so wrong a representation? It was not, I am persuaded, a want of candour, but of attention to the Author, he criticized. — For, seeing so much written by me against the principles of those Ancients who propagated the doctrine of a future state, he unwarily concluded that it was in my purpose to discredit the doctrine, as discoverable by the light



light of nature; and, on that ground, rightly inferred that my business was with the whole tribe of Ancient Philosophers: and that to stop at the Greeks was mistaking the extent of my course. But a little attention to my general argument would have shewn him, that this inquiry into the real sentiments of a race of Sages, then most eminent in all political and moral Wisdom, concerning this point, was made solely to shew the vast importance of the doctrine of a future state of reward and punishment to society, when it was seen that these men, who publicly and sedulously taught it, did not indeed believe it. For this end the Greek Philosophers served my purpose to the full. Had my end been not the importance, but the *discredit* of the Doctrine (as this learned man unluckily conceived it) I had then, indeed, occasion for much more than their suffrage to carry my point.

In what follows of this learned Criticism I am much further to seek for that candour which so eminently adorns the writings of this worthy person. He pretends I have not proved my charge against the *Greek Philosophers*. Be it so. But when he says, I have not attempted it by any clear and evident testimonies; but only by conjectures; by instances in some Particulars; by consequences deduced from the doctrines and Institutes of certain of the Philosophers; This, I cannot reconcile to his ingenuous spirit of criticism. For what are all those passages given above, from Timæus the Locrian, from Diogenes Laertius, from Plutarch, Sextus Empiricus, Plato, Chrysippus, Strabo, Aristotle, Epictetus, M. Antoninus, Seneca and others, but *testimonies, clear and evident*, either of the parties concerned, or of some of their school, or of those who give us historical accounts of the Doctrines of those Schools, that none of the Theistical Sects of Greek  
Phi-



*Philosophy* did believe any thing of a future state of rewards and punishments.

So much for that kind of evidence which the learned person says I have not given.

Let us consider the nature of that kind, which he owns I have given, but owns it in terms of discredit. — In tanti momenti accusatione — *conjecturis tantum, exemplis nonnullis denique consecrariis ex institutis, &c.* —

1. As to the CONJECTURES he speaks of — Were these offered for the purpose he represents them; that is to say, directly to inforce the main question, I should readily agree with him, that in an *accusation of such moment* they were very imperinently urged. But they are imployed only occasionally to give credit to some of those particular *testimonies*, which I esteem *clear and evident*, but which he denies to exist at all, in my inquiry.

2. By what he says of the *instances or EXAMPLES in some particulars*, he would insinuate that what a single Philosopher says, holds only against himself, not against the Sect to which he belongs: though he insinuates it in defiance of the very genius of the Greek Philosophy, and of the extent of that temper (by none better understood than by this learned man himself) which disposed the Members of a School *jurare in verba Magistrum*.

3. With regard to the INFERENCES deduced from the *Doctrines and Institutes of certain of the Philosophers*; by which he principally means those deduced from their ideas of *God and the Soul*, We must distinguish.

If the *inference*, which is charged on an opinion be disavowed by the Opinionist, the charge is *unjust*.

If it be neither avowed or disavowed, the charge is *inconclusive*.

But

But if the *Consequence* be acknowledged and even contended for, the charge is *just*: and the evidence resulting from it has all the force of the most direct proof.

Now the *Consequence* I draw from the Doctrines of the Philosophers concerning *God* and the *Soul*, in support of my charge against them, is fully and largely acknowledged by them. The learned person proceeds, and assures his reader that, by the same way of reasoning, he would undertake to prove that none of the Christian Divines believed any thing of that future state which they preached up to the people. “Ego quidem mediocris ingenii homo et  
“tanto viro quantus est *Warburtonus* longe inferior,  
“Omnes Christianorum Theologos nihil eorum,  
“quæ publice tradunt, credere, et callide hominum  
“mentibus impietatis venenum afflare velle, convincam, si mihi eadem eos via invadendi potestas  
“concedatur, qua Philosophos Vir doctissimus aggressus est.”

This is civil. But what he gives me on the side of *ingenuity*, he repays himself on the side of *judgment*. For if it be, as he says, that by the same kind of reasoning which I employ to convict the Philosophers of impiety, the Fathers themselves might be found guilty of it, the small talent of *ingenuity*, which Nature gave me, was very ill bestowed.

Now if the Learned Person can shew that *Christian Divines*, like the *Greek Philosophers*, made use of a *double doctrine*—that they held it lawful to deceive, and say one thing when they thought another—that they sometimes owned and sometimes denied a future state of reward and punishment—that they held *God* could not be angry nor hurt any one—that the soul was part of the substance of *God*—and avowed that the consequence of these ideas of *God* and the *Soul* was, no



*future state of rewards and punishments* — When, I say, he has shewn all this, I shall be ready to give up the *Divines*, as I have given up the *Philosophers*.

But if, instead of this, he will first of all misrepresent the force of my reasoning against the *Philosophers*, and then apply it, thus misrepresented, against the *Divines*; bringing vague *conjectures* in support of the main question; making the *case* of particular (Synesius for instance) to include the whole body; or urging *consequences* not seen, or abhorred when seen, (such as Polytheism from the Trinity :) If, I say, with such kind of proof (which his ingenuity and erudition may find in abundance) he will maintain that he has proved the charge in question as strongly against Christian *Divines* as I have done against the Greek *Philosophers*; why then — I will agree with the first Sceptic I meet, that all enquiries concerning the *Opinions* either of the one set of men or of the other, is an idler employment than picking straws: For when Logic and Criticism will serve no longer to discover Truth, but may be made to serve the wild vagaries, the blind prejudices and the oblique interests of the *Disputers of this World*, it is time to throw aside these old Instruments of Vanity and Mischief.

#### S E C T. V.

**B**UT it may now perhaps be said, “ Though I have designed well, and have obviated an objection arising from the present question; yet, — Was it not imprudent to employ a circumstance for this purpose, which seems to turn to the discredit of the Christian doctrine of a future state? For what can bear harder on the REASONABLENESS of this doctrine, than that the best and wisest of Antiquity did



not believe a future state of rewards and punishments?"

To this I reply,

1. That if the authority of the *greek Philosophers* have found weight with us in matters of religion, it is more than ever the *sacred Writers* intended they should; as appears from the character they have given us of them, and of their works.

2. Had I, indeed, contented myself with barely shewing, that the Philosophers rejected the doctrine of a future state of rewards and punishments, without explaining the grounds on which they went, some slender suspicion, unfavourable to the Christian doctrine, might perhaps have staggered those weak and impotent minds which cannot support themselves without the Crutch of AUTHORITY. But when I have at large explained those grounds, which, of all philosophic tenets, are known to be the most absurd; and the reader hath seen these adhered to, while the best *moral arguments* for it were overlooked and neglected, the weight of their conclusions loses all its force.

3. But had I done nothing of this; had left I the Philosophers in possession of their whole AUTHORITY, that authority would have been found impertinent to the point in hand. The supposed force of it ariseth on a very foolish error. Those, who mistake CHRISTIANITY for *only a republication of the Religion of nature*, must, of course, suppose the doctrine it teacheth of a future state, to be one of those which *natural religion* discovers. It would therefore seem a discredit to that *Republication*, were not the doctrine discoverable by human reason; and some men would be apt to think it was not, when the Philosophers had missed of it. But our holy Religion (as I hope to prove in the last book) is quite another thing: and one consequence of its true nature

will be seen to be this, that the CHRISTIAN DOCTRINE of a future state is not in the number of those which *natural Religion* teacheth. The authority of the Philosophers, therefore, is entirely out of the question.

4. But again, it will be found hereafter, that this *fact* is so far from weakening the doctrines of Christianity, that it is a strong argument for the *truth* of that Dispensation.

5. Yet as we have often seen writers deceived in their representations of *Pagan Antiquity*; and, while zealously busy in giving such a one as they imagined favourable to *Christianity*, they have been all along diserving it; Lest I myself should be suspected of having fallen into this common delusion, I shall beg leave, in the last place, to shew, that it is just such a representation of ANTIQUITY as this, I have given, which can possibly be of service to our holy Faith. And that, consequently, if what is here given be the *true*, it does revealed Religion much service.

This will best appear by considering the *USUAL VIEWS* men have had, and the consequent methods they have pursued, in bringing PAGAN ANTIQUITY into the scene.

THEIR design has been, either to illustrate the REASONABLENESS, or to shew the NECESSITY of *Christianity*.

If the subject were REASONABLENESS, their way was to represent this *Antiquity*, as comprehending all the fundamental truths, concerning God and the Soul, which our holy Religion hath revealed. But as greatly as such a representation was supposed to serve their purpose, the Infidels, we see, have not feared to join issue with them on the allowed *fact*; and with much plausibility of reasoning, have endeavoured to shew, that THEREFORE CHRISTIANITY



WAS NOT NECESSARY. And this very advantage, TINDAL (under cover of a principle, which some modern Divines afforded him, of *Christianity's being only a republication of the Religion of nature*) obtained over some writers of considerable name.

If THE design were to shew the NECESSITY of Christianity, they have then taken the other course, and (perhaps misled by a sense of the former mischief) run into the opposite extreme; in representing Pagan Antiquity as ignorant even of the first principles of Religion, and moral duty. Nay, not only, that it knew nothing, but that nothing could be known; for that human Reason was too weak to make any discoveries in these matters. Consequently, that *there never was any such thing as natural religion*; and that what glimmerings of knowledge men have had of this kind, were only the dying sparks of primitive Tradition. Here the Infidel again turned their own artillery upon them, in order to dismount that boasted REASONABLENESS OF CHRISTIANITY, on which they had so much insisted: And indeed, what room was there left to judge of it, after human Reason had been represented as too weak and too blind to decide?

Thus while they were contending for the *reasonableness*, they destroyed the *necessity*; and while they urged the *necessity*, they risked the *reasonableness* of Christianity. And these infidel retortions had an irresistible force on the principles on which our Advocates seemed to go; namely, *that Christianity was only a republication of primitive natural Religion*.

It

As what is here said relates entirely to the revolutions in the state of Religion here at home, strangers will not be able to see the force of it, without some further account of this matter. — JUSTIFICATION BY FAITH ALONE, built upon the doctrine of the Redemption of Mankind by the death and sacrifice of Christ, was the great Gospel-Principle, on which PROTESTANTISM was



It appears then, that the only view of *Antiquity* which gives solid advantage to the CHRISTIAN CAUSE,

founded, when the Churches of the North-West of Europe first shook off the Yoke of ROME: By some perhaps pushed too far, in their abhorrence of the Popish doctrine of MERIT; the Puritan schism amongst us being made on the panic fancy that the Church of England had not receded far enough from Rome. However, *Justification by Faith alone* being a Gospel-Doctrine, it was received as the badge of true *Protestantism*, by all; when the PURITANS (first driven by persecution from religious into civil Faction, and thoroughly heated into Enthusiasm by each Faction, in its turn) carried the Doctrine to a dangerous and impure *Antinomianism*. This fanatic notion soon after produced the practical virtues of these modern Saints. The mischief which ensued are well known. And no small share of them has been ascribed, to this impious abuse of the doctrine of *Justification by faith alone*; first by depreciating MORALITY, and then by dispensing with it.

When the Constitution was restored, and had brought into credit those few learned Divines whom the madness of the preceding times had driven into obscurity, the Church of England, still smarting with the wounds it had received from the abuse of the great Gospel-principle of FAITH, very wisely laboured to restore MORALITY, the other essential part of the Christian System, to its Rights, in the joint direction of the Faithful. Hence, the encouragement, the Church gave to those noble discourses which did such credit to Religion, in the licentious times of Charles the Second, composed by these learned and pious men, abused by the Zealots with the nick-name LATITUDINARIAN Divines. The reputation they acquired by so thoroughly weeding out these rank remains of Fanaticism, made their Successors fond of sharing with them in the same labours. A laudable ambition! but, too often mixed with a vain passion for improving upon those who have gone, successfully, before. The Church was now triumphant. The Sectaries were humbled; sometimes oppressed; always regarded with an eye of jealousy and aversion; till at length this Gospel-principle of Faith came to be esteemed by those who should have known better, as wild and fanatical. While they who owned its divine Original found so much difficulty in adjusting the distinct Rights and Prerogatives of FAITH and MORALITY, that by the time this Century was ready to commence, things were come to such a pass (*Morality* was advanced so high, and *Faith* so depressed and incumbered with trifling or unintelligible explanations) that a new defini-

CAUSE, is such a one as shews natural Reason to be CLEAR enough to PERCEIVE Truth, and the necessity of its deductions when proposed; but not generally STRONG enough to DISCOVER it, and draw right deductions from it. Just such a view as this, I have here given of *Antiquity*, as far as relates to the point in question; which I presume to be the TRUE; not only in that point, but likewise with regard to the state of NATURAL RELIGION IN GENERAL: where we find human Reason could penetrate very far into the essential difference of things; but wanting the true principles of Religion, the Ancients neither knew the origin of obligation, nor the consequence of obedience. REVELATION hath discovered these Principles, and we now wonder, that such prodigies of parts and knowledge could commit the gross absurdities, which are to be found in their best discourses on morality. But yet this does not hinder us from falling into a greater and a worse delusion. For having of late seen several excellent systems of Morals, delivered as the *Principles of natural Religion*, which disclaim, or at least do not own, the aid of *Revelation*, we are apt to think them, in good earnest, the discoveries of natural Reason; and so to regard the extent of its powers as an objection to the necessity of any further light. The objection is plausible; but sure, there must be some mistake at bottom; and the great difference in

tion of our holy Religion, in opposition to what it's Founder taught, and unknown to its early Followers, was all in fashion; under the title of a *Republication of the Religion of Nature*; natural Religion, it seems, (as well as Christianity) teaching the doctrine of life and immortality. So says a very eminent Prelate\*. And the GOSPEL, which till now had been understood as but coeval with REDEMPTION, was henceforth to be acknowledged, as old as the Creation.

\* Sherlock. Sermons, vol. 1. Ser. 6.



point of excellence, between these *supposed* productions of mere Reason, and those *real* ones of the most learned Ancients, will increase our suspicion. The truth is, these modern system-makers had aids, which as they do not acknowledge, so, I will believe, they did not perceive. These aids were the true principles of Religion, delivered by *Revelation*: principles so early imbibed, and so clearly and evidently deduced, that they are now mistaken to be amongst our first and most natural ideas: But those who have studied *Antiquity*, know the matter to be far otherwise.

I cannot better illustrate the state and condition of the human mind, before *Revelation*, than by the following instance. A summary of the *Atomic Philosophy* is delivered in the *Theætetus* of *Plato*: yet being given without its principles, When *Plato's* writings, at the revival of learning, came to be studied and commented upon, this summary remained absolutely unintelligible: for there had been an interruption in the succession of that School for many ages; and neither *Marcilius Ficinus*, nor *Serranus* could give any reasonable account of the matter. But as soon as *Des Cartes* had revived that Philosophy, by excogitating its principles anew, the mist removed, and every one saw clearly (though *Cudworth*, I think, was the first who took notice of it) that *Plato* had given us a curious and exact account of that excellent Physiology. And *Des Cartes* was now thought by some, to have borrowed his original ideas from thence; though, but for the revival of the *Atomic* principles, that passage had still remained in obscurity. Just so it was with respect to the powers of the *HUMAN MIND*. Had not *Revelation* discovered the true principles of *Religion*, they had without doubt continued altogether unknown. Yet on their discovery, they appeared so  
consonant



consonant to human Reason, that men were apt to mistake them for the production of it.

CICERO (and I quote him as of superior authority) understood much better the true limits and extent of human knowledge. He owns the state of natural Reason to be just what is here delivered; clear enough to perceive Truth, when proposed, but not, generally, strong enough to discover it. His remarkable words are these——“*Nam neque tam est acris acies in naturis hominum, & ingeniiis, ut res tantas quisquam, NISI MONSTRATAS, possit videre: neque tanta tamen in rebus obscuritas, ut eas non penitus acri vir ingenio cernat, si modo adspexerit.*”

## S E C T. VI.

I HAVE now gone through the second general proposition, which is, THAT ALL MANKIND, ESPECIALLY THE MOST WISE AND LEARNED NATIONS OF ANTIQUITY, HAVE CONCURRED IN BELIEVING, AND TEACHING, THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS WAS NECESSARY TO THE WELL-BEING OF SOCIETY. In doing this, I have presumed to enter the very *Penetralia* of Antiquity, and expose its most venerable secrets to open day. Some parts of which having been accidentally and obscurely seen by the owl-light of infidelity, were imagined by such as Toland, Blount, and Coward, (as is natural for objects thus seen by false Braves) to wear strange gigantic forms of terror: and with these they have endeavoured to disturb the settled piety of sober *Christians*.

<sup>2</sup> *De Orat.* l. iii. c. 31.

The ridiculous use these men have made of what they did not understand, may perhaps recal to the reader's mind that stale atheistical objection, that RELIGION IS ONLY A CREATURE OF POLITICS, a State-engine, invented by the Legislator, to draw the knot of Civil Society more close. And the rather, because *that* objection being founded on the apparent use of Religion to Civil Policy, I may be supposed to have added much strength to it, by shewing in this work, in a fuller manner than, perhaps, has been done before, the EXTENT OF THAT UTILITY; and the large sphere of the Legislator's agency, in the application of it.

For thus stood the case: I was to prove MOSES'S *divine assistance*, from his being ABLE to leave out of his Religion, the doctrine of a *future state*. This required me to shew, that this doctrine was *naturally* of the utmost importance to Society. But of all the arguments, by which that importance may be proved, the plainest, if not the strongest, is the conduct of LAWGIVERS. Hence the long detail of circumstances in the *second* and *third* books.

But indeed it not only served to the purpose of my particular question, but, appeared to me, to be one of the least equivocal proofs of the truth of RELIGION in general; and to deserve, in that view only, to be carefully examined and explained. I considered this part, therefore, and desire the reader would so consider it, as a *whole* and separate work of itself, TO PROVE THE TRUTH OF RELIGION IN GENERAL, FROM ITS INFINITE SERVICE TO HUMAN SOCIETY, though it be but the *introduction* to the truth of the MOSAIC.

Let us examine it: Lawgivers have unanimously concurred in propagating Religion. This could be only from a sense and experience of its UTILITY; in which they could not be deceived: Religion there-



therefore has a general utility. We desire no more to establish its truth.

For, TRUTH AND GENERAL UTILITY NECESSARILY COINCIDE; that is, Truth is *productive* of Utility; and Utility is *indicative* of Truth. That truth is *productive* of utility, appears from the nature of the thing. The observing truth, is acting as things really are: he who acts as things really are, must gain his purposed end; all disappointment proceeding from acting as things are not: Just as in reasoning from true or false principles, the conclusion which follows must be necessarily right or wrong. But gaining this end is utility or happiness; disappointment of the end, hurt or misery. If then Truth produce utility, the other part of the proposition, that utility indicates truth, follows of necessity. For not to follow, supposes two different kinds of GENERAL UTILITY relative to the same creature, one proceeding from truth, the other from falsehood; which is impossible; because the natures of those utilities must then be different, that is, one of them must, at the same time, be, and not be, utility\*. Wherever then we find *general utility*, we may

\* How expedient it was to give this detailed proof of the coincidence of truth and general utility, may be seen by the strange embarras which perplexes that ingenious Sceptic, Rousseau of Geneva, when he treats of this subject. "Je vois, (says he, in his letter to the Arch Bishop of Paris) deux manieres d'examiner & comparer les Religions diverses, l'une selon le vrai & le faux, qui s'y trouvent — l'autre selon leurs effets temporels & moraux sur la terre, selon le bien ou le mal qu'elles peuvent faire a la Societé et au genre humain. Il ne faut pas, pour empêcher ce double examen, commencer par décider que ces deux choses sont toujours ensemble, et que la Religion la plus vraie est aussi la plus sociale. — But then again he says, — Il paroît pourtant certain, je l'avoue, que si l'homme est fait pour la Societé la Religion la plus vraie est aussi la plus sociale & la plus humaine — Yet for all this he concludes — Mais ce sentiment, tout probable qu'il est, est sujet a de grandes difficultés par l'histoire et les faits qui le contra-



may certainly know it for the product of Truth, which it indicates. But the practice of Lawgivers shews us, that *this utility* results from Religion. The consequence is, that RELIGION, or the idea of the relation between the creature and the creator, is true.

However, as the unanimous concurrence of Lawgivers to support Religion, hath furnished matter for this poor infidel pretence, I shall take leave to examine it more thoroughly.

Our Adversaries are by no means agreed amongst themselves: Some of them have denied the truth of Religion, because it was of no UTILITY; Others, because it was of so GREAT. But commend me to the man, who, out of pure genuine spite to Religion, can employ these two contrary systems together, without the expence so much as of a blush<sup>b</sup>. However the System most followed, is *the political invention of Religion for its use*: the other being only the idle exercise of a few Dealers in paradoxes\*.

I have begun these volumes with an examination of the *first* of these systems; and shall now end them with a confutation of the *other*. For the Unbeliever driven from his first hold, by our shewing the *utility* of religion, preposterously retires into *this*, in order to recover his ground.

CRITIAS of Athens, one of the thirty tyrants, and the most execrable of the thirty, is at the head of this division; whose principles he delivers in the most beautiful Iambics. His words are to this

contrariant."—p. 71-2. But Antiquity, which had intangled itself in this question, apparently drew *him*, in. The Sages of old saw clearly that *Utility* and *Virtue* perfectly coincided. They thought *Utility* and *Truth* did not; as conceiving the constitution of things to be so framed, that falsehood (as it was circumstanced) might at one time be of general benefit, just as Truth is at another.

<sup>b</sup> See Blount's *Anima Mundi*, and *Original of Idolatry*.

\* Such as the Author of *Du Contract Social*, Ch. VIII. p. 192. purpose:

purpose: "There <sup>c</sup> was a time when man lived  
 "like a savage, without government or Laws, the  
 "minister

"Ἦν χρόνος ὅτ' ἦν ἀτακτοῦ ἀνθρώπων βίη,  
 Καὶ θνητῶν, ισχύος ὃ ὑπείκειτο  
 "Ὅτ' ἔδδεν ἄθλον ἔτε τοῖς ἐσθλοῖσιν ἦν,  
 Οὐτ' αὖ κόλασμα τοῖς κακοῖς ἐγίνετο.  
 Κάπνιστά μοι δοκεῖσιν ἀνθρώποι νόμος  
 Θίσσεται κολαστῆς, ἵνα Δίκη τύραννος ᾖ  
 Γένος βροτῶν, τὴν δ' ἔχον δόλην ἔχρη  
 Εἰρημύτο, δ' εἰ τις ἐξαμαρτάνοι.  
 "Ἔπειν, ἐπιπὼν ταμψαν μὲν οἱ νόμοι  
 Ἀπῆγον αὐτοῖς ἔρτα μὴ πρᾶσσειν βία,  
 Λάθρα δ' ἔπρασσον, τηκνῶντά μοι δοκεῖ  
 Πικρὸς τις ἄλλος, καὶ σοφὸς γνώμων αἰτῆρ  
 Γεγονῆναι, ὃς θνητοῖσιν ἐξευραν, ὅπως  
 Εἴη τι δόγμα τοῖς κακοῖσι, καὶ λάθρα  
 Πρᾶσσουσιν, ἢ λείψουσιν, ἢ φρονέουσιν τι.  
 Εἰκένθην δὲ τὸ Δίῳ εἰσηγησάλο  
 "Ὡς ἐστὶ Δαίμων ἀφθίτῳ θάλλων βίῳ,  
 Νῶν τ' ἀκμων, καὶ βλέπων φρονεῖν τε, καὶ  
 Πεισίσχων τε ταῦτα, καὶ φύσει Δίῳ φρονεῖν  
 (Ἄφ' οὗ) πᾶν μὲν τὸ λελυθὲν ἐν βροτοῖς ἀκνέσκει  
 "Ὅς δρώμενον δὲ πᾶν ἰδεῖν δυνίσταται.  
 "Ἐάν τε σὺν σιγῇ τι βελύγῃς κακόν,  
 Τὸτ' ἐχί λησὶ τὰς θεάς, τὸ γὰρ φρονεῖν  
 "Ἔστι. Τόσδε τὰς λόγους αὐτοῖς λέγων  
 Διαδαιμάταν ἦδ' ἔπειν εἰσηγήσατο  
 Ψευδεῖ καλῆφας τὴν ἀληθεῖαν λόγῳ  
 Εἶναι δ' ἔφασκε τῆς θεᾶς εἰκένθην, ἵνα  
 Μάλιστα γ' ἐκπλήξῃαι ἀνθρώπων ἄγων,  
 "Ὅθι πρὸς ἴγνῳ τὰς φύβας εἶναι βροτοῖς,  
 Καὶ τὰς πατήτας τῷ ταλαιπύρῳ βίῳ,  
 Ἐκ τῆς ὑπερθε περισφορᾶς, ἢ ἀτραπᾶς  
 Καλυθεῖσας, δύναι τε εὐπνέμαλα  
 Βροτῶν, τό, τ' ἀστερωπὸν ἔραν δέμας,  
 Χρὸν καλὸν ποικιλίαν, τίκλον δ' σφῆ  
 "Ὅθι τε λαμπρὸς ἀγέρον γείχῃ χρόνος,  
 "Ὅ, δ' ὑγρὸς εἰς γῆν ὀμβρὸς εἰσπορεύεται  
 Τοιούτῳ περιέχθην ἀνθρώπων φύβας.  
 Δι' οὗ καλῶς τε τῷ λόγῳ κατακίστε  
 Τὴν δαίμονας καὶ ἐν περικύβῃ χροῖῳ  
 Τῆς ἀνομίας τε τῶν νόμοις κατέσσειται.  
 Οὕτω δὲ πρῶτον οἶμαι πείσαι τινα  
 Θνητὸς νομίζει δαιμόνων εἶναι γένος.

There



“minister and executioner of violence; when there  
 “was neither reward annexed to virtue, nor pu-  
 nishment

There are many variations in the reading of this fragment; and I have every where chosen that which appeared to me the right. That Critias was the author, how much soever the critics seem inclined to favour the claim of Euripides, I make no scruple to assert. The difficulty lies here: Sextus Empiricus expressly gives it to Critias; and yet Plutarch is still more express for Euripides: names the *Play* it belonged to; and adds this farther circumstance, that the poet chose to broach his impiety under the character of Sisyphus, in order to keep clear of the Laws. Thus two of the most knowing writers of Antiquity are supposed irreconcilable in a plain matter of fact. Mr. Petit, who has examined the matter at large, [*Observ. Miscell.* l. i. c. 1.] declares for the authority of Plutarch. And Mr. Bayle has fully shewn the weakness of his reasoning in support of Plutarch's claim. [*Crit. Diss. Art. CRITIAS, Rem. H.*] Petit's System is to this effect, that there is an *hiatus* in the text of Sextus: That a Copist, from whom all the existent MSS. are derived, when he came to Critias, unwarily jumped over the passage quoted from him, together with Sextus's observation of Euripides's being in the same sentiments, and so joined the *name* of Critias and the *Iambics* of Euripides together. But this is such a liberty of conjecturing, as would unsettle all the monuments of Antiquity. I take the true solution of the difficulty to be this: Critias, a man, as the Ancients deliver him to us, of atheistic principles, and a fine poetic genius, composed these *Iambics* for the private solace of his Fraternity; which were not kept so close but that they got air, and came to the knowledge of Euripides: to whom the general stream of antiquity concurs in giving a very virtuous and religious character, notwithstanding the iniquitous insinuations of Plutarch to the contrary. And the Tragic Poet, being to draw the Atheist, Sisyphus, artfully projected to put these *Iambics* into his mouth: for by this means the sentiments would be sure to be natural, as taken from real life; and the poet safe from the danger of being called to account for them. And supposing this to be the case, Plutarch's account becomes very reasonable; who tells us, the Poet delivered this atheistic doctrine by a dramatic character, to evade the justice of the Areopagus; but, without this, it can by no means be admitted: For, thinly to screen impiety by the mere interposition of the Drama, which was an important part in their festivals, and under the constant eye of the Magistrate, was a poor way of evading the penetration and severity of that formidable judicature,



“ nishment attendant upon vice. Afterwards, it  
 “ appears, that men invented civil Laws to be a  
 “ curb to evil. From hence, Justice presided over

judicature, how good a shift soever it might prove against modern penal Laws. But the giving the known verses of Critias to his Atheist, was a safe way of keeping under cover. For all resentment must needs fall on the real author; especially when, it was seen, they were only produced for condemnation, as will now be shewn. Without doubt, the chief motive Euripides had in this contrivance, was the satisfaction of exposing a very wicked man; in which he had nothing from his adversary's power to deter him, for Critias was then a private man; the *Sisyphus* being acted in the 91<sup>st</sup> Olymp. and the tyranny of the Thirty not beginning till the latter end of the 93<sup>d</sup>. But what is above all, the genius and cast of that particular Drama wonderfully favoured his design: for the *Sisyphus* was the last of a *tetralogy* (*τετραλογία τραγικῶν δραμάτων*) or a *satiric tragedy*, in which species of poetry, a licence something resembling that of the *old comedy*, of branding evil citizens, was indulged; and where, the same custom of parodying the verses of rival poets was in use. And we may be sure that Euripides, who was wont to satirize his fellow-writers in his serious tragedies (as where in his *Electra* he ridicules the *discovery* in the *Choëphorai* of *Æschylus*) would be little disposed to spare them in this ludicrous kind of composition. Admitting this to be the case; it could not but be, that, for a good while after, these *Iambics* would be quoted by some as Critias's, whose property they were; and by others, as Euripides's, who had got the use, and in whose Tragedy they were found; and by both with reason. But in after-times, this matter was forgotten or not attended to; and then some took them for Euripides's, exclusive of the right of Critias; and others, on the contrary: And as a Copist fancied this or that man the author, so they read the text. Of this, we have a remarkable instance in the 35<sup>th</sup> verse, where a transcriber, imagining the fragment to be the Tragic Poet's, chose to read,

Ὅθεν τε λαμπρὸς ἀνὴρ εὖ χεῖρ μύδρῳ.

Because this expresses the peculiar Physiognomy of Anaxagoras, the preceptor of Euripides; which Mr. Barnes thought a convincing proof of the fragment's being really his: whereas that reading makes a sense defective and impertinent; the true being evidently this of Grotius:

Λαμπρὸς ἀνὴρ εὖ χεῖρ χορῷ.

And thus, I suppose, Plutarch and Sextus may be well reconciled.

“ the

“ the human race ; force became a slave to right,  
“ and punishment irremissibly pursued the trans-  
“ gressor. But when now the laws had restrained  
“ an open violation of right, men set upon contriv-  
“ ing, how to injure others, in secret. And then it  
“ was, as I suppose, that some CUNNING POLITI-  
“ CIAN, well versed in the knowledge of mankind,  
“ counterplotted this design, by the invention of a  
“ principle that would hold wicked men in awe,  
“ even when about to say, or think, or act ill in  
“ private. And this was by bringing in the BE-  
“ LIEF OF A GOD ; whom, he taught to be immor-  
“ tal, of infinite knowledge, and of a nature super-  
“ latively excellent. This God, he told them,  
“ could hear and see every thing said and done by  
“ mortals here below : nor could the first concep-  
“ tion of the most secret wickedness be concealed  
“ from him, of whose nature, knowledge was the  
“ very essence. Thus did our POLITICIAN, by in-  
“ culcating these notions, become the author of a  
“ doctrine wonderfully taking ; while he hid truth  
“ under the embroidered veil of fiction. But to  
“ add servile dread to this impressed reverence, the  
“ Gods, he told them, inhabited that place, which  
“ he found was the repository of those Mormo's,  
“ and panic terrors, which man was so dexterous at  
“ feigning, and so ready to fright himself withal,  
“ while he adds imaginary miseries to a life already  
“ over-burthened with disasters. That place, I  
“ mean, where the swift coruscations of enkindled  
“ meteors, accompanied with horrid bursts of thun-  
“ der, run through the starry vaults of heaven ; the  
“ beautiful fret-work of that wise old Architect,  
“ TIME. Where a social troop of shining orbs per-  
“ form their regular and benignant courses : and  
“ from whence refreshing showers descend to re-  
“ create the thirsty earth. Such was the habitation  
“ he

“ he assigned for the Gods; a place most proper  
 “ for the discharge of their functions: And with  
 “ the terrors he applied, to circumvent their mi-  
 “ chief, stifle disorder in the seeds, give his Law, for  
 “ play, and introduce Religion, by necessity in the Dis-  
 “ gistrate. — This, in my opinion, was the reason,  
 “ whereby mortal man was first brought to believe  
 “ that there were immortal Natures.”

How excellent a thing is justice, said Somebody or  
 other, on observing it to be practised in the persons of  
 thieves and robbers? How useful, how necessary a  
 thing is Religion, may we say, when it forces this  
 confession of its power, from its two most mortal  
 enemies, the Tyrant and the Atheist?

The account here given of Religion is, that it  
 was a STATE INVENTION: that is, *that the idea of  
 the relation between the creature and the Creator was  
 formed and contrived by politicians to keep men in awe.*  
 From whence the Infidel concludes it to be VANI-  
 TARY and GROUNDLESS. From the Magistrate's  
 large share in the Establishment of ancient national  
 Religions, two consequences are drawn: the one by  
*Believers*; the other by *Unbelievers*. The first con-  
 clude that therefore these *national Religions* were of  
 political original: and this the ancient Fathers of the  
 Church spent much time and pains to prove. The  
 Second conclude, from the same fact, that therefore  
*Religion in general*, or the idea of the relation between  
 the creature and the Creator, was a politic invention,  
 and not founded in the nature of things. And if in  
 confuting this, I strengthen and support the other  
 conclusion, I suppose, that, in so doing, I give ad-  
 ditional strength to the cause of *Revelation*; other-  
 wise the *Fathers* were very much mistaken. And  
 though Infidels, indeed, in their writings, affect to  
 dwell upon this conclusion, “ that *Superstition* was a  
 State-invention;” it is not, I presume, on account



of any service, which they imagine it can do their cause; but because it enables them to strike obliquely, under that cover, at *Religion* in general, when they do not care to appear without their mask. But if ever they should take it into their heads to deny, that there is any better proof of *Superstition's* being a mere politic invention than that *Religion in general* is so, let them take notice that I have here answered them beforehand. On the whole then, if I prove that *Religion in general* was not a politic invention, I enervate all the force of the Atheist's argument against *Revelation*, taken from the *invention of Religion*. For that *Superstition* was of human original, both parties seem to agree: though not *all of it* the invention of Statesmen, as we shall see presently, when we come to shew that *one species* of Idolatry was *in use* even before the institution of civil Society.

I shall prove then, and in a very few words, that their *fact* or *position* is *first*, IMPERTINENT, and *secondly*, FALSE. For,

## I.

Were it true, as it certainly is not, that *Religion was invented by Statesmen*, it would not therefore follow that *Religion is false*. A consequence that has been, I do not know how, allowed on all hands; perhaps on the mistaken force of one or other of these Propositions.

I. Either, *that Religion was not found out, as a truth, by the use of Reason.*

II. Or, *that it was invented only for its Utility.*

III. Or lastly, *that the Inventors did not believe it.*

I. As to *Religion's not being found out, as a truth, by the use of reason*, we are to consider, that the finding out a truth by reason, necessarily implies the exercise of that faculty, in proportion to the importance and difficulty of the search: so that  
where

where men do not use their reason, truths of the utmost certainty and highest use will remain unknown. We are not accustomed to reckon it any objection to the most useful civil truths, that divers savage nations in Africa and America, remain yet ignorant of them.

Now the objection against the truth of Religion, is founded on this pretended fact, that the Lawgiver taught it to the people from the most early times. And the Infidel System is, that man from his first appearance in the world, even to those early times of his coming under the hands of the Civil Magistrate, differed little from brutes in the use of his rational faculties; and that the improvement of them was gradual and slow: for which, Antiquity is appealed to, in the account it gives us concerning the late invention of the arts of life. Thus, according to their own state of the case, Religion was taught mankind when the generality had not begun to cultivate their rational faculties; and, what is chiefly remarkable, it was TAUGHT BY THOSE FEW WHO

AD.

It is true, our holy Religion gives a different account of *these first men*: But then it gives a different account too of the *origin of Religion*. And let our Adversaries prevaricate as they will, they must take *both or neither*. For that very thing which was only able to make the first men so enlightened, as they are represented in Scripture, was *Revelation*; and, this allowed, the dispute is at an end.

If it should be said, That “supposing Religion true, it is of so much importance to mankind, that God would never suffer us to remain ignorant of it:” I allow the force of the objection: but then we are not to prescribe to the Almighty his way of bringing us to the knowledge of his Will. It is sufficient to justify his goodness, that he hath done it:

and whether he chose the way of REVELATION, or of REASON, or of the CIVIL MAGISTRATE, it equally manifests his wisdom. And why it might not happen to this *truth*, as it hath done to many others of great importance, to be first stumbled upon by chance, and mistaken for a mere *utility*; and afterwards seen and proved to be what it is, I would beg leave to demand of these mighty Masters of reason.

II. *As to Religion's being invented only for its utility*: This, though their palmary argument against it, is, of all, the most unlucky. It proceeds on a supposed inconsistency between *utility* and *truth*. For men perceiving much of it, between private, partial, utility and truth, were absurdly brought to think there might be the same inconsistency, between general utility and some truths. This it was which led the ancient Sages into so many errors. For neither *Philosopher* nor *Lawgiver* apprehending THAT TRUTH AND UTILITY DID COINCIDE; the First, while he neglected utility, missed (as we have seen) of the most momentous *truths*: and the Other, while little solicitous about truth, missed in many instances (as we shall see hereafter) of *utility*. But general utility and all truth, necessarily coincide. For truth is nothing but that natural or moral relation of things, whose observance is attended with universal benefit. We may therefore as certainly conclude that *general utility* is always founded on *truth*, as that *truth* is always productive of *general utility*. Take then this concession of the Atheist for granted, *that Religion is productive of public good*, and the very contrary to his inference, as we have seen above, MUST follow: namely, *that Religion is true*.

If it should be urged, That "experience maketh against this reasoning; for that it was *not Religion*, but SUPERSTITION, that, for the most part, procured



cured this public utility: and superstition, both sides agree to be *erroneous*." To this we reply, that *Superstition* was so far from procuring any good in the ancient world, where it was indeed more or less mixed with all the national Religions, that the good which Religion procured, was allayed with evil, in proportion to the quantity of Superstition found therein. And the less of Superstition there was in any national Religion, the happier, *ceteris paribus*, we always find that people; and the more there was of it, the unhappier. It could not be otherwise, for, if we examine the case, it will appear, That all those advantages which result from the worship of a superior Being, are the consequences only of the true principles of Religion: and that the mischiefs which result from such worship, are the consequences only of the false; or what we call *Superstition*.

The wiser Ancients (in whose times, SUPERSTITION, with it's malignant embraces, had twined itself round the noble trunk of RELIGION, had poisoned her benigne qualities, deformed all her comeliness, and usurped her very NAME) were so struck and affected with what they saw and felt, that some of them thought, even ATHEISM was to be preferred before her. PLUTARCH composed a fine rhetorical discourse in favour of this strange paradox; which hath since given frequent occasion to much sophistical declamation. M. BAYLE hath supported Plutarch's Thesis at large, in an *historical and Philosophical Commentary*: Yet, by neglecting, or rather confounding, a real and material DISTINCTION, neither the ancient nor the modern Writer hath put the reader fairly into possession of the question. So that, both the SUBJECT and the RESULT of the Proposition are left in that *inconclusive* state of ambiguity which is necessary to give a *Paradox* the air and reputation of an *Oracle*.

The ambiguity in the *subject* ariseth from the word, SUPERSTITION's being so laxly employed as to admit of two senses: either as a THING ADVENTITIOUS TO RELIGION, with which it is fatally apt to mix itself; Or as a CORRUPT SPECIES OF RELIGION. In the first sense, Superstition is of *no use at all*, but of infinite mischief; and worse than Atheism itself: In the second sense, of a corrupt Religion, it is of *great service*: For, by teaching a Providence, on which mankind depends, it imposeth a necessary curb upon individuals, so as to prevent the mischiefs of mutual violence and injustice. It is likewise, indeed, of *great disservice*: for, by infusing wrong notions of the moral attributes of God, it hinders the progress of Virtue; and sometimes sets up a false species of it. However, in the sense of a *corrupt Religion*, the Reader sees, it is infinitely preferable to Atheism: As in a Drug of sovereign efficacy, the application even of that which by time or accident is become decayed or viciated, is, in desperate disorders, greatly to be preferred to the rejection; tho' it may engender bad habits in the Constitution it preserves; which, the sound and pure species would not have done. Now one of the leading fallacies, which runs through PLUTARCH's little Tract, keeps under the cover of this ambiguity, in the SUBJECT.

The ambiguity in the PREDICATE does as much service to sophistry. "Superstition (they say) is *worse* than Atheism." They do not tell us, to WHOM; but leave us to conclude, that they mean, both to PARTICULARS and to SOCIETY; as taking it for granted, that if worse to *one*, it must needs be worse to the *other*. But here they are mistaken: and so, from this ambiguity arises a *new* fallacy, which mixes itself with the other. The degree of mischief caused by Superstition is different, as it respects its objects,



objects, *Individuals* or *Societies*. Superstition, as it signifies only a CORRUPT RITE, is more hurtful to Societies than to Individuals; and to both, *worse* than Atheism. But as it signifies a CORRUPT RELIGION, it is less hurtful to Societies than to Individuals; and, to both, *better* than Atheism. The confounding this *distinction* makes the ambiguity in which Bayle principally delights to riot. And this, by the assistance of the other from Plutarch, supports him in all his gross equivocations, and imperfect estimates: Till at length, it encourages him to pronounce, in the most general terms, that *Superstition is worse than Atheism*<sup>d</sup>.

BAYLE is a great deal too diffused to come within the limits of this examination. But as PLUTARCH led the way; and hath even dazzled BACON himself<sup>e</sup>, with the splendor of his discourse; I propose to examine his arguments, as they lie in order: Whereby it will appear that, besides the capital fallacies above detected, it abounds with a variety of other sophisms, poured out with a profusion which equals, and keeps pace with the torrent of his wit and eloquence.

This famous Tract is, as we have observed, a florid declamation, adorned with all the forms and colouring of Rhetoric; when the question demanded severe reasoning, and philosophical precision. At the same time, it must be owned, that it is of a genius very different from those luxuriant, and, at the same time, barren Dissertations of the Sophists. It is painted all over with bright and lively images, it sparkles with witty allusions, it amuses with quaint

<sup>d</sup> Pensées diverses écrites à un Docteur de Sorbonne à l'occasion de la comète qui parut au mois de Decembre 1680. Et continuation des Pensées diverses, &c.

<sup>e</sup> See his *Essays*; where this paradox of Plutarch is supported.



and uncommon families; and, in every decoration of spirit and genius, equals the finest compositions of Antiquity: Indeed, as to the solidity and exactness of the Logic, it is on a level with the meanest: His REASONING is the only part I am concerned with; and no more of this, than lies in one continued COMPARISON between Atheism and Superstition: For, as to his positive proofs, from fact, of the actual mischiefs of Superstition, I am willing they should be allowed all the force they pretend to.

It will be proper, in the first place, to observe That it is hard to say, What Plutarch intended to infer from this laboured *Comparison between Atheism and Superstition*; in which, he, all the way, gives the preference to *Atheism*: For though, throughout the course of the argument, he considers each, only as it affects *Particulars*, yet, in his conclusion, he makes a general inference in *favour of Atheism with regard to Society*. But, it will not follow, that, because Atheism is less hurtful to *Particulars*, it is therefore less hurtful to *Societies* likewise. So that, to avoid all sophistical dealing, it was necessary these two questions should be distinguished; and separately considered. However, let us examine his reasoning on that side where it hath most strength, *The effects of Atheism and Superstition on PARTICULARS*

1. He sets out in this manner—"Ignorance concerning the nature of the Gods, where it meets with a bold and refractory temper, as in a rough and stubborn soil, produces ATHEISM; where it encounters flexible and fearful manners, as in rank and low land, there it brings forth SUPERSTITION."

Ἡ Τῆς περὶ θεῶν ἀμαθίας καὶ ἀγνοίας εὐθὺς ἐξ ἀρχῆς διχα εὐρίσκει, τὸ μὲν ὥσπερ ἐν χωρίοις τις ἀληθοῦς καὶ ἀήντητοις, ἔθισι τὴν ἀθεογήαν, τὸ δὲ, ὥσπερ ἐν ὑγροῖς καὶ ἀπαλοῖς, τὴν δεισιδαιμονίαν ἐμπεποιήκει. — περὶ δεισιδ. Steph. Ed. 8<sup>vo</sup>. vol. i. p. 286.

—This

— This is, by no means, an exact, or even generally true account of the origine of these evils. There are various causes which incline men to Atheism, besides fool-hardiness; and, to Superstition, besides cowardice. The affectation of singularity; the vanity of superior knowledge; and, what Plutarch himself, in another place of this very Tract, assigns as a general cause, *the sense of the miseries of Superstition*, have frequently inclined men to this fatal obliquity of judgment. On the other hand, ignorance of Nature; impatience to pry into futurity; the unaccountable turns in a man's own fortune, to good or bad; and, above all, a certain reverence for things established, carry them into *Superstition*. And as *these* considerations are equally adapted to affect the hardy and the pusillanimous; so the *others*, mentioned before, as soon get possession of the fearful as of the bold. Nay, FEAR itself is often the very passion which most forcibly inclines a wicked man, who hath nothing favourable to expect from divine Justice, to persuade himself that there is none to fear. Plutarch owns as much; and says expressly, that “the end the Atheist proposes in his opinions is to exempt himself from all fear of the Deity.”— Again, we find, by the Histories of all times, that Superstition seizeth, along with the weak and fearful, the most daring and determined, the most ferocious and untractable. Tyrants, Conquerors, Statesmen, and Great Generals, with all the savage tribes of uncivilized Barbarians, submit tamely to this galling Yoke.

But our Author's account of the different births of Atheism and Superstition was no more than was necessary to support his Thesis. He all along estimates the two evils by the miseries they bring on those who

\*— ΤΙΝΟΣ ἐστὶν αὐτῇ τῇ μὴ νομίζειν θεός, τὸ μὴ φοβέσθαι. p. 287.

are under their dominion. These miseries arise from the passions they create. But, of all the passions, *FEAR* is the most tormenting. The pusillanimous mind is most subject to fear. And it is over the fearful (he says) that Superstition gains the ascendant. This, therefore, was to be laid down as a *postulatum*. The rest follows in order.

2. For now coming to his parallel, he begins with a confession—"That both errors are very bad. But as Superstition is accompanied with passion or affection, and Atheism free from all passion, Superstition must needs be the greater evil; as in a broken limb, a *compound* fracture is much worse than a *simple*. Atheism (he says) may pervert the mind, but Superstition both *ulcerates* and perverts. A man who believes no God hath none to fear; but he who believes God to be a capricious or vindictive Being hath a great deal to fear<sup>h</sup>." — This is wittily said: but Nature talks another language. We should beware how we credit poetical similes; or even philosophical analogies; which, indeed, is but poetry, once removed. They both have their hopes and fears. Though the Atheist has no God to fear, yet the miserable forlorn condition of a World without a Ruler must keep him under perpetual alarms, in the apprehension of the dismal effects which Chance and Hazard may produce in the Material system; either by removing the parts of it (whose present position supports the harmony of the whole) too far from, or else by bringing them too near to, one another.

And now again, the rapidity of Plutarch's invention throws him on a Comparison, to support his reasoning, which entirely overturns it — "He (says

<sup>h</sup> "Ἀπαντα μὲν ἐν κρίσει ψευδῆς, ἄλλως τε καὶ ἡ περὶ ταῦτα μηχανεῖν, τῶδε κ' παρὰ πρῶτον μηχανήστεον· πάν γὰρ παρὰ εἰκὴ ἀπάτη φλεγμαίνουσα εἶναι," &c. p. 286—7.



our author) who thinks Virtue a *corporeal being* is only absurd. Here we have an error without passion. But he who thinks Virtue a *mere name* is miserable; for his error is attended with passion<sup>1</sup>.—How so?—“Because such a one lies under the sad reflection of having lost his ablest support.” But must not a man’s being deprived of the *LAWGIVER* be as sensible a mortification, as his being deprived of the *LAW*, whose existence depends upon the *Law-giver*? On the other side, Though Superstition hath its *fears*, it hath its *hopes* also; which, upon the whole, I think, to be more eligible than that supposed freedom of the Atheist (even as our author draws it) from all passion and affection. For tho’ the superstitious man may think perversely concerning the means whereby the Deity is appeased, yet he thinks him placable; and supposeth the means to be in his own power. So that he is not under the tyranny of that *pure and unmixed fear*, which Plutarch represents in such a manner as if all Nature furnished out provision to the superstitious man, for food and exercise to this passion. Whereas the affection of Superstition is equal between hopes and fears; It is the proper temper of the superstitious man, which more inclines him towards one than to the other. But Plutarch had before, gratuitously, laid it down as an axiom, “That the essential temperament of the superstitious man is fear and cowardice.”

3. However, all this would not have been sufficient to support the weakness of his declamatory reasoning, without the assistance of two commodious sophisms, to set it off. The first, indeed, is of a slender make, and hath little more in it than sound. He says “the very *name* shews, the essence of super-

<sup>1</sup> Πάλιν εἰσὶν αἱ τινες εἶναι σῶμα τῆς ἀρετῆς, &c. p. 286.

tion to be *Fear*: For the Greek name of this moral mode, δεισδαίμωνία, signifies a *fear of the gods*.<sup>k</sup> A Roman might with the same pretence aver, that the essence of superstition is *Love*: For that the Latin word *superstitio*, hath a reference to the *love we bear to our children, in the desire that they should survive us*; being formed upon the observation of certain religious practices deemed efficacious for procuring that happy event. The other sophism is more material; and consists in putting the change upon us, and representing the God of the Superstitious man, by whom he supposes the world to be governed, in false and odious colours as an *envious Being, hurtful to man*.<sup>l</sup> For it is not the *good*, but the *EVIL DEMON* whom the superstitious man *thus* represents: Not the Being which he worships; but the Being which he avoids and detests. The superstitious man, indeed, foolishly enough, supposeth, that the God whom he acknowledgeth to be good, is capricious, inconstant, and vindictive. But then, from that essential quality of *GOODNESS*, which belongs to him as God, he concludes, that this Being may be appeased by submission, and won upon by oblations and atonements. All this, Plutarch himself confesseth; and in words which directly contradict the account he here gives of the God of the superstitious man. *Superstition* (says he) *agitated by many contrary passions, suffereth itself to suspect that THE GOOD itself may be evil*.<sup>l</sup> Plutarch has therefore acted unfairly, and to serve a purpose, in thrusting in the superstitious man's *evil Demon*, in the place of his *God*. This conduct will bear the harder upon his ingenuity, as he held the doctrine of the *TWO PRINCIPLES*: and,

<sup>k</sup>—Οἰόμενοι τ' εἶναι θεός, εἶναι δὲ λυπηρὸς καὶ βλαβερός. p. 287.

<sup>l</sup>—Ἡ δὲ δεισδαίμωνία πολυπάλαια κακὸν τὸ ἀγαθὸν ὑπονοῶσα· φοβέεται τὸν θεόν καὶ καταφεύγειν ἐπὶ τὸν θεόν. p. 291.

therefore,



therefore, can hardly be supposed to have changed the object inadvertently, or without design.

4. Having made the God of the superstitious man, a Devil, he hath, consistently enough, represented the superstitious man's condition to be the very state of the *damm'd*; "That his pains have no remission; that he carries Hell in his bosom, and finds the Furies in his dreams". The terms of the original are very elegant: But as they plainly allude to the *shews of the mysteries*, I think the author should have been so fair to recollect, that there was an ELYSIUM as well as a TARTARUS both in the *Dreams* of the superstitious man and in the *shews* of the Mysteries. And that as Tartarus and Elysium were alike the fictions of superstition, they were alike the objects of the superstitious Man's dreams. His natural temperament and the redundancy of a particular humour would determine the colour of the Scene. The Atheist therefore, who, he says, enjoys the benefit of repose, might have his sleep disturbed by the *cries of the damnd* as well as the superstitious man; whom he represents as kept in perpetual alarms by this passion; because the *habit of the body* makes the very same impressions on the fancy, in sleep, which the *state of the mind* does on the imagination while awake.

5. But, "from the tyranny of Superstition, he says, there is no respite nor escape; because, in the opinion of the superstitious man, all things are within the jurisdiction of his God; and this God is *inexorable and implacable*". From such a Being, in-

"—Νοστις ἐς ἀσέβων χεῖρα, τῶ ὕπνῳ τῶν δευσιδαιμόνων, εἰδωλὰ φεκομένη καὶ τρώσας φαρμάκων, καὶ ποινὰς τινας ἐγγείματα καὶ τρεβδῶσα τὴν κελίαν ψυχῆς ἐκ τῶν ὕπνων ἐκδιώκει τοῖς ὄντοισι, μαζιζομένη καὶ κολαζομένη αὐτὴν ὑπ' αὐτῆς, ὡς ὑπ' ἑτέρου, καὶ διὰ προαίμακα καὶ ἀλλόκληα λαμβάνουσα. — p. 288.

"—Ὁ δὲ τὴν τῶν θεῶν ἀρχὴν ὡς τυρανίδα φερέμεν· σκυθρανὴν καὶ ἀπαραίτητον, πῶ μὴ καὶ, πῶ φυγῇ, ποῦται γὰρ ἄνθρωπος, ποῦται θάλασσαν. p. 289.

deed,



deed, there can be no escape, nor respite from torment. But, as was said before, this is not the superstitious man's *God*, but his *Devil*. Besides, the attribute of *implacability* totally removes, what our Author makes the other half of the miseries of Superstition; its slavish attention to the foolish and costly business of expiations and atonements: A practice arising from the idea of *placability*, and necessarily falling with it.

6. Therefore, as if conscious of this prevarication, he adds: "That the superstitious man fears even his best conditioned Gods, the *Beneficent*, the *Preservers*: that the Gods, from whom men seek grandeur, affluence, peace, concord, and success, are the objects of his dread and terror<sup>o</sup>." Here we see the superstitious man is at length confessed to have Gods very different from those before assigned unto him. However, we must not think that even these will afford him any solace or consolation. It is well that the whole proof of this cruel exclusion lies in the ambiguity of the terms, *φοβίῳ* and *τρέμω*; which, when they signify the *fearing slavishly*, do indeed imply *misery*: But when they signify *fearing religiously*, do as certainly imply a *blessing*; because they deter the subject, they influence, from evil. Now, when these terms are applied to the Gods confessedly beneficent, they can signify only a *religious fear*; unless when Plutarch hath defined SUPERSTITIOUS MAN<sup>p</sup> cannot *fear religiously*. And where is the absurdity in flying for refuge to Gods, so feared? Though Plutarch puts it among the contradictions of Superstition.<sup>q</sup>—

<sup>o</sup> — Ὁ φοβούμενος τὰς πατρῶας καὶ γυναικείας, ὁ φοβίῳ τὰς σωτήρας καὶ τὰς μελιχρῆς, τρέμων καὶ διδουκὼς παρ' αὐτῶν αἰτέμεθα πλεόντων, εὐπορίαν, ὁμολογῶν, ἱερῶν, θεῶν λόγων καὶ ἔργων τῶν ἀρίστων. p. 289.

<sup>p</sup> See p. 295.

<sup>q</sup> — Φοβούνται τὰς θεάς, καὶ καταφεύγουσιν ἐπὶ τὰς θεάς. p. 291.

It is remarkable, that these *good-conditioned* Gods, here described as τὰς σωτηρίας καὶ τὰς μελιχίας, are called by our author πατρίους ἢ γενεθλίας, *his native and country Gods*. Yet if we consider the stories of Jupiter, Mars, Mercury, Bacchus, Diana, &c. we shall find no great reason to extol their morals. But here lay the distress of the affair. Plutarch was a Priest of this class of Deities; and *Greece*, at that time, being over-run with strange Gods, and labouring under Eastern superstitions, it was proper to blacken this *foreign* worship, for the sake of the *national*: So that Plutarch, like the fair Trader, in an ill humour with Interlopers, reckons all Eastern Rites as even worse than Atheism. Hence his famous exclamation to his Countrymen, which the noble author of the *Characteristics* quotes with much exultation, and transferred bitterness. “O wretched Greeks (says Plutarch, speaking to his then declining countrymen) who in a way of superstition run so easily into the relish of barbarous nations, and bring into Religion that frightful mien of sordid and vilifying devotion, ill-favoured humiliation and contrition, abject looks and countenances, consternations, prostrations, disfigurements, and in the act of worship distortions, constrained and painful postures of the body, wry faces, beggarly tones, mummings, grimaces, cringings, and the rest of this kind.—A shame indeed to us *Grecians*! — Shall we, while we are nicely observant of other forms and decencies in the Temple, shall we neglect this greater decency in voice, words, and manners; and with vile cries, fawnings, and prostitute behaviour, betray the natural dignity and majesty of that divine Religion, and NATIONAL WORSHIP, delivered down to us by our forefathers, and purged from every thing of BARBAROUS and savage  
“kind.”



"kind". Such then were the circumstances of the time; and these, together with the personal views of our Author, were, I suppose, the causes which gave birth to this famous Tract, OF SUPERSTITION. To proceed,

7. Another advantage of *Atheism* over *Superstition*, in Plutarch's reckoning, is, "that the Atheist is secured from the impressions of a *future state*." It is no wonder that we find this in the number of the Atheist's blessings, when we consider that our Author regarded a future state as a Fable, at best, invented for the restraint of evil. Yet, whatever pleasure the Atheist may take in his security from this terror, it is certain, Society would suffer by taking off so useful a curb upon the manners of the people.

8. Our Author then proves, and indeed proves it effectually, "That superstition is much worse than the true knowledge of the Deity".

9. He considers next the different effects of Atheism and Superstition on their subjects, *in the disastrous accidents of life*. And here again, Atheism, as usual, is found to have the advantage. "The Atheist indeed curses Chance, and blasphemes Providence; but the superstitious man complains of his Gods, and thinks himself hated or forsaken of them".—The Atheist is well come on. Hitherto

<sup>1</sup> *Miscel. Res.* vol. III. *Misc.* ii. c. 3.

<sup>2</sup> Τί δὲ μακρὰ λέγειν, πείρας ἐστὶ τὰ βίη πᾶσιν ἀνθρώποις ὁ θάνατος· τῆς δὲ διανοητικῆς ἐδ' ἔστω. ἀλλ' ὑπερβάλλει τὰς ὁρῶν ἐπικείμενα τὰ ζῆν, μακρότερον τὰ βίη ποιῶσα τὸν φόβον, καὶ συνάψισσα τῷ θανάτῳ κακοὶ ἐπίνοιαι ἀθανάτων, &c. p. 289—90.

<sup>3</sup> Φιλοσόφῳ δὲ καὶ Πολιτικῶν ἀνδρῶν καταφρονῶσιν, &c. p. 291.

<sup>4</sup> — Πάντας ἐπὶ τὴν τύχην καὶ τὸ αὐτόματον ἀπειροδόμεναι τὰς ὁρογμὰς καὶ βουλήν· ὡς οὐδὲν κατὰ δικήν, ἐδ' ἐκ προνοίας, ἀλλὰ πάντα συγκαχυμῆναι καὶ ἀκρίτως φέρεσθαι, καὶ σπαθᾶται τὰ πᾶν ἀνθρώπων—πᾶσαν τὴν δὲ αἰτίαται—καὶ ὡς ἐν δυστυχίᾳ ὦν, ἀλλὰ διανοητικῆς τῆς ἀνθρωπίνου. p. 291—2.

Plutarch



Plutarch had represented his Favorite as always calm and undisturbed: Indeed, he makes one great part of the Atheist's advantage over Superstition to consist in his freedom from all unruly passions. Here, they labour both alike under their tyranny. Well, but some passions make their owner more miserable than others. It is confessed, they do. But, is that the case here? Or if it be, Is it to the advantage of the Atheist? By no means. The disasters of life are supposed to have betrayed them both into *passion*. But he surely is least oppressed by the commotion, who sees a possibility of getting out of his distresses. It is impossible the Atheist can have any such prospect. There is no Fence against a Flail, nor provision against *blind Chance*: The superstitious man may easily hope to appease the irritated Deity: for though *he fears and dreads the Gods, yet, as Plutarch acknowledges, he flies to them for refuge*. I might mention another advantage which the superstitious man hath over the Atheist in the disasters of life, namely, that he is frequently *bettered* by his misfortunes; and this the Atheist never is; because the superstitious man may suppose them sent by the Gods in punishment for his crimes; which the Atheist, never can.

“ But (says our Author) If the disaster in question be disease or sickness, the Atheist referring it to the right cause, *intemperance*, seeks out for the proper cure. While the superstitious man imagining it to be a *judgment from Heaven*, neglects to have recourse to medicine\*.” The delusion here is evi-

\* Νοσῶν τε ὁ ἀθεὶς ἐκλογίζεται καὶ ἀναμνηστικαὶ πηρημοῖς αὐτῷ καὶ εἰσοδοῖς, καὶ ἀταξίας περὶ διαίταν, ἢ κόπης υπερεαλυσίας, ἢ μελαγχολίας αἶρων αἰτίαις καὶ αἰτίαις—Τῷ δὲ θεισινδαίμονι καὶ σώματος ἀρρώστια πάντα—πληγὰς θεῶν καὶ προσβολὰς δαίμονος λέγουσι. ὅθεν οὐδὲ τοῦμας βοηθεῖν, οὐδὲ διακλῖναι τὸ συμβεβηκός, οὐδὲ θεραπεύειν, οὐδὲ ἀνιτάντισθαι, μὴ δὲ τὴν θεομαχίαν καὶ αὐτάνειν κολαζόμενος. p. 292.

dent. It is built on that false position, which the experience of all ages hath discredited, namely, That men always act according to their principles. In this case especially, of avoiding or freeing themselves from instant physical evil, men of the most different Principles go all one way; and however divided in their religious opinions, they all meet in an *uniformity* to medical practice. It is an idle sophism which would persuade us, that, because the superstitious man useth sacred Rites to remove what he esteems a *sacred disease*, that, therefore, he employs no other means<sup>1</sup>. The early mixture of medicinal drugs with religious charms and incantations in the first state of Physic, might have taught our Author, how naturally men are wont to lend a helping hand to the supposed efficacy of Religion. But this reasoning is utterly discredited by his own instance of the *Mariners*; the most superstitious of mortals; who, in the distresses of a storm, while they pour out their vows to their *Saviour Gods*, at the same time fall lustily to their tackle, and pump without intermission<sup>2</sup>. Indeed, he seems fully sensible of its weakness, when he catches at an occurrence in the *Jewish*<sup>3</sup> history, to support it; where, we know (though he did not) that all things were extraordinary, and nothing to be brought to example, any more than to imitation.

To disgrace Superstition still more, our Author urges “ the misfortune of Nicias the Athenian; who frightened by an eclipse of the Moon, delayed

<sup>1</sup> Plotarch makes the superstitious man say, Ταῦτα πάσχον, ὡ καὶ οὐδὲν, ἐκ προνοίας καὶ θεῶν καὶ ἀνθρώπων ἐξέστη πάσαν ἐλπίδα πρὸς αὐτὸν, αὐτὸν — p. 293.

<sup>2</sup> Τὸ τοῦ ἰδίου κυβερνήτης εὐχέλαι μὲν ὑπεκφυγεῖν, καὶ θεῶς επικαλεῖσθαι σωτήρας, εὐχόμενος δὲ τὸν οὐρανὸν προσάγει, τὴν κεραίαν ὑφίσταται — p. 294.

<sup>3</sup> — Ἀλλὰ Ἰουδαῖοι σαρδάνων ὄβριον ἐν ἀγομίῳις καθίζουσιν, τῶν ποταμῶν κλίμακας προτιθέμενοι, καὶ τὰ τοῖχῃ καταλαμβανόμενοι, καὶ αὐτῶν, &c. p. 294.



his retreat till He and his army were invested, and cut in pieces, by the enemy." But this kind of superstitious observance is as well adapted to *encourage* as to *dismay* armies and bodies of men; and hath just as often done the one as the other. So that, under this article, Plutarch should have fairly stated, and balanced the account.

From the *miserics* of life, He comes to the *pleasures* of it. And here too the Atheist must have an exclusive possession. He confesseth, "that the pomps and ceremonies of religious Festivals abound with complacency and joy." He owns "his Atheist can receive no further amusement from such a scene than to laugh at it: But to the superstitious man (he says) they are the subject of distress and misery".

—Not to allow the relaxations of the superstitious man's mental terrors to have their *effect* is hard indeed. It is much the same as not to suffer us to *feel* the remissions of our bodily pains. If the superstitious man fancies the Gods are often angry, he sometimes, at least, believes them to be appeased. And when can he hope to find them in good humour, if not at their Festivals? To draw him, therefore, at this season, with pale looks and trembling gestures, is certainly over-charging the picture. The truth is, the superstitious man hath as strong paroxysms of joy as of grief; though perhaps neither so frequent nor so lasting. Yet to deny them to him at the celebration of his religious Festivals is a contradiction to all common sense.

Our author next attempts to shew, That "the *crime of impiety* is rather to be charged upon the superstitious man than the Atheist: for Anaxagoras,

<sup>b</sup> "Ἡδιστα δὲ τοῖς ἀνθρώποις ἰορταῖ, &c. ἰληῦθα τοίνυν σκοπεῖ τὸν αἰθερ, γελῶθα μὲν μακρὸν καὶ στενδάνον, γέλαθα τούτοις ποιμήναις — ἄλλο δὲ εἶδεν ἔχοντα κακόν· ὃ δὲ δισινδαιμον βεβῆλαι μὲν, ὃ δὲ δύταλαι δὲ χαίρουσιν, ἐπὶ ἡδιστα — ἰστραὶ μὲν ἐχρεῖα, δύται καὶ φοβεῖται, &c. p. 294—5."



he says, was accused of impiety, for holding the *Sun* to be only a red-hot stone: But no body challenged the Cimmerians of that crime for denying its existence<sup>c</sup>. By this, our Author would insinuate, that it is more injurious to the Gods, to hold dishonourable notions of their *Nature*, than to call in question their *Being*. The opposition of these cases is witty and ingenious: but very defective, in the integrity of the application. Plutarch's Philosophic atheist in question, corresponds no more with the *Cimmerians*, than his Theist does with *Anaxagoras*.—The Atheist, after having had a *full view* of the works of God, denies the existence of the Workman. The Cimmerians, because debarred, by their situation, the use of that sense which alone could inform them of the Sun's nature, had no conception of his Being. In the first case, the conclusion being derogatory to the Nature of the Power denied, the Denier is justly charged with *impiety*; In the latter, as no such derogation is implied, no such crime can be reasonably inferred. But this brisk sally was only to introduce the famous *declaration* which follows, and hath been so often quoted<sup>a</sup> by the modern advocates of this paradox. "For my own part I had rather men should say of me, That there neither is nor ever was such a one as Plutarch; than they should say, there was a Plutarch, an unsteady, changeable, easily provoked, and re-

<sup>c</sup> "ὅθεν μάλιστα ἐξ ἀναγκαζομένης τῆς τῆς ἀδυστοχίας φασκοῦσας ἀσέβειαι εἶναι, μὴ φασκοῦσας δὲ τῆς διανοητικῆς καὶ τῆς ἀναγκαζομένης διανοητικῆς ἀσέβειας ἐπὶ τῷ λίθῳ ἐπὶ τῷ ἥλιῳ. Κιμμερίων δὲ οὐδὲς αὖτε ἀσέβειαι ἐπὶ τῷ ἥλιῳ ἢ εἶναι τοπαράπαν νομίζουσι. p. 295.

<sup>a</sup> "It were better (says BACON) to have no opinion of God at all, than such an opinion as is unworthy of him.—Plutarch saith well to that purpose. Surely, (saith he) I had rather a great deal men should say there was no such man as Plutarch, than that they should say there was one Plutarch that would eat his children," &c. — *Essays civil and moral*, c. xviii.

vengeful

"vengeful man." *These*, says the noble author of the *Characteristics*\*, are the words of honest Plutarch.

And, without doubt, did God stand only in that relation to the rest of Beings in which one creature stands to another; and were his existence no more necessary to the Universe of things than the existence of honest Plutarch, every body would say the same. But the KNOWLEDGE of a Creator and Governor is so necessary to the rational system, that a merciful Lord would chuse to have it retained and kept alive, though he might happen to be dishonoured by many false and absurd opinions concerning his Nature and Attributes. A private man of generous morals might rather wish to continue unknown than to be remembered with infamy. But a supreme Magistrate, who loved the Community he governed, would certainly prefer the being known to his Subjects, even at the hazard of their mistaking him for a Tyrant; because, if the members of a Community, through ignorance of their having a Ruler, should think themselves free from subjection, every one would consult his passions and appetites, till he brought the whole into confusion. Whereas, while they knew they had a Master, their actions would be so conformed to the general measures of obedience as to support the order of Society: though their perverse notions of his Character might indeed obstruct many of those blessings which Government produces under a Ruler of acknowledged justice and goodness.

Our author proceeds; and observes next, "that the Atheist, it is true, *believes* there is no God; but the superstitious man *wishes* there were none: That the Atheist is averse to Superstition; but the superstitious man, if he could, would shelter himself in

\* *Charact. Letter conc. Enthusiasm, sect. 5.*



Atheism<sup>f</sup>." It is by no means true that the superstitious man ever desires to be free of the sense of a superior Being, to whom he may be accountable for his actions; as appears plainly from his abhorrence and persecution of Atheism: All that he wisheth is, to render such a Being propitious, and easily placable.

As to our author's inference, concerning *the better condition of Atheism*, because "the Atheist never wisheth to be superstitious, though the superstitious man wisheth to be an Atheist," it is a mere sophism: The proposition, on which it standeth, amounting to no more than this, That the Atheist *doth not wish* what is *afflictive* in Superstition: And the superstitious man *doth wish* what is *easy* in Atheism. And from those restrained premises no such general conclusion can be logically inferred.

But he hath found out another reason for preferring Atheism to Superstition. "Atheism, he says, was never the cause of Superstition: but, on the contrary, Superstition has very often given birth to Atheism<sup>g</sup>." His meaning may be, either, that an Atheist did never change to a superstitious Religio-nist; Or that an Atheist, while such, could never become superstitious.

In either sense, fact hath shewn that the assertion is utterly false.

In the first, we have seen, that it is of the essential weakness of humanity to run continually from one extreme to another. *Modum tenere nescia est*, saith the great Philosopher<sup>h</sup> very truly. And the

<sup>f</sup> Νὸν δὲ τῷ μὴ ἀθεῖν δισσιδαιμονίας εἶναι μίτην· ὁ δὲ δισσιδαιμον τῇ περὶ αἰθέρος ἀθεῖ· ὡς, ἀσθενέστερός ἐστιν ἢ τῷ δοξάζειν περὶ θεῶν ὁ βέλαι. p. 297.

<sup>g</sup> Καὶ μὴ ὁ ἀθεῖς δισσιδαιμονίας εἰς ἀμὴ συνάγει· ἢ δὲ δισσιδαιμονία τῇ ἀθεΐᾳ καὶ γινώσκει παρῆσθαι ἀρχὴν. — p. 297.

<sup>h</sup> BACON.



phenomenon is no mystery. The mind, as soon as ever it becomes sensible of it's excesses, striveth, from it's innate abhorrence of what is wrong, to break away from them. And the force, with which it is then impelled, being increased by the struggle between its old prejudices, which would restrain it, and its new aversion, which drives it on, rarely remits, till it arrives at the OPPOSITE EXTREME. The behaviour of all Ages supports this observation; and of none, more than the Present. Where a *contempt of Revelation* having for some time spread amongst the People, we see them now become an easy prey to *fanaticism* and *superstition*: and the METHODIST and the POPISH PRIEST succeed, with great ease and silence, to the Libertine and the Freethinker.

To say, that an Atheist, while he is such, cannot become superstitious, betrays great ignorance of human nature. How many Princes and Ministers of state hath the history of the two or three last Ages delivered down to us as Unbelievers in all Religion, and yet strongly devoted to the dotages of *judicial Astrology*. The Italians, in particular, have not been more noted for their irreligion and refined Politics, than for their credulity in this gross Imposture. Should I stay to enquire at large into the cause of so strange a phenomenon, it would be seen, how much honour it does to Religion. At present I shall only observe, That these men finding (and none have so good opportunities) how perpetually public events fall out beside their Expectation, and contrary to their best-laid schemes of Policy, are forced to confess that human affairs are ordered by some *power extrinsical*. To acknowledge a *God and his Providence* would be the next way to introduce a *morality* destructive of that *public system*, which they think necessary for the government of the World. They have recourse therefore to that absurd

scheme of Power, which rules by no other Law than *Fate or Destiny*.

I have now gone through our Author's various arguments in support of his Paradox; or, to call them by their right name, a group of ill-combined sophisms, tricked off by his eloquence, or varnished over with his wit.

But there is one MASTER-SOPHISM still behind, that animates the Whole, and gives a false vigour to every Part. Let us consider the question which Plutarch invites his reader to debate with him. It is not, What the *simple* qualities of Atheism and Superstition, if found *alone* in man, are severally capable of producing: but what each really doth produce, as each is, in fact, found mingled with the rest of man's passions and appetites. He should not, therefore, have amused us with inferences from the *abstract* ideas of *Atheism* and *Superstition*; but should have examined their effects in the *concrete*, as they are to be found in the *Atheist*, and in the *superstitious man*. For, nature having sown in the human breast the seeds of various and differing passions and appetites, the *ruling passion*, in each Character, is no more in its *simple*, unmixed state, than the predominant colour in a well-wrought picture: Both the *passion* and the *colour* are so darkened or dissipated by surrounding light and shade, so changed and varied by the reflection of neighbouring tints, as to produce very different effects from what, in their separate and simple state, whether real or imaginary, they were capable of affording<sup>1</sup>. Let the reader

apply

<sup>1</sup> The exquisitely learned Author of the *English commentary and notes on Horace's Art of poetry*, has, with admirable acumen, detected and exposed the same kind of mistake in the dramatic Poets. Who when, as he observes, they were become sensible of the preference of *Plays of character* to *Plays of intrigue*, never rested till they ran into this other extreme. But hear this fine writer



apply this observation to any part of Plutarch's *Declamation*, who considers Atheism and Superstition not in the *concrete*, but in the *abstract* only, and it will presently expose the inconsequence of his reasoning. I will but just give an example, in one instance. He prefers Atheism to Superstition, "because *this* is attended with passion; *that* is free from all passion." Now the only support of this remark is the sophism in question. Consider the ideas of Atheism and Superstition in the *abstract*, and there is a shew of truth: for Superstition, simply, im-

writer in his own words:—"The view of the comic scene being to delineate characters, this end, I suppose, will be attained most perfectly by making those characters as *universal* as possible. For thus the person shewn in the drama being the representative of all characters of the same kind, furnishes, in the highest degree, the entertainment of *humour*. But then this universality must be such as agrees not to our *idea of the possible* effects of the character, as conceived in the *abstract*; but to the *actual* exertion of its powers which experience justifies, and common life allows. *MOLIERE*, and before him, *PLAUTUS*, had offended in this; that, for a picture of the *avaritious man*, they presented us with the phantastic unpleasing draught of the *passion of avarice*.—This is not to copy Nature: which affords no specimen of a man turned all into a single passion. No metamorphosis could be more strange or incredible. Yet portraits of this vicious taste are the admiration of common flatterers. — But if the reader would see the extravagance of building dramatic manners on *abstract ideas* in its full light, he need only turn to B. Johnson's *Every man out of his humour*; which, under the name of a play of character, is, in fact, unnatural, wholly chimerical, and unlike any thing we observe in real life. Yet this comedy has always had its admirers. And *Randolph*, in particular, was so taken with the design, that he seems to have formed his *Muse's looking-glass* in express imitation of it." *Diff. on the several provinces of the Drama*, p. 239. When Pliny therefore compliments Silarion for giving one of his statues the expression not of an *angry man*, but of *anger itself*, either it is a mere flight of rhetoric, to shew the just force of the artist's expression: or, if, indeed, the ferocious air did exceed the traces of humanity, the Philosopher's praise was misapplied, and the Statuary's figure was a *Caricature*.

plying



plying *the fear of the gods*, is of the essence of *passion*; and Atheism, simply, implying the *denial of their existence*, includes nothing of the idea of *passion*. But consider these moral modes in the *concrete*, as in this question we ought to do, and Atheism will be always found accompanied with passion or affection; and of as uneasy a kind, perhaps, as Superstition. It is of no moment, to this discourse, whether Plutarch hath here imposed upon himself or his reader. It is possible, that, in the drawing his two characters, he might imitate, or be misled by, *HECOPHRASTUS*; Whose various pourtraits have all this fundamental defect. That is, if we understand them as given for copies of any thing really existing. But, I apprehend, this is not their true character. I rather think This curious fragment of Antiquity was only the remains of a Promptuary for the use of the COMIC POET, from whence he might be supplied with his materials, the *simple passions*; in order to blend, and shade, and work them into his pictures of *real life and manners*. However if Plutarch considered them under the common idea, and, under that, would make them his model, he shewed as little judgment as that painter would be found to do, who should apply his simple colours just as he received them from the colourman; without forming them into those curious

—“ Lights and shades, whose well accorded  
strife

“ Gives all the strength and colour of our life.

To proceed with our author's Argument: It is directed, we see, to shew the advantage of Atheism above Superstition, only as these opinions and practices regard PARTICULARS: Though, by the turn and management of his reasoning, he appears willing, you should infer that the same advantage holds equally,

equally, with regard to SOCIETY also: And therefore he concludes, “ That it had been better for the Gauls and Scythians to be without any Religion, than to have had such a one as taught them to believe that the Gods delighted in the blood of human victims: And much better for Carthage to have had the Atheists, Critias and Diagoras, for Lawgivers, than such as those who authorized the Sacrifices performed to Saturn<sup>k</sup>.” The sophisms which support these assertions are fully exposed in the introductory observation to these remarks; and so, stand in need of no further detection.

LORD BACON's chapter on *Superstition*, in his *Essays civil and moral*, is no other than an epitome of this tract of Plutarch. Now whether that great man thought his Original defective, in not attempting to shew the advantage of Atheism over Superstition, as well with regard to *Society* as to *Particulars*; Or whether he thought, that though his Author did attempt it, yet he was too concise and obscure; and therefore judged it expedient to comment on his hints; It is remarkable, that he addresses himself very strenuously, to make out this important point. “ Atheism (saith his lordship) did never perturb  
“ States; for it makes men wary of themselves, as  
“ looking no farther: And we see, the times inclined to Atheism, as the time of Augustus Cæsar, were civil times. But Superstition hath been  
“ the confusion of many States; and bringeth in a  
“ new *primum mobile*, that ravisheth all the spheres  
“ of Government. The Master of Superstition is  
“ the People.”

<sup>k</sup> — Οὐκ ἄριστοι ἂν ἢ Ταλάρταις ἐκείνοις ἢ Σκύθαις τοπαράπαν μῆτε ἔκνοαν ἔχειν θίον, μῆτε φαίλασιαν, μῆτε ἱεροίαν, ἢ θεὸς εἶναι νομίζον χαίροντας αἰθερώτων φατομένων αἵμασι — τί δὲ Καρχηδονίοις ἐκ ἰλυσσίνης Κερτίαν λαβόντι ἢ Διαγόραν νομοθέτην ἀπ' ἀρχῆς, μῆτε τινα θεῶν μῆτε δαιμόνων νομίζον, ἢ τοιαῦτα θύειν οἷα τῷ Κρόνῳ ἰθύνον; — p. 297.

This is a paragraph totally unworthy so great a Genius. *Atheism*, he says, *did never perturb States*. The observation might, perhaps, pass for true, when he wrote. But, true or false, to make it to his purpose, he must suppose, that this negative advantage ariseth from the *essential* nature and intrinsic quality of Atheism, and not from mere *accident*; and so he plainly insinuates, in the reason subjoined — *For it makes men wary of themselves, &c.* but falsely. It is not from the nature of things, but by mere accident, that *Atheism never perturbed States*; it having rarely, or never, spread amongst the People, but hath been confined to a few speculative men. If ever it should become thus extensive, if ever it should infect the Sovereign, it must not only *perturb States*, (as we have sad experience that it does, even under it's negative form of IRRELIGION) but, as we have shewn at large<sup>1</sup>, would certainly *overturn Society*. Indeed his Lordship himself fairly confesseth thus much, where, charging this very mischief on Superstition, he subjoins the *cause* of its malignity — *the Master of Superstition is the People*, i. e. the people are they who are infected with this error. *Atheism*, he says, *makes men wary of themselves, as looking no further*: This argument in favour of Atheism seems to have been borrowed from CARDAN; and (as miserable as it is) hath been considered in its place<sup>m</sup>.

*The times, inclined to Atheism*, he says, *were civil times*: I know of no times inclined to Atheism; that is, when the people had a *propensity* to it, unless, perhaps, two or three centuries ago in Italy; and then the times were as miserable as civil distractions could make a bad and wicked Government. His Lordship, indeed, refers to the age of Augustus Cæsar. But it is certain, that, at that time, no Roman troubled his head with Grecian principles, (and

<sup>1</sup> Book I. sect. iv.

<sup>m</sup> See Vol. i. p. 83.



Atheism was then to be had no where else) except it were a few of the Nobility : Then, indeed, part of their Grandees, to make themselves easy under Servitude, espoused the principles of EPICURUS : But a much larger part followed the doctrine of the POARCH. Either served their turn. If they could persuade themselves to believe, that their miseries were *inevitable*, it was just as well as if they could force themselves to think, that these miseries were *no evils*. The soft, the delicate, the luxurious, espoused the *first* : The more rigid, and severe of morals, the *latter*. But still we must observe, that their PRINCIPLES were the *effect* of their acquiescence in a state of Servitude; not the *cause*; as his lordship would insinuate : And did then, in reality, no more concern the Public, than their different tastes for *wild-beer* or *mullets*.

*The time of Augustus Caesar, he says, was a civil time.* And this must be placed to the score of Atheism, although other causes be so very obvious : The miseries of the preceding civil wars, in support of Liberty, often renewed, with still greater violence, and still less success, made men weary both of struggling and suffering; and willing, at last, to thrust their necks under the yoke of a well-established Master. And this, together with the want of Instruments (for the general slaughter of them had made Confusion cure itself) were the real causes which, in the ceaseless round of human actions, produced that still calm of real Slavery, after a long tempestuous season of nominal Freedom.

However, the general observation we made on PLUTARCH may be well applied to BACON : What he wants in fact and argument, he makes up in wit, and the ornaments of fancy : as where he says, *Superstition bringeth in a new primum mobile, that ravisheth all the spheres of government.* By which pompous

pous figure, borrowed of the Peripatetic Philosophy, no more is meant than the *Churchman's destructive claim of independency on the State*; which conceals a vile ambition under the cloak of Religion: A claim, which, at that time, those two capital enemies of the established Church, the PAPIST and the PURITAN, alike pursued; as then to the disturbance, so, wherever they succeed, to the certain ruin of civil Government.

BUT to return to Plutarch, and conclude. The only sage part of his Declamation is in his last words; where he observes, "That, for the reasons he hath given, we ought to shun and avoid SUPERSTITION; but so cautiously, as not to fall into the other extreme of ATHEISM; like those giddy travellers, who flying from wild beasts and robbers, fall down rocks and precipices, where they perish<sup>a</sup>." But to inforce so plain a conclusion, there was no need of all that expence of wit and sophistry to prove, (what the conclusion did not want) That *Atheism was in all things preferable to Superstition*. To proceed,

III. *As to the Inventors of Religion their not believing what they taught concerning it*, which is the last pretence, This comes with an ill grace from an Atheist, who, under cover of an unquestionable maxim, *That, in matters of speculation, reason and not authority should determine the judgment*, despiseth all Authority, so as to oppose his own singularities against the common voice of mankind. Was it true then, that the Inventors did not believe what they taught, this would be seen to be a very poor argument against the truth of Religion.

<sup>a</sup> Φυγόντες ἐν αὐτῇ ἀσφαλῆς τε καὶ συμφερέσθαις εἰς ἃ ἀποπίπτει οἱ ληστές ἢ θάλασσα ἢ ὄρος, ἢ πῦρ ἀπεριστάτως καὶ ἀλογίστως περιφρυγόμενοι, ἐπιπίπτουσιν εἰς σφοδρὰς βλάβους καὶ κηρύμους ἔχοντας. ὅπως γὰρ ἴσθαι Φρυγίαν τὴν διασημειωμένην, ἐπιπίπτειν εἰς ἀβύσσου τραγυῖαν καὶ ἀλλοιωμένην, οὐκ ἐκ τῆς φύσεως, ἀλλ' ἐκ τῆς κερμένου τῆς ἐπιβουλῆς. p. 298.

But



But indeed, the supposition is absolutely false; and betrays gross ignorance of the true character of the ancient Lawgivers. The idea, our adversaries have formed of these Civilizers of mankind (as men are but too apt, in their representations of others, to copy from themselves) is of a species of fly-cold-headed Cheats, whose capacity arose only from the predominancy of their phlegm. But the History of all times might have told them, that, amongst the infirmities of Heroes, a deficiency of Faith is not one. Diodorus was so sensible of their propensity to be on the believing side, that he makes it a question, Whether those ancient Lawgivers whom he there enumerates, did not *really believe* the divine Mission they professed to execute? "They did this" (says he) either because they really thought that the conceptions which they had formed, so productive of public good, must needs be strictly supernatural and divine;"—And I may venture to affirm, That there never was a great Conqueror, a *Founder of Civil Policy*, or the *Preacher up of a new Religion*, (if he succeeded by mere human means) but who was naturally much inclined to *ENTHUSIASM*. Not that I suppose the heat of *Enthusiasm* is not always tempered, in Heroes, with an equal share of *CRAFT* and *policy*. This extraordinary composition makes their true character: A character so much better conceived than expressed, that it hath embarrassed the pen even of a *Livy* to delineate correctly<sup>p</sup>.

But

<sup>p</sup> Εἰς Σουματην κ' ὅταν ὅλος ὁμοίαν εἶναι κρίνας τῇ μάχῃσιν ὑφ' ἑαυτὸν ἀνδραπὼν πολλῶν, ὅτε — I. i. p. 59. S. E.

<sup>p</sup> His picture of Scipio Africanus, is, however, so very curious, that the learned reader will not be displeased to find it in this place: — Quam ubi ab re tanto impetu acta sollicitudinem curamque hominum animadvertit, advocata concione, ita de reata sua imperioque mandato, et bello quod gerendum esset, magno elatoque



But the necessity of this odd-paired union appears plainly from the nature of things. A mere cold-headed Contriver, without any tincture of natural enthusiasm, can never succeed in his designs; because such a One can never supply those surprizing freaks, which a heated imagination, working on a *disordered*, though, for this purpose, *fitly-framed* temper of body, so speciously exhibits. For the spirits of the PEOPLE, who are to be taken in, can never be allured but by raising their Admiration, and keeping up their confidence, by the aid of an inspired Leader. Besides, new doctrines and new ideas are never so readily received as when the Teacher of them is in earnest, and believes *himself*: for then there is something so natural in his conduct, so alluring in his behaviour, as easily conciliates wavering opinions; and acts, on his followers, like facination, or a charm. This made an ingenious French writer not scruple to say; "Give me but

elatoque animo differuit, ut impleret homines certioris spei, quam quantam fides promissi humani, aut ratio ex fiducia rerum subijcere solet. Fuit enim SCRIPTO, non veris tantum virtutibus mirabilis, sed arte quoque quadam ab juvenia in ostentationem earum compositus: pleraque apud multitudinem, aut per nocturnas visa species, aut velut divinitus, mente monita, agens: sive ut ipse capti quadam superstitione animi, sive ut imperia confutatioque, velut sorte oraculi missa, sine cunctatione assequeretur. Ad hæc jam inde ab initio præparans animos, ex quo togam virilem sumpsit, nullo die prius ullam publicam privatamque rem egit, quam in Capitolium iret, ingressusque ædem confideret, & plerumque tempus solus in secreto ibi teneret. Hic mos, qui per omnem vitam servabatur, seu consulto, seu temere, vulgatæ opinionis fidem apud quosdam fecit, stirpis eum divinæ virum esse, retulitque famam, in Alexandro Magno prius vulgatam, & vanitate & fabula parem, anguis immanis concubita conceptam, & in cubiculo matris ejus persæpe visam prodigii ejus speciem, interventuque hominum evolutam repente, atque ex oculis elapsam. His miraculis numquam ab ipso elusa fides est: quin potius aucta arte quadam, nec abnuendi tale quicquam, nec palam affirmandi. Hist. lib. xxvi.

"half a dozen men whom I can thoroughly persuade that it is not the Sun makes the day, and I would not despair of seeing whole nations brought over to the same opinion<sup>9</sup>."

On the other hand, a mere *Enthusiast*, who by virtue of his fanaticism, hath gone so far in his purpose, as to raise the admiration, and captivate the spirits of the Populace, must *here* begin to fail for want of the other quality, of *sectarian craft*; for his imagination not being under the government of his judgment, he will want the proper dexterity to apply the different views, tempers, and stations of the People, now enflamed, and ready to become his instruments for the attainment of his purpose.

But when these two talents of *Fraud* and *Fanaticism* unite to furnish out a Hero, or Leader of a sect, great will be the success of his undertakings. The fallies of enthusiasm will be so corrected by his cunning, as to strengthen and confirm his supernatural pretences: And the cold and slow advances of a too cautious policy, will be warmed and pushed forward by the force of his fanaticism. His *craft* will enable him to elude the enquiries and objections of the more rational; and his visions will irrecoverably subdue all the warmer noddles. In a word, they will mutually strengthen and inforce each others power; and cover and repair each others defects. St. Jerom seems to have had some idea of this extraordinary combination, when he said, "Nullus potest Hæresin struere, nisi qui ARDENTIS INGENII est, et habet DONA NATURÆ." Which may be thus paraphrased, — *No Heretic will ever be able to raise a Sect, but he, in whose constitution, Na-*

"Donnez moi une demi-douzaine de personnes, à qui je puisse persuader que ce n'est pas le Soleil qui fait le jour, je ne désespérerai pas que des nations entières n'embrassent cette opinion. Fontanelle *Hist. des Oracles*, cap. xi.



ture hath enabled Fraud and Fanaticism to act in concert. And indeed, there are so many powerful and opposite interests to overcome and reconcile, so much caprice and humour to cajole, and artfully to apply; that it is not strange, if no one ever yet succeeded in any great design, where a whole People was the instrument, who had not reconciled in himself, by a happy union, these two qualities seemingly incompatible.

Several things concur to facilitate this conjunction. An Enthusiast considers himself as an instrument employed by Providence to attain some great End, for the sake of which he was sent out. This makes him diligent in his Work; impatient under Let or impediment, and disposed to practise every means for removing them. Persuaded of the necessity of the END, and of the reality of the divine Commission intrusted to him, for procuring it, he begins to fancy that One so employed, is dispensed with, in breaking, nay is authorized to break, the Common-Law of Morality; which, in the cant of that fatal time when Fanaticism had it's full swing amongst us, was called the BEING ABOVE ORDINANCES. In the first application of these extraordinary MEANS the People are the Dupes of their Leader: But the success being frequently even beyond his own expectation, he becomes, in his turn, the Dupe of his own contrivance; and begins in good earnest to believe that the trick which he played them was indeed not of his own invention, but the inspired instigation of Heaven<sup>1</sup>. This may

<sup>1</sup> That great observer of Nature, CERVANTES, having made Sancho (to save himself from the vexation of a sleeveless errand) palm upon his Master a supposititious Dulcinea; when the Squire comes to relate this adventure to the Dutchess, she extols his ingenuity so highly, that he begins to suspect himself tricked by the Inchanter into his own contrivance; who had presented him with a true Dulcinea in Masquerade, while he thought he was barefacedly imposing on his Master a false one.



serve to explain an obscure passage of Tacitus, where speaking of this sort of Character, he says, in his Oracular way, *FINGUNT SIMUL CREDUNTQUE.*

To confirm all this, it might be easily made appear, by an historical deduction from ancient and modern Times, that all those successful *Disturbers* or *Benefactors* of mankind, who have prospered in their designs, were indebted for their good fortune to the mutual assistance of these two Qualities. By this operation, under the management of such as MAHOMET, IGNATIUS LOIOLA, and OLIVER CROMWELL, great and powerful Empires have been created out of nothing.

And again, it might be shewn, that those, who are upon the records of History for having failed, were either mere *Enthusiasts*, who knew not how to push their projects, when they had disposed the People to support them; or else mere *Politicians*, who could never advance their wise schemes so far, as to engage a fanatic Populace to second them; or lastly, which most deserves our observation, such as had the two qualities in conjunction, but in a reverted order. Of each of which defects, we have domestic examples in the three great Companions of the last successful Impostor, mentioned above; I mean in FLEETWOOD, LAMBERT, and VANE.—CROMWELL had prepared the way for their succession to his power, as thoroughly as Mahomet had done for that of Abubeker, Omar, and Othman. Yet these various wants defeated all their efforts, and rendered all his preparations fruitless. *Fleetwood* was a *frank enthusiast*, without parts or capacity; *Lambert* a cool contriver without fanaticism; and *Sir Harry Vane*, who had great parts, and as great enthusiasm, yet had them, and used them, in so preposterous an order as to do him no kind of service. For the history of those times informs us,

that he began a sober and sedate plotter : But, when now come in view of the goal, he started out the wildest and most extravagant of Fanatics : In a word, he ended just where his MASTER began : so that we need not wonder his fortune proved so different. But this was a Course as rare as it appears to be retrograde. The affections naturally keep another Order. And the reason is evident. *Enthusiasm* is a kind of ebullition, or critical ferment of the Mind ; which a vigorous nature can work through ; and, by slow degrees, be able to cast off. Hence the most successful Impostors, as we say, have set out in all the blaze of Fanaticism, and completed their schemes amidst the cool depth and stillness of Politics. Though this be common to them all, yet I don't know any who exemplifies it so strongly as the famous *IGNATIUS LOIOLA*. This illustrious personage, who confirms the observation of one who came after him, and almost equalled him in his trade, " that a man never rises so high as when he does not know whither he is going," began his extasies in the mire : and completed his schemes with the direction and execution of Councils, that, even in his own life-time, were ready to give the law to Christendom. Yea, the same spirit of Enthusiasm so regulated and conducted is no less serviceable to Nations and to Bodies of Men than it is to particulars. This built up *old* and *new* *ROME*. Prophane history tells us, that when the City had not six miles of dominion beyond it's Walls, it indulged the dream of *UNIVERSAL MONARCHY* ; and we learn by the *ecclesiastical*, that when the jurisdiction of the Bishops of Rome extended not beyond a small Diocese, they entertained the celestial vision of a *POPEDOM*. And it was this spirit, which, in de-

\* CROMWELL.

fiance,



fiance, and to the destruction, of Civil Policy and Religion, made the fortune of Both.

But these things belong rather to the History of the human Mind than to the work I have in hand: and besides, would keep me too long from the conclusion of the volume, to which I am now hastening. I will only observe, that this high Enthusiasm was so conspicuous in the character of ancient Heroism, and so powerful in making easy the most difficult undertakings, that the learned Varro scruples not to say, "It is of great advantage to Society, that Heroes should believe themselves the offspring of the Gods, whether indeed they be so or not. That by this means, the mind, confiding in its divine original, may rise above Humanity; so as more sublimely to project, more boldly to execute, and more happily to establish the grand schemes it labours with, for the service of mankind."

Hence it appears, that if Religion were a cheat, the LEGISLATORS themselves were among the first who fell into the deceit.

On the whole then we see, That of all these mediums, whereby our adversaries would infer that Religion is false, because invented by Statesmen, the third, which is most to their purpose, proves nothing: While, of the other two, the first is a high presumption of its truth; and the second, a demonstration of it.

I have said, that it was (I don't know how) taken on all hands for granted, that the invention of Religion by Politicians inferred its falshood. But, on se-

\* Utile est civitatibus, ut se viri sortes, etiam si falsum sit, ex diis genitos esse credant, ut eo modo animus humanus, velut divinæ stirpis fiduciam gerens, res magnas aggrediendas præsumat audacius, agat vehementius, & ob hoc impleat ipsa securitate felicius. Apud Aug. *Civ. Dei*, l. iii, c. 4.



cond thoughts, I am persuaded, the too great facility in agreeing to this conclusion arose from hence; The popular argument of the *innate idea of God*, had been for many ages esteemed a demonstration of his Being and Attributes: And the *political origin of Religion* overthrowing *that argument*, it was too hastily concluded that it overthrew the *truth of Religion in general*: For prejudice had established this consequence, *If no innate idea of God, Then no God at all.*

## II.

But now, although (as hath been proved) the granting this infidel pretence doth not at all affect the truth of NATURAL RELIGION; yet it doth by accident, and by accident only, affect the truth of REVELATION: Because Holy Scripture hath given us a different account of the origin of divine worship.

I shall shew therefore, in the next place, that the Notion is as *false* and *visionary*, as it is *vain* and *impertinent*; first, by examining the circumstances from which it's pretended truth is inferred; and secondly, by producing plain matter of fact to the contrary.

I. The first of these circumstances is, *That the Lawgiver employed his utmost pains and labour in teaching, propagating, and establishing Religion.* But what can be inferred from this but that he employed his pains from a full conviction of its utility? And how should he come by that conviction but from observing the effects of its influence on the actions of men? Which must needs suppose him to have *found*, and not to have *invented* Religion.

If this argument against Religion hath any weight, we must conclude the Magistrate was not only the inventor of *natural* RELIGION, but of *natural* JUSTICE likewise; for he took the same pains in teaching, propagating, and establishing both. But will any one pretend to say, that men, in a state of nature,

ture, had no ideas of *justice*? Indeed, both one and the other had lost much of their efficacy, when men applied to the civil Magistrate for relief: And this explains the reason why, on their entering into Society, the Legislator was always so intent upon RELIGION; namely, that he might recover it from the powerless condition, to which it was then reduced.

It will be said, perhaps, that the Atheist doth, in fact, contend, that *natural justice* was an invention of Politicians, as well as *Religion*. We have seen, indeed, a Countryman of our own, who hath made this proposition the foundation of his Philosophy, *that Just and Unjust arose from the Civil Magistrate*. But then, he never supposed, that men, before Society, had no idea of these things: All he would contend for was, that the idea (when and wherever got before) was merely fantastic.

II. The other, and more peculiar circumstance from which our adversaries infer their paradox, is, *that the first and original idolatry was the worship of DEAD MEN*: And these being Lawgivers, Magistrates, and public Benefactors, Religion appears to have been a political Institution. So amongst the Ancients, EUHEMERUS, surnamed *the Atheist*, wrote a treatise to prove that *the first gods of Greece were dead men*; which, Cicero, who saw his drift, rightly observed, tended to overturn all Religion<sup>a</sup>. And so, amongst the Moderns, TOLAND, the pious author of the PANTHEISTICON, with the same design, wrote a pamphlet, intitled, *Of the origin of Idolatry, and reasons of Heathenism*. It is not unpleasant to observe the uniform conduct of this noble pair of writers, which one never fails to find in authors of a like character, how distant soever in

<sup>a</sup> Nat. Deor. l. i. c. 42.

time or country. Euhemerus pretended his design was only to expose the popular religion of Greece, and Toland, that his great learning was only pointed against Pagan idolatry: While the real end of both, was the destruction of Religion in general.

It must be owned, that this circumstance, of *the first and original idolatry*, hath a face (but a very false one) of plausibility; being manifestly founded on this sophism, That the *first idolatry*, and the *first religious worship*, are one and the same thing. Whereas, it is not only possible that the *worship of the first Cause* of all things should be prior to any *Idol worship*; but, in the highest degree, *probable* that it was: *Idol worship* having none of the marks of an original practice; and all the circumstances attending a depraved and corrupt Institution.

But it being utterly false that the *worship of dead men* was the *primitive Idolatry*, We shall endeavour to convince these men of a FACT they are so unwilling to see or acknowledge.

I was pleased to find a book, like this of Toland's, written professedly on the subject; being in hopes to meet with something like argument or learning, that would justify an examination of it: For an *answer* to a licentious writer arrests the attention of common readers, better than *general reasoning*, though this goes more directly to the fact, and determines the question with greater precision. But I had the mortification to find nothing there but an indigested heap of common-place quotations from the *Ancients*; and an unmeaning collection of common-place reflexions from *modern infidels*; without the least seasoning of logic or criticism, to justify the waste of time to the Reader, or to make the labour supportable to one's self. And the authority of the man, which is nothing, could not engage me to any farther notice of his book. But another, whose



whose name stands justly highest in the learned world, and whose heart was as unlike this writer's as his head, seems to be of the same opinion concerning the primitive idolatry. It is the incomparable NEWTON in his *Chronology of the Greeks*. His words are these: "Æacus the son of Ægina, who was two generations older than the Trojan war, is by some reputed one of the first who built a temple in Greece. Oracles came first from Egypt into Greece about the same time, as also did the custom of forming the images of the gods with their legs bound up in the shape of the Egyptian mummies: For IDOLATRY began in Chaldæa and Egypt, and spread thence, &c. — The countries upon the Tigris and the Nile being exceeding fertile, were first frequented by mankind, and grew first into kingdoms, and therefore began first to adore their dead kings and queens \*." This great man, we see, takes it for granted, that the worship of dead men was the FIRST kind of idolatry: And so only insinuates a reason for this supposed fact, namely, that the worship of dead men introduced image worship: For, the Egyptians first worshiped dead men in person, that is, in their mummies; which when lost, consumed, or destroyed, were worshiped by representation, under an image made with its legs bound up, in likeness of the mummies. The reader now will be curious to know how this infers the other, that the worship of dead men was the primitive idolatry? All I can say to it is, that the excellent person seems to have put the change upon himself, in supposing image worship inseparably attendant on idolatry in general; when it was but commonly attendant on Hero-worship; and rarely

\* *Chron. of ancient kingdoms*, p. 160.

† See Vol. III. plate IX. fig. 1, 2, and 3, compared together,

upon the *Elementary*. As to the elementary, Herodotus tells us that the Persians, who worshiped the *celestial bodies*, had no *statues of their Gods* at all: And as to *Hero-worship*, we are assured by Dionysius Halicarnasseus, that the Romans, whose Gods were *dead men deified*, worshiped them, during some ages, without statues.

But to come closer to the point: Our Adversaries overturn their position, on the very entrance on the question. The grand symbol of the Atheistic school is, that FEAR FIRST MADE GODS:

“ Primus in orbe Deos fecit timor.

And yet, if we will believe them, these first gods were *dead men*, deified for their PUBLIC BENEFITS to their country or mankind: “ Not only (says Toland) kings and queens, great generals and legislators, the patrons of learning, promoters of curious arts, and authors of useful inventions partook of this honour; but also such private persons, as by their virtuous actions had distinguished themselves from others.”

But to pass this over. Their great principle of FEAR is every way destructive of their System: For those very ages of the world, in which FEAR most prevailed, and was the predominant passion of mankind, were the times BEFORE civil society; when every man's hand was against his brother. If *fear* then was the *origin of Religion*, Religion, without question, was BEFORE civil Society.

But neither to insist upon this: I let us hear what the ancient *Theists* thought of the matter. They said it was LOVE, and not FEAR, which was the origin of Religion. Thus Seneca: “ Nec in hunc furo-

<sup>2</sup> *Letters to Serena, Tract of the origin of Idolatry, p. 73.*



“rem omnes mortales consensissent alloquendi furda  
 “numina & inefficaces deos; nisi nossent illorum  
 “BENEFICIA nunc ultro oblata, nunc orantibus  
 “data; magna, tempeſtiva, ingentes minas inter-  
 “ventu ſuo ſolventia. Quis eſt autem tam miſer,  
 “tam neglectus, quis tam duro fato, & in pœnam  
 “genitus, ut non tantam deorum munificentiam  
 “ſenſerit? Ipſos illos complorantes ſortem ſuam,  
 “& querulos circumſpice, invenies non ex toto be-  
 “neficiorum cœleſtium expertes; neminem eſſe,  
 “ad quem non aliquid ex illo BENIGNISSIMO  
 “FONTE manaverit<sup>b</sup>.”

But as HOPE and FEAR, LOVE and HATRED, are the cardinal hinges, on which all human actions and cogitations turn, I ſuppoſe it was neither one nor other of theſe paſſions alone, but both of them together, which opened to thoſe early Mortals (whoſe uncultivated reaſon had not yet gained the *knowledge*, or whoſe degenerate manners had now loſt the *tradition* of the TRUE GOD) the firſt idea of ſuperior Beings.

I. Such men, in a ſtate of nature, whoſe ſubſiſtence was *immediately* to be ſupplied by the product of the earth, would be exact obſervers of what facilitated or retarded thoſe ſupplies: So that of courſe, the grand genial Power of the ſyſtem, that viſible God the SUN, would be ſoon regarded by them as a moſt beneficent Deity: And *thunder* and *lightning*, *ſtorms* and *tempeſts*, which his Qualities produced, would be conſidered as the effects of his anger. The reſt of the celeftial Orbs would, in proportion to their uſe and appearance, be regarded in the ſame light. That noble fragment from SANCHONIATHO, quoted above<sup>c</sup>, as part of the *Hiſtory* rehearſed in the ἀπορρήτα of the *Mysterics*, gives this

<sup>b</sup> *De Benef.* l. iv. c. 4.

<sup>c</sup> *Div. Leg.* vol. I. p. 226.



very original to Idolatry. It tells us that "*Genos* and *Genia* (begotten of the two first mortals, *Protogonus* and *Aeon*) in the time of great droughts, stretched out their hands towards the SUN, whom they regarded as a God, and sole Ruler of the heavens. After two or three generations, came *Upsouraios* and his brother *Ousous*. These consecrated two pillars to FIRE and WIND, and then offered bloody sacrifices to them, as to Gods." This is a very natural account of the origine and FIRST species of Idolatry. That it is the true, we shall now endeavour to shew.

1. Those ancient people of the North and South, the Suevi, the Arabs, and Africans, who lived long uncivilized, and in tribes, were all worshipers of the celestial bodies. The same appears to have been the case of the Chinese; of the North Americans; and of the people of Mexico and Peru; as may be collected from what is said above, of their first Lawgivers pretending to be the offspring of the *Sun* and *Heaven*<sup>a</sup>: For we may be assured they had the sense to chuse a well established authority, under which to set up their own Pretensions.

2. But all Antiquity concurs in asserting, that *the first religious adoration, paid to the Creature, was the worship of heavenly Bodies*. This was so evident, and so universally acknowledged, that CRITIUS himself, as we see<sup>c</sup>, was forced to allow its truth. And this being the entire overthrow of his system of the origin of religion, nothing but the fullest evidence could have extorted the confession from him.

<sup>a</sup> Le SOLEIL est la divinité des peuples de l'Amerique, sans en excepter aucun de ceux qui nous sont connus. *Lesfranc, Mœurs des sauvages Ameriquains*, tom. i. p. 130.

<sup>c</sup> See his Iambics above.

To support so manifest a point with a long heap of quotations, would be trifling with the reader's patience.

To cut the matter short, EUSEBIUS expressly affirms, and attempts to strengthen his position by an etymology of the word ΘΕΟΣ, that no Beings were anciently accounted Gods or divine, neither dead men, nor demons good or bad; but the STARS of heaven only<sup>f</sup>.

BUT AS GREECE and EGYPT, the two Countries where civil Policy took deepest root, and spread its largest influence, had, by the long custom of deifying their public Benefactors, so erased the memory of a prior idolatry, as to have this *second* species of it, by some moderns, deemed the *first*; I shall produce an ancient testimony or two, of the highest credit, to shew that the adoration of the celestial Bodies was the first idol-worship in those two grand Nurseries of Superstition, as well as in all other places.

I. IT APPEARS TO ME (says PLATO in his *Cratylus*) THAT THE FIRST MEN WHO INHABITED GREECE, HELD THOSE ONLY TO BE GODS, WHICH MANY BARBARIANS AT PRESENT WORSHIP; NAMELY, THE SUN, MOON, EARTH, STARS, AND HEAVEN<sup>g</sup>. The *barbarians* here hinted at, were both such as remained in, and such as had got out of, the *state of nature*. As first, the civilized Per-

<sup>f</sup> Αλλ' ὅτι μὲν οἱ πρῶτοι καὶ παλαιότατοι τῶν ἀνθρώπων, ὅτε νῦν οἰκοδομαῖς προσεῖχον—ὅτι δὲ οὐδὲ τῶν μετὰ ταῦτα καλουμενῶν θεῶν τις καὶ ἥρουν μύμη τις τοῖς τοις παρῇν, ἢ ἢ τις ἢ αὐτοῖς Ζεὺς, ἢ Κρόνος, ἢ Διὸς.—ἀλλὰ οὐδὲ δαίμων τις ἀγαθός, ἢ φαῦλος ἐν ἀνθρώποις ἱθαυμάζον· μόνα δὲ τὰ φαινόμενα τῶν ἡραίων Ἀστῶν, παρὰ τὸ Δίον, ὅπερ ἐστὶ τείχη, θεῶντι προσηγορίας, ὡς αὐτοὶ φασιν ἐτύχχανε. *Præf. Evang. l. i. c. 9.*

<sup>g</sup> Φαίνεται μοι ὁ πρῶτος τῶν ἀνθρώπων περὶ τῇ Ἑλλάδι τῆς μόνος Διὸς ἡγεῖσθαι, ὥσπερ νῦν πολλοὶ τῶν βαρβάρων, Ἕλων, καὶ Σιληνῶν, καὶ Γῆν, καὶ Ἀστῆρα, καὶ Οὐρανόν.



fians, of whom HERODOTUS gives this account:  
 “ They worship the Sun, Moon, and Earth, Fire,  
 “ Water, and the Winds: And this adoration they  
 “ have all along paid from the very beginning.  
 “ Afterwards, indeed, they learned to worship Ura-  
 “ nia<sup>b</sup>, &c.” And so goes on to speak of their  
 later idolatry of dead mortals. Secondly, the sa-  
 vage Africans, of whom the same Herodotus says,  
 “ They worship only the Sun and Moon: The  
 “ same do all the Africans<sup>i</sup>.”

2. DIOBORUS SICULUS, speaking of the EGYPTIANS, tells us, THAT THE FIRST MEN LOOKING UP TO THE WORLD ABOVE THEM, AND TERRIFIED AND STRUCK WITH ADMIRATION AT THE NATURE OF THE UNIVERSE, SUPPOSED THE SUN AND MOON TO BE THE PRINCIPAL AND ETERNAL GODS<sup>k</sup>. The reason which the historian assigns, makes his assertion general; and shews he believed this idolatry to be the *first* every where else, as well as in EGYPT. But that it was so *there*, we have likewise good internal evidence, from a circumstance in their hieroglyphics, the most ancient method of recording knowledge: Where, as we are told by Horus Apollo, a STAR denoted or expressed the idea of the DEITY<sup>l</sup>.

Such was the genius and state of Idolatry in the UNCIVILIZED world. So that the Author of the book called, *The Wisdom of Solomon*, said well,  
 “ Surely vain are all men by nature who are igno-

<sup>b</sup> Θέουσι δὲ Ἡλίῳ τε καὶ Σελήνῃ, καὶ Γῇ, καὶ Πυρὶ, καὶ ὕδατι, καὶ Ἀνέμοις· τέτοιτοι μὲν δὴ μέντοισι θύουσι ἀρχῇθεν· ἐπιμεμαθηκασὶ δὲ καὶ τῇ Ουρανίῃ θύειν. — I. i. c. 131.

<sup>i</sup> Θέουσι δὲ Ἡλίῳ καὶ Σελήνῃ μέντοισι· τέτοιτοι μὲν νῦν πάντες Διότυες θύουσι. I. iv. c. 188.

<sup>k</sup> Τὴς αἰθερώπης τὸ παλαιὸν γενομένης ἀναδελφείας εἰς τὸν κόσμον, καὶ τῇ τῶν ὕλων φύσει καταπλαγέντας καὶ θαυμάσοντας, ὑπολαβεῖν εἶναι θεοὺς αἰδέας τε καὶ πρῶτους, τὸν τε Ἥλιον καὶ Σελήνην. — I. i.

<sup>l</sup> Ἀστὴρ παρὰ Αἰγυπτίοις γεγράφμενος Θεὸν σημαίνει. I. ii. c. 1.



“rant of God; and could not by considering the  
 “*Work*, acknowledge the *Work-master*: but deemed  
 “either FIRE or WIND, or the *swift air*, or the  
 “*circle of the stars*, or the *violent water*, or the  
 “LIGHTS OF HEAVEN, to be the Gods which go-  
 “vern the World<sup>m</sup>.”

II. But when now SOCIETY had produced those mighty blessings, which exalt our brutal nature to a life of elegance and reason; and, in exchange for penury, distress, and danger, had established safety, and procured all the accommodations of Civil intercourse, the RELIGIOUS system received as great, though far from so advantageous, a change as the POLITICAL.

I. GRATITUDE and ADMIRATION, the warmest and most active affections of our nature, concurred to enlarge the object of Religious worship; and to make men regard those BENEFACTORS OF HUMAN NATURE, the Founders of Society, as having more in them than a common ray of the Divinity. So that, god-like benefits bespeaking, as it were, a god-like Mind, the deceased PARENT OF A PEOPLE easily advanced into an IMMORTAL. From hence arose, though not till some time after, their metaphysical distribution of Souls into the several classes of *human*, *heroic*, and *demonic*. A distinction which served greatly to support this species of Idolatry.

2. When the religious bias was in so good a train, NATURAL AFFECTION would have its share in advancing this new mode of Adoration. PIETY TO PARENTS would easily take the lead; as it was supported by gratitude and admiration, the primum mobile of this whole system: The *natural Father* of the Tribe often happening to be the *political Father* of the People, and Founder of the State.

3. FONDNESS FOR THE OFFSPRING would next have its turn. And a disconsolate Father, at the head of a People, would contrive to sooth his grief for the untimely death of a favourite child, and to gratify his pride under the want of *Succession*, by paying divine honours to its memory. "For a Father afflicted with untimely mourning, when he had made an image of his child, soon taken away, now honoured him as a God, which was then a dead man, and delivered, TO THOSE THAT WERE UNDER HIM, ceremonies and sacrifices".

4. Lastly, the SUBJECT'S REVERENCE for his Master, the CITIZEN'S VENERATION for the Lawgiver, would not be far behind to complete this religious Farce of mistaken gratitude and affection.

This was the course of the SECOND SPECIES OF IDOLATRY; as we may collect from ancient history both sacred and profane: And, especially, from the famous fragment of SANCHONIATHO, which partakes so much of *bolb*; where these various motives for this species of Idolatry are recounted in express words: "After many generations came Chrysor; and he INVENTED many things useful to civil life; for which, after his decease, he was worshipped as a God. Then flourished Ouranos and his sister Ge; who deified and offered sacrifices to their FATHER *Uppistos*, when he had been torn in pieces by wild beasts. Afterwards *Cronos* consecrated *Muth* his SON, and was himself consecrated by his SUBJECTS".

III. But Idolatry did not stop here. For when men, as the Apostle says, would not retain God in their knowledge, He gave them up to their own vain imaginations, whereby they changed the truth of God into a lye,—into an image made like to corruptible man,

<sup>n</sup> *Wisd. of Sol.* c. xiv. 15.

<sup>o</sup> See Vol. I. p. 227.



and to birds, and to four-footed beasts, and to creeping things<sup>p</sup>. How this last monstrous change was effected, I have discoursed of at large, elsewhere<sup>q</sup>. It is sufficient to observe at present, that it was begun in EGYPT, and was propagated from thence. Where the method of their Learned, to record the history of their Hero-gods, in improved hieroglyphics, gave birth to BRUTE-WORSHIP. For the characters of this kind of writing being the figures of animals, which stood for marks of their ELEMENTARY GODS, and principally of their HEROES, soon made their Hieroglyphics, sacred. And this, in no great space of time, introduced a SYMBOLIC worship of their Gods, under hieroglyphic Figures. But the People (how naturally, we may see by the practice of saint-worship in the church of Rome) presently forgot the *symbol* or *relation*; and depraved this superstition still farther, by a *direct* worship: till at length, the animals themselves, whose figures these hieroglyphic marks represented, became the object of religious adoration. Which species of Idolatry, by the credit and commerce of the EGYPTIANS, and their Carriers and Factors the PHOENICIANS, in course of time, spread amongst many other nations. And this was the THIRD AND LAST SPECIES of Pagan Idolatry.

And here again, as well for the *original* as the *order* of this Idolatry, we have the confirmation of SANCHONIATHO's authority: "Ouranos (says he) was the Inventor of the *Betylia*, a kind of ANIMATED STONES framed with great art. And *Taautus* [the Egyptian] formed ALLEGORIC FIGURES, CHARACTERS AND IMAGES of the celestial Gods and Elements".

<sup>p</sup> Rom. ch. i. 23.

<sup>q</sup> Book IV. sect. iv.

<sup>r</sup> See Vol. I. p. 227.



By these *animated stones* (as is observed above) must needs be meant, *stones cut into a human figure*. For, before this invention, brute, unformed, or *pyramidal Stones*, were consecrated and adored. The *allegoric figures and characters* more plainly describe Hieroglyphic writing: From whence, as we say, this species of Idolatry was first derived.

This is a plain, consistent account of THE RISE AND PROGRESS OF PAGAN IDOLATRY; supported as well by the scattered evidence of Antiquity, as by the more certain reason of things. I say, "the scattered evidence of Antiquity:" For I know of no writer who hath given us a direct, or so much as consistent, account of this matter. And it is no wonder. For a system of Religion, of which the MORTAL GODS are so considerable a part, would appear too hard even for the digestion of the People. An expedient therefore was soon found, and by a very natural incident, to throw a veil over this shocking absurdity; and this was by pretending one while, to those who grew inquisitive concerning the nature of the *Hero-Gods*, that these Gods were only SYMBOLIC of the *Celestial*: and at another, to those who pried too closely into the ELEMENTARY worship, that this was only SYMBOLICAL of their Heroes: who were not *dead men*, as might be suspected, but a species of superior Beings, which, in affection to mankind, had once been conversant on Earth: and whom, now, a deification had reinstated in their original Rights. Thus the popular belief presented nothing but one *uniform order* of IMMORTALS: The SECRET of the *human original* of one part of them being reserved for the private instruction of the MYSTERIES.

This cover for their absurd Idolatries, would naturally produce two orthodox Parties of Symbolizers in the Pagan Church. They, who most favoured

HERO-

HERO-worship, would find the Symbol in ELEMENTARY: And they, who best liked the *Elementary*, would find the Symbol in the *Heroic*. Both parties, as usual, laid claim to primitive Antiquity. For true it is, that the DEGREES and MANNER by which the early Mortals SUPERINDUCED the worship of *dead men* on the primary idolatrous worship of the *heavenly Bodies*, gave countenance to either side. This was the *natural incident* I spoke of above, as favouring the expedient employed to hide the dishonours of Paganism. The matter is worth knowing; and I shall endeavour to explain it.

1. The first step to the APOTHEOSIS was the complimenting their Heroes and public BENEFACTORS, with the Name of that Being, which was most esteemed and worshiped. Thus a King, for his beneficence, was called the *Sun*; and a Queen, for her beauty, the *Moon*. Diodorus relates, that SOL FIRST REIGNED IN EGYPT; CALLED SO FROM THE LUMINARY OF THAT NAME IN THE HEAVENS. This will help us to understand an odd passage in the fragment of Sanchoniatho, where it is said, "that Cronus had seven sons by Rhea, the youngest of which was made a God, as soon as born." The meaning, I suppose, is, that this youngest son was called after some luminary in the Heavens, to which they paid divine honours: and these honours came, in time, to be transferred to the terrestrial name-fake. The same Historian had before told us,

\* Πρωτος μὲν ἦσαν βασιλεύσαντες τῶν κατ' Αἴγυπτον, ἀνδρῶν ὡς τῶ κατ' ἑσπερίαν ἀστρον. l. i. In the language of Egypt called *men*, as we see in Herod. l. ii. c. 99. The practice of Assyrian superstition was the same; their king Belus being named from *Baal* the Sun.

\* — Τὸ αὐτὸ [Κρόνος] γινώσκειται ἀπὸ Πλάτος ὡς αἰεὶ ἐκείνου τοῦ κατὰ τὴν ἡμετέραν ἀστρον.



that the sons of Guenos, mortals like their father, were called by the names of the elements, *light*, *fire*, and *flame*, whose use they had discovered<sup>1</sup>.

2. As this adulation advanced into an Established worship, they turned the compliment the other way: And now the Planet or Luminary was called after the Hero; I suppose, the better to accustom the people, even in the act of *Planet-worship*, to this new adoration. Diodorus, in the passage quoted a little before, having told us that the SUN and MOON were the first Gods of Egypt, adds, THE FIRST OF WHICH, THEY CALLED OSIRIS, AND THE OTHER ISIS<sup>2</sup>. But this was the general practice. So the Ammonites called the SUN, *Moloch*; the Syrians, *Adad*; the Arabs, *Dionysius*; the Assyrians, *Belus*; the Persians, *Milbra*; the Phœnicians, *Saturn*; the Carthaginians, *Hercules*; and the Palmyrians, *Elegabalus*<sup>3</sup>. Again, the MOON, by the Phrygians was called *Cybele*, or the mother of the Gods; by the Athenians, *Minerva*; by the Cyprians, *Venus*; by the Cretans, *Diana*; by the Sicilians, *Proserpine*; by others, *Hecate*, *Bellonia*, *Urania*, *Vesta*, *Lucinia*<sup>4</sup>, &c. Philo Byblius, in Eusebius, explains this practice: "It is remarkable (says he) that they [the ancient idolaters] imposed on the ELEMENTS, and on those parts of nature which they esteemed Gods, the NAMES OF THEIR KINGS: For the natural Gods, which they acknowledged, were only the Sun, Moon, Planets, Elements, and the

<sup>1</sup> Εξῆς, φησὶν, ἀπὸ Γένους γεννηθῆναι αὐτοῖς παῖδας θνητοὺς, οἷς εἰκοσι, ὀνομασία Φῶς καὶ Πῦρ καὶ Φλόξ ἔτοι φησὶν, ἐκ παραπείθεως ζώων εὖρον πνεύ, καὶ τὴν χερσὶν ἐκράξαν. Euseb. præp. Evang. l. i. c. 10.

<sup>2</sup> — Ὑπολαβεῖν ἵνα θεῶς αἰδίους τε καὶ περὶ τῶν, τῶν τε ἡλίου καὶ Σελήνης, ὡς τὸν μὲν Ὀσίριν, τὴν δὲ Ἰσιν ὀνομάσαι. l. i.

<sup>3</sup> See Macrob. Saturn. l. i. c. 17. & seq.

<sup>4</sup> See Apul. Met.

“ like;



“ like; they being, now, in the humour of having  
 “ Gods of both classes, the MORTAL and the IM-  
 “ MORTAL.”

3. As a further proof that *Hero-worship* was thus superinduced upon the *planetary*, let me add a very singular circumstance in the first formation of *STATUES*, consecrated to the *Hero-Gods*; of which circumstance, both ancient<sup>b</sup> and modern<sup>c</sup> writers have been at a loss to assign a reason. It is, that these first *Statues* were not of *human* form, but *CONICAL* and *PYRAMIDAL*. Thus the Scholiast, on the *Vespæ* of Aristophanes, tells us, that the Statues of Apollo and Bacchus were *conic* pillars, or *Obelisks*<sup>d</sup>: and Pausanias, that the Statue of Jupiter Meilichius represented a *Pyramid*<sup>e</sup>: That of the Argive Juno did the same, as appears from a verse of Phoronis<sup>f</sup>, quoted by Clemens, intimating, that these *pyramidal* columns were the first Statues of the Gods: And this practice was universal, as well amongst the early Barbarians as the Greeks. Now it is well known that the Ancients represented the rays of Light under pillars of this form: And we find, from the fragment of Sanchoniatho, that Usous consecrated two COLUMNS to the *Wind* and *Fire*: Hence, the erecting them as representatives of their *Hero-gods*

<sup>a</sup> Ἐξαιρέτως δὲ καὶ ἀπὸ τῶν σφίγγων βασιλέων, τοῖς κοσμητοῖς γοιχείοις, καὶ τισὶ τῶν νομιζομένων θεῶν τὰς ὁμοειδέας ἐπέθεσαν, φυσικῆς δὲ, ἥλιον καὶ σελήνην, καὶ τὰς λοιπὰς πλανήτας ἀστέρας, καὶ τὰ γοιχία, καὶ τὰ τεύχεα συναφῇ θεῶς μοῖαις ἐγίνωσκον ὡς αὐτοῖς τὰς μὲν θνητοῖς, τὰς δὲ ἀθάνατοις θεοὺς εἶναι. *Præp. Evang.* l. i. c. 9.

<sup>b</sup> See *Clem. Alex. Strom.* l. i. p. 348. *Par. Ed.*

<sup>c</sup> See *Spencer de Leg. Heb. Rit.* l. ii. c. 28. sect. 3.

<sup>d</sup> Πρὸ τῶν θυρῶν ἑστῶτες εἶχον κίονας εἰς ὅξυ ληροῦς, ὡς ὀβελίσκους ἰδρύειν εἰς τιμὴν Ἀπόλλωνος Ἀγνιεύς — ἰδίως δὲ φασὶ αὐτὸς εἶναι Ἀπόλλωνος. οἱ δὲ Διονύσου οἱ δὲ Ἀμφίου. *Σφ. ver.* 870.

<sup>e</sup> *In Corin.* p. 132.

<sup>f</sup> — Ἦεν Ἀργείης, ἡ γέμματα καὶ θυράνοιον, Ἡρώτη ἐπὶ στήθεσιν αὐτῆς κίονα μακρὸν ἀνάσσης.

shows how These succeeded to the titles, rights, and honours of the *natural and celestial* Deities.

To explain this matter at large would require a Volume: It is sufficient to have given this hint: which, if pursued, might perhaps direct us to the right end of the clew of that hitherto inexplicable labyrinth of PAGAN MYTHOLOGY. The Reader sees clearly, by what has been already said, that this unheeded, but very natural way of superinducing *Hero-worship* on the *Planetary*, easily confounded the different specieses: and afforded a plausible pretence for the two Parties mentioned above, to make Either, SYMBOLICAL of the Other.

Here matters rested: and the vulgar Faith seems to have remained a long time undisturbed. But as the Age grew refined, and the Greeks became inquisitive and learned, the common MYTHOLOGY began to give offence. The Speculative and more Delicate were shocked at the absurd and immoral stories of their Gods; and scandalized, to find such things make an authentic part of their story. It may indeed be thought matter of wonder how such tales, taken up in a barbarous age, came not to sink into oblivion as the age grew more knowing; from mere abhorrence of their indecencies, and shame of their absurdities. Without doubt, this had been their fortune, but for an unlucky circumstance: The great Poets of Greece who had most contributed to refine the public taste and manners, and were now grown into a kind of sacred authority, had sanctified these silly Legends by their writings, which Time had now consigned to immortality.

Vulgar Paganism, therefore, in such an Age as this, lying open to the attacks of curious and inquisitive men, would not, we may well think, be long at rest. It is true, FREE-THINKING then lay under great difficulties and discouragements. To insult the Religion



Religion of one's Country, which is now the mark of learned distinction, was branded, in the ancient world, with public infamy. Yet *Free-thinkers* there were: Who, (as is their wont) together with the public worship of their Country, threw off all reverence for Religion in general. Amongst these was EUPHEMERUS, the Messenian; and, by what we can learn, the most distinguished of this tribe. This man, in mere wantonness of heart, began his attacks on Religion, by divulging the *secret of the Mysteries*. But as it was capital to do this directly and professedly, he contrived to cover his perfidy and malice by the intervention of a kind of *Utopian Romance*. He pretended, "that in a certain City, which he came to, in his travels, he found this GRAND SECRET, that the Gods were dead men deified, preserved in their sacred writings; and confirmed by monumental records, inscribed to the Gods themselves; who were there said to be interred." So far was not amiss. But then, in the genuine spirit of his Class, who never cultivate a truth but in order to graft a lye upon it, he pretended, "that DEAD MORTALS WERE THE FIRST GODS: And that an imaginary Divinity in these early Heroes and Conquerors created the idea of a superior Power; and introduced the practice of religious worship amongst men." The learned reader sees below, that our *Free-thinker* is true to his Cause, and endeavours to verify the fundamental principle of his Sect, that FEAR first made Gods, even in that very instance where the contrary passion seems to have been at its height, the time when men made Gods of their deceased BENEFACTORS. A little matter of

Εὐήμερος δὲ, ὁ μεσσηνίου ἄλφειος, φησὶν ὅτι τῆς ἀτακτοῦς ἀνθρώπων φύσεως οἱ περιγενόμενοι τῶν ἀλλοτρῶν ἐκείνῳ καὶ συνίστασθαι πρὸς τὰ ἐν αὐτοῖς κερδομένηα πάσας βίαι, σπουδαίους μισθούς δαίμασι καὶ σαρκοφάγοις, ἀνίστασθαι καὶ αὐτοὺς ἐντεθαμένους τῶν καὶ δεῖαι δυνάμει, αἰεὶ τοῖς ἄλλοις ἐπιδοσθῆναι διὰ τὸν φόβον. Sext. Empir. adv. Mathem.



address hides the shame of so perverse a piece of malice. He represents those Founders of Society, and Fathers of their Country, under the idea of *destructive* Conquerors, who by mere force and fear had brought men into subjection and slavery. On this account it was that indignant Antiquity concurred in giving EUHEMERUS the proper name of ATHEIST; which, however, he would hardly have escaped, tho' he had done no more than divulge the *Secret of the Mysteries*; and had not poisoned his discovery with this impious and foreign addition, so contrary to the true spirit of that *Secret*.

This detection had been long dreaded by the orthodox Protectors of Pagan Worship: And they were provided of a temporary defence in their intricate, and properly perplexed, system of SYMBOLIC ADORATION. But this would do only to stop a breach for the present, till a better could be provided; and was too weak to stand alone, against so violent an attack. The PHILOSOPHERS, therefore, now took up the defence of Paganism, where the PRIESTS had left it: And, to the other's SYMBOLS, added their own ALLEGORIES, for a second cover to the absurdities of the ancient Mythology. So, MINUCIUS FELIX——ZENON, interpretando *Junonem* Aëra, *Jovem* Coelum, *Neptunum* Mare, *Ignem* esse *Pulcrum*, et ceteros similiter vulgi Deos elementa esse monstrando, publicum arguit graviter et revincit errorem. Eadem fere CHRYSIPPUS, vim divinam, rationalem naturam, et mundum interim, et fatalem necessitatem Deum credit; ZENONEMQUE interpretatione Physiologiæ in HESIODI, HOMERI, ORPHEIQUE *carminibus* imitatur. *Babylonio* etiam DIOGENI disciplina est exponendi et differendi, Jovis partum et ortum *Minervæ* et hoc genus cetera, *rerum vocabula* esse non *Deorum*<sup>b</sup>. For, all the genuine

<sup>b</sup> *Oclavius*, c. xix.

Sects of Philosophy, as we have observed, were steady Patriots; LEGISLATION making one essential part of their Philosophy. And, to legislate without the foundation of a national Religion, was, in their opinion, building castles in the air. So that we are not to wonder, they took the alarm; and opposed these Insultors of the public Worship with all their vigour. But, as they never lost sight of their proper character, they so contrived, that the defence of the national Religion should terminate in a recommendation of their philosophic speculations. Hence, their support of the public worship, and their evasion of *Eubemerus's* charge, turned upon this proposition, "That the whole ancient MYTHOLOGY was no other than the vehicle of PHYSICAL, MORAL, and DIVINE knowledge." And, to this it is that the learned *Eusebius* refers, where he says, "That a new race of men refined their old gross THEOLOGY; and gave it an honefter look; and brought it nearer to the truth of things<sup>1</sup>."

However, this proved a troublesome work; and, after all, ineffectual for the security of men's PRIVATE MORALS; which, the *example* of the licentious story according to the *letter*, would not fail to influence, how well soever the allegoric interpretation was calculated to cover the PUBLIC HONOUR of Religion: So that the more ethical of the Philosophers grew peevish with what gave them so much trouble, and answered so little to the *interior* of religious practice: this made them break out, from time to time, into hasty resentments against their capital Poets; unsuitable, one would think, to the dignity of the Authors of such noble recondite

<sup>1</sup> Τοιαῦτα ἦν τὰ τῆς παλαιᾶς Θεολογίας, ἣν μέγαβελόνης νοίει τινες, ἔχειν καὶ πρῶτον ἐπιφύειν λογικώτερον τε φιλοσοφίᾳ αὐχρῆναι, τὸν δὲ φυσικωτέραν τῆς περὶ Θεοῦ ἱστορίας δόξαν εἰσηγήσασθαι, σημειώσας ἐνερσιολογίας τοῖς μύθοις προσεπινοήσασθαι. *Præp. Evang.* l. ii. c. 6.

truths,

truths, as they would persuade us to believe were treasured up in their Writings. Hence it was that PLATO banished HOMER from his *Republic*: and that PYTHAGORAS, in one of his extramundane adventures, saw both HOMER and HESIOD doing penance in Hell, and hung up there, for examples, to be bleached and purified from the grossness and pollution of their ideas.

The first of these Allegorizers, as we learn from Lærtius<sup>\*</sup>, was ANAXAGORAS; who, with his friend METRODORUS, turned Homer's Mythology into a system of *Ethics*. Next came HERACLIDES PONTICUS, and, of the same fables made as good a system of *Physics*: which, to shew us with what kind of spirit it was composed, he intitled *Ἀλλῆγορίαι τῶν κατὰ οὐρανὸν* [*Ομήρου*] *βλασφημιανούτων*. And last of all, when the necessity became more pressing, PROCLUS undertook to shew that all Homer's Fables were no other than *physical, ethical, and moral ALLEGORIES*. For we are to observe, that the Philosophers INVENTED and REVIVED this way of interpretation, as at two different times, so on two different occasions.

1. It was invented to encounter such men as EUPHEMERUS, who attempted to overthrow all Religion, by this pretended fact, That the FIRST Worship was paid to *dead men deified*; which they supported on a *real one*, namely, that the *greater Gods* of Greece were only deified Mortals; as appeared from HOMER and the other early Greek Poets: whose writings being become a kind of *SCRIPTURE* in the popular Religion, the Defenders of the *common faith* had it not in their power to REPUDIATE their fables as only the idle visions of a poetic fancy: Nothing was left but to SPIRITUALIZE the sense, by allegorical interpretations. And this proved so lucky an

<sup>\*</sup> Lib. ii. *Anaxag. vit.*



expedient, that, at the same time that it covered their fables from the attacks of their adversaries, it added new reverence and veneration both to them and their Authors. So TERTULLIAN. *Ipsa quoque vulgaris superstitio communis Idololatriæ, cum in simulacris de nominibus et fabulis veterum mortuorum pudet, ad interpretationem naturalium refugit, et dedecus suum ingenio obumbrat, figurans Jovem in substantiam fervidam, et Junonem ejus in æream,* <sup>1</sup> &c.

2. What *These* began for the sake of their THEOLOGERS, their successors continued for the sake of their THEOLOGY. For it is to be noted, that the first CHRISTIAN APOLOGISTS took up so much of the argument of EUHEMERUS and his Fellows, as concerned the real nature and original of the greater Gods of Greece. And as they had disencumbered this truth, of the false consequence with which those audacious Freethinkers had loaded it, they were enabled to urge it with superior force. But if the CHRISTIANS added new vigour to this attack, the PHILOSOPHERS became still more animated in their defence: for they hated this new Sect as an enemy equally to the PHILOSOPHY and to the RELIGION of Greece. And their *accidental* advantages in the application of this revived method of *allegory*, were not inferior to their *most studied* arts of improving it: For their Christian Adversaries could with no grace object to a way of interpretation which they themselves had just borrowed from Paganism, to SPIRITUALIZE, forsooth, their sacred Scriptures, which the Philosophers had long used with more sense and better judgment, to make theirs, REASONABLE.

But here we are to take notice of this difference between these Allegorizers BEFORE, and the Allegorizers AFTER the time of Christ. The *first* were prin-

<sup>1</sup> Adv. Marc. l. i.

cipally employed in giving a *physical*<sup>m</sup> or *moral* interpretation of the Fables; the *latter*, a THEOLOGICAL. As we may see in the case of Plutarch; who was both Priest and Philosopher in one. His famous tract, OF ISIS AND OSIRIS, is directly written to support the national Religion, which had just taken the alarm; and not without reason. His purpose, in it, is to shew, That all its MULTIFORM worship was only an address to the SUPREME BEING, under various names and covers. But then ancient history, which acquaints us with the origin of their Gods, stood in his way. He denies therefore, what these histories invariably attest. He calls *Euhemerus*, who enforced their evidence, an Impostor<sup>n</sup>: And hath many other evasions to elude such circumstances as are most decisive. Thus, when he cannot deny, that, what is recorded of their Gods shews them to be subject to *human passions*, he will not yet allow the inference for their *humanity*; because the Genii and Demons are agitated by the like passions<sup>o</sup>. Thus again, the *bewailing* and *lamenting* gestures, in

<sup>m</sup> So ARNOBIUS. *Vulnerari, vexari, bella inter se gerere familiarium memorantur ardore discriminum: Vobis illa est descriptio voluptati, atque ut scriptorum tantam defendatis audaciam, ALLEGORIAS res illas, et NATURALIS SCIENTIÆ mentimini esse doctrinas. Adv. Gent. l. iv. p. 150. Ed. quarto.*

<sup>n</sup> ——— Ὅς αὐτός [Εὐήμερος] ἀντίγραφον συνθείς ἀπὸ τῆς καὶ ἀντιπαρὸς μυθολογίας, πᾶσαι ἀθεύηται καὶ ἀσκηδάντοι τῆς οἰκουμένης, τὰς περὶ θεῶν παλαιὰς ὁμαλῶς διαγραφῶν, εἰς ὥσπερ Στρατηγῶν καὶ Ναυάρχων καὶ Βασιλέων, ὡς δὴ πάλαι γελούστων. p. 641.

<sup>o</sup> Βίβλιον δὲ, οἱ τὰ περὶ τὸν Τυφῶνα καὶ Ὀσίριν καὶ Ἰσὶν ἱστορήματα, μὴτε θεῶν παθήματα, μὴτε ἀνθρώπων, ἀλλὰ Δαιμονίων μεγάλων εἶναι νομίζουσιν, ὡς καὶ Πλάτων καὶ Πυθαγόρας καὶ Σωκράτης καὶ Χρύσιππος, ἐπόμενοι τοῖς παλαιῇ Θεολογίᾳ, ἐξουσιάζουσιν μὴ ἀνθρώπων γελῶναι λόγους καὶ πικρὰ τὰ δύναμι τὴν φύσιν υπερφύουσας ἡμῶν, τὰ δὲ θεῶν ἐκ ἀμύνης, καὶ ἀκράτου ἰσχυρίας, ἀλλὰ καὶ ψυχῆς φύσει καὶ σώματος αἰσθήσει ἐν συνήθειᾳ καὶ ἐν δόξῃ καὶ ἐν πάσῃ καὶ ὅσα ταῦτα ἐγγιγνόμενα ταῖς μετὰ βούλαις πάσθαι, τὰς μὲν πολλὰς, τὰς δὲ πλεονεχίας ἐπὶ γινώσκειν γὰρ ὡς ἐν ἀνθρώποις, καὶ Δαιμονίων, ἀλλῆς διαφορᾷ καὶ κακίας. p. 642.



many of their established Rites, which looked so like mourning for the dead, signified, he assures us, no more than an allegorical representation of *corn sown and buried*<sup>p</sup>. In this manner, the postulate having supported the allegories; the allegories come, in good time, to the assistance of the postulate.

Thus stood the matter in the ancient World. Let us see now what use the Moderns have made of what they found recorded there. Our *Freethinkers*, such as *Toland* and his school, have revived the old rank doctrine of Euhemerus. That PANTHEISTIC Philosopher's understanding had so strong a bias to impiety, that it seemed rather a natural sympathy than any thing acquired, which drew him to it at all distances. Hear how awkwardly he represents *Euhemerus's* system to us: and yet he labours hard to set it off. *The FIRST Idolatry* (says he) *did not proceed, as is commonly supposed, from the beauty, or order, or influence of the STARS. But men observing Books to perish [before there were any] by fire, worms, or rotteness; and Iron, Brass, and Marble, not less subject to violent hands or the injuries of the weather, they IMPOSED ON THE STARS, as the only everlasting monuments, the proper names of their HEROES, or of something memorable in their History*<sup>q</sup>. All this, his Predecessors, the *Freethinkers* of Antiquity, (who knew how to express themselves) informed us of when they said, *That Star-worship was only symbolical of Hero-worship*; and, consequently, of later date: the thing they aimed at, to induce their conclusion, that therefore *Religion was a political invention*. To-

<sup>p</sup> This ingenious conceit of SEED-CORN did not escape the Abbé Pluche, who in his *Histoire du Ciel*, hath judiciously employed it for the foundation of a reformed system on this matter; which, however, brings us to the same place, by a back way; and ends in this, *that the Gods were not dead men deified*.

<sup>q</sup> *Of the origin of Idolatry and reasons of Heathenism*, p. 74.



land treads in their footsteps, though he treads awry. But our *Religionists* in general, have not been so happy in the choice of their arms, nor in their sagacity of knowing their friends from their enemies. The excellent G. J. Vossius (to mention him amongst a multitude) hath, in his very learned collection of *Gentile Theology*, gone, *bona fide*, into the old pagan method of *allegorizing* their Theology; as if it were doing service to true Religion to shew, that the Pagan Idolatry was, at bottom, tolerably reasonable.

It is true, a late ingenious Person seems to have understood his subject better, and to know to what it all tends; I mean the learned Writer of the *Letters concerning Mythology*. We have observed, that the ancient defenders of Paganism had by their *Symbols* and *Allegories* resolved the *Hero-gods* into the *Elementary*; and these again, into the various attributes of the *first Cause*. In which they were so successful, that they not only changed their *Idolatry*, but their *Idols* likewise. For the *SIGNA PANTHEIA* expressive of this new Theology have all the marks of the later times of pagan Antiquity. The ancient *FATHERS* of the Church are very copious in exposing this subterfuge. In which service they employed all that was found in the system of *Euhemerus*; that is to say, That the *Greater Gods of Greece and Rome*, the *Dii majorum Gentium*, were *Dead men deified*. And I have endeavoured throughout this work to support their Cause. There are hardly now, I believe, two opinions on this matter, amongst knowing men. But the Author of the *Inquiry into the life and writings of Homer* attempts, in these *Letters*, to bring us back again to the old *MUMPSIMUS*. He saw, I suppose, the necessary connexion between *Allegories* and *ideal Gods*: a principle which could produce nothing more than a *SHADOWY IDOLATRY* at worst. And therefore, in honour of Pa-  
gan

gan Antiquity, hath laid it down as an axiom, *That the powers producing, and parts composing the Universe, were their GREATER GODS*; or the *Dii majorum Gentium*. This He calls, *the grand Key of Mythology*. And here it is worth while to observe, (but by the way only) that these admirers of the wisdom of prophane Antiquity, are not so favourable to that of sacred: but are generally amongst the first to laugh at what Divines call *the DOUBLE SENSE in Scripture prophecies*. And yet they make the greatest part of *pagan wisdom* to consist in the use and invention of DOUBLE SENSES: "Witness (says this writer to his friend) the DOUBLE view you have already had of the rise of things, and government of the world from *Orpheus*, in the description of *Pan*: and from *Hesiod* in his borrowed *Theogony*: and still plainer in the DOUBLE moral of *Prometheus*, as signifying either the divine Providence in the formation of the world, and particularly of man, or human foresight perpetually on the rack, for the necessities and conveniencies of life." The difference is, the *pagan double sense* connects together two things that are foreign to one another in the constitution of Nature: The *scripture double sense* connects together two things that are as nearly related, as the various parts of one moral Dispensation. But to return,

As these LETTERS seem to be written as much in opposition to what is here, and elsewhere throughout this work, advanced, concerning the rise, progress, and various fortunes, of ancient Idolatry, as in favour of the now exploded MYTHOLOGY; which was, as we say, invented, and, from time to time, improved by the early, middle, and later Philoso-

P. 409, of the *Letters concerning Mythology*.

P. 120—1.



phers, to hide the deformities of vulgar Polytheism, I think proper to consider what he hath to say in support of such an undertaking.

Now against my various reasoning in *confutation* of this pagan System, I find not so much as one argument opposed; and in *support* of the System itself, but one; and this one, borrowed from Cudworth<sup>1</sup>. It is put thus, “*Eubemerus* and his FOLLOWERS, ere we join with them in *mortalizing* the first Divinities, must satisfy us, Why the Poetical Sages, the Instructors of mankind, termed their grand Work, the basis of their doctrine, not only a THEOGONY, or an account of the birth and pedigree of the Gods, but a COSMOGONY, or an account of the birth and creation of the *World*? Or, plainer still, a COSMOPOEIA, a making or framing of the *Universe*? The PLATONIC Philosophy had no hand in the Cosmogonies, or histories of the Creation written by *Taaut* or *Thoth*, by *Linus*, by *Orpheus*, &c. It was plain, therefore, the Allegory did not come too late,” &c.”—These last are my words.

If *Eubemerus* supposed, as it appears he did, that the FIRST pagan Divinities were mortal Men, he would have found it difficult to answer this objection of Cudworth. But the FOLLOWER of *Eubemerus* (for with this title he honours the Author of the *Divine Legation*) who supposes no such thing, but hath evinced the contrary, will find no difficulty at all. For he holds<sup>2</sup>, that the first Gods of Greece were the heavenly Bodies. And if the Makers of these Cosmogonies, such as *Thoth*, *Linus*, and *Orpheus*, held the same, then their THEOGONIES, or accounts of the birth and pedigrees of these Gods, could be no other

<sup>1</sup> See *Intell. System*. Contents annexed to 1st Ed. p. 234.

<sup>2</sup> P: 211, 212.

<sup>3</sup> See above.



than COSMOGONIES, or accounts of the birth and creation of the world; these Gods being parts of it.

But things seem here to be confounded by our Letter-Writer. These *Cosmogonies* have just as much, and no more, to do with *Platonic allegories*, than the *elements of Speech* with the *ornaments of Rhetoric*.

There are two errors likewise, in this matter, which our Letter-Writer seems to have laboured under. The one is, that *Euhemerus* was the *Inventor* of the *mortalizing system*: Whereas, I had shewn, it was taught in all the *Mysteries* long before *Euhemerus* had any being. He, indeed, maliciously carried it much farther than the *Mysteries* intended: He made *planetary worship* *symbolical of the Heroic*: and, from thence, inferred the *political origin of Religion*: for which, he passed with Antiquity, and perhaps justly, for an Atheist. Whereas the *Mysteries*, as we see from the fragment of *Sanchoniatho*\*, kept these two species of Idolatry distinct; and assigned the proper order of time to each of them.

The other error this lively Writer falls into, is in supposing, that this *Follower of Euhemerus*, against whom he writes, holds all the *first*, as well as *last*, Gods of Greece to have been *mortal men*: Whereas he distinguishes between the Gods of civilized and uncivilized Greece: The first, he supposes to have been *heavenly bodies*; and the latter only, *dead men deified*.

From censuring the *Learning* of *Euhemerus's Followers*, the Letter-Writer proceeds to censure their *Morals*. "It is not easy (he says) to ascertain what should make some warm Ecclesiastics, for the wiser are far above such weakness, so angry at the Allegories of ancient Poets, now, when all danger from their Deities is over. Of old, in-

\* See above, and likewise p. 226 of the first volume.

“ deed, when Temples and *Revenues* belonged to  
 “ them; when *wealth, and Dignities of the Church*  
 “ were annexed to the allegorical Devotion, and  
 “ vested in its Teachers, no wonder the *good FA-*  
 “ *THERS* should fulminate against the wild and im-  
 “ pious Worship. But *now*, when the struggle is  
 “ long since over, when the Father of Gods and  
 “ men has not so much as a lamb offered, nor his  
 “ *Daughter* [i. e. Minerva or WISDOM] a single  
 “ grain of incense burnt upon her altar for near a  
 “ thousand years, it is hard to tell what should  
 “ awake this *preposterous* zeal, or make them so ea-  
 “ ger to *mortalize* the EMBLEMS of Antiquity. Is  
 “ there not, as I was hinting, some *infection* in the  
 “ case?—Has not the reading the FLAMING INVEC-  
 “ TIVES of the primitive Fathers, who were actu-  
 “ ally in the struggle, a little *infected* their Follow-  
 “ ers with the same fiery spirit and INDECENT LAN-  
 “ GUAGE?”

As to these *flaming Invectives*, the Letter-  
 Writer seems to lie under a small mistake. For  
 though such *invectives* may perhaps be thought  
 characteristic of the FATHERS' zeal, the *terms* are  
 not here in their place. They reserved their *invec-*  
*tives* for a better occasion, to fulminate the malice  
 of their Enemies, and the follies of their Friends.—  
 On this point, viz. the *mortalizing the emblems of*  
*antiquity*, I can assure him, they appeared much at  
 their ease; and more disposed to quibble than to  
 rail; as he might have seen by one of the most seri-  
 ous of them, and who least understood raillery when  
 he was pressed, I mean St. Austin; who in his con-  
 futation of Varro and his *emblems*, could afford to  
 be thus jocular: “ Sed, hæc omnia inquit [Varro]  
 “ referuntur ad mundum; videatne potius ad immun-  
 “ dum.”

<sup>1</sup> P. 226—7.

<sup>2</sup> Civ. Dei, l. vii. c. 27.



As to the *indecent language*; it is to be found in the third volume of the *Divine Legation*; where it is said, that *the Ancients adopted into the number of their greater Gods, Ravishers, Adulterers, Patkics, Vagabonds, Thieves, and Murderers*\*. But it is pleasant to hear this Letter-Writer talk of *decency* to a set of PHANTOMS, EMBLEMS, and SYMBOLS; for such he esteems these *Greater Gods* to be; and yet observe it so little to the MINISTERS of the Christian Religion. For he is at a loss, the Reader sees, to account for their *warmth*, where their *private interest is not concerned*. And in seeking for the *cause* of it, when he cannot fix it on their *avarice* and *ambition*, rather than allow them a motive becoming their character and office, he will throw it upon their *passions* and *prejudices*. He supposes, they *caught the infection from the Fathers*, whose worldly interests, he imagines, were much concerned in the quarrel. But if he deserves the opinion I have of his candour, he will be pleased to find his suspicions ill grounded: And that the ECCLESIASTICS, who engage so *warmly* in this question, do it on important reasons, becoming their character of Ministers of the Truth.

The Bible represents ancient Idolatry, in the most odious colours; and the whole Gentile World as given up to its delusions. A species of modern Mythologists, hinted at above, had, on the revival of learning in the West, endeavoured to evade this charge, by borrowing the defences of the ancient Philosophers; who allegorized the fables of the popular Religion, to screen it from the contempt of the more knowing Vulgar; as *Learning*, at one time, and *Christianity*, at another, had severally shaken the Seat of Superstition<sup>b</sup>. In those *Allego-*

\* Book IV. sect. iv.

<sup>b</sup> See p. 330.



ries, all the national Gods were reduced to mere SYMBOLS, expressive of the Attributes of the first Cause: and, consequently, the Scripture-charge against the Gentiles, of *worshipping the Creature for the Creator*, rendered groundless, or at least, uncandid. These modern Mythologists, a late french Writer hath well described in the following words, —“ Au commencement du Seizieme Siecle quelques-uns des Savans, qui contribuèrent au retablissement des lettres, étoient, dit on, Païens dans le cœur, plus encore par PEDENTERIE, que par libertinage: enforte qu'il n'eût pas tenu à eux de ramener le culte des Dieux d'HOMERE et de Virgile — ils emploïoient ce qu'ils avoient de littérature et d'esprit, pour donner au Paganisme un tour plausible, et en former un système moins insensé. Ils avoüoient que la MYTHOLOGIE étoit insoutenable prise à la lettre: mais, en même tems, elle contenoit, selon eux, sous l'EMBLEME des fictions les profondeurs de la PHYSIQUE, de la MORALE et de la THEOLOGIE.” — In this state and representation of things, some Ecclesiastics have thought it of their office to MORTALIZE these pretended *emblems of Antiquity*; and to shew, that the *greater national Gods* were *dead men deified*: and, consequently, that their worshipers were REAL IDOLATERS; and of the worst sort too, as they frequently had for their objects the worst kind of men.

But so little of this matter entered into the Letter-Writer's views, that he says, “ This, which was formerly a grand religious controversy, is now turned to a point of pure speculation. What, in the days of Polytheism, raised the indignation of the Priests, and inflamed the *rival* zeal of the Fathers of the Church, now raises a *little squabble* amongst the Antiquaries, as a question of mere cu-

\* Vie de L'Emp. Julien. p. 48—9.

“ riosity:

“ riosity : to wit, *whether all the Gods of Antiquity were not mortal men*.”

Now, if the Letter-Writer will needs suppose, that where the CLERGY have no *oblique and interested designs*, they have no *reasonable ones*, he will be often out in his reckoning : And (what to be sure is greatly to be lamented) unequal to the office of a Censor on their Manners.

After all, perhaps I may understand Him as little, as he appears to have understood Me, if I think him in earnest. The whole of his *Letters*, if one may judge by hints dropt here and there, seems to be only the wanton exercise of a Sophist; and just such an *encomium* on the WISDOM OF THE ANCIENTS, as Erasmus’s was on the FOLLY OF THE MODERNS. It is certain, at least, that in the prosecution of his argument, his chief concern is for FICTION AND ITS INTERESTS. Thus, in one page, he tells us, “ That this eager zeal to MORTALIZE these emblems of Antiquity is DESTRUCTIVE OF ALL TRUE POETRY.” And in another, “ That *this prevailing PROSAIC TASTE has neither dignity of manners, nor strength of genius, nor extent of fancy*.” But he explains himself more fully, where speaking of SYMBOLS and ALLEGORIES, and the *inseparable* as well as *accidental marks* by which they may be unravelled, he illustrates his subject by Ab. Pluche’s Hypothesis : Which, however, in several places, he treats for what it is, an idle and a groundless fancy. “ Symbols (says he) carry natural marks that strike a sagacious mind, and lead it, by degrees, to their real meaning. A hint in one author brightens the obscurities in many others ; as one single observation of Macrobius proved the clue to Abbé Pluche’s (*how justly I say not*) to unravel

<sup>d</sup> P. 208.

<sup>e</sup> P. 215.

<sup>f</sup> P. 214.



“ the whole mystery of Egyptian, Assyrian, and “ Grecian Gods.” He had no occasion to consider *how justly*, if he were in jest. Otherwise, a man might have seen, that the *justness of unravelling* depended on the *reality of the Clue*: Which, too, tho’ dignified by the name of Clue, is indeed no other than a number of *odd ends*, that wanted to be made *consistent*, rather than to be *unravell’d*. For the rest, as our learned Critic would *immortalize* the Pagan Deities in reverence to the *CLASSICS*, so this Abbé Pluche (of whom he speaks with so much honour) has attempted to draw them out of their *mortal state*, in order to cover the disgraces of *POPERY*; to which that superstition is obnoxious, from the protestant parallels between *Saint* and *Hero-worship*.

But as if all this had not been enough to shew us that his concern was not for *TRUTH* but *FICTION*, he gravely professes to credit all *BACON*’s visions, as the genuine *Wisdom of the Ancients*, which every body else admires as the sportive effort of modern wit. As he is in so pleasant an humour he may not be displeased to hear the *Determination* of *DOCTOR RABELAIS* upon this question, who thus addresses the Allegorizers of his time, “ Croyez-vous, en “ vostre foy, qu’oncques *HOMERE*, escripvant l’*Illiad* & l’*Odyssée*, pensast és *ALLEGORIES* lesquelles “ de luy ont calefreté *Plutarque*, *Heraclide* de “ *Ponticq*, *Eustatie*, *Phornute*, et ce que d’iceulx “ *POLITIAN* ha descrobé? Si le croyez, vous n’ “ approchez ne de piedz, ne de mains à mon opi- “ nion; qui *DECRETE* icelles aussi peu avoir esté “ songées de *Homere*, que d’*Ovide* en ses *Meta- “ morphoses*, les *Sacremens* de l’*Evangile*, lesquels “ ung *Frere Lubin*, vray croquelardon, s’est efforcé “ démonstrier si d’aventure il rencontroit gens aussi “ folz que luy.” This facetious Satirist had here in his eye those very Mythologists of the sixteenth Century,



Century, whom the learned Author of *the life of Julian*, quoted above, so very justly censures.

And thus much for this GRAND KEY OF MYTHOLOGY, as this Letter-Writer is pleased to call his Fancies<sup>s</sup>.

To return to the Patrons of the other extreme, That the *heavenly bodies* were only SYMBOLS of the *Hero-Gods*.—Having thus shewn, the worship of the *elements* to be prior to that of *dead men*, I have not only overthrown this *argument*, for the proof of the *atheistic notion of the origin of Religion*, but likewise the *notion itself*. For if (as our adversaries own) the worship of dead men were the first religious institution after entering into civil society; and if (as I have proved) the worship of the heavenly bodies preceded that of dead men; the consequence is, that Religion was in use before the Civil Magistrate was in Being. But I need not our Adversaries' concession for this consequence; having proved from ancient testimony, that *planetary worship* was the only Idolatry long before Civil Society was known; and continued to be so, by all unpolicied nations, long after.

II. I come, in the next place, to direct *Faët*: from whence it appears, *that the Lawgiver, or Civil Magistrate, did not invent Religion*.

Here the Atheist's gross prevarication ought not to pass uncensured. — From the notoriety of the Magistrate's care of *Religion*, he would conclude it to be *his INVENTION*: And yet, that very Antiquity, which tells him this, as plainly and fully tells him *this other*; namely, *that Religion was not invented by him*: For, look through all Greek, Roman, and Barbarick Antiquity; or look back on what we have extracted from thence in the second section of

the foregoing book, and it will appear, that not one single Lawgiver ever found a People, how wild or unimproved soever, *without a Religion*, when he undertook to civilize them. On the contrary, we see them all, even to the Lawgivers of the Thracians and Americans, addressing themselves to the savage Tribes, with the credentials of that God who was there professedly acknowledged and adored. But this truth will be farther seen from hence: It appears by the *history* of the Lawgivers; by the *sayings* recorded of them; and by the *fragments* of their writings yet remaining, that they perceived the error and mischief of the gross idolatries practised by those People, whom they reduced into Society; and yet, that they never set upon reforming them. From whence we reasonably conclude, that they found the People in possession of a Religion which they could not unsettle; and so were forced to comply with inveterate prejudices. For, that they were willing and desirous to have reformed what they found, appears not only from the PROEMS to their Laws, mentioned above, but from the testimony of one of the most knowing Writers of Antiquity, I mean *Plutarch*; who, in his Tract of *Superstition*, speaking of the unruly temper of the People, says they ran headlong into all the follies which the makers of Graven images propagated; and in the mean time, turned a deaf ear to their Lawgivers, who endeavoured to inform them better<sup>h</sup>. This forced even Solon himself to establish the Temple-worship of *Venus the Prostitute*<sup>i</sup>. But the reform was seen to be so impossible, that Plato lays it down as an axiom in his *Republic*, That nothing ought to

<sup>h</sup> Φιλοσόφων δὲ καὶ ΠΟΛΙΤΙΚΩΝ ἀνδρῶν καταφρονῶσιν, ἀποδεικνύων τὴν τῶν θεῶν σπουδὴν καὶ μὴ καὶ χρηστότητα καὶ μεγαλοφροσύνης, μὴ βίας καὶ κηδεμονίας.

<sup>i</sup> παυδόμεν Ἀφροδίτης. Athenæi Deip. l. xiii.



be changed in the received Religion which the Law-giver finds already established; and that a man must have lost his understanding to think of such a project. All they could do, therefore, when they could not purify the *Soul of Religion*, was more firmly to constitute the *Body* of it. And this they did by NATIONAL RITES AND CEREMONIES. Indeed, in course of time, though insensibly, the genius of the Religion, as we observed before <sup>k</sup>, followed that of the civil Policy; and so grew better and purer, as it did in *ROME*; or more corrupt and abominable, as it did in *SYRIA*. But had the Legislators given an entire *NEW RELIGION*, in the manner they gave *LAWS*, we should have found *some* of those, at least, nearly approaching to the purity of natural Religion. But as we see no such, we must conclude they *FOUND* Religion, and did not *MAKE* it.

On the whole then, I have proved, what the most judicious *HOOKE* was not ashamed to profess before me, That "a *POLITIQUE USE* of Religion there " is. Men fearing *GOD* are thereby a great deal " more effectually than by positive Laws restrain- " ed, from doing evil; inasmuch as those Laws " have no further power than over our outward ac- " tions only; whereas unto men's inward cogita- " tions, unto the privie intents and motions of their " hearts, Religion serveth for a bridle. What more " savage, wilde, and cruell than man, if he see " himselfe able, either by fraude to over-reach, or " by power to over-beare, the Laws whereunto he " should be subject? Wherefore in so great bold- " nesses to offend, it behoveth that the World should " be held in awe, not by a *VAIN SURMISE*, but a " *TRUE APPREHENSION* of somewhat, which no " man may think himselfe able to withstand. *THIS*

<sup>k</sup> See p. 152 of the first volume.



“ IS THE POLITIQUE USE OF RELIGION <sup>1</sup>. ”——

Thus far this great man; where he takes notice how certain Atheists of his time, by observing *this use* of Religion to Society, were fortified in their folly of believing that Religion was invented by Politicians to keep the World in awe. An absurdity, I persuade myself, now so thoroughly exposed, as to be henceforth deemed fit only to go in rank with the tales of Nurses, and the dreams of Free-thinkers.

I HAVE *now at length gone through the two first Propositions* :

1. THAT THE INCULCATING THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, IS NECESSARY TO THE WELL BEING OF CIVIL SOCIETY.

2. THAT ALL MANKIND, ESPECIALLY THE MOST WISE AND LEARNED NATIONS OF ANTIQUITY, HAVE CONCURRED IN BELIEVING, AND TEACHING, THAT THIS DOCTRINE WAS OF SUCH USE TO CIVIL SOCIETY.

*The next Volume begins with the proof of the third; namely,*

3. THAT THE DOCTRINE OF A FUTURE STATE OF REWARDS AND PUNISHMENTS, IS NOT TO BE FOUND IN, NOR DID MAKE PART OF, THE MOSAIC DISPENSATION.

Hitherto we have been forced to move slowly, to feel for our way in the dark, through the thick confusion of many irrational RELIGIONS, and mad schemes of PHILOSOPHY, independent of, and in-

<sup>1</sup> *Ecc. Pol.* Book V. sect. ii.

consistent with one another: Where the labour of the search, perhaps, has been much greater to the Author, than the pleasure will be to the Reader, in finding this CHAOS reduced to some kind of order; the PRINCIPLES developed, from whence the endless diversity and contradiction have arisen; and the various USE that may be made of these Discoveries for our *demonstration* of the truth of *revealed Religion*.

We now emerge into open day:

“ Major rerum mihi nascitur ordo,

“ Majus opus moveo.

And having gotten the PROMISED LAND in view, the labour will be much easier, as the Discoveries will be more important, and the subject infinitely more interesting: For having now only one single System and Dispensation to explain, consistent in all its parts, and absolute and perfect in the Whole, which though, by reason of the profound and sublime views of its Author, these perfections may not be very obvious, yet, if we have but the happiness to enter rightly, we shall go on with ease, and the prospect will gradually open and enlarge itself, till we see it lost again in that IMMENSITY from whence it first arose.

Full of these hopes, and under the auspices of these encouragements, let us now shift the Scene from GENTILE to JEWISH Antiquity; and prepare ourselves for the opening of a more august and solemn Theatre.

The following information was obtained from the records of the [redacted] Department of the [redacted] Government:

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## A P P E N D I X,

*Shewing that the OMISSION of a future State in the Mosaic Dispensation doth not make it unworthy of the Original to which Believers ascribe it.*

AS both Believers and Unbelievers have, by some blind chance or other, concurred to make this *Objection* to the OMISSION, I think it not improper, before I enter upon the Subject of the MOSAIC LAW, which comes next into consideration, to remove this common prejudice concerning it. And as a celebrated Writer has collected together what hath been said in support of the *Objection*, and given to it all the strength that the force of his own genius could impart, I suppose his words will be the best text to my discourse.

“ L'Eveque Warburton, auteur d'un des plus savants ouvrages qu'on ait jamais fait, s'exprime ainsi, page 8. tome I. “ Une Religion, une Société qui n'est pas fondée sur la créance d'une autre vie, doit être soutenue par une Providence extraordinaire. Le Judaïsme n'est pas fondé sur la créance d'une autre vie; donc, le Judaïsme a été soutenu par une providence extraordinaire.” Plusieurs Theologiens se sont élevés contre lui, et  
comme

comme on rétorque tous les arguments, on a retorqué le sien, on lui a dit : " Toute Religion, qui n'est pas fondée sur le dogme de l'immortalité de l'ame, & sur les peines et les récompenses éternelles, est nécessairement fautive ; Or le Judaïsme ne connut point ces dogmes, donc le Judaïsme, loin d'être soutenu par la Providence, était par vos principes une Religion fautive & barbare qui attaquait la Providence." Cet Evêque eut quelques autres adversaires qui lui soutinrent que l'immortalité de l'ame était connue chez les Juifs, dans le temps même de Moïse ; mais il leur prouva très-évidemment que ni le Décalogue, ni le Lévitique, ni le Deutéronome, ne avaient dit un seul mot de cette créance, & qu'il est ridicule de vouloir tordre & corrompre quelques passages des autres livres, pour en tirer une vérité qui n'est point annoncée dans le livre de la Loi.

" Mr. l'Evêque ayant fait quatre Volumes pour démontrer que la Loi Judaïque ne proposait ni peines ni récompenses après la mort, n'a jamais pu répondre à ses adversaires d'une manière bien satisfaisante. Ils lui disaient : " Ou Moïse connaissait ce Dogme, et alors il a trompé les Juifs en ne le manifestant pas ; ou il l'ignorait ; & en ce cas il n'en savait pas assez pour fonder une bonne Religion. En effet si la Religion avait été bonne, pourquoi l'aurait-on abolie ? Une Religion vraie doit être pour tous les temps & pour tous les lieux, elle doit être comme la lumière du Soleil, qui éclaire tous les Peuples & toutes les Générations."

" Ce Prelate tout éclairé qu'il est, a eu beaucoup de peine à se tirer de toutes ces difficultés ; mais quel Système en est exempt ?"

*" Dict. Philosophique Portatif, article ( Religion, première question.)*

*—The*



— The trouble I have had in disengaging myself from these difficulties will now be seen.

The Objections, as here stated by this ingenious man, respect, we see, both the LEGISLATOR and the LAW.

1. *Either Moses (says he) was acquainted with a future State, and in that case he deceived the Jews in not teaching it: or he was ignorant of the doctrine, and in this case he did not know enough to become the Author of a good Religion. Indeed, if the religion had been good, Why was it abolished? a true Religion should be for all times and places. It's light should be like that of the Sun, which illumines all nations and all generations.*

2. *All Religion which is not founded on the doctrine of the Soul's immortality and future rewards and punishments is necessarily false: but, in Judaism, these doctrines were not contained: therefore Judaism, so far from being supported by an extraordinary Providence, was, on your own Principles (says he to the Bishop) a religion false and barbarous, which attacked and insulted Providence.*

1. The first argument, against the integrity of *Moses's conduct* from this *Omission*, had been urged at large by the late Lord BOLINGBROKE; and the Reader may find it at large confuted, in the *Appendix* to the IV<sup>th</sup> Vol. of the *Divine Legation*.

2. The second argument, against the integrity of *the Law* from this *Omission*, has been clamoured by a large Body of *Answerers*, led up by Dr. STEBBING. But these men pretending to believe Revelation, their reason, for want of integrity in such a Religion, was founded in a supposed defect in it's Essence; so their conclusion from this reasoning was, "That a future State was certainly in the Mosaic Religion, how much soever it might walk there in Masquerade." The celebrated Frenchman, who pretends to no such belief, founds his argument



gument on the *reality* of the Omission, and from thence concludes, "that the Mosaic Law was an imposture."

I shall examine what they have to say, in their order.

## I.

The English Doctor comes first. "You consider (says this candid Divine, addressing himself to the Author of the D. L.) "the Ignorance of the Jews as "to the doctrine of a future State, as one of the most "*momentous truths* that Religion has to boast of. "I, on the other hand, look upon it as a DISGRACE "to Revelation; as by the very act of God himself, "it shuts out his own chosen People, for many "ages, from that single point of Knowledge, "which could be the foundation of a reasonable "Worship; while, by the directions of his Providence, all the world besides were permitted to "have the benefit of it."

Here we see the Doctor proposes to confute *my representation of the omission* of a future State in the Mosaic Religion: But, for mine, he gives us *his own*, and very notably confutes *that*. My idea of the *omission* I declared to be this, that, as the Jews, to whom the Mosaic Religion was given, were, at the time of giving, under an *extraordinary* Providence, they had no absolute need of the doctrine. The Doctor's idea of the *omission* is, that when the Mosaic Religion was given to the Jews, they were under an *ordinary* Providence, and therefore the doctrine was necessary. That I do him no wrong in charging him with this sophistical chicanery, appears from his own words, where he gives his reason for saying that *my* (meaning *his own*) representation of the omission is a disgrace to Revelation; namely, be-

\* An Examination of Mr. Warburton's second proposition, &c. in an Epistolary Dissertation addressed to the Author — p. 131—2.

cause *this single point of Knowledge* [i. e. a future state] *is the only FOUNDATION of a reasonable Worship.* Now, it is obvious to common sense, that this can be only predicated of a future state under an *ordinary* Providence: And that under an *extraordinary* it is no *necessary* FOUNDATION at all.

If it should be pretended (for it will hardly be owned that the Dr. with all his zeal, was an Unbeliever) that by *the many ages* in which *the people of God were shut up* (as he expresses it) *from this knowledge*, he meant, those ages in which the Jews lived under a *common* providence, this subterfuge will not serve his turn, for I have shewn, that when the *extraordinary* dispensation ceased, the Jews, like all the world besides, and by the same means of information, had all the benefit which the knowledge of this FUTURE STATE, such as it was, could afford them.

But let us take the Dr. as we find him.

He tells us why he looks upon my representation of the Mosaic Religion as a *disgrace to Revelation.*—*Because* (says he) *by the very act of God himself it shuts out his own chosen people from that single point of Knowledge which could be the foundation of a reasonable Worship.*

Let us examine this curious period on all sides.

By *the act of God himself* he must mean, (for nothing else can be meant; and it is only when his meaning is thus circumstanced, that I can be certain, I do not mistake it) he must mean, I say, *God's act, by the ministry of Moses.* Now this very Doctor, in his several Pieces against the *Divine Legation*, has, over and over again, told his Reader, that *Moses did not teach, NOR HAD IT IN HIS COMMISSION TO TEACH a future state to the Israelites.* For, at every step, he brings himself into these distresses (if such a trifle as a contradiction can be supposed to distress



him) by a *false modesty*. He was ashamed of the absurdity of his Brethren, who all along maintained, that *Moses taught, or ought to have taught, a future state*; and therefore, at this turn, leaves them in the lurch; and slyly steals in the better principle of his Adversary, that *Moses had no Commission to teach it*: for he must have been duller than any Doctor can be supposed to be, not to discover that this was his *Adversary's principle*, after having seen him write a large book to prove that, *Moses did not teach it*. I call this desertion of his Friends, a *false modesty*; For what is it else, to be shocked at one of their absurdities, while he is defending all the rest? whose only support, too, happens to be in that one which he rejects. Indeed, good Doctor,

—PUDOR TE MALUS urget  
*Infantes, qui inter vereare Infanus haberi.*

But “God (says he) by this very act, *shut out his own chosen people* from the knowledge of a future state.” It is very true, *God's own chosen people were shut out*. But not, as our Doctor dreams, *by the very act of God himself*: but (if he will have the Truth, who never seeks it, for itself) *by the very act of their Forefather, ADAM*. It was the *First Man* who *shut them out*; and the door of Paradise was never opened again, till the *coming of the Second Man, the Lord from Heaven*. But this is the Language of Scripture: and this language his *Summs and Systems* do not teach him. But more of this secret hereafter.

A *future state* (says our Dr. absolutely and without exception) *is that single point of knowledge which could be the foundation of a reasonable worship*. Here Doctors differ. St. Paul places the *foundation of a reasonable worship* in another thing. He saith, that,



that, HE THAT COMETH TO GOD MUST BELIEVE THAT HE IS; AND THAT HE IS A REWARDER OF THEM THAT DILIGENTLY SEEK HIM<sup>\*</sup>. — What is Man's purpose *in coming to God*? Without doubt, to *worship* him. And what doth the great Doctor of the Gentiles tell us is the true, the *reasonable foundation of this worship*? Why, TO BELIEVE THAT HE IS A REWARDER OF THEM THAT DILIGENTLY SEEK HIM. He places this *foundation* (we see) in a REWARD simply, and generically; not in that particular species of it, a FUTURE STATE. He places it in the *nature*; not (as our modern Doctor) in the *inessential circumstances*, of REWARD. The consequence is, that a reward given HERE was as solid a *foundation of a reasonable Worship* to the early Jews, living under an EXTRAORDINARY Providence, as a reward given HEREAFTER, is to us Christians, living under the ORDINARY one. Another consequence (though it be but a trifle) is, that our learned Doctor is mistaken. But to come a little closer to this formidable man, now I have got the Apostle on my side. I will undertake to DEMONSTRATE, (how much soever he and his Fellows take offence at the word) that a FUTURE STATE is so far from being *the only foundation of a reasonable Worship*, that, as a *MODE of existence*, it is no foundation at all. The *true foundation of a reasonable Worship* being this and this only, that *God is a rewarder of them who seek him*. He may reward *here*, or he may reward *hereafter*. But, which he chuses is indifferent, as to the solidity of the foundation; because PIETY and MORALITY, which constitute a REASONABLE WORSHIP, spring only from the belief that *God is, and that he is a Rewarder*. The Mosaic Religion, teaching this, enjoins that men should love *God with all their hearts, with all their souls, &c.* for the excellence of his nature; and

\* Heb. xi. 6.

that they should love *their neighbours as themselves*, for the equality of their common nature, which requires an equal measure for ourselves and others. Now Jesus says, that, *on the Love of God and of our Neighbour hang all the Law and the Prophets*, i. e. in the most confined sense, it is the foundation of a *reasonable Worship*. Our Dr. says, No, a *future state is the only foundation*. In a word then, since PIETY, which constitutes a *reasonable Worship*, and since VIRTUE, which constitute a *reasonable service*, are both raised and supported by the belief, that *God is, and that he is a Rewarder*; What more forceable inducement is there in our selfish nature to cherish them, than that which the Law of Moses holds forth, when it teaches that *every work shall receive it's full recompence of reward* HERE.—Here or hereafter, in this life or in another, being only the *modes* of receiving one and the same thing, cannot possibly affect either piety or morality. But it hath been taken for granted, that there is in *future rewards* something of a virtue to PURIFY the mind, which *present rewards* have not. I shall consider, before I have done with the question, on what ground this opinion stands. In the mean time, let us hear the famous Orobio, the Jew; who, though little to his own purpose, yet much to ours, and to such Objectors to the purity of the Mosaic Law, as our Doctor — Omnes [Christiani] cultum internum prædicant, quasi a Deo internus cultus summa cum perfectione in Lege non fuisset præscriptus; Tota quidem interni cultus perfectio consistit in vero et constantissimo Dei amore, et Proximi propter ipsum Deum: Hic est totus cultus internus, ex quo omnia opera, externa, seu moralia, seu ritualia sint, debent profluere: quæ si ex hoc principio non emanaverint, imperfectissima sunt, et divina Legi prorsus adversa.

See P. 110.

Our



Our Doctor proceeds——“God’s chosen people were shut out, for many ages, from that point of knowledge, which, *by the directions of his Providence, all the world besides were PERMITTED to have the BENEFIT of.*” In examining the predicate of this proposition, I shall first consider the PERMISSION and then the BENEFIT.

*All the World besides* (says he) *were permitted.* By what instrument? I ask; for they had no *Revelation*——By the use of their *Reason*, says he.——And had not the Jews the use of theirs? No, replies he, not the *free* use: for their Prophet (according to you) delivering to them, from God, a new Law and a new Religion in which the doctrine of a future state was *omitted*, this would naturally lead them to conclude against it?—What? in defiance of all the clear deductions of Reason, which, from God’s demonstrable attributes of justice and goodness, made the Pagan world conclude, that as moral good and evil had not their retribution *here*, they would have it, *hereafter*?——Yes, for Moses PROMISED they should have their retribution *here*.——What then? other ancient Lawgivers *promised* their People the same thing. Yet this did not hinder their having recourse to a *future state* to secure the foundation of Religion, which St. Paul tells us, is *the belief that God is, and that he is the Rewarder of them that seek him*. The matter now begins to pinch: and the Doctor must be dumb, or confess that the only possible reason one can assign why the Jews had not recourse to the same expedient for securing the *foundation of Religion*, which the Gentiles had recourse to, was because they *felt the performance* as well as *heard the promise*: For when that was no longer felt, (the *extraordinary providence* being withdrawn in punishment for their crimes) the Jews, like all other people, had their doctrine of a future state,



which, by it's complexion, is seen to be of foreign, and very spurious birth.

See then, to what this PERMISSION amounts; so invidiously urged, not against me, for that is nothing, but against the Scriptures of God? Just to thus much — “That *all the world besides were permitted* to find out, by REASON as they could, what his *chosen people* were taught, by the practical demonstration of an EXTRAORDINARY PROVIDENCE; namely, that God would act with justice and goodness towards man.”

Come we next to the BENEFIT. The benefit of the doctrine of a *future state* is twofold; to *Society* as such, by encouraging Virtue and suppressing Vice, under an *unequal* distribution of things; to *Religion* as such, by affording a *solid foundation* to it, under the same distribution. But both these aids from the doctrine of a *future state* were more effectually afforded by an *extraordinary providence*. We find then, the learned Doctor to be miserably mistaken, in supposing the Gentiles enjoyed any *spiritual benefit* which the Jews were deprived of. The former indeed had a *future state* to support Society and Religion; the latter had an *extraordinary Providence*. Which of them was, in it's nature, the most efficacious support, common sense will not suffer us to remain in doubt. But the benefit of *believing* is one thing; the benefit of *having* is another. I have only yet spoken to the *first*. Now, the Dr. seems to think the *latter* affected by the OMISSION. We commonly hear it said, that *seeing is believing*, but I suspect our learned Doctor has been imposed on by another Aphorism, (as absurd in the thought as that is in the expression) that *believing is having*; else how came he to place so great a *benefit* in the point in question, if he did not suppose that the Jews' want of the DOCTRINE would deprive them of the THING.

And

And now, in taking my final leave of this Champion in Ordinary to the Party Orthodoxal, let me not be here again misunderstood as I have so often been by them. I deny, indeed, that the want of a future State, in the Mosaic Religion, at all affected the true *foundation of a reasonable* Worship. Yet I am very far from denying, that the frame and constitution of this Religion rendered it, on many accounts, partial and incomplete. In my address to the Jews, prefixed to the second part of the *Divine Legation*, I have shewn in what particulars it was so. As first, in the whole turn of the *Ritual Law*: and secondly, in that omission, at what time the Jews came under the ordinary and common Providence of Mankind. For I am there placing before these mistaken People a view of the Mosaic Religion as it appears and operates at present, in order to convince them of the necessity of its receiving it's completion from the Religion of Jesus. In which conclusion, I suppose, all Christians are agreed. At least, they who have escaped the thick darkness of controversy will see that these two assertions are very distinct and different, and at the same time consistent. 1. That a Religion without a future state, wanted not, during the existence of an *extraordinary* providence, a solid *foundation of a reasonable worship*. And, 2dly, that such a Religion, if supposed to serve for *all times and places*, must needs be deemed incomplete.

This *Omission* of a future state in the Mosaic Religion is now generally acknowledged by all who read the Bible with the same impartiality that they read other Histories. Should not our Doctor therefore, who pretends to believe the divinity of the Mosaic Religion, blush at his rashness in calling it, A DISGRACE TO REVELATION? He does it, indeed, in confidence that the early Jews were not ignorant of this matter. But will his confidence persuade impartial men



against their senses? Were there but a chance of being mistaken in this supposed *knowledge* of the early Jews, a sober Minister of God's word would have avoided the scandal of so irreverend an assertion; so unlutable to the veneration he owes to his Maker; when speaking of a Dispensation which he professes to believe, did indeed come from him; and not have dared to measure this Dispensation of Providence by his scanty and obscure ideas of fit and right. The Author of *the Divine Legation demonstrated*, might, indeed, say, and I hope without offence, that the *ignorance of the early Jews concerning a future state* was a truth of so HIGH IMPORTANCE, that from thence might be *demonstrated* the divinity of their Religion; because, though he should be mistaken, no injury was done to Revelation; He left it whole and entire, just as he took it up. But should our Doctor be mistaken, his calling this *ignorance* (now found to be real) A DISGRACE TO REVELATION, would be supplying the Enemies of Religion with arms to insult it. The only excuse he can make for himself, (an excuse full as bad as the offence) is, that he had now gone back to the common principle of his Party, which before he seemed to have rejected, That *if God did not teach his chosen People a future state, he ought to have taught it.* A species of folly, which the sage HOOKER, to whom their Orthodoxy may haply be disposed to pay attention, has admirably reprov'd in another set of men, possessed with the same impious and presumptuous spirit — “As for those marvellous  
 “discourses (says this great man) whereby they  
 “[the Puritans] adventure to argue that God must  
 “needs have done the thing which they imagined was  
 “to be done, I must confess, I have often wondered  
 “at their exceeding boldness herein. When the  
 “question is, Whether God have delivered in  
 “Scripture (as they affirm he hath) a complete par-  
 “ticular



" ticular immutable Form of Church-politie, Why  
 " take they that other, both presumptuous and su-  
 " perfluous, labour to prove; that HE SHOULD HAVE  
 " DONE IT, there being no way, in this case, to  
 " prove the deed of God, saving only by produc-  
 " ing that evidence wherein he hath done it? For  
 " if there be *no such thing apparen: upon Record,*  
 " they do as if one should demand a Legacie by  
 " force and virtue of some written Testament,  
 " wherein there being no such thing specified, he  
 " pleadeth, that THERE IT MUST BE; and bring-  
 " eth arguments from the love or good will which  
 " always the testatour bore him; imagining that  
 " these or the like proofs will convict a testament to  
 " have that in it, which other men *can no where,*  
 " *by reading, find.* In matters which concern the  
 " actions of God the most dutiful way, on our  
 " part, is to search what God *hath done;* and with  
 " meekness to ADMIRE that, rather than to DIS-  
 " PUTe what he, *in congruity of reason, ought to do.*  
 " The waies which he hath, whereby to do all  
 " things for the greatest good of his Church, are  
 " mo in number than we can search, other in  
 " nature than we should presume to determine,  
 " which, of many, should be the fittest for him to  
 " choose, till such time as we see he hath chosen,  
 " of many, some one; which one we then may  
 " boldly conclude to be the *fittest,* because he hath  
 " taken it before the rest. When we do otherwise,  
 " surely we exceed our bounds: who, and where  
 " we are, we forget; and therefore needfull it is  
 " that our PRIDE, in such cases, be controld, and  
 " our disputes beaten back with those demands of  
 " the blessed Apostle, *How unsearchable are his*  
 " *judgments, and his ways past finding out? Who hath*  
 " *known the mind of the Lord, or who hath been his*  
 " *Counsellor?*" ?

Book III. sub. fin.

We

We have now done with the Orthodox DIVINE; and come in good time, to the Freethinking PHILOSOPHER.

Dr. STUBBING, who sees a future state in the Mosaic Religion by a kind of SECOND SENSE, just as northern Highlanders see *things to come* by a SECOND SIGHT, affirms, only *hypothetically*, that this Religion was a DISGRACE TO RELIGION: Our Philosopher, who can see in it nothing of *futurity*, affirms *positively*, that it was such a DISGRACE.

The Philosopher's Principles incur no discredit, though he should fail in his conclusion, since he had discarded Revelation before-hand: But should the Divine be mistaken, he exposes his Principles to the scorn and contempt of Freethinkers, since he professes to believe Revelation.

For the rest, the Philosopher stands charged with the same SOPHISTRY, of which the Divine hath been found guilty; the *taking for granted the thing in dispute*, viz. that the Jews were under an *unequal* Providence. Yet here again both his sense and his modesty triumph over the Divine's. The Philosopher, in the Opinion that the Jews were under an *unequal* Providence, betrays no Principles of *Natural Religion*, which he pretends to follow: The Divine, in avowing the same Opinion, betrays all the Principles of *Revealed Religion*, which he pretends to believe.

Indeed, the *Sophistry* in both, is equally contemptible. For no principles, whether of belief or unbelief, can authorize a Disputant to take for granted the thing in question. The Author of the *Divine Legislation* undertook to prove, that the early Jews were under an equal Providence, by this Medium, the *Omission* of a Future State in their Law; and from thence concluded, that the Religion revealed by



by the ministry of Moses was true; which, reduced to a syllogism, runs thus,

Whatever Religion and Society have no future state for their support must be supported by an extraordinary Providence.

The Jewish Religion and Society had no future state for their support:

Therefore the Jewish Religion and Society were supported by an extraordinary Providence.

To deny the *major*, as our Philosopher should have done; to deny the *minor*, as our Divine did; was fair argument. But to leave both, as the First hath done, without an answer, and deny only the *conclusion* is, amongst all nations and languages, a

BEGGING OF THE QUESTION. If our Philosopher would argue to the purpose he should either shew that the promises are false, and then he attacks the *minor*; or that they do not infer the conclusion, and then he attacks the *major*. He does neither, but, instead of this, having begged the question, he falls to syllogizing, in his turn—

Every Religion (says he) which is not founded in the Doctrine of the immortality of the soul, and eternal rewards and punishments is necessarily false. But Judaism was ignorant of these doctrines. Therefore Judaism, so far from being upheld by a providence, was even, on the Principles of the Author of the Divine Legation, a Religion false and barbarous, which attacked Providence itself.

The Argument we see is in form: And, if you will believe the Philosopher, enforced upon my Principles.

But, to bring his syllogism to bear against me, he must go upon this Postulatum, that the Law was not administered by an extraordinary Providence: And

then, I dare appeal to his own venerable Bench of PHILOSOPHERS (if Logic hold any place in their school) whether the upshot of all his syllogizing be not taking for granted the thing in dispute. And if

this



this were all, As these men have accustomed us to this beggarly way of reasoning, we might pass it over in silence and contempt: But there is something more than ordinary perverse in the conduct of this syllogism. For, not content to beg the question, our Philosopher *falsifies my Principles*.—On the PRINCIPLES (says he) of the Author of the Divine Legation, *Judaism was a false Religion*.

Now the *Principles* which, as a Christian, I believe, are these, “That Moses *promised* an extraordinary providence, and that he *omitted* a future state.”

The *Principles*, which, as a Logician, I have *proved*, are these, “That the *promise* was fulfilled, and therefore that the *Omission* was attended with no hurtful consequences either to Religion or Society.”

The *Principles* believed I had collected from my Bible: the *Principles* *proved*, I had deduced from what I understood to be the conclusions of right reason.

How then (I would fain learn) can it fairly be inferred, from *these Principles*, that the Religion of Moses is FALSE?

In the mean time, let me acquaint the Philosophers, in what manner I infer from these *Principles*, that the Religion of Moses is TRUE.

That Moses *promised* an extraordinary Providence is held by all Believers; and that he *omitted* a future state, is seen by all Unbelievers. Neither of them are mistaken. These are my *Principles* of belief.—My purpose was to convince Unbelievers, on their own grounds, that the *promise* was PERFORMED, and this I do by the MEDIUM of the *Omission*. How strongly let the Book itself declare. These are my *Principles* of proof.

It was amongst my more general *Principles*, That whatever Religion, under a common providence, omits to teach a future state, is certainly false.

And

And it seems to be amongst our Philosopher's logical conclusions, that, therefore, on this *Principle* of mine, whatever Religion under an *extraordinary Providence* omits to teach a future state is false likewise.

But the Philosopher's syllogism seems to have been made up out of an Objection ill understood, which certain Divines brought against my argument. (for, of objections, against an *offensive* truth, there is neither end nor measure.) These Doctors of the Church objected, "That I should first of all have proved from Scripture that the *promised Providence* was actually *bestowed*, before I used the service of my *MEDIUM*."—Let me ask them for what end? Should it be to convince Unbelievers? But that it could not do; for they reject the *extraordinary or supernatural part* of Scripture-History. Did they mean, that it should have been done for their own satisfaction? But what need of that? Believers profess to hold that all which Moses *promised* was performed. What was it then that brought forth this Objection? A mere blunder in their reasoning; in the course of which, they had confounded two very different things, with one another — The *promise* of an extraordinary providence, with the *actual administration* of it. They saw, that it was necessary previously to prove that Scripture *speaks* of the Administration of an extraordinary Providence, otherwise the *medium*, which I employ, would be vague in its aim, and uncertain in its direction. But they did not see, that this was done by simply producing the *promises* of Moses on this point: And that as Unbelievers professed to allow this much (and with Unbelievers only, I had to do) my point was to prove to them, on their own principles, the *actual performance* of those promises, by the *medium* of the OMISSION. It is true, indeed, had no extraordinary providence been *promised*, it had then been



been incumbent on me previously to have shewn, that Scripture represented the Israelites as living under such a providence, in order to give my *medium* that certain direction, which leads to my Conclusion. But as it was *promised*, the Unbeliever's confession of that *promise* was all I wanted.

Yet both Believers and Unbelievers have thought it of such consequence that the Argument of the *Divine Legation* should be discredited, that they have not scrupled to reverse all the Laws of Logic in this important service. Hence the Conclusion is turned into the premisses for the use of our *Doctors*; and the premisses, into the Conclusion for the use of our *Philosophers*.

The ingenious Frenchman's second Argument against the *Divine Legation* is in these words —

“ Either Moses was acquainted with this doctrine [a *future state*] and, in this case, he deceived the Jews in not communicating it to them; Or he was ignorant of it, and, in this case, he did not know enough for the Founder of a Good Religion.”

As to the first charge of *his deceiving the Jews*, I have answered it long ago, in my animadversions on Lord BOLINGBROKE, from whom the argument is taken.

As to the second, that *Moses's ignorance made him incapable of founding a good Religion*, — it receives all it's strength from an equivocation in the term, *good*; and a misrepresentation of the nature of the *mosaic History*.

*Good* may signify either relative or absolute; good for some, or good for all. Our Philosopher confounds these two meanings. A *good Religion* designed for all men cannot be without a future state: But a *Religion* given to a single Tribe, singularly circumstanced, may be *good*, without a future state.

Moses



Moses (says he) ignorant of a future state knew not enough to found a good Religion. Had Moses, when he said nothing of a future state, been equally silent concerning an extraordinary Providence, He might, I will confess, be concluded by our Philosopher (who supposes him a mere civil Lawgiver and uninspired) not to know enough to found a good religion: But when the Philosopher himself tells us that Moses had promised this extraordinary providence when he omitted a future state; then, even on his own Idea of the Character of Moses, he can never rationally conclude, that the Lawgiver was not knowing enough in his office, to found a good Religion, since we find that he did indeed know the use of a future state, as he provided a succedaneum for the want of it. Now, a Religion which teaches all that natural Religion teaches, viz. that God is, and that he is a rewarder of them who seek him, must needs be a good Religion; and the Founder of it a perfect Master of his business.

Let us consider what all other Lawgivers did, whom our Philosopher will allow to have known enough. They founded their Religions on this common Principle, *That God is, and that he is a Rewarder, &c.* The doctrine of a future state was no more than a security for this Foundation, by a proper sanction, under an unequal Providence. Moses, under an equal dispensation of things, wanted not this sanction for the security of his Foundation, and therefore did not employ it.

But then (adds the Philosopher) if the Mosaic Religion was a good Religion, Why was it abolished? His equivocation in the use of the word good, which may signify either relative or absolute good, hath been already taken notice of. Had the Mosaic Religion been absolutely good, that is, good for all men as well as for the Jews, it had certainly never been

been *abolished*. But *good*, in this sense, he well knows, the Religion of Moses was never said to be, by the Author of the Divine Legation, or any other Believer. They only contend for it's *relative goodness*. It was *relatively good*, they say, as it fully answered the design of God who gave it; which was, to preserve a chosen People, separate from the rest of mankind, to be a repository for the doctrine of the UNITY; and to prepare the way for the further Revelation of a Religion *absolutely good*, or a Religion for the use of all Mankind. Now, to ask, Why a Religion only *relatively good* was abolished, to make way for another *absolutely good*, for the sake of which, the first was given in the *interim*, is a question that could be kept in countenance by nothing but the impertinence of a formal answer.

But, as our Philosopher, by his question, "If the Mosaic Religion was a *good* religion, Why was it abolished?" seems to deny the justice and reasonableness of such a conduct in the Deity, I shall attempt, a little more fully,

*to justify the ways of God to man.*

—— "TRUE Religion, (says he) should be "for all times and all places."—— I have rarely found any other labour in solving an objection to Revelation, than in detecting and exposing the ambiguity and equivocation of the terms, in which such are almost always delivered. It is the case here. *True Religion*, (as we before observed of *good*) may either signify a *perfect Religion*, or a *Religion truly coming from God*. *True Religion*, in the sense of a *perfect Religion*, hath certainly the attributes here assigned to it, of *being for all times and places*; and this, we say, is amongst the attributes of the CHRISTIAN. But *true Religion* in the sense only of a *Religion truly coming from God*, like the MOSAIC,



MOsaic, doth imply no such *universality*; as shall be now shewn.

The assertion stands on this Principle, "That it is not agreeable to what the best Philosophy teacheth concerning the Nature and Attributes of the Deity, to give a rule of life to one particular people, exclusive of the rest of Mankind:" because such a dispensation would imply partiality and an impotent fondness for one above the rest. Now if God's revealing himself to one Race or Family doth imply *in the act itself* such a partiality, the Principle is well founded. But, it is apparent to common sense, that it doth not imply it; since various other reasons, besides *partial fondness*, may be assigned for the act. To know whether a *partial fondness* be the motive, we must attend to the reasons which the Divine Author hath given for the Dispensation; either explicitly by words in the declarations of his Messengers, or implicitly by circumstances attending the Gift.

Now, we say, that the Jewish Religion (the Dispensation in question) contains all these proofs, both express and implied, of it's not being given out of *fondness* for the Jews, or under a *neglect* of the Gentiles; but, on the contrary, for the sake of Mankind in general.

It is notorious to all acquainted with ancient History, that, at the time Moses revealed the *Law of God* to the Jews, the whole Posterity of Adam, by some disaster or other, had forgot the Lord their Creator, and were sunk into the grossest Idolatries. It is agreeable to all the ideas we have of God's *goodness*, that he should rescue the human Race from the miserable condition into which they had fallen, through the abuse of their free-will; and out of which, by their own strength, they were unable to extricate themselves.



The only remaining question, then, will be, Whether, in this charitable work, God should seek the way of performing it, in our ideas, or in his own? The Philosopher says, without all doubt *in ours*: God should have relieved his labouring Creatures all at once, and have proceeded directly to the *END*, an universal Religion like the Christian; instead of stopping so long at the *MEANS*, a partial Religion like the Jewish. If God had any thing to do in the matter, we may be assured, the *universal Religion* would be delayed no longer than to the time in which he foresaw, that the giving of it would produce the best effects. And as Ages and Seasons are in the hand of God, He only knows the proper time for the accomplishment of his *end*. Indeed, were *Man a machine*, and to be governed only by the Laws of matter and motion, we can conceive no reason why infinite Wisdom did not pursue that direct course which led immediately to the *END*, instead of exercising it's Providence so long in the support and continuance of the *MEANS*. But as, in the opinion of Religionists of all kinds, *man is not a machine*, but was created an accountable Creature; and as none can be accountable without the power and use of *FREE-WILL*, this Creature was to be *drawn*, (according to God's own expression) *with the cords of a man*. But He only, who formed the human heart, and *knows what is in man*, can tell when these cords are to be relaxed, and when drawn strait. In other words, the best means or method of bringing all mankind to God's truth cannot possibly be known by any but Himself. When we have seen the method employed, and the effects it hath produced, we have a sure way of knowing that it was the *best*; because it was employed by an all-wise Conductor.

Now the *Jewish Religion* was the great *MEAN*, employed by Providence, of bringing *all Men to*  
CHRIST:

CHRIST. If this can be proved, and that the Mosaic Law was not given to the Jews out of any partial fondness for them, it will appear, that a Religion may be *true*, though it were not designed for *all times and places*.

ABRAHAM (as appears by the history of his Race) was called by God out of an *idolatrous City*, to be the Father and founder of a People, which, sequestered from all other, was to preserve amongst them, as in a sure Repository, the name and memory of the Creator; at this point of time, in imminent danger of being obliterated and lost; to preserve it, I say, till *the fullness of time should come*; that is, till, an *Universal Religion*, founded in the mystery of Redemption, should be revealed. In the very entrance on this MEANS, the END was imparted to *the Father of the Faithful*, viz. that IN HIS NAME ALL THE FAMILIES UPON EARTH SHOULD BE BLESSED.

When the race of Abraham were now become numerous enough to support themselves in a National sequestration, God informs them, by the ministry of Moses, that the *immediate blessings* attending this sequestration, were bestowed upon them for the sake of their Father, Abraham; as the *sequestration itself* was ordained for the sake of all Mankind, intimated in the promise, that *in his name all the Families upon earth should be blessed*. By the ministry of his Prophets He repeats the same Lesson to them, viz. that this distinction was *not for their sakes, but for his holy name's sake*; that is, for the better manifestation of his gracious Dispensation to all mankind. And, without question, the exceeding perversity and unworthiness of this People was recorded in sacred story, as for other uses to us unknown, so for this, to obviate that egregious folly both of Jews and Gentiles, in supposing that the Israelites were thus



distinguished, or represented to be thus distinguished, as the peculiar *Favourites of Heaven*. An absurdity which all who attended to the nature of the God of Israel could confute; and which the Jewish History amply exposes.

But if their HISTORY informs us *for what they were not selected*, their LAW and their PROPHETS inform us, *for what they were*. These declare, in their different modes of information, that this Religion was given, to prepare men for, and to facilitate the reception of, one UNIVERSAL.

In the first place, Let us consider the RITUAL or CEREMONIAL Law. If what I have here assigned to be, was, in truth, the *end* of the Jewish Dispensation, we may expect to find this Ritual *declarative* of such a purpose. And on examination it will be found to be so. The whole body of the *ritual Law* being framed, in part, to oppose to the prevailing superstition of the Age in which it was given; and, in part, to prefigure that future Dispensation, which was to take it away. By Virtue of the *first part* of it's nature, the Jews were kept separate: and by virtue of the *second*, they were prepared to receive, and enabled to understand, the Religion of their promised Messiah. This, for the sake of mankind in general, was a necessary provision, since the first Preachers of the Gospel were preordained to be taken from amongst the Jewish People.

As to the PROPHETS, which from time to time were sent amongst them for the support of the LAW. These (as appears by their predictions) had it principally in their Commission to acquaint their Countrymen occasionally, and by slow degrees, with the approaching CHANGE of their Oeconomy, and with the different NATURE of the new Dispensation.

Amongst the several intimations given them of the *change*, I shall select only two of the most capital;



tal; the one is concerning *the punishment of Children for the crimes of their Fathers*; the other, of *the abolition of the Temple-Worship*.

I have shewn that the first was promulged in aid of the sanction of the Jewish Law, in the absence of a *future state*: but of no further use after the revelation of *Life and immortality*. So that Jeremiah, prophesying of this future Dispensation, says—*In those days, they shall say no more, The Fathers have eaten a sowre grape, and the Children's teeth are set on edge. But every one shall die for his own iniquity; every man that eateth the-sowre grape his teeth shall be set on edge*°. Yet such hath been the fortune of this illustrious evidence of the *connexion* between the old and new Law, that it has been represented as a *contradiction* between the Law and the Prophets°. Although Jeremiah, as if on set purpose to obviate so foolish a calumny, immediately adds—*Behold the days come, saith the Lord, that I will make a NEW COVENANT with the house of Israel and Judah*°. i. e. “The Reason why I take away this support of the sanction is, because the sanction itself will be abolished.”

Another intimation of the *change* of the Dispensation is the Prophecy concerning the abolition of the *Temple Worship*. From the account given of the nature of the Jewish Law it appears, that the principal Rites of their Religious Worship were to be performed and celebrated in some appropriated and determined Place. This, the *object* and *subject* of their CEREMONIAL seemed equally to require: For the ideas of a *tutelary God and King* implied a *LOCAL RESIDENCE*: and a *national Act*, created and arising from these relations, required a *fixed and certain place* for it's celebrations. This, which the nature and rea-

° Jer. c. xxxi. v. 29, 30.

° See B. V. Sect. 5. of this Work.

° Jer. v. 31—2—3.

son of things so evidently point out, the institutes of the Law expressly order and enjoin. During the early and unsettled times of the Republic, the sacrifices prescribed by the Mosaic Ritual were directed to be offered up before the door of an ambulatory Tabernacle: But when they had gained the establishment decreed for them, and a magnificent Temple was now erected for the God of Israel, from henceforth all Sacrifices were to be offered at Jerusalem only. Now sacrifices constituting the very essence of their national Worship, their Religion could no longer subsist than while that celebration continued. Yet the Prophets foretold, that a time would come when there should be no longer any TEMPLE-WORSHIP; which, in other words, was to foretell a *change* in the Dispensation. Zephaniah says, *The Lord shall be terrible—Men shall worship him every one FROM HIS PLACE, even all the Isles of the GENTILES*—every one from his place; that is, “they were not to go up to JERUSALEM to worship.” This he expresses more precisely in another place—*In that day, there shall be an ALTAR to the Lord in the midst of the Land of EGYPT*. i. e. “the Temple-service shall be abolished.” Which Malachi thus confirms, in a diversified expression—*And IN EVERY PLACE incense shall be offered unto thy name, and a PURE OFFERING*. i. e. “it shall not be the less acceptable for not being offered up at the Temple of Jerusalem.”

But the Prophets not only give information of the CHANGE of the *old*, but explain the NATURE of the new Dispensation. Isaiah speaking of this *change* intimates its nature in these words—*As the Heavens are higher than the Earth, so are my ways higher than your ways, and my thoughts than your thoughts*. And ex-

<sup>†</sup> Chap. ii. v. 11.

<sup>‡</sup> Chap. xix. v. 19.

<sup>§</sup> Chap. i. v. 11.

<sup>¶</sup> Chap. lv. v. 9.



plains it more clearly by the following figure. — *Instead of the thorn shall come up the fir-tree, and instead of the brier shall come up the myrtle-tree*<sup>2</sup>. i. e. “the new Religion shall as far excel the old as the fir-tree does the thorn; or, the myrtle, the brier.” — *Behold* (says the same Prophet speaking in the name of God) *I create NEW HEAVENS and a NEW EARTH; and the former shall not be remembered or come in mind*<sup>1</sup>. — *Behold the days come, saith the Lord, (by the Prophet Jeremiah) that I will make a NEW COVENANT with the house of Israel — not according to the covenant that I made with their Fathers — But this shall be the covenant — I will put my Law into their INWARD PARTS, and write it in their HEARTS*<sup>3</sup>. What Isaiah figuratively names, a new Heaven and a new Earth, Jeremiah, more simply and literally, calls a new Covenant. And what kind of Covenant? — *I will put my Law into their inward parts, &c.* i. e. “this Law shall be *spiritual*, as the other given to their Fathers was *carnal*.” But, concerning the nature of this prophetic phraseology, and the reasons of it's use, the Reader may see it explained at large in the second part of this Work<sup>4</sup>.

From all this it appears (if we may credit the clearest conclusions of human reason) that a Religion may be true though it be not fitted for all times and places. A proposition which (although our Philosopher takes for granted) carries its absurdity in the very face of it.

But, says this ingenious Writer — *True Religion should be like the splendour of the Sun, which extends its beams to all People and to all Generations.* — When the controversy runs from reasoning to simile, it begins to smell of the Poet rather than the Philosopher. What relation, what connexion is there between the Sun and Religion more than in

<sup>1</sup> c. lv. v. 13.<sup>2</sup> c. lxxv. v. 17.<sup>3</sup> c. xxxii. v. 31.<sup>4</sup> Book VI. Sect. 6.



a fanciful analogy? *Light* is a physical emanation operating on this material Globe: *Revelation*, a voluntary gift bestowed upon the rational Inhabitants of it. All they hold in common is, that they are both  *blessings*, but of very different kinds.—— Or was it the *Poet's* intention, in this simile, to insinuate the *Philosopher's* system of NATURALISM?

## II.

So much for the strait-laced *Divine* and the loose-bodied *Philosopher*; but to the SOBER RELIGIONIST, of whatever denomination, I have something more to say; and I hope so much to his satisfaction that this objection to the Mosaic Law, from the omission of a future state, shall never hereafter be considered in the learned world, as any other than an ignorant prejudice.

Now to understand how *Revelation* in general is affected by the representation which I have given of the Jewish, it will be necessary to consider, What the light of Nature teacheth us concerning RELIGIOUS SANCTIONS.

The true idea of *natural Religion* (defining and including the essence wherein it consists) is no where so concisely, so fully, and so elegantly delivered as by St. PAUL in these words,——*He who cometh to God must believe that he is; and that he is a Rewarder of them who diligently seek him*: In other words, the sum of *natural Religion* (he tells us) is this, “Belief in God, and that he rewards his Faithful Worshipers; which implies his punishing the unfaithful.”—While this is steadfastly believed, *natural Religion* stands on a solid Basis. If any thing be seen in God's dispensing Providence here, which shews that God is not always a *Rewarder*, &c. the Belief is shaken, and Religion is in danger. The unequal distribution of things here below endangers it; and it becomes re-established by the intervention of the Doctrine of a FUTURE STATE. Thus,

we

we see, the belief of a *future state* is not of the *Essence* of NATURAL RELIGION, but one of the *accidents* of it only; for were the distribution equal, as from the Being and Attributes of the Deity (abstractedly considered) one might be led to expect, a *future state* had never come into the definition of *natural Religion*.

The *Mosaic Religion* was a REPUBLICATION of *natural Religion* to the Jews. And all it taught, concerning it's sanction, was, *that God is, and that he is a Rewarder*, &c. The reason why a *future state* was omitted is apparent: Moses assured them they were under the dispensation of an *equal providence here*. And now let me ask, How it comes to pass that the self same system of Religion, which, one way (*by the light of reason*) revealed to man, does honour to God, if we believe St. Paul; yet, another way, revealed (*by Moses*) does dishonour him, if we give credit to our modern Divines?

When God separated a chosen People, he gave them, for their Belief, the principles of NATURAL RELIGION (*republished* by the Ministry of Moses) in its ORIGINAL and most perfect Form, under an *equal Providence*. And yet this circumstance, which sets it far above it's *publication* amongst the Gentiles by natural light, is esteemed a disgrace to it; and men rather chuse to piece-out God's Dispensation from what they can find in the lumber and rubbish of Paganism, than receive it in it's native simplicity and genuine grandeur: And, because *natural Religion*, disturbed and corrupted amongst the Gentiles, was forced to lean on the Crutch of a *future state*, they will needs find the same prop for the pure and perfect, as REPUBLISHED by Moses, though it stands upright, under an *extraordinary Providence*.

The truth is, this false idea arises from an inveterate error (to be exposed at large in the last volume

lume of this Work) that *natural Religion* not only teaches a *future state*, (which it does indeed, though by accident only) but that it teaches *this state* to be ENDLESS, which it neither does, nor can do. All it teaches is, that *God is, and that he is a Rewarder*; whether here or hereafter is to be collected from the mode of God's dispensing Providence *here*.

This error, which confounds all our reasoning on God's moral Government, arose, in part, from a later Revelation, the *Christian*, ill understood; (of which, more hereafter) and, in part, from a false and visionary Metaphysics.

1. But say they, "Admitting, that *natural Religion* taught no more than St. Paul learned of it, yet surely a *Revelation*, such as the *Mosaic*, must contain more, or why was it given?"—I will answer these men in their own way.—It was given as a *republication of the Religion of Nature*: For though they were egregiously mistaken in receiving the *Christian Religion* for no more; yet it is very certain, the *Mosaic*, with regard to *Doctrine*, was, indeed, just such a *Republication*, and no other. Nor, does human conception discover any thing incongruous in the moral conduct of the Deity, when he RENEWS those Laws, first revealed in an *ordinary* way, and by the folly of men become almost erased; to *renew* them, I say, in an *extraordinary*. For we do not oppose the talk of Christianity's being only such a *republication* on account of any incongruity in the thing itself; but because, that, when applied to the *Christian Religion*, this definition of it is both false and imperfect, and averse to the whole genius and nature of the Dispensation.

2. But, secondly, it may be said, That "the *Doctrine of future rewards* is of force to purify and spiritualize the mind; which that of *temporal rewards*

is



is not." To this, I reply, That the *known* rewards here, or the *unknown* hereafter, leave the mind just in that state in which Religion itself, or Piety towards God, hath put it. It is the FREE OBEDIENCE to his commands, not the sense of the necessary consequence of that obedience, which rectifies the Will and purifies the Affections.

But the mistake, here confuted, arises from men's having confounded a *future state*, as discoverable by natural light, with the *future state* as announced in the Gospel. Now, Natural light discovers to us nothing of the *Nature* of that State; and therefore leaves the mind in that situation in which an indefinite Reward puts it. The Gospel, indeed, defines a future state so fully, as to enable the doctrine to purify and spiritualize the Mind, above all other modes of Religion.

But what does this concession infer? That the Mosaic Religion, which taught an *equal Providence*, but omitted to teach a *future state*, was unworthy of God? Surely not. For then it would follow, that natural Religion, that other revelation of God's will, which taught no future state, till Providence here was found to be unequal, was likewise unworthy of Him. What then, does it infer? This, and this only, That the *Mosaic Religion* wants much of that perfection which the *Christian* hath. Now, this truth is not only acknowledged, but contended for.

The Question then may return, Could God, according to the idea we have of his attributes, give a *less perfect* Religion, in order to facilitate the reception of one *more perfect*? The question may return, I say, but in order to be sent back for its confutation, to the answer already bestowed upon it, in the examination of Mr. Voltaire's Objections.



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I N D E X  
TO THIS  
NEW EDITION  
OF THE  
FIRST AND SECOND VOLUMES.

N. B. *It is proper to advertise the Reader, that the several Alterations and Additions made in this new Impression of the First and Second Volumes, having rendered the General Index useless, so far as relates to them; a new Index is here supplied, adapted to them, and including all the additional Matter.*

\* \* *The Roman Numerals refer to the particular Volumes, and the Figures to the Pages.*

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